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PHILOSOPHY PATHWAYS electronic journal

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P H I L O S O P H Y   P A T H W A Y S                   ISSN 2043-0728
http://www.philosophypathways.com/newsletter/

Issue number 53
9th March 2003

CONTENTS

I. 'Four Forms of Redistribution' by Jonathan Wolff

II. 'A Comment on Professor Wolff's "Four Forms of
    Redistribution"' by Tony Flood

III. 'Philosophy in Georgia' by Magda Kobakhidze

-=-

I. 'FOUR FORMS OF REDISTRIBUTION' BY JONATHAN WOLFF

    http://www.catalystforum.org.uk/pubs/article6.html

There are signs that redistribution may be moving back up the agenda of public
policy debate. But redistribution is never simple. It can take different forms,
and carry different meanings. A common tendency, found in both political
discussions and those of academic philosophers, to treat policies of
redistribution as a matter of compensation, "making up for" unfair
disadvantage. But this is very limiting.

Think of a child who, despite her keen interest and undoubted academic
potential, has little chance of finding her way to university because she is
being brought up in state care (at present, fewer than one in a hundred
children in care go on to higher education). If I were to propose that, as a
solution, we offer her a cash lump sum to an amount such that she no longer
minds missing out on a university career, you would think this a woefully
inadequate response. Most of us would think it far preferable to get her to
university if we could find a way of doing so, through positive discrimination
or some kind of mentoring scheme.

In fact, as this example illustrates, even once we are agreed that a
disadvantage is unfair and calls for public action to rectify it, there will be
more than one way of approaching the problem. We can approach this by dividing
the factors which determine anyone's opportunities in life into three broad
categories: "external" resources (such as money or possessions); "internal"
resources (such as talent or knowledge); and the social structures and
frameworks within which they live.

Consider an individual who has very low skills, and thus can obtain only low
paid employment, which, in turn, can fund only a poor standard of living, and
so, we feel, this person has fewer opportunities for a good life than is right.
What should we do?

As before, we could just offer the individual extra cash through some form of
income support, to "make up for" the loss of opportunities that he suffers.
This would be to conceive redistribution as simple compensation. Or, we could
adopt a strategy of "targeted resource enhancement", providing the goods and
services in kind that we feel the individual is missing and most in need of,
such as housing or healthcare. Alternatively, we might try to act upon his
"internal resources", by retraining him to improve his employment prospects.
This would be redistribution through "personal enhancement".

Finally, we might seek to enhance his status by refashioning the economy to cut
the link between low skill and low pay. It is hard to imagine how we might
achieve the comprehensive re-ordering of pay scales that this would require,
but minimum wage legislation might be seen as at least making a mitigating move
in this direction. But there are other cases where this kind of "status
enhancement" seems a more likely option. Consider another example: someone who
suffers from the sort of disability that makes mobility difficult. What should
we do here?

Again, we could aim to offer the person a sufficient amount of money so that
she no longer minds immobility. Or we could provide external resources not as
general compensation, but for the specific purpose of improving mobility -
special equipment, or money with strings attached about how it is spent.
Thirdly, we could offer some form of medical or surgical treatment to attempt
to enhance the person's mobility. This would be to treat disability as akin to
an illness, to be treated by the medical profession, and thus this invokes what
has been termed the "medical" model of disability.

Finally we could claim that the disadvantage of disability is largely a
consequence of how the physical world has been structured, and how attitudes to
disability have developed. We could attempt to remove this disadvantage by
reconfiguring the material environment and re-educating ourselves. This is the
insight of the "social" model of disability, and suggests that the route to
addressing the problem of disability includes introducing buildings with ramps
and stairlifts, to encourage technical innovation to reduce the obstacles
currently faced by those with mobility problems, and to challenge public
perceptions.

Interestingly, among those active in the disability movement, this kind of
status enhancement is the generally favoured approach, and the project of the
disability movement has largely been to shift perceptions of disability from
the medical to the social model. Medicalisation seems to express a humiliating
attitude of pity on the part of society to its supposed beneficiaries, whereas
status enhancement sends a different message, one of inclusion and tolerance,
even appreciation, of diversity.

What is at stake in such debates? I want to suggest that each form of
redistribution typically brings with it certain presuppositions about the
nature of "the human good". Bringing out these pre-suppositions may help us
gain clarity about our reasons for preferring one approach to another.

To begin with simple compensation - this, if proposed as a general remedy,
seems to pre-suppose that the only good for human beings is
preference-satisfaction, and that all such satisfactions can be placed on a
single scale (in the form of a welfare economist's utility function). The
problem with this is not so much that compensation is never appropriate, but
that we seem to have strong inclinations that sometimes at least it is not, as
in the example of the child missing out on university education. Note the
rhetoric in which people sometimes reject offers of financial compensation:
that they refuse to be "bought off", for it is cheapening or degrading. There
seems a type of disrespect involved that cannot easily be reduced to levels of
preference satisfaction.

On the other hand, what I have called "targeted resource enhancement" may
sometimes be charged with carrying paternalistic overtones. If we are providing
people with resources worth a certain value, why not just give people that value
in monetary terms and then let them decide what to do with it? If there is
something else they would prefer to do with the money on offer, why not let
them? This would both respect their autonomy and make them better off. This
charge has been levelled at the policy of granting free television licenses to
pensioners aged over-75. The government justified this as "helping older
pensioners stay in touch and keep informed" , but the Opposition pledged to
offer the option of an equivalent increase in their state pension instead. The
reply to such objections can only be that the point of redistribution here is
to correct a particular wrong, not to create a flexible benefit. Autonomy,
identified here with short-term pursuit of preference satisfaction, is not
uncontroversially the highest good.

However, the argument for targeted resource enhancement always needs to be
balanced against the possible stigmatising effects that such treatment may
have. Food vouchers, notoriously, are deeply stigmatising. This could tip the
balance to cash aid if no high quality in-kind mechanism of delivery can be
found. Routine humiliation is far too high a price to pay. But note that if we
do provide cash for food, and it is used for other purposes, we may feel
resentful, maybe even exploited, even if we may also feel that, all things
considered, there is nothing we should do about it.

Where we propose personal enhancement, we may send the message that people are
in some sense lacking or falling short, that they suffer from a defect that
needs to be overcome. Here, the pre-supposition is "essentialist" or
"perfectionist" - that there is a right way for human beings to be. This, it
seems, shows where simple compensation goes wrong: goods may not be
substitutable, in that it is simply not true that enough of one can make up for
any lack of another, because failing to be as one should in one respect cannot
be repaired by being given more of something else. Money is no compensation for
lack of education or lack of mobility; redistribution has to be made in the
specific dimension which is lacking.

Although this appears to explain why compensation fails in some cases, the idea
of personal enhancement has its own difficulties. For the presupposition that
someone is in some sense defective and in need of enhancement is a very
personal judgment, which may be deeply insulting. This is one reason why those
in the social disability movement argue against the "medical" model of
disability, and refuse the language of "handicap" and "impairment". We must
distinguish, it is argued, the idea of defectiveness from the idea of
difference.

The relationship between personal enhancement and essentialist or perfectionist
ideas of the human good also helps us to clarify why this form of redistribution
can be politically controversial, because it may imply a conception of human
nature or the good life for human beings that is itself contested. Consider
slogans such as "a hand-up not a hand-out" or "work is the best route out of
poverty". It is clear that part (if not all) of the appeal here is to a notion
what a good life for human beings is, based on values of self-reliance and the
"work ethic". And this is why some people feel discomfort with the moralising
tone of some of this language, because this particular ideal may be a
contestable one, especially if you take into account the kind of "work" that
people on the edge of poverty are likely to be offered.

Status enhancement, on the other hand, seems to convey a message of difference
rather than deficiency. When we try to alter social or material structures we
are accepting that our practices, whether designed to or not, can "pick on"
certain groups of people for no good reason, and that we are committed to
undoing this. This seems radically pluralist, or anti-perfectionist. It seems
to appeal to a notion of individual sovereignty in which people are valued
precisely for the qualities and ambitions they have - conventional or
unconventional - and assumes that the world should be adjusted in order to
accommodate each person. But where it differs from the preference satisfaction
theory is the notion that goods should not, in general, be allowed to
substitute for each other. The underlying assumption might then be
characterised as one of "individual essentialism": each person has their unique
set of essential qualities, goals and potentialities, and these should be
neither changed nor exchanged.

This seems very attractive, but can status enhancement ever be the wrong
approach? Yes, if certain features "really are" deficiencies that ought to be
overcome. One obvious example may be illiteracy. Rather than adjusting the
world so that illiteracy isn't a disadvantage, presumably we should help people
overcome it. In the world as it is, it really is a defect, albeit socially
dependent, and personal enhancement seems the natural response.

But this is always going to be a sensitive matter - as illustrated when
complaints are raised about "political correctness gone mad". This would be to
treat a "real" defect as if it is a difference which requires accommodation. Of
course, often "political correctness gone mad" is no such thing, but an improved
perception of what life could be like for people who are in some ways different
from others. The example of the "deaf community" who have their own (sign)
language and imagery, and who, in some cases, argue that they would not want
their hearing restored even if it were possible, is a clear example of a group
who claim a difference where others see a deficit. But a recent example of a
controversial borderline case was seen in the rows over "ebonics" in the US
where it was proposed that schoolteachers stop treating "African American
Vernacular English" as a sloppy or incorrect approximation of "Standard
English".

Difficult questions cannot be avoided if we want to engage in redistributive
policies. If we agree that the rectification of unfair disadvantage cannot
always be reduced to mere compensation, then we are inescapably embroiled in
the task of defining what we think a flourishing human life ought to consist
in, at the same time as allowing room for individual texture and variation and
not trying to force everyone into one mould. To put things starkly, in any
given case we have to decide whether the source of disadvantage is the person
or the world. Is it a deficiency that needs to be overcome, or a difference
that should be accommodated? Even if we refuse to address this question
explicitly, our answer to it may well be revealed by the policies we adopt.

(c) Jonathan Wolff 2003

E-mail: j.wolff@ucl.ac.uk

---

 This article is based on a longer paper, "The Message of Redistribution:
Disadvantage, public policy and the human good", published by Catalyst and
available for download from http://www.catalystforum.org.uk/pubs/pub8.html

 Jonathan Wolff is Professor of Philosophy and Head of Department at
University College London. His publications include 'An Introduction to
Political Philosophy', Oxford University Press, 1996, and 'Why Read Marx
Today?', Oxford University Press, 2002. He is currently looking at the ways in
which contemporary egalitarian political philosophy can better inform public
policy decision making. He has recently begun an Arts and Humanities Research
Board funded project entitled Philosophical Foundations of Public Policy:
Rethinking Cost Benefit Analysis, and is co-ordinating an international and
interdisciplinary seminar series, entitled Priority in Practice, looking into a
number of further themes related to this project. For more information contact
j.wolff@ucl.ac.uk.

     +-------------------------------------------------+
     |  The Message of Redistribution:                 |
     |  Disadvantage, public policy and the human good |
     |  By Jonathan Wolff                              |
     |                                                 |
     |  A Catalyst Working Paper                       |
     |  Published in February 2003                     |
     |                                                 |
     |  ISBN 1 904508 03 0                             |
     |  32 pp                                          |
     |  Price £5                                       |
     +-------------------------------------------------+

The   C a t a l y s t  F o r u m
150 The Broadway
London SW19 1RX
Telephone +44 (0)20 7733 2111
e-mail: catalyst@catalystforum.org.uk
www.catalystforum.org.uk
'practical policies
for the redistribution of wealth, power and opportunity'

-=-

II. 'A COMMENT ON PROFESSOR WOLFF'S "FOUR FORMS OF
REDISTRIBUTION"' BY TONY FLOOD

I appreciate the invitation Dr. Geoffrey Klempner gave me to comment on
Professor Wolff's paper. At first I was not sure how to respond, however,
because he does not defend the propositions on which his arguments depend.
Rather, he presupposes their truth while addressing an audience who does
likewise. Whitehead's observation in 'Science and the Modern World' that
sometimes statements "appear so obvious that people do not know what they are
assuming because no other way of putting things has ever occurred to them" came
to mind.

The presumption of consensus uncharacteristic of philosophical papers permeates
this one. The pronoun "we" occurs 38 times, but never as the editorial "we."
That is, it is not an author's device for avoiding the pronoun "I". It is the
"we" that fellow-laborers in a common cause use to address each other. Since I
am not one of them, however, I felt as if I was eavesdropping.

"I" and "we" occur together tellingly for the first time in the second
paragraph: "If I were to propose that...we offer her a cash lump sum...." My
question to Professor Wolff is, "Why don't you offer her cash (or whatever)?"
Of course, he probably does not regard himself or his fellow redistributionists
as personally obligated to solve her problem any more than they are financially
able to do so.

The point of the redistributionist program as I understand it is that money or
other resources, regardless of who owns them, must be moved from around society
so that they can do more good as that program defines "good." Professor Wolff
apparently does not believe that only the owner of a resource has the moral
right to deploy it. It is an interesting question whether he holds that a
beneficiary of "redistribution" morally owns his or her benefit, such that no
one may rightfully forcibly deprive him or her of it, even forcible
expropriation made it available in the first place.

The idea of exclusive moral ownership of resources is the only idea I have with
which to counter redistributionism. Until that idea is defeated, however, the
discussion of the various "messages" that redistributionists send to "their"
beneficiaries cannot hold my interest. There is a passing reference to "public
action" that allegedly "rectifies" someone's "disadvantage" that no one
knowingly imposed. Does "public action" itself involves the imposition of
foregone opportunities on innocent parties? We are not told. Professor Wolff is
concerned only with how "we" ought to frame our offer of forcibly expropriated
resources lest we add insult to an injury we did not in any case inflict. (If
he has any interest in the insult or injury that those who are expropriated
sustain, he does not express it in this paper.)

Professor Wolff asks us to consider a very low-skilled individual who can
support only a poor standard of living, one that is "less than is right." "What
should we do?," he immediately asks. I fail to see why that is the first
question. For instance, why is that person so low-skilled? How low is "low"?
What is "poor"? Might the answers to these questions depend in part on an
understanding of historical time and place? There is no sense that this is the
case in Professor Wolff's paper. His discussion implies some notion of what is
right, for it has one of "less than is right." He does not suggest that someone
stole from this individual something that was his by right, which theft
consequently made him poor. This person may, for all that Professor Wolff has
shown to the contrary, have everything that he has is entitled to have.

Even if, after knowing more about this person, I came to agree with Professor
Wolff that he or she could do much good with more resources, I am sure that we
would still disagree over the means by which he or she may acquire them. For
while I would not force Professor Wolff to pay any costs associated with
improving that individual's lot, I am not sure he would grant me the same
freedom.

Professor Wolff seems to presuppose that, generally speaking, all persons with
needs have enforceable claims on all persons who are capable of meeting them.
That is, A's need per se is an enforceable claim on some B (or some set of
persons {B...n}). Grant that, however, and the rest is administrative detail.
The result of the consistent implementation of this precept would be to make us
all equal in poverty. For that program would slowly but surely grind to a halt
the wheels of the production of the very things that are allegedly distributed
inequitably, thereby guaranteeing that they would not be distributed at all.[1]

A word about Professor Wolff's key term. It seems to trade on the legitimacy
enjoyed by Aristotle's discussion of "distributive justice" (one form of
"particular justice," the other form being "rectificatory") in 'The Nicomachean
Ethics' (1130b-1131a). Aristotle's context is statist: distributive justice is
something the State dispenses. The State has resources that it must allocate in
the interest of the "common good." But how did the State acquire them? Did it
violate justice in doing so? After all, the State has no resources it did not
acquire by force or the threat thereof. The State is not a family whose
individuals members have voted on where to go for their summer vacation and who
now must cooperate to make the trip a success. Neither, as Joseph Schumpeter
wryly noted in 'Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy', is the State a club to
which we owe dues. I will not insult the reader by spelling out why the State
is not like a family or a club, but I wonder whether some such notion underlies
the rationale for "redistribution."

"Redistribution" is a political notion. It refers to the economic sphere where
the things to be "redistributed" are first produced, but it has no distinctly
economic meaning. After the production and the exchange of what is produced
there is no remainder. In a society of voluntary exchange, as Mises put it,
there "is no such thing as an appropriation of portions out of a stock of
ownerless goods. The products some into existence as somebody's property. If
one wants to distribute them, one must first confiscate them."[2]

Perhaps the redistributionist fear is that if the fruits of production accrue
only to producers, then the economy will be like a moving car without a driver,
always about to careen out of control. "Distribution," being mindless in the
sense of without direction, needs to be done mindfully. To avoid a crack-up the
harvest of all our labors needs to be "redistributed." But "distribution" is not
mindless. The word is a misnomer for voluntary exchange which, while not
single-minded, is not for that reason mindless. It is the coordination of many
minds, many plans of flesh-and-blood individuals who have dreams of their own.
There is, therefore, no need for a corrective scheme of "redistribution" that
can easily become a source of injustice, economic malady, and debilitating
despair.

Most of Professor Wolff's paper entertains various ways that redistributionists
might go about their business: compensation, refashioning the economy, etc. As
they all presuppose what is most in need of examination, there is little reason
for me to comment on them.

I found common ground with Professor Wolff when he mentioned that basic goods
are not substitutable for each other. Our human nature sets for each of us the
task of creating for ourselves good lives, lives characterized by the
enjoyment, and prospect of the regular or routine enjoyment, of all, or very
nearly all, of the kinds of basic intrinsic goods that a human being desires
(e.g., good health, gratifying work, love, etc). We tend not to describe a
human life as good if any basic, intrinsic good is missing. I was therefore
pleased to read that "goods may not be substitutable, in that it is simply not
true that enough of one can make up for any lack of another, because failing to
be as one should in one respect cannot be repaired by being given more of
something else. Money is no compensation for lack of education or lack of
mobility..." But then, after a semicolon, he drops the other shoe:
"...redistribution has to be made in the specific dimension which is lacking."
Non sequitur!

I do, however, agree absolutely with one sentence of Professor Wolff's:
"Difficult questions cannot be avoided if we want to engage in redistributive
policies." But they can if we don't.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Ludwig von Mises, 'Human Action' [1949], 4th ed., ed. by Bettina B.
Greaves (Irvington, NY: Foundation for Economic Education, 1996), esp. Chapter
XXXII, "Confiscation and Redistribution." The complete text of this classic in
.html or .pdf format is freely available, chapter by chapter or as a whole:
http://www.mises.org/humanaction.asp. The Mises Institute's site is an
armamentarium in the defense of sound economics against socialist and other
anti-market fallacies which, despite the empirical confirmation that Mises'
early 20th-century theoretical predictions enjoyed, die such a hard death and
assume so many forms.

2. Ibid. http://www.mises.org/humanaction/chap32sec1.asp

(c) Anthony Flood 2003

E-mail: anarchristian@juno.com

-=-

III. 'PHILOSOPHY IN GEORGIA' BY MAGDA KOBAKHIDZE

Mr Geoffrey,

I received your PATHWAYS NEWS, thank you for your attention. At the present
moment I am sending you a short summary about Philosophy in Georgia. Our new
founded Society welcomes you to cooperate with us.

Georgian Philosophical Society

Georgia is a native land of wine and grain in which the tradition of
philosophical thinking started in Antiquity. In IV century was created the
Academy of Phazis, where, according to Greek historians not only Greeks but
also native population learned philosophy. The analysis of Georgian
hagiographic literature obviously shows the clear relations between the Ancient
and Georgian thinking. (It is important that Christianity was declared as a
state religion in IV century in Georgia, and the first literatural monument
that is maintained until today belongs to V century.)

In the Middle Ages Georgian thinkers translated Neoplatonic treatises and works
by the church fathers. In Georgia at this time there were two Academies in which
interpretive activities and philosophical investigations were largely spread.
After 1453 Georgia fell in isolation but always preserved the desire to be
integrated with the western world. The restoration of this relationship began
in XXVII-XXVIII centuries, when Georgian philosophical thinking was strongly
interested in the western mind. The first Georgian University was founded in
1918, where a philosophical faculty was started up. At the same time was
founded the Philosophy Society. The development of the Georgian Philosophical
mind was interrupted by the option of Soviet Totalitarianism. Georgian
philosophers such as Shalva Nutsubidze, Kothe Bachradze, Mose Gogiberidze and
others had already received education at western universities.

Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union Georgia received the chance
to return to its natural European culture. This circumstance made us to decide
to establish our Philosophy Society. Its main purposes are as follows: to put
individuals together all over the country (including its non-controlled
regions: Abkhasia and South Osethi) who are interested in thinking and to
promote and carry out their corporate interests, to increase interpretative
activities, to involve in these scholars, students and interested persons.

The Geo-Political location of Georgia and also its cultural peculiarity provide
us with possibilities of becoming a mental bridge between Europe and Asia.
Historically our strategy was (and still is) to promote a dialogue among
different cultures. We think we may be able to contribute to this aim.

We are ready to cooperate and want to thank you beforehand.

Magda Kobakhidze
Tbilisi, Georgia
Philosophy Society

E-mail: nkobackidze@yahoo.com

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