P H I L O S O P H Y P A T H W A Y S ISSN 2043-0728
Issue number 173
27th June 2012
I. Readers' Reactions to Special Issue 172
II. 'What Is the Meaning of Life? A Sixth Argument for the Existence
of God' by Max Malikow
III. 'Frankfurt's Free Will: Moses Maimonides in Modern Thought' by
This is a transitional issue of Philosophy Pathways. A new procedure
of peer review (we prefer the term 'evaluation') is being introduced
which will I hope give rise to a steady improvement in the quality of
articles published in the e-journal. The Board of the International
Society for Philosophers will be much more fully involved in the
editorial process than hitherto. As I write, members of the Board are
evaluating the first batch of submitted articles.
The Pathways evaluation process is special -- I wouldn't go so far as
to say unique -- in that it is not 'blind'. We take into consideration
whether the author is a senior professor or undergraduate, an
academically trained philosopher or self-taught. As it states on the
journal home page, 'Providing us with these details will prejudice
your application -- but in a positive way.'
There are not many philosophical journals where an undergraduate has
the chance to publish work alongside senior academics, or where the
lack of an academic background is not necessarily a bar to
acceptance. Our interest is in quality, but there is more than one
measure of quality. We wish to evaluate the process of production and
not just the cold product in marks on a page or 1s and 0s on a
computer disk. Do bear this in mind when you submit articles for
publication in Philosophy Pathways. Tell us who you are and how you
came to write your piece.
Articles will be evaluated by members of the ISFP Board at the
Editor's discretion. Announcements, or reports of activities of local
philosophy groups, or other topical items of interest do not need to
go through this process. However, even for those articles which are
evaluated by the ISFP Board, the delay is only one month, a much
shorter turnaround than other journals are able to achieve.
Other changes are afoot. The Pathways School of Philosophy has a new
home page. We've chosen this time a much simpler design than the
previous 'compressed quadruple-decker sandwich' (as one viewer
unkindly put it). The writing is more discursive, so that the page
reads like a real page, and we've added some nice illustrations to
break up the text. If you have any thoughts or comments, please email
Exactly a year ago today, we launched a new service aimed at helping
philosophy students pair up online with other students taking the
same or similar courses: 'StudyPartners.net -- a new (old) way to
talk' (Issue 163). Last week, the service was relaunched with a new
setup. When you register, you will be asked to give the web address
of your Facebook or other social media page, such as Twitter or
LinkedIn. You don't need to give an email address, nor do you have to
request a private discussion space, although we are still more than
happy to provide this. It's an easy and safe way to find like minds,
and also to be found:
Special Issue 172 provoked a fantastic response. I was overwhelmed. I
am tempted to go back on my embargo on posting the issue on the
Philosophy Pathways web site. However, as I state in my comments
below, it would be too easy. It would also not be cool. Those who had
the chance to see the issue will know what I mean.
One very welcome email, from former Pathways student S.H., suggested
the idea of 'Pathways to Philosophy Meetups'. The idea is that if you
are a present or former Pathways student, you can start a local study
or discussion meetup group with the full backing and resources of
Pathways. Here is the new link:
As it states on the page, 'There are no restrictions on philosophical
topics or subject matter. The possibilities are endless. You are there
as convenor, rather than as a teacher or presenter. From our
experience, if you want the group to be a success then everyone
should be encouraged to contribute ideas and help make your meetings
enjoyable and rewarding for all.'
So to the present issue.
The first piece in Issue 173 is a compendium of responses to Special
Issue 172. I have given initials, rather than the names of
individuals concerned, even though I'm sure some would be happy for
their names to appear. However, I can state that the last item, a
poem, is by John Pullin, who has previously written a couple of
articles for our sister publication, 'Philosophy for Business'. I
didn't know you were a poet, John!
We also have two articles. The first article, which is also the first
to pass the new Pathways evaluation process, is by Max Malikow,
Professor at Syracuse University. Dr Malikow considers the weighty
question of the meaning of life as a possible source of a 'sixth
argument' for God's existence. As one ISFP Board member succinctly
put it, 'Well written, logical, and crystal clear.' My own view is
that Dr Malikow's case remains 'ad hominem', because it is aimed
specifically at someone who feels dissatisfied with what he terms the
secular/ existentialist view of the meaning of life. Let us know what
The second article is by Mark Goldfeder, a postgraduate student
currently doing his doctorate in Law and Religion at Emory
University, which draws fascinating parallels between the views of
Harry Frankfurt and the medieval philosopher Maimonides on the
question of freedom of the will. On Goldfeder's reading, Maimonides
shows himself to be far ahead of his time in anticipating modern
sophisticated compatibilist views on the question of freedom and
determinism, although the exact degree of correspondence is difficult
to discern. I had accepted this paper -- Goldfeder's second article
for Philosophy Pathways -- long before the evaluation process was set
up, so the double jeopardy rule applies.
I. READERS' REACTIONS TO SPECIAL ISSUE 172
Just to get into the swing of things, here's a thoughtful piece by
T.A. with which I heartily concur:
As I was reading about these male critics of yours, I was
reminded of a Clint Eastwood performance in one of his own
movies (of which I've forgotten the title).
Another rather intelligent viewer remarked that in the
movie Clint seemed to be in a rather pinched and diminished
state. Veins bulged on his forehead. The reviewer concluded,
correctly in my estimation, that Eastwood must have had a
tourniquet around his t*sticles during the shooting of the
It is my best guesstimate that these certain male critics
of yours must be suffering from the same condition.
It is furthermore my suggestion that a kind soul should
step forward and relieve these gentlemen of their pinched
After that, would the same kind soul be so kind as to
escort these gents to their local and help them down a few
That should loosen up their spirits and allow them to once
again get some more blood flowing into their philosophical
If, on the other hand, thus relieved and replenished, the
gentlemen in question still find themselves unable to get
their philosophical pen up, well, then my final suggestion
would be to enroll them in a basic rock 'n' roll class.
(Why? For the simple reason that you cannot dance rock,
have a tourniquet around one's t*sticles, and smile at the
same time at one's cute partner -- as one is required to do
I believe my that my comments and suggestions are not
naive, but in fact are quite mature, ethical and kind.
I therefore trust that my input has been helpful.
The concept of the 'male critic' is worthy of further investigation.
In these postmodern times, it is impossible to deny or overlook the
role of sexuality in relation to academic infighting, and attacks on
(mostly male) philosophers by other (mostly male) philosophers.
There's altogether too much testosterone flowing about in the
Now that we've suitably loosened up, here are some more comments.
This more serious response, is from M.D:
I thoroughly endorse Issue 172. It is good that you can
write in the first person singular as a philosopher and
write about damage. Damage causes damage and it piles up
over time, personally, socially, historically -- this was
Walter Benjamin and Adorno's view and is mine too. Part of
the sense of mission (which is in Marxism too, hence
perhaps your attraction to it -- who was it called Marxism a
secularised version of Judaism?) of having a task to perform
in this world is to rectify the damage. This is a core
doctrine of Kabbalah too, the rectification of the broken
I like the words of the reviewer of Naive Metaphysics, 'the
opacity and interminability of his text subvert the effort
required to make even minimal sense of it.' He meant it
negatively, but this could be said of Hegel's
phenomenology, as of Adorno's brilliant aphoristic Minima
Moralia, or anything at all by Derrida and so on. It is
what fools say of philosophers in short.
I have always privately recognised you as a philosopher of
historic worth by which I mean when they look back at
philosophy in England from the world to come they will see
you, not B. It is why you are on your own and he has the
plush jobs and influence. You are Spinoza to whoever were
the (now forgotten) Bs of Spinoza's day. You must trust in
this, which is perhaps a theological trust.
Why I like that quote about Naive Metaphysics is that
although you have grown up with analytic philosophy and
profess to dislike 'continental philosophy' -- the fact is
that against yourself you are too 'continental' and that is
what they are picking up on. Not just any-old continental,
but what that reviewer said of you that I quoted is like
what the goyim said of the Talmudists. You have some of
this Talmudic tendency -- the interminability of commentary,
the opacity of the logic, which is not Greek or Latin, that
I do not think you are as fully conscious of as you could
be. To be more fully conscious of it is to come into your
own and own it. In other words you are more of a
'continental' thinker than you think, but continental
philosophy is more open to history and the world, it isn't
just a 'discipline'.
Back in the 90s when I first read Naive Metaphysics, which
was too analytical for me, I could see in and around the
analytical mode, an independence of spirit that I see in
Hume (hence his connecting with Rousseau), Locke (deeply
resonant with Spinoza) and the best of British philosophy.
I think you might think about making Issue 172 available on
the website if you remove the paragraph about the Bs at
breakfast. And just run a search on B to make sure there is
nothing else too hypothetical. But the sense of injury at
his hands, his misuse of power, the academic inbreeding
which is a big problem and spells the death of good
philosophy and does indeed attach to names e.g. B, and
others -- his work buddies, working together, called insider
trading in business -- this should be known and exposed and
no-one is saying it loud; if you are wrong, let B say so,
you are not scared to retract if you are totally wrong and
he can convince you otherwise.
I'm blushing now. I'm not putting Issue 172 on the web. Not because
I'm afraid of lawsuits, nor because I'm shy about baring my soul and
letting it all hang out for every casual surfer to see. The Glass
House notebooks give the lie to that conceit. No, it's simply because
it's too damned easy to publish on the web. I'm not taking the easy
route this time.
Let's press on. I like this, from my current student M.S. which
captures his sense of what it means to be 'enlightened' with a
The honesty in the entire article is of great value to me
personally. So often, I have read about philosophers
without obtaining any relevant details about their
relationship with to their own work that does not feel like
an outright embellishment. I suppose it is very easy when
writing about a philosopher to mythologize about their
struggle coupled with their genius. That being said, most
of what I've read (which by all means does not imply that
that's all there is) is speculatively written from a third
person point of view. In this interview however you speak
about your work and N.M. in a way which can for me be
compared to turning a light on in a dark room. There is no
mediate levels of light; it goes from complete darkness 0
to 100 -- metaphors don't have to be logically possible ;)
There is no mood lighting and it is just about philosophy
in content and in an action explicated in language.
Especially warming were the messages I received from subscribers to
the e-journal who were former Pathways students, who hadn't
contacted me in years. Here is an example, from M.Y:
You probably don't remember me amongst the other students.
I took an online class with you four years ago. The class was
most stimulating: while I didn't agree with many things --
which was expected, I guess -- it opened my eyes to a whole
host of metaphysical issues, made me read quite a few books
and articles; in fact, I remember the issues we discussed
more vividly than some of my academic courses.
Since then I have been studying for my PhD -- and the
writing sample I used to get accepted was the one produced
for your class. Moreover: I seems that people in the
academic community here in the USA know and appreciate your
The experience with academic philosophy helped me put
things in perspective. And here is what I can say now: what
you are doing is a great thing. The web is the medium for
philosophy: the pure contact between minds it allows while
keeping spatial considerations in their deserved humble
place seems precious. Moreover: I think that the emphasis
on the issues that you keep, as opposed to textual
commentary on the sources, provides a nice counterweight to
some of the academic philosophy today.
Pathways contributor P.B. develops the theme of 'institutionalized
This is a great idea for a supplementary issue. It gave me
some hours of reflection on the meta-topic of
institutionalized philosophy and teaching. What brought
this to the front was the comment from one of your
reviewers that a textbook could be 'too idiosyncratic.'
Shouldn't they be so? By what standard does/ could one
write a textbook that can suit all learners, all learning
styles, and all cultural vantage points? To do so would
make too many assumptions about the very nature of
This must be new in the history of ideas. People in the
past studied under teachers, not schools. Aristotle 'was a
student of' Plato. John of Damascus 'studied under' Kosmas
the Sicilian. Saint Thomas Aquinas 'studied with' John of
Saint Julian. Even of recent philosophers we read that they
studied under someone. Immanuel Kant 'was taught by' Martin
Knutzen. We do not say of Husserl that he studied at
Humboldt University but that he was a student of Brentano.
Sometimes we identify the teacher with a group: we do not
typically say which University Wittgenstein graduated from,
but that he was involved with the Vienna Circle, and so on.
This is what makes it all the more imperative for
philosophers today not to hide behind the name of some
'accredited institution' (emphasis on institution,
suspicion on accredited) but to take on responsibility for
their product. I'm glad that you are one of these.
Now for some shorter comments, relating in different ways to the
theme of what it is to 'be a philosopher'. This, from R.S, an
independent philosopher and author for whom I have great respect:
You are at heart an existential philosopher, the highest of
all callings. Regarding academic criticism, your poem
Gulliver says it all. To put it more directly, when
academic monkeys are confronted with contemporary
existential philosophy, all they are able to hear is monkey
And this, from D.K, like R.S. a valued Pathways contributor and
author of several excellent and original books on philosophy:
Recently, I confess, I have been reading the Philosophy
Pathways issues only selectively. Not so this present
issue. I have read every word from 'Contents' to 'All the
best' and as I read, through the bitterness and the anger,
I felt was reading an account of my own experience clothed
in different outer garb. At many a point I could relate an
exact parallel down to the minute details. I am certain
that a few of our Pathways friends will feel the same; in
particular I have in mind R.S. But we have to go on doing
what we have to do. It is not 'of no consequence'.
Finally, this comment from J.L., who studied with Pathways before
going on to take his PhD as well as publishing several fine books:
You incarnate the Platonic Eros of Paideia (Phaedrus) with
your work. Let no-one disparage it who doesn't understand,
can't do or mistakes it for philodoxy.
The last word, however, I will give to J.P. who was inspired by my
attempts at poetry, to write a poem of his own.
The hubris of mankind
Lies entirely in the mind,
That, but for forbear's steam and sweat
Life would never seem
So much like a dream.
Created as we are
From gaseous dust of star
And by gravity's patient breath,
Aeons of years and bacterial soup,
Energy made this human troop.
What luck you have, dear
To live a life unfraught
By poverty and hunger
And war's endless thunder.
Life is but to love and live
And to others give
A sense of purpose
So future generations
Finds joys in their creations.
Not just to procreate
Or follow king and prelate
Through endless mindless job.
It is but to engage our minds
To make futures for our kinds
The wheel of life goes on
In an endless marathon.
It does not stop with us,
For death is not the end
Energy does eternity bend.
I accept the nudge of criticism. In my defence, I would say that the
two pieces, 'Gulliver' and 'Dream' were not intended as statements
of some philosophical faith. It would be worrying if they were. The
implication would then be that I am, or am close to being a solipsist
and a nihilist, both views which I heartily despise. No, they are not
true as philosophy. But they are, or are intended to be, true as art:
as expressions of certain mood or way of seeing things, intended to
strike a chord with persons who have had similar feelings, at some
particular time in their lives.
Apologies to those whose comments I haven't included. I am grateful
to all the Pathways readers who took the trouble to write to me. It
has been a wonderful experience, learning that others really do care.
Thank you :)
1. 'Gulliver/ Dream'
(c) Geoffrey Klempner 2012
II. 'WHAT IS THE MEANING OF LIFE? A SIXTH ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE
OF GOD' BY MAX MALIKOW
You will never live if you are looking for the meaning of life.
-- Albert Camus
The purpose of life is to stay alive. Watch any
animal in nature -- all it tries to do is stay alive.
-- Michael Crichton
What is the meaning of life? The writer Dale Long has addressed
philosophy's fundamental question with these words,
Why are we here? This is a timeless question that expresses
humanity's fundamental desire to understand our collective
existence and value.
On a more personal level, why am I here? Many other people
seem to have a pretty clear opinion of why I'm here. My
wife believes I'm here to take out the garbage, help the
children with their homework, and rub her feet. My boss
believes I'm here to do my job and do it well. The person
in the car behind me this morning looked as if she believed
I was there to make her late (2012, p. 167).
Although clever, this assessment is hardly a definitive answer to the
question of life's meaning. Long admitted this by adding, 'However,
while living up to everyone's expectations may give our existence
purpose of a sort, it's not the same as figuring out our own answer
about why we, personally, are here'.
The question, What is the meaning of life? Brings to mind President
Clinton's statement to a grand jury in the wake of his dalliance with
Monica Lewinsky. It was there he said the oft quoted, 'It depends on
what the meaning of the word 'is' is.' Similarly, the question of
life's meaning depends on what the meaning of the word 'meaning' is.
In the present case, meaning is to be understood as, 'what is
intended to be; purpose; significance; end' (American Heritage
Dictionary, 1969, 811). Hence, this question can be alternatively
posed: Is there an intention or purpose to the existence of human
Any claim to have an answer to this question arises from faith -- a
belief that does not rest on logical proof or material evidence.
Apart from invoking faith, this question is unanswerable. Cheerfully,
this does not render the question valueless. The purpose of this
treatise is to argue that the enduring existence of this unanswerable
question implies the existence of God. As such, it constitutes a sixth
argument in favor of the existence of a supernatural creator.
The five arguments traditionally presented to make the case for God's
existence can be summarized as follows:
1. Cosmological: Anything that exists has a cause outside
of itself. Nothing can be the cause of itself since nothing
can exist and not exist simultaneously. Since the universe
exists, it must have an agent that caused it. God is that
causative agent. Ergo, God exists.
2. Teleological: The universe operates predictably rather
than randomly. Predictability implies an intelligent
designer. Ergo, God exists as the intelligent designer.
3. Ontological: God is the greatest conceivable being,
possessing all good qualities to the ultimate degree.
Existence is a good quality and greater than non-existence.
Ergo, God exists.
4. Moral: Unless God exists, moral absolutes are an
impossibility. (The only alternative would be moral
relativism.) Moral absolutes do exist. Ergo, God exists.
5. Ethnological: All cultures across human history
demonstrate a sense of the divine expressed in some form of
religion. This convergent data is evidence that human beings
have an innate sense of a supernatural being and spiritual
realm. This implies a creator who intended this and
designed human beings accordingly. Ergo, God exists.
To these five arguments (not proofs) a sixth can be added: The
persistence of the unanswerable question of life's meaning provides
an argument favoring the existence of God. Before proceeding to make
this case, an overview of a secular understanding of life's meaning
is in order.
A Secular Understanding of the Meaning of Life
Stated simply, all secular views of life's meaning have in common the
belief that human beings are not created by a supernatural being for
some divine purpose. For the secularist, there is no creator with a
personality and plan. Rather, human beings are part of an
evolutionary process that is indifferent to their existence. This
impersonal process is the agency by which human beings have developed
into their present state.
Existentialism provides an understanding of life's meaning that is
unmistakably secular. It is the philosophical movement associated
with Martin Heidegger, Friedrich Nietzsche, Albert Camus, and
Jean-Paul Sartre that emphasizes free will and personal
responsibility. For the existentialist, there is no meaning to life
apart from the meaning people bring to their lives. (Soren
Kierkegaard, a Christian existentialist, is an exception to this
description.) Further, the existentialist believes all of us can
bring meaning to our lives regardless of our circumstances. Moreover,
each of us is responsible for determining and living out the life that
will be personally meaningful.
Holocaust survivor and existential psychiatrist Viktor Frankl
believed that since life consists of thousands of situations, there
is no single meaning to life but thousands of meanings. In his
classic, Man's Search for Meaning, he wrote:
I doubt whether a doctor can answer this question in
general terms, For the meaning of life differs from man to
man, from day to day and from hour to hour. What matters,
therefore, is not the meaning of life in general but rather
the specific meaning of a person's life at a given moment
For this reason Frankl preferred the ten thousand commandments to the
In an age in which the Ten Commandments seem to many people
to have lost their validity, man must learn to listen to the
ten thousand commandments implied in the ten thousand
situations of which his life consists (1969, x).
Professor Robert Solomon has characterized existentialism as 'the
philosophy of no excuses.' The introduction to his course on
existentialism includes this characterization:
The message of existentialism... is about as simple as can
be. It is that every one of us, as an individual, is
responsible -- responsible for what we do, responsible for
who we are, responsible for the way we face and deal with
the world, responsible, ultimately, for the way the world
is. It is, in a very short phrase, the philosophy of 'no
excuses!'... If there is a God, we choose to believe. If
nature made us one way, it is up to us to decide what we
are to do with what nature gives us -- whether to go along
or fight back, to modify or transcend nature (2000, 1).
Walt Whitman's poem, 'O Me! O Life!' is a literary expression of
existentialism. In the first seven lines the poet laments the
apparent meaninglessness of life with phrases like, 'the struggle
ever renewed' and, 'the empty and useless years.' Then, dramatically,
he implores readers to optimize their lives by recognizing their
individuality and taking action:
That you are here -- that life exists and identity.
That the powerful play goes on, and you will contribute a
verse (1900, 166).
Existentialists are unimpressed by what people profess or predict for
themselves. Sartre wrote, 'Man is nothing else... than the ensemble of
his acts' (1957, 32). An individual's life is authenticated by what is
done rather than what is said. A belief that is not expressed by
action is inauthentic and not to be taken seriously. The
controversial psychiatrist Thomas Szasz expressed agreement with
Sartre with this observation: 'People often say that this or that
person has not yet found himself. But the self is not something one
finds, it is something one creates' (1973, 49).
A Sacred Understanding of the Meaning of Life
Natural selection is the principle that the behaviors and traits that
will maximize a species' survival and reproduction will be passed on
to succeeding generations. Evolutionary psychology is the study of
the development of human behavior and the mind using the principle of
natural selection. The question of life's meaning has no survival
value and contributes nothing to reproduction. Hence, an evolutionist
could not explain the existence and persistence of this question by
saying it is integral to the perpetuation of the human species. In
fact, to the contrary, it is counter-productive to the survival of
many individuals whose existential angst culminates in their suicide.
Further, an evolutionist might posit that this question once had
survival value and, like appendices, wisdom teeth and other vestigial
organs, no longer has a discernible function other than to keep
philosophers occupied. If offered, this would be an argument from
silence (argumentum ex silentio), by which a conclusion is derived
from the absence of evidence rather than its presence.
A sacred understanding of this question's durability is that human
beings owe their existence to a creator who has an intention for
their lives. The unanswerability of this question is intentional as
well. The creator (God) has orchestrated the human condition in such
a way that each of us must discover our own reason for being rather
than create it as the existentialists maintain. Further, the process
of discovering how our lives should be spent simultaneously
contributes to each of us being the kind of person God wants us to
be. Lest this idea remain abstract, consider the Nobel laureate and
humanitarian Albert Schweitzer. Reflecting on what he considered his
privileged life, he determined to follow the principle of Jesus
Christ: 'From everyone who has been given much, much will be
demanded; and from the one who has been entrusted with much, much
more will be asked' (Luke 12:48, NIV). Schweitzer describes his day
of decision in his memoir.
One brilliant summer morning at Gunsbach, during the
Whitsuntide holidays -- it was in 1896 -- as I awoke, the
thought came to me that I must not accept this good fortune
as a matter of course, but must give something in return.
While outside the birds sang I reflected on this thought,
and before I had gotten up I came to the conclusion that
until I was thirty I could consider myself justified in
devoting myself to scholarship and the arts, but after that
I would devote myself directly to serving humanity... What
the character of my future activities would be was not yet
clear to me... Only one thing was certain, that it must
be direct human service, however inconspicuous its sphere
Schweitzer's service was as a medical missionary to the people of
Lambarene in the rainforest of Central Africa. There he worked as a
physician from 1913 until his death in 1965.
The existentialist believes an individual's essence or defining
qualities are determined by action. Sartre communicated this in
several of his works.
What is meant here by saying existence precedes essence? It
means that, first of all, man exists, turns up, appears on
the scene, and, only afterwards defines himself (1957, 15).
The antithesis of existentialism is essentialism. The essentialist
believes the purpose of an individual's life precedes that person's
existence. The essentialist reverses the existentialist's mantra by
asserting essence precedes existence. Albert Einstein expressed an
essentialistic thought in an essay he wrote in 1931:
Strange is our situation here upon the earth. Each of comes
for a short visit, not knowing why, yet sometimes seeming to
divine a purpose.
From the standpoint of daily life, however, there is one
thing we do know: that man is here for the sake of other
men -- above all for those upon whose smile and well-being
our own happiness depends, and also for the countless
unknown souls with whose fate we are connected by a bond of
sympathy. Many times a day I realize how much of my own
outer and inner life is built upon the labors of my fellow
men, both living and dead, and how earnestly I must exert
myself in order to give in return as much as I have
received. My peace of mind is often troubled by the
depressing sense that I have borrowed too heavily from
the work of other men (1990, 3-4).
The Quaker philosopher and theologian David Elton Trueblood also
wrote of the meaning of life in juxtaposition to an obligation to
others: 'A man has at least made a start on discovering the meaning
of human life when he plants shade trees under which he knows full
well he will never sit' (1951, 58).
A knife provides an analogy that differentiates essentialism from
existentialism. Consider two answers to this odd question: What makes
a knife a knife? An essentialist would answer a knife is a knife owing
to its construction. An implement for cutting is conceptualized by a
knife-maker who then proceeds to fashion an instrument for cutting.
An existentialist's answer would be, 'It's merely an object until it
cuts, it then becomes a knife.' For the essentialist, a knife is a
knife by design, even if it never cuts, cutting is its raison d'etre.
For the existentialist, it is merely a nondescript object until it
cuts; the act of cutting defines the object.
Knives, unlike human beings, have neither a mental life nor a free
will. The sacred view of human beings is essentialistic, maintaining
that each of us is responsible for discovering our purpose. The
secular view is existential, positing that each of us is responsible
for creating our purpose.
A theological statement articulating the sacred view of humanity is
found in the New Testament. The Apostle Paul wrote to
Christ-followers at Ephesus:
For we are God's workmanship, created in Christ Jesus to do
good works, which God prepared in advance for us to do
(Ephesians 2:10, NIV).
Another such statement is made in the Westminster Shorter Confession,
a Protestant catechism:
Question: What is the chief end of man?
Answer: The chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy
him forever (1648, 1).
Granted, both of the above are no more specific than Einstein's vague
notion of a purpose for his life or Trueblood's assertion concerning
altruism. Nevertheless, all four communicate the idea of
intentionality to our existence. It was this idea that prompted
Schweitzer to discover his purpose and led to his calling to the
people of Lambarene.
An excerpt from the novel, Congo, is quoted in the introduction to
this essay: 'The purpose of life is to stay alive' (Crichton, 2012).
The fact that people kill themselves is ample evidence that this
analysis is simplistic. Thirty-thousand suicides occur annually in
the United States (Jamison, 1999, 24). If our lives could be reduced
to a mere struggle for survival there would be no suicides.
Psychiatrist and author Irvin Yalom posits there are four
philosophical issues present in psychotherapy, one of which is the
meaning of life (2000, 4-5). A psychiatrist of an earlier era, Carl
Jung, also viewed life's meaning as integral to psychotherapy:
Among my patients from many countries, all of them educated
persons, there is a considerable number who came to see me,
not because they were suffering from a neurosis, but
because they could find no meaning in life... When
conscious life has lost its meaning and promise, it is as
though a panic had broken loose and we heard the
exclamation: 'Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die!'
It is in this mood, born of the meaninglessness of life,
that causes the disturbance in the unconscious and provokes
the painfully curbed impulses to break out anew (1933,
Professor Jay L. Garfield of Smith College believes this question is
sufficient to justify an entire course devoted to it:
What is the meaning of life? It's a question every
thoughtful person has pondered at one time or another.
Indeed, it may be the biggest question of all... It is at
once a profound and abstract question, and a deeply
personal one. We want to understand the world in which we
live, but we also want to understand how to make our lives
as meaningful as possible; to not only know why we're
living, but that we're doing it with intention, purpose,
and ethical commitment (2012, 16).
This treatise presents the claim that the unanswerable question of
life's meaning constitutes a sixth argument (not proof) for the
existence of God. This question has persisted throughout the history
of philosophy in various forms. It is implied Aristotle's definition
of happiness (eudaimonia) as well as his analysis that every event
has four causes. The significance of this question resides not in its
answer but in its endurance in spite of its unanswerability. Since it
is not necessary for the survival of our species it is important for
another reason. The contention of this essay is that this question is
innate rather than part of an evolutionary process. To appropriate a
phrase from the Declaration of Independence, this question is
'endowed by the Creator.' This argument did not originate with the
author of this essay. It was stated sixteen centuries ago in far
fewer words by Saint Augustine: 'You have made us for yourself, O
God, and our hearts are restless until they find their rest in you'
American Heritage Dictionary. (1969). William Morris, Editor. New
Heritage Publishing Company.
Augustine(circa 398 A.D.) Reprinted in 1960 by New York: Image Books.
Crichton, M. quotation recovered from
http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/show/66453 on May 21, 2012.
Einstein, A. (1931). 'From living philosophies.' Living philosophies:
The reflections of some eminent men and women of our time. New York:
Frankl, V. (1959) Man's search for meaning. New York. Washington
_________ (1969) The will to meaning: Foundations and applications of
logotherapy. New York: Penguin Books.
Garfield, J. (2012). The meaning of life: Perspectives from the
world's intellectual traditions. Chantilly, VA: The Teaching Company.
Jamison, K. (1999). Night falls fast: Understanding suicide. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Jung, C. (1933). Modern man in search of a soul. New York: Harvest
Long, D. (2011). 'Why are we here?' from This i believe: Life
lessons. Dan Gediman, John Gregory, and Mary Jo Gediman, Editors.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons.
Sartre, J. (1957). Existentialism and human emotions. New York:
Kensington Publishing Corporation.
Schweitzer, A. (1931). Out of my life and thought. Translated by
Antje Bultman Lemke. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Solomon, R. (2000). No excuses: Existentialism and the meaning of
life. Chantilly, VA: The Teaching Company.
Szasz, T. (1973). The second sin. Garden City, NY: The Anchor Press.
Trueblood, D. (1951). The life we prize. New York: Harper & Brothers
Whitman, W. (1900). Leaves of grass. Acquired May 17. 2012 from Great
Yalom, I. (2000). Love's executioner and other tales of
psychotherapy. New York: Harper Perennial.
(c) Max Malikow 2012
III. FRANKFURT'S FREE WILL: MOSES MAIMONIDES IN MODERN THOUGHT' BY
Ever since humans have been aware of themselves, they have wondered
what exactly it is that they are aware of. And every attempt at
defining what constitutes the elusive term 'human nature' must at
some point deal with the question of the doctrine of free will;
simply put, do humans, or do humans not, have free will.
Freedom of the will, as defined by the Standard Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, is a 'philosophical term of art for a particular sort
of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from
among various alternatives.' Most great thinkers over the last two
thousand years have assumed that the concept of free will is very
closely connected with the idea of moral responsibility. It is no
wonder then that a philosopher like Maimonides, operating from within
Judaism's rich religious standpoint, would be quite interested in the
topic. Indeed, his writings on the subject are quite prolific, and a
thorough analysis of his work would be a lengthy undertaking. For the
purposes of this paper, we will examine the medieval conclusions of
Maimonides in the light of and in contrast to the model proposed by
one of today's leading philosophical thinkers, Harry G. Frankfurt.
The key to Frankfurt's theory is the understanding and application of
a set of self-defined terms. To summarize briefly: Frankfurt
recognizes that even non-humans have the capacity to have desires
for, and be motivated to achieve, certain things. The desire to do or
not to do one thing or another he calls a 'first-order desire.' What
separates humans for Frankfurt is their ability to form 'second-order
desires,' desires to have or not to have the aforesaid first-order
desires. In his words; 'No animal other than man... appears to have
the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the
formation of second-order desires.'
Before he can move on to discuss free will, Frankfurt must define
what the will that we are talking about actually is, and so he
develops the notion of an 'effective desire.' An effective desire is
the desire that moves, (or will, or would move) a person all the way
to action, even in the face of other, conflicting desires. While
these other desires may incline a person to act in a certain way, the
one that actually, effectively, causes an action is what Frankfurt
calls someone's will. We have now arrived at the crux of humanity:
for Frankfurt, what makes a man a person is his ability to have a
'second-order volition,' a desire that a specific first-order desire
should be his effective desire, or will, as opposed to some other
desire being effective. This identification with the desire makes it
more truly his own, and the preference demonstrates a level of caring
about what his will actually is.
Here Frankfurt makes the important distinction between 'free action'
and 'free will.' Free action is simply the ability to transform
first-order desires into action. Starting with the premise of a
person being someone who has second-order volitions, Frankfurt
suggests that in order to have free will they must also have the
ability to transform those second-order volitions into action, to
essentially choose their effective desires.
In the case he gives of a drug addict for example, someone with
conflicting first-order desires both to take and not to take the
substance, has a real second-order volition that his desire not to
take it be his effective desire, or will. The unwilling addict has
thus identified himself with the will to no longer be an addict, and
so when he is moved to take the drug anyways, he may claim (at least
according to Frankfurt), that it was not of his own free will, but
rather against his will, that he was forced to take it. To quote,
'the question of freedom of the will does not concern the
relationship between what he does and what he wants to do. Rather, it
concerns his desires themselves.' Free will is the ability to will
what one wants to will, or to have the effective desire that he wants
to have. Because the addict on this case is not operating under the
power of his own free will, Frankfurt would not necessarily hold him
morally responsible for what he does.
In any discussion of Maimonides' position on free will, it is
important to note that there has been some debate as to what his
views actually were, and if he considered them safe enough for public
consumption. In his popular works, Maimonides' Commentary to the
Mishnah and Mishneh Torah, scholars have traditionally found him to
be a proponent of strong libertarianism. And for good reason; in his
introduction to Tractate Avot, Maimonides writes that:
Without any doubt, the truth is that every aspect of a
person's conduct is subject to his [choice]. If he desires,
he will act in one way. And if he desires not to, he will
not. Nothing is forcing or compelling him at all.
In the Laws of Repentance in Mishneh Torah, this theme is dutifully
Free will is granted to every human being. If a man wants
to follow the good path and be good, he has the power to do
so; if he wants to follow the evil path and be wicked, he is
free to do so.
Specifically in that same chapter, Maimonides, on theological
principles, firmly rejects the notion of an externally imposed,
Let it not occur to your mind that G-d decrees at the birth
of a person that he shall be good or evil, a notion
expressed by foolish non-Jews and most of the stupid
individuals among the Jews. It is not so. Every human being
is capable of becoming righteous like Moses or wicked like
Jeroboam, wise or foolish, merciful or cruel, niggardly or
generous; and so with all other traits. There is no one to
compel him or to decree what he is to do, no one to pull
him in either direction; it is he who directs himself
deliberately towards any course he desires.
Now, Maimonides does recognize the possibility of a person possessing
inborn tendencies, but maintains that they are not to be considered
deterministic. In his Commentary, he notes that:
It is, however, possible for a person to be born with a
tendency to one of the virtues or one of the shortcomings:
i.e. conduct [representative of this trait] will come
easier to him than other types of conduct... Nevertheless,
if the person whose natural inclination puts him at an
advantage acts sluggishly and fails to study or develop his
potentials, he will surely remain foolish. Conversely, if
the person who is by nature coarse and phlegmatic applies
himself to study and conceptual activity, he will be able
to learn and comprehend, albeit with greater difficulty and
after expending more effort.
As Maimonides understands it, there is no inner deterministic force
that a person cannot choose to overcome. It is precisely this choice
that leads Maimonides to write, in regards to the accompanying moral
Hence he is judged according to his deeds: if he has
behaved well, he receives a good reward; if he has
misbehaved, he is punished.
Thus far it has been clear that Maimonides seems to support a strong
libertarian view in regards to the question of free will. There are,
however, difficulties with this assumption, namely other passages
that seem to contradict the notion. The main point of evidence that
scholars have cited is Chapter II of Maimonides' Guide of the
Perplexed. The chapter begins by stating that everything produced in
time has a proximate cause, which in turn has a cause, in a
regression all the way back to the First Cause, G-d's will. (When
prophets say that 'G-d did something,' they are ignoring the
proximate and intermediate causes of the event.) The late Professors
Shlomo Pines of Hebrew University and Alexander Altmann of University
College London have both used this chapter to argue for Maimonides as
a strong determinist. The main thrust of their argument comes from
the following passage, also in Chapter II of the Guide:
This is the notion to which I wished to draw attention in
this chapter. For inasmuch as the deity is, as has been
established, He who arouses a particular volition in the
irrational animal, and who has necessitated this particular
free choice in the rational animal [that is, man] and who
has made the natural things pursue their course... it
follows necessarily from all this that it may be said with
regard to what proceeds necessarily from these causes that
G-d has commanded that something should be done in such and
such a way or that He has said: Let this be thus.
Pines and Altmann both arrive at the conclusion that Maimonides did
not really believe in free will. As Altmann puts it, 'Maimonides
tacitly replaces the view expressed in his theological works by a
deterministic theory that must be considered to represent his
Scholars such as Jerome Gellman at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
understandably have trouble with the Pines-Altmann approach, and are
unwilling to buy into a view of Maimonides that leaves him
purposefully contradicting his own writings. In defense of our
original understanding, Gellman has suggested a reading of the above
passage in the Guide that protects the view of Maimonides as a strict
He understands Maimonides here to be simply pointing out that G-d has
determined only that we choose, not what we choose. While this is may
be a valid and possibly correct interpretation, for the goal of this
paper we will focus on the reconciliation proposed by Moshe Sokol of
Sokol is of the opinion that in actuality, Maimonides was a proponent
of what Susan Wolf has termed the 'sane deep self' view of human
agency and responsibility. This terminology denotes a school of
thought that stems from the theories of Harry Frankfurt, involving
higher and lower levels of human desire and compulsions. Basically,
for an action to be free it must be free of both all external and all
internal compulsions. This can only happen when, for example, the will
to steal, is itself under the control of a 'deeper' self that stands
back and evaluates it, and which can reject that lower order desire
if it so wishes, and if it is not in accordance with the deeper
self's values. As Frankfurt first described, that 'deeper' self
(controller of the second-order volitions) that chooses which
first-order desires to associate with is who we really are. While
Sokol uses this idea to answer several questions in Maimonides' work,
as stated our focus will be to look through Frankfurt's eyes in order
to get a fuller picture and better view of Maimonides' understanding
on the question of free will.
Armed with Frankfurt, we can now return to Maimonidean theory; while
Pines and Altman have correctly deduced from the passage in the Guide
that Maimonides believed in human choice being determined by a causal
chain extending back to G-d Himself, according to Sokol this has no
bearing on the discussion of free will or no free will. While a
person's first-order desires may be heavenly sent, determined
psychologically by the natural laws that G-d laid out, man has been
given the autonomic ability to form second-order volitions; to choose
which of the determined first-order desires will be effective. Thus
the concept of moral responsibility is perfectly understandable;
despite his inclinations, man can choose to be different than what he
has been made.
The beauty of this argument lies not only in its ability to
successfully weave the seemingly contradictory passages together; in
citing proofs that Maimonides actually believed in some form of this
theory, Sokol's method sheds new light on some of the most basic
Biblical passages, things that schoolchildren have taken for granted
for centuries but can finally understand in a more meaningful, less
For instance, in the Exodus account, many have struggled with the
idea of G-d hardening Pharaoh's heart. How could the king then be
held accountable for what he did? The answer given by all the
classical exegetes, including Maimonides, is that G-d was just
restoring the balance that the fear of the plagues had upset, letting
Pharaoh make the choice that he truly wanted to make. Taking the sane
deep self theory a step further; someone's will is not free only when
his or her deep self has lost control over the lower order desires.
If, however, external forces were used to manipulate his first-order
desires, bringing them back into accord with the deep self and its
second-order volitions, the external forces would actually be
restoring free will.
That, precisely, is how Maimonides and the rest of the commentators
view the story of Pharaoh. In hardening Pharaoh's weakening
first-order resolve to be evil, G-d actually restored Pharaoh's free
will, bringing his first-order desires back into accord with his evil
deep self and its second-order volitions.
Sokol's main textual proof though, comes from a halakhic context,
Maimonides' treatise on the Laws of Divorce. Basing himself on a
Mishnah and accompanying passage of Talmud, Maimondes writes that:
An individual who does not want to divorce his wife,
according to the law may be forced to do so. A Jewish court
of law may force him until he says 'I want [to divorce her]'
[Editorial note: in Jewish law, a divorce document is only
valid if the husband wanted to give it. If it was given
against his will, or without his consent, it is
nullified.]... And why is this bill of divorce not
nullified because he was forced, be it by non-Jews [who
acted at the behest of the Jews], or Jews? Because we do
not consider someone to be forced unless he is pressured
and forced to do that which the Torah does not obligate
him, such as someone who is hit until he sells or gives.
[Editorial note: in Jewish law, if a man is strong-armed
into making a sale or giving a gift that he did not want
to, the act of acquisition is deemed invalid.] But someone
who is attacked by his evil impulse to disobey a
commandment or perform a forbidden action, and he is hit
until he does that which he is obligated or desists from
that which he is forbidden, is not considered forced by the
hitting, but he forces himself despite his evil
characteristics... Since he was smitten until his evil
impulse was weakened, and he says 'I agree [to divorce my
wife],' he is divorcing in accordance with his will.
In this, perhaps the clearest formulation of Maimonidean philosophy
on what constitutes a person's will, a Frankfurt-inspired reading
seems not only valid but truthfully accurate. As Sokol explains,
'Maimonides distinguishes between two aspects of the self, a 'deep
self' that truly wants to be an observant Jew, and a member of the
Jewish people, and a lower-order self that chooses to do evil under
the influence of the evil impulse.' In other words, as evidenced
by his lifestyle choices and his other actions, despite the fact that
he says he does not want to grant the bill of divorce, the husband
before us does in fact have strong first-order desires to remain an
observant Jew and do what is right. That being the case, he must also
have, if not conflicting first-order desires about the giving of the
divorce, at least a second-order desire that he have the first-order
desire to give it. Judging again by his overall personality, he must
also have a second-order volition that the desire to give it be his
effective desire. What then, is stopping him from giving? Simply the
overwhelming strength of the first-order desire to be mean and
withhold it, what Maimonides calls his 'evil impulse.' He is, in
essence, Frankfurt's unwilling addict, who simply cannot resist the
temptation, but cannot be said to identify with it on the deepest of
Here is where Jewish law steps in. Recognizing the complexity of the
situation, the law mandates that we once again level the playing
field and allow his true self to shine through. Again, free will is
the ability to have the effective desire that one wants to have. We
know what this man's second-order volitions are; he wants to be a
good Jew. We know that the evil impulse is preventing him from making
this his effective desire. By compelling him to grant the divorce, all
we have done is weaken that impulse, and in the process we have
restored his free will. The analogous case would be to give some kind
of harsh therapy to the unwilling addict, weakening his first-order
desire to take the drug and allowing his second-order volitions to
On the flip side of the Frankfurt approach to Maimonides' philosophy,
if one's second-order volitions were, in theory, unable to choose the
correct path, then, having no choice at all, such a person could
hardly said to have made the wrong choice. They would therefore not
be held morally responsible for their actions. While Frankfurt
discusses the wanton, who is not a person because he has no
second-order volitions, and for whom freedom of the will is therefore
not even a question, Maimonides gives an example of a person whose
range of first-order volitions has been stifled or cut off, leaving
their second-order volitions no choices to make. These are
essentially people, just without free will. Once again in Mishneh
Torah, he writes, regarding heretics:
But their children and grandchildren, who, misguided by
their parents, were raised among the Karaites and trained
in their views, are like a child taken captive by them and
raised in their religion, whose status is that of someone
coerced who, although he later learns that he is a Jew,
meets Jews, observes them practice their religion, is
nevertheless to be regarded as someone acting under
compulsion, since he was reared in the erroneous ways of
While the children may feel like they are making a choice, connecting
with the first-order desire (to remain Karaitic) that they want to be
effective and bringing it to action, Maimonides sadly dismisses them
as not having free will at all in these circumstances. Their
conflicting first-order desire to become Orthodox has effectively
been either killed or unnaturally prevented from coming into
existence, leaving no choice for the second-order volition to make.
For Maimonides, as well as for Frankfurt, the definition of free will
requires there to have been alternative possibilities to choose from.
Having thus established the century-spanning connection between
Frankfurt and Maimonides, we will now take a moment to point out in
what ways the two are subtly different: While both deal with simple,
first-order desires to do or not to do something, Frankfurt gives no
explanation as to the origin of these desires, presumably ascribing
them to natural physiological laws. As we have pointed out,
Maimonides uses those same laws to portray his delicate balance of
determinism and free will; the laws themselves are what have been
determined, and operate because G-d said they should. Frankfurt does
not even address that idea, a concept Jerome Gellman calls 'ancestral
In regards to the more pertinent question of second-order volitions
and their determinants, Maimonides subscribes fully to the idea that
man is master of his own domain, and has the ability to stand up,
albeit with varying degrees of difficulty, to anything that the
natural laws might have thrown his way. As sole bearer of moral
responsibility for his actions, he is therefore both the culprit when
he commits wrong and the hero when he chooses to do right. Frankfurt,
for his part, makes no decision; as he notes at the end of his
My conception of the freedom of the will appears to be
neutral with regard to the problem of determinism... It is
possible that a person should be morally responsible for
what he does of his own free will and that some other
person should also be morally responsible for his having
Despite these minor differences in deterministic theory, and the
resulting moral/ theological stances that come along with those
differences, it is clear that there is a strong connection between
Frankfurt's 'modern' approach to the question of free will and
Maimonides medieval writings on precisely that subject. Aside from
what many have noted in regard to his rationalistic approach to Torah
learning, in this philosophical field at least, it is safe to say that
Maimonides was way ahead of his time. This is not to say that the
later work is anything but important. On the contrary; using
Frankfurt as a tool to decipher the philosophy and methodology behind
the Maimonidean law-making process can give us an invaluable insight
into the application and extension of his thoughts to new and varied
1. O'Connor, Timothy, 'Free Will', The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Spring 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta(ed.), URL =
2. Frankfurt, Harry G. 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a
Person,' The Journal of Philosophy 1971, Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
3. Frankfurt, p. 7
4. Frankfurt p. 15
5. Touger, Eliyahu, trans. 'Maimonides' Pirkei Avot.'Jerusalem,
Israel: Moznaim Publishing Corporation, 1994. Chapter Eight of
Introduction, p. 47
6. Birnbaum, Philip, trans. 'Maimonides' Code of Law and Ethics.' New
York: Hebrew Publishing Company, 1944. Laws of Repentance, Chapter
Five Paragraph One p. 41
7. Birnbaum p. 42, Paragraph Two
8. Touger, Chapter Eight of Introduction p. 46
9. Birnbaum, p.42-43, Paragraph Four
10. Pines, Shlomo, trans. 'The Guide of the Perplexed.' Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1964. p. 410
11. Altmann, Essays in Jewish IntellectualHistory, p. 41, quoted in
Jerome Gellman, 'Freedom and Determinism in Maimonides' Philosophy,'
in Eric L. Ormsby, ed. Moses Maimonides and His Time. Washington,
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1989 p. 144.
12. Sokol, Moshe. 'Maimonides on Freedom of the Will and Moral
Responsibility.' Harvard Theological Review 91, 1998 p. 25-39
13. Birnbaum, p.123 Paragraph 20
14. Sokol, p. 35
15. Maimonides, Moses, Laws of Heretics Chapter Three Paragraph
Three, quoted and translated in Sokol, p. 37
16. Gellman, p. 143
17. Frankfurt, p. 20
(c) Mark Goldfeder 2012
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