P H I L O S O P H Y P A T H W A Y S ISSN 2043-0728
Issue number 145
20th July 2009
I. 'Bertrand Russell: The Potential for Ethics Through Authentic Philosophical
Enquiry' by James M. Magrini
II. 'The Free Will Problem: Antinomy or Conundrum?' by Max Malikow
III. 'Aristippus for Happiness' by Kristian Urstad
This issue of Philosophy Pathways has a predominantly ethical theme. James
Magrini offers what is, for me, the startling revelation of the similarity
between Bertrand Russell's case for the value of philosophy in Problems of
Philosophy and the views of the continental philosopher Emmanuel Levinas on the
'radically other nature of the not-Self'. For Russell, authentic philosophical
inquiry recognizes that not-Self can never be assimilated to Self, and herein
lies the basis for a conception of ethics which places respect for otherness
and difference at the heart of moral endeavour.
Max Malikow offers a view of the free will problem, not as a mere theoretical
puzzle with different proposed 'solutions' but as the practical challenge of
deciding how we should respond to the most difficult cases where there is no
simple yes/no answer to the question whether an individual is morally
responsible for his or her actions. Along the way, he cites a number of famous
legal cases, including Clarence Darrow's defence of university students Nathan
Leopold and Richard Loeb, who claimed that they were inspired by reading
Nietzsche to murder a 14 year old boy in cold blood.
Kristian Urstad looks at Socrates' contemporary Aristippus whose provocative
espousal of thoroughgoing hedonism has led commentators to conclude that either
he had no meaningful conception of 'the good life', or that he rejected belief
in personal identity, or that he denied the need for prudence. Urstad argues
that the evidence for each of these three alternatives is feeble. It is
perfectly possible in Aristippus' view to set out as one's life plan the
pursuit of pleasure by every available means, adapting oneself to circumstances
in order to gain the maximum enjoyment of every moment, now and in the future.
I. 'BERTRAND RUSSELL: THE POTENTIAL FOR ETHICS THROUGH AUTHENTIC PHILOSOPHICAL
INQUIRY' BY JAMES M. MAGRINI
Violence dominates the landscape of our present world. Prejudice and
sectarianism threaten human rights, putting our hopes for the authentic
possibility of humane ethical/ moral interaction on a global scale in serious
question. Ours is a world where epistemological and ethical relativism appear
to rule the day. In these extremely 'hard times,' as Nietzsche was fond of
saying, it would benefit us, as philosophers, informed thinkers, and concerned
human beings, to revisit with a discerning eye and charitable heart the
philosophy of Bertrand Russell as it appears in The Problems of Philosophy
(1912), wherein Russell reminds us in a powerfully persuasive manner just how
important philosophy can be in offering hope for a better world during dark,
turbulent times. In what follows, I examine the unique way in which Russell
responds to the following question: What is philosophy good for, what is the
value of philosophy for the world and its inhabitants?
Bertrand Russell is firmly identified with philosophy's analytic tradition,
co-authoring with Alfred North Whitehead the monolithic tour de force,
Principia Mathematica (1910). Focusing on the study of mathematics and formal
logic, Russell's approach to philosophy is highlighted by a rigorous, academic
style of crystalline communication. However, in Russell's signature book, The
Problems of Philosophy, he employs a poetic style that is decidedly
uncharacteristic of the typical style and idiom of analytic philosophy. In the
final section, Chapter XV, 'The Value of Philosophy,' Russell writes in a
highly speculative and refreshingly idealistic manner about that which is
crucial to the understanding of what good philosophy is all about, namely, the
indispensable concern for the ethical when attempting to approach the ultimate
questions of existence. Perhaps this is not surprising considering that Russell
held fast to a humanitarian existence throughout his life. A pacifist during
World War II, active in the social movement to 'ban the bomb,' his life was
guided by the quest for knowledge, the search for love, and the ultimate cause
to alleviate human suffering in all its virulent forms.
According to Russell, if practiced as an ethical discipline, philosophy can
guide our enquiry along the path to knowledge of the world, and more
importantly, philosophy can also inspire us to actively improve the world that
we inhabit with others. Russell identifies philosophy's value in its potential
to authentically inspire our practical ethical comportment, fostering and
enhancing our legitimate interpersonal relationships, as a secondary benefit of
a unique method of enquiry. Russell believes that philosophical enquiry is best
practiced as an ethical endeavor when it retains and accentuates the crucial
distinction between what Russell terms the 'Self' (the philosopher) and the
'not-Self' (the objects of the philosopher's contemplation), stressing a
charitable and respectful attitude toward questioning the world at large and
Russell opposes the traditional and dogmatic subject-centered model of
philosophical enquiry that, 'fetters contemplation to the self' and finds its
ground in the absolutist tendency to reduce the objects of its enquiry to a
comprehensive and categorical body of systematic knowledge in which the notion
of difference, or otherness, is either pared down or abolished. According to
Russell, what traditional philosophy calls knowledge, 'is not a union with the
not-Self, but a set of prejudices, habits, and designs making an impenetrable
veil between us and the world beyond.' Russell's distrust of rigid,
systematic philosophical explanation emerges from his critique of all forms of
philosophy that display the heedless drive to understand the world in
unabashedly categorical terms. He is also critical of philosophies which
attempt to force the vast and expansive universe to conform with our
preconceived epistemological notions of how things should be, presumptuously
embracing the idea of Man as the 'measure of all things' while callously
neglecting the all-important ethical distinction between the Self and the
In The Problems of Philosophy, Russell effectively attacks the epistemological
relativism of Protagoras, Nietzsche's idea of truth as a human construct, the
idealism of Bishop Berkeley, and Kant's monumental attempt in The Critique of
Pure Reason to reconcile rationalism with the tenets of empiricism. Russell's
brilliant critique of the Western philosophical tradition renders the
aforementioned positions unsound and illogical. For in essence, as related to
Russell's understanding of ethical philosophical enquiry, they fail to adopt a
charitable and respectful attitude toward the not-Self:
There is a widespread [negative] philosophical tendency
towards the view that Man is the measure of all things,
that truth is manmade, that space and time and the world of
universals are properties of the mind, and if there be
anything not created by the mind, it is unknowable and of
no account for us.
Philosophers fall into error, according to Russell, for two reasons. First,
they make the assumption that humans are seamlessly woven into the complex
fabric of the world, and secondly, they believe that it is possible to
'assimilate the universe to Man,' and not vice versa. Importantly, when we
incorrectly perceive and judge that the world is just like us, that is, that
the world is identical to the 'Self,' we mistakenly imagine that 'knowledge of
it is possible without admission of what seems alien.' Russell, quite
correctly, is highly critical of the pervasive attitude within much of
philosophy's tradition that believes that all knowledge of the world
presupposes a reduction and assimilation of the object to the thinking subject
into a closed, all-encompassing, system of explanation, or grand-narrative.
Russell eloquently describes the philosopher's (Self) authentic relationship
with the objects of philosophical contemplation (not-Self) in terms of a union
that must be liberated from any and all self-centered aims on the part of the
Knowledge is a from of union of Self and not-Self; and like
all union, it is impaired by dominion and therefore by any
attempt to force the universe into conformity with what we
find in ourselves.
According to Russell, the philosopher must, with steadfast resolve, abstain
from the headstrong disposition that would violently force the objects of
philosophical contemplation to conform with preconceived notions of how they
should be, for philosophical knowledge can never be subjugated or controlled by
the thinking subject. Knowledge of a philosophical nature is never a possession
of the thinker because it always transcends the possibility of reducing the
world to our ways of perceiving and thinking.
Russell states that philosophical contemplation, in the form of the union of
Self and not-Self, should never 'aim at proving that the rest of the universe
is akin to man.' Rather, in Russell's opinion, it is philosophy that must
adapt to 'the characters which it finds in its objects,' and if the philosopher
grants to the objects of his contemplation the just due of their uniqueness and
'otherness,' he expresses an attitude that embraces and actively works to
preserve the sublime sense of wonder inherent to our world and the infinite
universe. Russell demands that all philosophical investigation should adopt
an ethical approach to its questioning, which is highlighted and characterized
by the desire to allow the not-Self, that which is radically Other and always
beyond our absolute comprehension, to retain its question-worthy status, its
unique, foreign, and mysterious nature with respect to our ways of being.
In response to the possibility of allowing the objects of our philosophical
thoughts to retain their uniqueness, or transcendent natures, as we attempt to
understand them, Russell proposes an ethical model for philosophical enquiry
wherein 'true' contemplation, 'finds its satisfaction in every enlargement of
the not-Self, in everything that magnifies the objects contemplated.' As
opposed to interpreting the universe as a means to the philosopher's ends, in a
relationship that privileges the Self above the universe (not-Self), Russell
reverses the variables in the equation by proposing an authentic model for
philosophical enquiry, as contemplation, wherein the universe, or not-Self, is
given priority. Russell urges the philosopher to grant a sense of superiority
to the objects of philosophy, and 'through the infinity of the universe the
mind which contemplates it achieves some share in infinity.'
Thus, Russell understands knowledge as the product of the asymmetrical union
between the Self and not-Self, wherein the philosopher embraces the
recalcitrant universe, and through a loving, intractable, and ever-evolving
discourse, works to reveal the hidden nature of the universe. The universe, in
turn, remains forever beyond the philosopher's logical grasp, despite the
philosopher's best attempts at explanation.
Unlike the sciences, the problems, issues, and questions to which we can
provide no definitive solutions and responses, 'remain to form the residue
which is called philosophy.' If it should ever be the case that philosophy
provides a categorical explanation for the things it interrogates, they leave
the purview of philosophy and become something other than a subject for
philosophy. The philosopher must recognize that definitive knowledge of the
world, specifically in terms of philosophical knowledge, is a hopelessly
True contemplation, according to Russell, finds satisfaction and its value in
all that enlarges and ameliorates the not-Self, or the objects of philosophical
reflection. Philosophical contemplation conceived as an ethical endeavor is the
liberating freedom from narrow subjective, egoistic aims and expresses an
impartial attitude through 'the unalloyed desire for truth,' which should
always be free from prejudice and dogmatism in all matters of truth-seeking. It
is Russell's claim that the freedom and impartiality of the philosopher's
charitable and respectful attitude afforded to the objects of thought carries
over into the philosopher's interpersonal relationships, preserving a similar
freedom and impartiality in the realm of practical activity, which includes the
understanding of the human as a fragile, passionate, and emotional being.
Russell is careful to elucidate and punctuate the notions of authentic social
justice and universal love that emerge from philosophy's unique method of
ethical reflection. According to Russell, retaining the openness of both mind
and soul in the unprejudiced quest for philosophical truth is,
... the very same quality of mind which, in action is
justice, and in emotion as the universal love which can be
given to all, and not only those who are judged useful or
Just as the great philosopher resists the complete 'objectification' of his
subject matter, so too the good, moral human avoids the 'objectification' of
other human beings. With such understanding, perhaps we can acquire a newfound
respect for the differences within others, allowing those people with whom we
share the world to retain their uniqueness. Thus, as opposed to privileging our
own personal desires, treating others as disposable means-to-the-ends of our
projects, the possibility exists for a renewed sense of dignity to rise up from
the heart of the human condition.
Presumably, this protracted relationship between Self and not-Self , one that
graduates from theoretical enquiry to the realm of practical interpersonal
social interaction can be grasped at the level of inter-subjective discourse,
for Russell is adamant that the objects of philosophical reflection can never
be reduced to philosophical subjectivism (solipsism) or expressed in terms of
objective, universal truth. Russell seeks to demonstrate that ethical discourse
on the social level plays out in the manner of charitable philosophical
interrogation, which attempts to address the various quandaries it encounters
with a heightened sense of respect, and such a context for ethical interaction
would perhaps manifest through a loving, intractable, and ever-evolving social
discourse in which radical differences are not only recognized, but further,
are privileged and preserved above similarity and identity.
Importantly, Russell intimates the responsibility that I have for each and
every living being who is quite literally not like me, radically Other in their
existence. In this realm of authentic social discourse, the philosopher (Self)
also assumes the role of the Other (not-Self) within a context where others
retain their privileged status as unique, different, and indefinable human
beings, and it is in this radical notion of the not-Self (Otherness) that
Russell locates the center of human dignity. In the immediacy of our ethical
encounters with the other, we are struck and overwhelmed by our innate
responsibility to be as ethical, engulfed by the transcendent sense of wonder
that allows for the manifestation of 'familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect.'
According to Russell, philosophy should not to be studied because it procures
definitive answers to its questions. Rather, he suggests that philosophy should
be pursued and practiced for the way it enriches our intellect, soul, and
contributes to the understanding of human potential, which always includes the
pressing and immediate concern with authentic ethical relationships. However,
it must be stressed that Russell is not propounding a rigid and complete
ethical schema or system for moral behavior, with prescribed and proscribed
rights and duties. Rather, he is working to break open the space, or context,
within which the potential exists for revealing and nurturing authentic ethical
encounters in the first instance, the rich soil from which ethics can take root,
growing and flourishing in time with the proper attention. This represents
Russell's original and primordial thinking on ethics, perhaps in terms of
offering the grounds for a possible ethics to emerge from the context
established by the ethical model of philosophical enquiry, which is highlighted
by the relationship, or union, between the Self and not-Self, between the
philosopher and the objects of philosophical contemplation.
In a move similar to the Continental philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas (Totality
and Infinity, 1961), a kindred philosophical spirit to be sure, Russell
discusses an ethical relationship that is importantly characterized by the
encounter with the radically Other nature of the not-Self. Thus, as opposed to
the notions of identity or similarity forming the singular fundamental ground,
or bedrock, for establishing morality based on what we all share universally,
he suggests that the potential for ethics must also be considered from the
notion of difference, or the radical and transcendent nature of the other's
There is a unique particularity bound up with the problem of ethics that
Russell refuses to ignore. The global landscape is such that the obvious and
apparent differences between cultures cannot be ignored. Technology, in one
respect, has brought the world's population into closer proximity than in any
other historical age. Ironically -- and herein lies the tragic double-bind at
the root of humanity's struggles -- despite the nearness of the proximity,
there exists a profound ethical distance between human beings, which appears to
be insurmountable, and so I return to the question that began the essay: What is
the value of philosophy for the world and its inhabitants?
Russell has provided a powerfully viable response to this query, and in these
'hard times,' we would benefit by taking seriously what Russell has to say about
the practice of philosophical enquiry. Ultimately, the only hope for authentic
social justice is through united group activity -- and if Russell is correct,
philosophy holds the potential to inspire such practical ethical activity, with
the potential to make us 'citizens of the universe, not only of one walled city
at war with all the rest.'
Russell, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy, (Oxford University Press, New
1. Russell, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy, (Oxford University Press, New
York) 1997, p. 159.
2. Ibid., p. 159.
3. Ibid., p. 159.
4. Ibid., p. 159.
5. Ibid., p. 158.
6. Ibid., p. 159.
7. Russell, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 158.
8. Ibid., p. 16.
9. Ibid., p. 160.
10. Ibid., p. 159.
11. Ibid., p. 155.
12. Ibid., p. 161.
13. Russell, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 160.
14. Ibid., p. 158.
15. Russell, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy, p. 161.
James M. Magrini
College of DuPage
Department of Liberal Arts: Philosophy
(c) James M. Magrini 2009
II. 'THE FREE WILL PROBLEM: ANTINOMY OR CONUNDRUM?' BY MAX MALIKOW
Men believe themselves to be free simply because they are
conscious of their own actions, knowing nothing of the
causes by which they are determined.
-- Benedict Spinoza
Triggers are pulled by individuals. Orders are given and
executed by individuals. In the last analysis, every single
human act is ultimately the result of an individual.
-- Scott Peck
Over two hundred years ago the French philosopher Paul Holbach wrote:
Man's life is a line that nature commands him to describe
upon the surface of the earth, without his ever being able
to swerve from it, even for an instant... Nevertheless,
in spite of the shackles by which he is bound, it is
pretended that he is a free agent. (1770, 1).
This is an uncompromising statement of determinism, 'the position... that every
event is the necessary outcome of a cause or set of causes' (Katen, 1973, 313).
So defined, it would seem that determinism makes no provision for free will,
'the capacity of human beings to make choices free of coercion or compulsion and
to choose the important actions of their lives' (Pence, 2000, 23).
The belief that people have the ability to make authentic selections from
options is not derived from experimentation, hence it is not an empirically
based position. Also, since belief in free will is not the result of a sound
reasoning process, it is not based upon logic. The appeal of free will emanates
from emotion and experience. William James, in his essay, 'The Dilemma of
Determinism,' argued for free will on the premise that the experiences of guilt
and regret make sense only if people believe they could have acted otherwise. An
eloquent, if not compelling case for free will is made by Thomas Ellis Katen
with these words:
Human beings come to terms with life and understand
themselves as human through such experiences as regret,
remorse, sorrow, and guilt. This entire mode of functioning
cannot be simply dismissed. Free will is a working
assumption of human existence as it has evolved throughout
history, and moral experience is an all-important aspect of
that history. Precisely because human experience over the
course of history does found itself on a premise of freedom,
we have an excellent working criterion on the basis of
which we might justify free will... Since determinism is
itself only a theory and not an established fact about the
universe, why should we deny our experience of freedom?
Determinists counter the sentimentalist argument represented by James and Katen
by pointing out that it is not unusual for people to feel guilty about events
over which they admit to having had no control. Further, since every effect has
a cause, it might be that human beings are compelled to have these emotions for
reasons that are unknown and might not ever be discovered. (Determinists posit
that there are three categories of causes: the causes that are known; those
that eventually will be known; and those that never will be known.)
The problem of '(whether) human beings can be said to be free agents or whether
their activities and thoughts are determined completely by the many influencing
factors that impinge on them' constitutes the free will problem (Popkin and
Stroll, 1981, 115).
Stated as a question, the free will problem asks: Why are people held
responsible for behaviors over which they had no control?
Introduced as a dilemma, the free will problem presents this paradox: Across
cultures and time, human beings are held responsible for their behavior. Also,
given the law of cause-and-effect, it is logical that the sequence of causes
that culminates in a given behavior is beyond the control of the individuals,
making them not responsible for their behavior.
Essential to a consideration of the free will problem is an understanding of
two subcategories of determinism: hard determinism and soft determinism:
Hard determinism maintains that all behavior is invariably
and without exception determined by causal forces beyond
the control and responsibility of any individual, so that,
in effect, free will and moral choice do not exist. However,
soft determinism... maintains that while there is a
cause for all action, certain choices can still be made
freely as actions that stem from the character or will of
the agent, thus preserving the notion of moral
responsibility (Pence, 14).
The subtitle of this essay poses the question of whether the free will problem
is an antinomy, 'the existence of two incompatible statements, each of which
taken alone is reasonable' (Pence, 3), or a conundrum, 'a problem admitting of
no satisfactory solution' (Morris, 1969, 290). Aristotle's axiom that the truth
of a matter is to be found between two extreme positions suggests that the
concept of soft determinism might contribute to a solution. Soft determinism,
also referred to as compatibilism, allows for both determinism and free will to
be true. Of course, such a meeting of east and west requires an elaboration,
which is the charge of this essay.
The Significance of the Free Will Problem
Approximately one-thousand years ago the Persian poet Jalalu'ddin Rumi observed:
'There is a disputation that will continue till mankind are raised from the
dead, between the necessitarians and the partisans of free will' (Feinberg and
Shafer-Landeau, 2002, 499). That observation is no less true today than it was
in the twelfth century. The longevity of the free will-determinism disputation
is attributable to its implications for civil order, criminal culpability,
interpersonal relationships, and the experience of guilt. In his essay, 'The
Problem of Free Will,' Walter Stace accurately characterized the free will
problem as a debate that is semantic rather than pragmatic:
It is to be observed that those learned professors of
philosophy or psychology who deny free will do so only in
their own professional moments and in their studies and
lecture rooms. For when it comes to doing anything
practical, even of the most trivial kind, they invariably
behave as if they and others were free (Fineberg and
Richard Popkin and Avrum Stroll made a similar argument against determinism
with this simple, but not simplistic, observation:
If the determinist's theory is true, then instead of
propounding arguments, he/ she ought to find out what
factors produce philosophical decisions, and then employ
these, whether they be wooden clubs, alcoholic beverages,
drugs, etc. But the fact that he/ she, too, uses
argumentation suspects there is some element of freedom in
human behavior. Also, if one takes determinism seriously,
anyone who believes in free will is determined to accept
that theory, so what possible good could reasonable
discussion accomplish (1993, 120).
'What is a human being?' is one of four questions Immanuel Kant put forward as
seminal and indispensable to philosophy (1998, 28). Katen provides a partial
answer to Kant's question with his assertion that free will is a distinguishing
feature of human beings:
Which makes most sense of and best illuminates the facts of
human experience as we know them? If the issue is put in
these terms, I think the position could be developed that
the idea of freedom is an inherent part of the defining
concept of man (1973, 318).
This is not to claim that an individual acting under coercion or handicapped by
a mental illness is not a human being. To the contrary, in criminal proceedings
such conditions are considered extenuating circumstances, contextualizing an
act in the interest of giving the accused full consideration as a human being.
Conversely, people who are being manipulated or lied to are not receiving full
consideration as human beings. Victims of manipulation or lies are unaware of
influences on their behavior, thus depriving them of their optimal exercise of
Harry Frankfurt of Princeton University has provided another partial answer to
the question: 'What is a human being?' He taught that free will is to be
understood in a hierarchical manner. The first-order of free will is the
ability to act on a desire. The second-order of free will is unique to human
beings: 'An act is free if it is in accord with the desire one wants to desire'
(Grim, 2008, 148). Frankfurt would make a distinction between alcoholics who
want a drink but do not want the desire to drink, and alcoholics who want a
drink and are untroubled by their desire to drink. The former are not free
because they do not want the desire to drink. They do not want to be alcoholics
and are drinking against their will. The latter are free to because their desire
to drink is acceptable to them. Having accepted their alcoholism, they are not
drinking against their will.
To better understand the difference between deliberate acts of free will and
nonthinking action, consider instances of creatures acting instinctively. The
eminent entomologist E.O. Wilson accomplished a fascinating experiment
following his discovery that living ants react to dead ants according to a
chemical message. Wilson learned that two days after an ant dies, the deceased
insect emits the odor of oleic acid. A living ant passing by a dead comrade
interprets the odor as a signal to remove the corpse to the colony's burial
area. Wilson was able to produce a substance with the odor of oleic acid, which
he then sprayed on a live ant. As he expected, the next ant passing by the ant
he had sprayed set about to remove the 'dead' ant to the burial site. The
sprayed ant resisted the premature funeral, vigorously fighting off the ant
attempting to make the removal to the final resting place. (One can only wonder
how the sprayed ant interpreted the odor of oleic acid.)
Similarly, Robert Cialdini reported the research of M.W. Fox, who noted an
innate behavior among turkeys -- specifically turkey mothers.
Turkey mothers are good mothers -- loving, watchful, and
protective... But there is something odd about their method.
Virtually all of this mothering is triggered by one thing:
the 'cheep-cheep' sound of young baby chicks... If a chick
makes the 'cheep-cheep' noise, its mother will care for it;
if not, the mother will ignore or sometimes kill it
(Cialdini, 1984, 2).
Polecats are natural enemies of turkeys and the approach of a polecat will
drive a turkey into a frenzy of squawking, clawing, and pecking. In Fox's
experiment he placed a stuffed polecat in the proximity of a mother turkey and
drew it toward her by pulling on an attached string. As expected, the mother
turkey reacted with a furious attack.
When however the same stuffed polecat carried inside it a
small recorder that played the 'cheep-cheep' sound of baby
turkeys, the mother not only accepted the oncoming polecat
but gathered it underneath her. When the machine was turned
off, the polecat model again drew a vicious attack (2).
In recent years considerable attention has been given to pheromones, chemical
signals that trigger a reaction to another member of the same species. A
possibility that has not been confirmed by research is that pheromones play a
significant role in the attraction of one human being to another. If pheromones
are a factor in romantic attraction then the role of conscious choice-making is
diminished. While this would not relegate people to the same deterministic
status as ants and turkeys, it does have implications for the understanding of
free will. Some researchers are suggesting that the selection of a partner
might not be an uncontaminated free will choice (Fallon and Aron, 2001).
The free will problem is not a mere playground for philosophers. As previously
stated, it is an integral part of any serious discussion of civil order,
criminal responsibility, justice, interpersonal relationships, and the personal
experience of guilt. In some situations, assigning responsibility to a person is
not easily accomplished. The case of James Carncross is such an instance. On
December 6, 2006 in Syracuse, New York a jury found the twenty-one year-old
Carncross guilty of criminally negligent homicide in the death of New York
State Trooper Craig Todeschini. Eight months earlier Todeschini was killed when
he lost control of his SUV while in pursuit of Carncross, who was on a
motorcycle evading the trooper at speeds in excess of one-hundred miles per
hour. Criminal negligence is defined as having acted in such a way as to create
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that an ordinary person would perceive as
substantial and unjustifiable. (The jury did not find Carncross guilty of
manslaughter: the killing of another with neither premeditation nor intention
The trial of James Carncross raised a philosophical question that has
reverberated through as many centuries as human beings have been thinking about
their behavior: How is personal responsibility determined? It is one thing to
say that people are responsible for their actions. Stated more precisely,
people are responsible for the consequences of their actions. It is quite
another thing to say that people are responsible for every event in a sequence
that was initiated by something they have done. People are accountable for any
and all foreseeable events that follow their actions and are connected to them.
However, there is no formula for distinguishing foreseeable events from those
that are unforeseeable. Making such a distinction is a matter of judgment.
The law of unintended consequences maintains that every significant action is
followed by unplanned events (Merton, 1936). It is implicit in this law that
statements like, 'I didn't intend for X to happen,' and 'I never anticipated
that X would happen,' are inadequate for the relief of responsibility. People
are responsible for the intentions and imaginable effects of their behavior.
This being said, 'I didn't mean for or anticipate that X would happen,' is not
the same thing as saying, 'No one could not have imagined that X would happen.'
Applying the law of unintended consequences to this case, is it reasonable to
assume that Trooper Todeschini's death is one of the possibilities Carncross
should have anticipated when he decided to take flight? Given the situation, it
seems doubtful that he deliberated before attempting his escape. If he
considered any possibilities, likely they included getting caught, getting away,
or getting himself killed. To have anticipated the trooper's death, Carncross
would have had to calculate that the trooper had no alternative means of pursuit
and would not break-off the chase -- even if it meant pursuing in excess of the
SUV's maneuvering capability. Ironically -- some might say criminally --
Carncross took for granted the trooper's high-speed driving ability and good
judgment in making pursuit. In other words, Carncross took for granted
Todeschini's ability to take care of himself.
The jury agreed with the prosecution and Carncross was sentenced to seven years
imprisonment to be followed by five years on probation. That he was responsible
for initiating the high-speed chase is indisputable. That he should have
anticipated the trooper's death is unclear. An indelicate question is: Does
Todeschini bear some responsibility for his own death? At his sentencing,
Carncross said, 'Had I known then what I know now, I would have stopped' (The
Post Standard, 2/15/07). There is no hint of determinism in that statement. He
believes that given different circumstances (i.e. more knowledge) he would have
chosen to act differently.
Regarding crime and punishment, forensic psychiatrist Dorothy Otnow Lewis has
likened free will to sanity in that both exist as a continuum:
... all or none standards of sanity and insanity don't do
justice to the complexity of human behavior... Guilt was a
lot easier to measure before we recognized that free will,
like sanity and insanity, is a constantly fluctuating
intellectual and emotional continuum and not a fixed,
immutable capacity or state of mind (1998, 283-284).
In 1984 a young lawyer witnessed the testimony of a ten-year-old rape victim in
the De Soto County courthouse in Hernando, Mississippi. The lawyer, John Grisham,
based his first novel, A Time to Kill, on what would have happened if the
girl's father had murdered her rapists. Legal defenses based on diminished
capacity, temporary insanity, and crimes of passion give weight to Lewis' view
that a human being's state of mind is subject to considerable variability. It
is no simple matter to assign responsibility for a crime committed under stress
so extraordinary that the defendant's state of mind was altered.
In a 1924 case hailed as 'the trial of the century' Clarence Darrow served as
the defense counsel for two young men who had abducted and murdered a
fourteen-year-old boy. Darrow had the accused, Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb,
plead guilty and then argued for life imprisonment in lieu of their execution.
Darrow argued that their state of mind had been altered by indoctrination into
the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche believed that men should
create their own values rather than passively conform to societal standards.
Darrow was successful in making the case that Leopold and Loeb were not fully
responsible for their crime:
Is any blame attached because somebody took Nietzsche's
philosophy seriously and fashioned a life upon it?... it is
hardly fair to hang a 19 year- old boy for the philosophy
that was taught him at a university (Darrow, 8/22/24).
Equally challenging is determining the culpability of individuals who have done
something so horrifying that the act itself is a declaration of a mental illness.
The psychiatric diagnosis of Edward Van Dyke will never be known, but there
is no doubting that his state of mind was pathological. In the spring of 2006,
while on vacation with his family in Florida, he threw his eight and
four-year-old sons from the fifteenth floor balcony of their hotel room. Van
Dyke, a physician, then jumped to his own death, making an explanation for this
bizarre murder-suicide unavailable.
Even among those who have committed similar acts, there is diversity among
their sentences. Sherwin Nuland's How We Die includes the horrifying,
heart-breaking narrative of the murder of nine-year-old Katie Mason by Peter
Carlquist, a paranoid schizophrenic man who was determined as not being
responsible for his crime. Not so for Andrea Yates, who drowned her five
children, ranging in age from six months to seven years. She was found guilty
of capital murder in spite of her psychiatric history that included chronic
depression and psychotic episodes accompanied by auditory hallucinations.
(Convicted in 2002, her sentence was overturned in 2006, when she was found not
guilty by reason of insanity and confined to a psychiatric institute.)
In The Man Who Mistook His Wife for His Hat, neurologist Oliver Sacks presents
the case study of Donald, a man who was not held responsible for a murder.
Although there was no question that he had committed the murder, Donald was
neither executed nor sent to prison. Instead, he was incarcerated in a
psychiatric hospital for the criminally insane.
Donald killed his girl while under the influence of PCP. He
had, or seemed to have, no memory of the deed -- and neither
hypnosis nor sodium amytal served to release any. There was,
therefore, it was concluded when he stood trial, not a
repression of memory, but an organic amnesia -- the sort of
blackout well described with PCP.
The details, manifest on forensic examination, were macabre
and could not be revealed in open court. They were discussed
in camera -- concealed from both the public and Donald
himself. Comparison was made with acts of violence
occasionally committed during temporal lobe or psychomotor
seizures. There is no memory of such acts, and perhaps no
intention of violence -- those who commit them are
considered neither responsible nor culpable, but are
nonetheless committed for their own and others' safety.
This was what happened with the unfortunate Donald
In contrast to Donald is Arthur Shawcross, the 'Genessee River Killer'
convicted in 1990 of ten murders and sentenced to 250 years in prison.
(Shawcross died in prison in 2008 at age 63.) Dorothy Otnow Lewis interviewed
Shawcross and testified for the defense at his trial. In Guilty by Reason of
Insanity she expresses her belief that there is a neurological explanation for
his psychopathic behavior:
... the MRI had shown that, nestled at the tip of his right
temporal lobe, was a small, fluid-filled cyst. The brain is
a very sensitive organ. The tiniest scar or tumor or cyst
can, under certain circumstances, trigger abnormal
electrical activity... Abnormal electrical foci at the
anterior pole of the temporal lobe have been associated
with bizarre, animalistic behaviors...
Mr. Shawcross never denied any of the murders to me. He
admitted everything. The trouble was, whenever I tried to
get a complete account of what he had done, Mr. Shawcross
became befuddled. He would repeatedly confuse one murder
with another. Finally, in desperation, I asked, 'Mr.
Shawcross, do you remember what happened?'
'No. Not really.'
'Then why did you confess to the police?'
He looked at me as though I were crazy. 'because I was
there!' (Lewis, 1998, 272)
Dr. Lewis' testimony did not establish an extenuating circumstance for the jury.
Moreover, she was reviled by the media and public. Instead of being respected
as a scientist and expert, she was maligned as being effusively sympathetic to a
Not only did the jury not believe me, they hated me. Then
again, so did the rest of Rochester (New York)... Night
after night during the course of my testimony I would
return to my hotel room... I would then switch on the news
and watch the man (or woman) in the street belittle me and
my testimony... It was a nightmare (280).
The Solution: Compatibilism
Is there a way out of this fly bottle or is any claim to a solution a futile
attempt to have one's cake and eat it too? Compatibilism 'claims that
determinism and free will can both be true. In other words, every event may
have a cause and I am still free to make my own choices' (Pence, 10). In
'Freedom and Necessity' A.J. Ayer advocated compatibilism as the solution to the
free will problem:
It seems that if we are to retain this idea of moral
responsibility, we must either show that men can be held
responsible for actions which they do not do freely, or
else find some way of reconciling determinism with the
freedom of the will (1969, 273).
Ayer and other compatibilists have located the problem in the confusion of two
terms: causation and coercion. Compatibilism maintains that causality equals
coercion is a false equation. At this point, perhaps an illustration will be
helpful. It is 8:00 p.m. and I have the desire for a cup of coffee. How do I
account for this desire? The contributing causes for this desire are numerous.
I live in a coffee-drinking culture and was raised in a family of coffee
drinkers. Many of the social interactions I enjoy are around a cup of coffee
and I find the taste of coffee pleasurable. In fact, the taste is so
pleasurable that after so many years of drinking coffee I have become
psychologically dependent upon it, if not addicted. Further, the Dunkin Donuts
advertisement informs me that, 'America runs on coffee.' Given all of these
factors, how can I believe that this desire generated from within me? It would
seem that Arthur Schopenhauer is right: 'A man can do what he wants, but the
catch is that he cannot will what he wills' (Katen, 314). Is there any place
for a free will choice in this circumstance?
Compatibilism allows for the concession that my desire for coffee is not the
result of a choice. The desire is the effect of the aforementioned causes.
Nevertheless, in the context of this situation I can choose to have or not have
the coffee. If I choose to have the coffee I will be responsible for not being
able to fall asleep tonight and any subsequent dysfunctionality owing to sleep
deprivation. I am not like a ping-pong ball going over Niagara Falls; I can
choose to resist this desire and actualize my choice. An allegory that
reinforces this idea is 'Autobiography in Five Short Chapters,' used in
I walk down the street.
There is a deep hole in the sidewalk.
I fall in.
I am lost... I am helpless.
It isn't my fault.
It takes forever to find a way out.
I walk down the street.
There is a deep hole in the sidewalk.
I pretend I don't see it.
I fall in again.
I can't believe I'm in the same place.
But, it isn't my fault.
It still takes a long time to get out.
I walk down the street.
There is a deep hole in the sidewalk.
I see it is there.
I still fall in... it's a habit... but,
my eyes are open.
I know where I am.
It is my fault.
I get out immediately.
I walk down the same street.
There is a deep hole in the sidewalk.
I walk around it.
I walk down another street.
According to compatibilism, God's foreknowledge equals no free will is another
false equation. It is a non sequitur that God's knowledge of all things future
constitutes coercion of all human beings to act in accordance with this
foreknowledge. To believe foreknowledge negates free will is analogous to
believing that knowledge of how a movie will end, because it is being seen for
the second time, determines how the movie will end. It could be argued that
God's knowledge of how people will use their free will has been integrated into
the divine plan. Such incorporation does not imply hard determinism. For example,
included in the New Testament is a narrative describing Pontius Pilate's
decision to have Jesus of Nazareth executed by crucifixion. If this is what
Pilate wanted to do, and apparently he did, then he exercised free will. He
cannot be commended for his contribution to the plan of salvation. Rather, he
is responsible for the execution of an innocent man and God is responsible for
integrating Pilate's unjust sentence into the redemptive plan. A more ordinary
illustration of non-coercive foreknowledge is accurately predicting that an
honest man will tell the truth in a given situation. Knowing that a man will
tell the truth is not tantamount to compelling him to speak truthfully.
There might be those who would view Pilate's placement in history as a form of
entrapment. Legally, entrapment is the construction of a situation to induce a
person to commit a crime that person would not have committed otherwise.
Entrapment is illegal because it places someone who has no predisposition to
commit a crime in a situation which any normal, law-abiding citizen would find
irresistible. Ruling on the matter of entrapment, the Supreme Court's decision
To determine whether or not entrapment has been established,
a line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary
innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal (Sherman v.
Implicit in this ruling is that a constructed situation that would not induce a
normal, law-abiding citizen to commit a crime is not entrapment. This category
of situation is referred to colloquially as a sting. A sting is within the law
because the determining factor for the criminal act resides in the
psychological state of the individual, not the orchestrated situation. Walter
Stace addressed this difference in his essay on free will:
... free acts are all caused by desires, or motives, or by
some sort of internal psychological states of the agent's
mind. The unfree acts, on the other hand, are all caused by
physical forces or physical conditions, outside the agent
(Fineberg and Shafer-Landeau, 2002, 490).
Returning to Pilate's decision, it could be said that he was caught in a sting
because his action was caused by his desire to do what was expedient -- even if
it meant the execution of an innocent man. (In John 19:6 Pilate said of Jesus:
'I find no basis for a charge against him.' In Luke 23:22, referring to Jesus,
Pilate said: 'I have found in him no grounds for the death penalty.')
A dilemma is a situation in which no matter which of two options you choose,
you will be wrong. Conversely, an antinomy is a situation in which no matter
which of two options you choose, you will be right. An antinomy is, 'the
existence of two incompatible statements, each of which taken on its own, is
reasonable' (Pence, 3). Rene Descartes classified the free will-determinism
debate as an antinomy (Grim, 131).
The Book of Kings records the wise ruling of Solomon when confronted by two
women claiming the same infant son. The king was unable to discern which of the
two women was the rightful mother until he called for a sword to have the baby
cut in half and then divided between the disputing women. The case was settled
when the actual mother said, 'Please my lord, give her the living baby! Don't
kill him!' (The other woman said, 'Neither I nor you shall have him. Cut him in
two!') If the baby had been divided by the sword, both women would have lost,
including the one who was telling the truth. In contrast to the case before
Solomon, both sides in the free will-determinism debate are telling the truth.
In the free will problem there is no 'true mother' to be discerned.
The benefit of compatibilism is that both free will and determinism enjoy the
status of being right. Imagine a world in which human beings were not
responsible for their behavior. The fact that such a world has never existed is
ample evidence that free will is right and necessary. Imagine a world in which
the law of cause-and-effect did not apply. Certainly, it is not the world in
which we live or anyone has ever lived. If either free will or determinism were
not true, it would be impossible for people to manage their lives.
A compromise is required when opposing sides have equal and competing claims.
People who say, 'I never compromise when I am right,' are properly asked, 'When
do you compromise, when you are wrong? Why should anyone compromise with you
when you are wrong?' A compromise is a settlement of differences between two
parties who are right, each in their own way. A compromise provides a solution
in which the merits of both positions are retained. The free will-determinism
problem is not like a Rubik's cube with a solution by which all sides are
neatly reconciled. Neither is the free will problem like the case decided by
Solomon, in which one claimant lost and the other won. The free
will-determinism dispute is an antinomy that calls for each side to concede to
the correctness of the other. Compatibilism includes these concessions.
Compatibilism also requires each side to see itself, if standing alone, as an
incomplete explanation of the human condition.
Ayer, A.J. 1969. 'Freedom and Necessity.' in Philosophical Essays. New York. St.
Cialdini, R. 1984. Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. New York: Collins.
Darrow, C. 'The State of Illinois vs. Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb.' August
22, 1924. Recovered from the Lerner and Loeb Homepage.
Fallon, J. and Aron, A. 2001. 'Mysteries of Mating.' The Learning Channel. Film
Garden Entertainment, Inc.
Feinberg, J. and Shafer-Landeau, R. 2002. Reason and Responsibility: Readings
in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thompson
Grim, P. 2008. Philosophy of the Mind: Brains, Consciousness, and Thinking
Machines. Chantilly, VA: The Teaching Company.
Holbach, P. 1770. 'The Illusion of Free Will.' in Reason and Responsibility:
Readings in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy. 2002. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/
Thompson Learning. p. 462.
Kant, I. 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Guyer, P. and Wood, A.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Katen, T. 1973. Doing Philosophy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Lewis, D.O. 1998. Guilty by Reason of Insanity. New York: The Ballantine
Merton, R. 'The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposeful Social Interaction.'
American Psychological Review. Vol. 1, Issue 6, Dec. 1936.
Morris, W., Editor. 1969. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Pence, G. 2000. A Dictionary of Common Philosophical Terms. New York:
Popkin, R. and Stroll, A. 1993. Philosophy Made Simple. New York: Bantam
Sacks, O. 1970. The Man Who Mistook His Wife for His Hat and Other Clinical
Tales. New York: Summit Books.
The Post Standard. Syracuse, NY. February 15, 2007.
(c) Max Malikow 2009
III. 'ARISTIPPUS FOR HAPPINESS' BY KRISTIAN URSTAD
The traditional and popular characterization we have handed down to us of
Aristippus of Cyrene amounts to something like the following. That though he
led a kind of colourful, iconoclastic pleasure-filled life, there was little
there in the way of a clearly defined end or telos, no conception, in other
words, of happiness or eudaimonia, understood in the minimal sense as a concern
for one's life as a whole. Scholars have had various explanations for this. I
want to spend some time on three of the more popular explanations advanced in
recent years for Aristippus' alleged anti-eudaimonism. All three accounts, I
try to argue, are not only unconvincing but largely incompatible with the bulk
of the evidence. More positively, I hope to show that Aristippus is actually
someone who is firmly entrenched in the surrounding eudaimonistic tradition,
someone who does not run foul of the ordinary Greek commitments to prudence and
life as a whole, understood as a concern for the future.
It must be mentioned that the notion of ancient eudaimonia is a comprehensive
(and contentious) one, and I do not here try to give a comprehensive treatment
of it. Such a treatment would include considerations of self-sufficiency,
rationality and morality, among others -- all important eudaimonist concerns.
What I am particularly interested in here are the following minimum assumptions
(discernible in Socrates/ Plato and the surrounding philosophical tradition):
there is an articulation of an ultimate goal or aim (telos), which is (agreed
on as best) characterized by the term happiness (eudaimonia), and that
happiness must concern one's life as a whole, or at least involve a significant
amount of forethought about one's future. Again, my intention in this paper is
to show that Aristippus, against popular interpretation, does not break with
these minimum assumptions.
Wolfgang Mann claims that Aristippus makes no clear statement of, and has no
account of, the telos, understood as a single and specific end for one's life
as a whole. I will call this the lack of telos explanation. T. H. Irwin, in his
paper entitled 'Aristippus against Happiness', argues that Aristippus rejects
eudaimonia because he has doubts about personal identity or a continuing self,
which are in turn grounded in a kind of radical epistemology. I will call this
the radical epistemology explanation. Julia Annas claims that Aristippus
essentially throws prudence to the winds, that he goes after 'what is presently
attractive, quite explicitly at the price of commitments to ideals which require
self-control and deferral of gratification'. I will refer to this as the lack of
Let us begin with the lack of telos explanation. Mann has written a paper on
Aristippus where he claims that he held no telos at all, for the reason that
'philosophers before Aristotle did not use this terminology; they did not
concern themselves with anything they called the telos.' He concludes that
those who ascribe a view about a telos to Aristippus are doing so
anachronistically, on the basis of the anecdotes about him. Before proceeding,
a quick word about the meaning of telos is in order. Of course, the principal
sense of telos is end or goal. Though in some cases it can mean the goal or
purpose of any particular action, here it is concerned with the overriding goal
of a person's life, the ultimate or supreme good.
Now is Mann right to question the existence and use of the concept telos as it
concerns the final aim for one's life as a whole before Aristotle? This would
seem to depend on the sense he gives it. Perhaps he means that those before did
not concern themselves with anything they called the telos in the sense that
their views were not grounded in anything like Aristotle's theoretical
teleology about human nature. If talk of telos is strictly connected to the
development of Aristotelian teleology, then of course it would seem to be ipso
facto true that philosophers before Aristotle did not concern themselves with
the terminology in exactly that sense. But, for starters, the notion of telos
as the final end and its determination has no essential connection to natural
teleology. Aristotle may rely on it but Plato, and certainly the two later
Hellenistic schools, seem to start from some conception of the highest good,
and then from that derive a characterization of the good life.
Moreover, and importantly, Plato actually does use the term telos explicitly at
Protagoras 354b7 and in the same dialogue seems to employ it synonymously with
the goal concerned with the whole of one's life (356d4-5), which we know from
elsewhere he identifies with happiness (eudaimonia) (Meno, 77e-78b; Symp. 205a2
-3; Euthd. 278e). Plato also uses telos at Gorgias 499e8 (and again at Symp.
205a-d) where he identifies it with the good, which later he uses
interchangeably with happiness (494eff). So Mann, it would seem, is simply
wrong to say that philosophers before Aristotle did not use this terminology.
In any case, since Plato uses it in his publications, the notion of a final end
or telos is clearly available to Aristippus, a contemporary of his and a student
Now what is true is that the term telos is not explicitly attributed to
Aristippus anywhere in the historically proximate testimony (although there are
clear attributions of telos to Aristippus in later sources). However, that it
is not given explicit mention is no assurance that Aristippus did not employ it
or have it in mind. For instance, in Xenophon's Memorabilia, an important
historically proximate source, Aristippus speaks markedly to Socrates about
wanting to aim for the 'pleasant life' and 'happiness' (eudaimonia) ( 2. 1. 9-
11). There is every indication here that he takes this aim to be synonymous or
convertible with telos, or end concerned with the whole of one's life (more on
this discussion in the Memorabilia shortly).
Let us now move on to the radical epistemology explanation. Some scholars have
attempted to account for Aristippus' (and the Cyrenaics') strong emphasis on
the present by appealing to the view that he holds a conception of personal
identity which denies that the same agent sees himself as persisting throughout
a lifetime, in other words, that he sees himself as a single, temporally
extended person. T.H. Irwin (as far as I am aware of, the only scholar to
have devoted an entire paper to it) claims Aristippus and the Cyrenaics reject
long-term planning, or eudaimonia, because they have doubts about personal
identity or a continuing self. Such reservations are in turn related, it is
argued, to certain ontological and epistemological doubts they have about
aggregates or collections of affections or impressions (pathe).
Very briefly, the brunt of Irwin's argument runs as follows. The Cyrenaics
ground their main ethical position, that individual present pleasure is the
moral end, on the distinction between particular and collections of pathe.
While they see individual present pleasure as belonging to particular or simple
pathe and so as identifiable and irrefutable, they see eudaimonia and temporally
extended selves in compositional terms or as collections of pathe and so as
unidentifiable and fallible -- hence they adopt a sceptical stance towards them
Whether Irwin believes Aristippus the Elder to hold these doubts is unclear,
although he does say that if 'my argument is plausible, it may indirectly
support the view that Cyrenaic philosophical doctrines may go back to
Aristippus the Socratic...' (n.2) In any case, the view espoused here would
amount to roughly the following. Aristippus holds an account of personal
identity which conflicts with the 'common-sense' view of the same agent
persisting throughout the whole of life. 'Future selves' stand to 'present
selves' from a diachronic perspective in the same way as other persons on a
synchronic perspective do. Hence, the reasoning goes, we will not be concerned
with the future since whatever it brings will not really belong to us -- those
plans will really be for our 'future selves' for whom we have no rational
concern. We would have no good reason therefore to sacrifice our pleasures now
for the sake of our 'other' selves down the road. We would thus be rejecting
the assumption that temporal stages in our life must all be taken into account
with every rational choice, or, to put it another way, we would be concluding
that to discount 'our' own future pleasures is rational because the pleasures
experienced by later selves is not fully one's 'own'.
Though neatly cogent, there is absolutely no justification for such a view to
be found in the testimony on Aristippus, let alone the Cyrenaics. Nothing
explicit in the sources concerning Aristippus himself even remotely suggests
concerns about temporal identity. In fact, the sources on Aristippus
unequivocally land on the side of the 'common-sense' view. For example,
Aristippus explicitly states there that he wishes for a life (bios) of the
greatest pleasure that can be had (2. 1. 9) and then goes on to claim that he
in fact has the most certain path to happiness (eudaimonia) (2. 1. 11). This
does not seem to be indicative of someone who has abandoned or diverged from any
normal way of thinking about himself or his life as a whole. Rather it seems
clear that this sort of perspective, or eudaimonism, presupposes, or rests on
the assumption of, a conception of the ethical agent as a self whose identity
endures over time, in other words, of someone conceiving of oneself as having a
life -- a chain of actions and experiences that belong to one subject lasting
through (a least a significant period of) time.
Moreover, even when they are not explicitly spelled out, such eudaimonistic
undertones clearly permeate their discussion and similar implications are to be
found later in Socrates' rendition of Prodicus' Fable, where, for starters, the
two women there appear to symbolize two opposing personal lifestyles or
life-strategies, not two opposing points of view with regards to time, or
considerations for the whole of life. Hence, with respect to the testimony of
Xenophon, not only is it clear from certain claims he makes that Aristippus is
conceiving of the good life or life as a whole -- and thus by extension of
himself as a temporally extended and persisting agent -- but the language and
the overriding concern of the discussion itself, actually presupposes it.
Much of the later testimony also implies or entails belief in a continuing self
on the part of Aristippus. To take just one apparent example, consider the
following passage from Diogenes:
Again, when Aristippus was asked what are the subjects
which handsome boys ought to learn, his reply was, 'Those
which will be useful to them when they are grown up.'
Aristippus here is clearly conceiving of the boys and the grown men they will
one day become as the same agents in different times.
That Aristippus rejects eudaimonia, understood as a concern for one's life as a
whole, because he holds certain sceptical views about personal identity is
simply not supported by any evidence. Nevertheless, Aristippus does not require
any such view in order to reject a concern for the future. Perhaps he simply
advocates a policy of present pleasure-pursuit divorced entirely from
forethought towards one's life as a whole. This brings us to the lack of
prudence explanation. Julia Annas, in her The Morality of Happiness, claims
that Aristippus' position falls short of any kind of prudential theory of
conduct. She thinks that seen against the long-term hedonism of Plato's
Protagoras, Aristippus holds an irrational and absurd view. She maintains that
Aristippus' own form of pleasure pursuit, with its emphasis on the present
moment and perceived lack of concern for the future, is far removed from
Socrates' stress in the Protagoras on hedonism as a rational overall strategy
to guarantee maximum pleasure over one's life as a whole (228).
To begin with, I take it as evident that, in an assessment of his actions, it
simply cannot be true that Aristippus takes no concern whatsoever of the future.
Nobody who is concerned with any kind of deliberative activity at all can
ever be said to be totally unconcerned with anything that extends beyond the
present temporal point that one occupies; after all, even a simple action like
reaching for a glass of wine at the dinner table involves a concern for a
future state of affairs.
But more importantly, to attribute to Aristippus any such radical discounting
simply runs antithetical to his commitments, implied throughout the testimony,
to a fair amount of prudential discrimination and self-control. This is clearly
expressed in both of Aristippus' discussions with Socrates in the Memorabilia.
At 2. 1. 4-6, he agrees with Socrates' counsel in approaching certain situation
with the requisite foresight. Earlier on, Socrates runs through seven respects
in which, if one wishes to lay claim to being fit to rule, one ought to
practice prudence and self-control. In every instance Aristippus responds with
full affirmation; for instance, he completely agrees with Socrates that to
plunge headlong, like a silly animal, into adultery when there are other, less
dangerous ways of satisfying such a desire is sheer lunacy (2. 1. 5). And later,
at 3. 8. 2, Aristippus asks Socrates if anything is good, with the intent of
showing that, if Socrates mentioned some good thing like food or drink, it can
sometimes be bad. I take Aristippus' point here to be about the harmful
consequences of present indulgence; drinking is not a good thing if it turns
out to be outweighed by its painful effects. So, at least according to the
testimony of Xenophon, Aristippus does not appear to deny reflection or
foresight of the future effects of one's actions.
Outside of the historically proximate Memorabilia, there is also much testimony
to the effect that Aristippus was very conscious of forethought and of not being
overcome by pleasures and not being subjected to unpleasant consequences. An
excellent example of this is reported by Diogenes Laertius: 'One day, as they
entered the house of a courtesan, one of the young men in his company blushed.
Aristippus warned him, 'It is not going in that is dangerous, but being unable
to come out.'' (II 69) Thus Grote (1865, 555), going against the traditional
and popular characterization of Aristippus, appears to be right on track:
'Prudence, knowledge, the art of mensuration or calculation, were essential to
Aristippus, and ought to be put in the foreground when his theory is stated.'
Now we might perhaps allow that Aristippus cares for some amount of prudential
discrimination without at the same time attributing to him any kind of
long-term concern about one's life. Maybe he holds to some type of short-term
conception of happiness, where there is some forethought about one's future
actions but this is limited to the near-distant future. According to such an
account, Aristippus would show some prudential concern for the shorter-term
future, but no over-arching concern for life as a whole. I think this is highly
doubtful. This is because a conception of happiness as some kind of short-term
state is not something that would be widely shared by the Greeks, at least up
until the time of Aristotle. This is reflected, among other places, in
Aristotle's account of common views in the Rhetoric (1360b14ff). There, when
Aristotle describes the different views of happiness representing common
beliefs, there is not one which does not point to, or show concern for, a
condition of a person's life as a whole. Of course, this is not proof that
Aristippus could, or did not, hold such a view, but it makes clear the general
counter-intuitiveness of any such claim about happiness. Moreover, given the
prevalence of this view of happiness as some condition of a person's life as
whole, we might reasonably suppose that Aristippus should be understanding it
in this way unless he clearly says or indicates otherwise.
A final point about Aristippus' surrounding philosophical tradition. In the
very few commentaries on the ethical views of Aristippus out there, there has
been little attempt to try to consider his views, or make sense of him, in
light of his Socratic background and affiliation. This, I believe, is an
important oversight; since consideration of this background will also give us
some reason to assume Aristippus does not run foul of a commitment to happiness
or life as a whole.
To begin with, there was clearly a strong connection between Aristippus and
Socrates. This connection is first implied by Plato in the Phaedo. Recalling
the names of the most faithful friends of Socrates who were present the day on
which the philosopher drank the hemlock, Plato felt the need to expressly say
that Aristippus was not there since he was at Aegina (59b). This might suggest
that Aristippus was a true intellectual follower of Socrates, someone with a
special adherence on a philosophical level. After all, Plato is reported to
have been on bad terms with Aristippus and to have abused him. The fact that
Plato nevertheless makes sure to account for the absentee makes all the more
convincing that there existed an important connection or relationship between
Socrates and Aristippus. Moreover, we might find it hard to envision
Socrates being in a relationship with anyone without there being some sort of
intellectual bond between them.
This connection in the Phaedo brings us to a further important point which
bears on the issue of philosophical substantiality on the part of Aristippus.
Aristippus was not only a friend and admirer of Socrates (e.g. see Phaedo 58c,
Aristotle's Rhetoric 2. 23. 12, Eusebius, PE, 14. 18. 31, and Xen. Mem. 2. 1)
but also his student. Diogenes Laertius reports that Aristippus was a pupil of
Socrates (II 74), who was his teacher (II 65), and that he went to him for
wisdom and education (II 78, 80). It would be reasonable to assume from this
that it is not simply certain attitudes or convictions or a set of character
traits exhibited in a style of life that Aristippus receives from his teacher -
- although these are important too (for instance, a sense of confidence and
autonomy), but also certain philosophical views or reflections (though of
course this is not to suggest that Aristippus need have endorsed them all).
Indeed, it is hard to imagine that listening to Socrates speak and being
exposed to the sorts of questions he asked and to his intellectual vitality in
general would not have bore in an admirer and receptive individual like
Aristippus a worthy degree of philosophical fruit, both in the form of
reflection and theory.
As well, it is important to remember that both Plato (Phaedo 59b) and Xenophon
(Mem. Book 2. 1; 3. 8), two informants who were actually present in the
Socratic circle, imply (in Plato's case), or report (in Xenophon's case),
Socrates' and Aristippus' presence with one another. Furthermore, given that
they were similar in age and their close association in Athens, Plato's
dialogues were almost certainly available to Aristippus. Thus not only was
Aristippus actually intimately close at hand to Socrates himself, but he had
exposure to the views of 'Socrates' in Plato dialogues (and presumably to other
Socratic writings in the same period).
So why is all this important? It is important because it would seem to make all
the more probable that Aristippus was not some anomalous figure with heterodox
views with respect to eudaimonia. As mentioned earlier, Socrates, both in the
works of Plato and Xenophon, is repeatedly talking to his interlocutors about
the long-term goal of happiness (with no apparent sign of confusion or
disagreement on their part). Moreover, the philosophical climate in general
espouses the commonplace idea that there was a highest good and that this
involved consideration of one's life as a whole. For instance, many of the
so-called minor-Socratics around during this time -- Antisthenes for example --
are working within this eudaimonistic model (DL VI 11). Thus, given the
philosophical climate he was immersed in and his looming Socratic background
and affiliation, it is hard to imagine Aristippus would have advocated a type
of anti-eudaimonism. This, coupled with the (as we have seen) failure of
certain popular explanations advanced in recent years for Aristippus' alleged
lack of concern for the future or long-term goal, should strongly suggest that
Aristippus does not run foul of Greek eudaimonism, understood in the basic
sense as a concern for one's life as a whole.
1. Mann, 1996, 114-116.
2. Long, 1999, 618, n.3.
3. E.g., Athenaeus, Deipn. XII 544a; Diogenes, II 85; Aristocles, Praep. Ev.
XIV 18, 31.
4. Mitsis, 1998, 56; Irwin, 1991.
5. Irwin, 1991, 62-6.
6. Even Irwin, 1991, though well into his exposition by now, admits this: 'My
attempt to connect Cyrenaic objections to happiness with doubts about personal
identity lacks direct support from the sources; for they never say either (i)
that Cyrenaics have sceptical doubts about personal identity or (ii) that these
doubts underlie the objections to happiness.' (69) For further doubts on Irwin's
view, primarily in regards to Cyrenaic epistemology, see Tsouna, 2002, Sect. III,
and O'Keefe, 2002, 395-416. See also Gosling and Taylor, 1983, 41.
7. In fact, drawing from the conversation between Aristippus and Socrates and
including the rendition of Prodicus' Fable, there are, assembled together,
thirteen references to variations of bios, zoe, and eudaimonia.
8. See also Tsouna, 1998, 133, for more such presuppositions in the testimony.
9. For example, DL III 36, DL II 65; see also the suggested enmity at 1398b31-
32 in Aristotle's Rhetoric, and in Athenaeus, Deip. VIII, 343c-d and XI, 507b.
10. Plato, after all, does not mention Xenophon's absence from the death-scene,
and there was apparently also quite a bit of bad-blood between these two (see,
e.g. Athenaeus, Deip. XI, 504e-f). Again, that he felt a need to mention
Aristippus is perhaps telling.
11. See Vlastos, 1991, 203 and Irwin, 1995, 32-33.
12. Isocrates, writing just 10 to 15 years after the death of Socrates, also
points out that this understanding of happiness was a central one in the early
Socratic tradition (Against the Sophists 3-4).
(c) Kristian Urstad 2009
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