P H I L O S O P H Y P A T H W A Y S ISSN 2043-0728
Issue number 106
6th July 2005
I. 'Moral Objectivity and Moral Relativism' by Brandon Johns
II. 'Leibniz on The Good Life' by Jurgen Lawrenz
III. 'The Principle of Non-Attachment and the Problem of Human Meaningfulness'
by Ruel F. Pepa
In this issue, Brandon Johns, a graduate philosophy student at the University
of Southern California, questions the explanations offered by the moral
objectivist to account for the phenomenon of moral relativity.
Jurgen Lawrenz takes a fresh look at the views of the philosopher Leibniz --
famous, or infamous, for his view that this world is the 'best of all possible
worlds' -- on the nature of the good life.
Professor Ruel Pepa offers a concise and challenging definition of human
freedom in terms of his concept of 'non-attachment'.
I have received a call for submissions from Munayem Mayenin, Editor of The
Poet's Letter http://www.poetsletter.com which has sections on Philosophy,
Politics, Literature, Art and Music. Munayem Mayenin is a poet and philosopher
who has contributed articles to Issues 35, 45, 50 and 68 of Philosophy Pathways.
I. 'MORAL OBJECTIVITY AND MORAL RELATIVISM' BY BRANDON JOHNS
[Article removed at author's request]
(c) Brandon Johns 2005
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, CA
II. 'LEIBNIZ ON THE GOOD LIFE' BY JURGEN LAWRENZ
As an apostle of 'the best of all possible worlds', Leibniz had much to say
throughout his life on the notion that there is in Nature an undeniable
tendency for maximisation of potential, or as he styled it, an 'increase in
perfection'. Indeed, he goes further than simply observing this trend and
stating it as a principle: existence itself is a consequence of this striving.
Inasmuch, therefore, as God is himself the arch-epitome of perfection, it would
be surprising indeed if his creatures did not exhibit this striving towards
perfection -- a striving, in a word, for the goodness and plenitude that are
exemplified in the concept of a benevolent and omnipotent creator.
Whenever we speak of The Good, this platonic reification of an adjectival
attribute, and of The Good Life, a close kin of Plato's 'examined life', we are
moving on ground which can be illustrated from a Leibnizian perspective. Leibniz
saw himself as the legatee of Plato's thought in these matters, even though that
was a dubious self-ascription, because his own doctrines are much closer to the
spirit of Aristotelian metaphysics. Indeed Leibniz, like Aristotle, was not
above commonplace moralising on the goods which go hand in hand with the good
life. If you detect a whiff of the pejorative in my way of phrasing this, it is
probably due to an inner disharmony in the juxtaposition of the three 'goods'
here assembled. The Good and the Good Life are moral concepts; but what shall
we say of Goods? We have come around today to a pretty cynical appreciation of
them as consumables, of ourselves as consumers and of consumption as a disease
of capitalism. So there is a contrapost of sanity, apparently, in the words
addressed by Leibniz to his fellow Germans, while reconstruction from the ruins
of war was in progress:
... do you not enjoy abundance of all things that make
living a pleasure? Do you not live under a grape vine and fig
tree of your own?... Need I rehearse how the heavens are
well-disposed, neither burning with excess of heat nor
irking your with damnable cold; that infectious diseases
are rare among us; that we know nothing of the earthquakes
which affright Asia and other foreign parts; that our soil
is criss-crossed with metals and covered with fruits and
filled with livestock, so that, if you but grant and
confess your own good luck, whatsoever serves to satisfy
your needs, and your comforts and pleasures too, you will
find it right here at home.
But Leibniz's age had a different perspective on goods in any case. Goods are
part of the social product: whether food, clothing, friendship, entertainment
-- or in general those things that make life easier such as today's kitchen
appurtenances or microphones for speakers, or more enjoyable such as cars,
computers and casinos.
There is no bargaining with the fact that a considerable portion of the science
of the West has been devoted to its conversion into goods. Yet science, let me
remind you, is geared to the discovery of the Truth, just as philosophy is:
though science is also, in intention, value-free, except to the extent that
truth is regarded as a value.
Elevating the culture of knowledge was one of Leibniz's most ardently pursued
dreams. Many of his own inventions served this purpose; but he was tireless
also in encouraging others to put their shoulders to the wheel, especially
those with power or money. In 1671 he wrote his Grundriss eines Bedenkens
towards the establishment of a German Academy of Arts and Sciences; in it he
reminded his readers that
we may be certain that, so much as anyone knows of
nature's wonders, his heart encloses so many portraits of
God's majesty, if he but refer from those unto their
You can't get closer the concept of 'value-free value' than this. For Leibniz,
it goes without saying, God is best sought in his works; but equally, that what
is good about life is nothing other than the enjoyment of the provisions made by
the Almighty for our admiration and wonderment:
... on account of which I am of opinion that even the
greatest moralists and politici, if they altogether lack of
being naturalists and neither perceive nor attend the
wonders of nature, of necessity forfeit the right amazement
and the true cognisance and therewith the heartfelt love of
God, that ought to vouchsafe the perfection of their souls.
Work pleasing to God must ipso facto be pleasing to us. Yet there follows a
reminder that human weakness is prone to lapsing from even a mediocre standard
every truth, every experiment or theorem, has its worth
and commendation -- even if you cannot make a problem
out of it such as, whether it yield lucriferum, or
perchance only luciferum? -- as a new-found mirror of God's
A warning cry of a sort, to be sure. But perhaps all this has been said too
many times -- has it not become a platitudinous cynicism to believe in the
perfectibility of mankind? What do we make today of Leibniz's penultimate
paragraph, just before he comes down to the practicalities of how actually to
set up an academy?
Happiness would be in the compass of the human race if a
general conspiracy and comprehension were not reckoned as
an inter chimaeras, alike to Utopia Mori and Civitate Solis
Campanellae and Atlantide Baconi; and withal the great Lords
consilia kept themselves at great distance from the common
weal. Notwithstanding reason, with justice and good
conscience, brings about that each man who works his
best in his sphaera activitatis, be exculpate before God
and the tribunal of his conscience.
Cold comfort, we should say. What happiness to people whose migraines persisted
for lack of a Panadol; whose sphaera activitatis (work or leisure) was
constrained to a radius of 5 leagues in all directions; whose survival in old
age depended on the Gnadenbrot of some princeling's whim? True: this is
judging through the wrong end of the tube. But affluence exacts its price too.
A society in which any person can earn 'rewards' before they do any work and
pay for them for perhaps the rest of their lives are as imprisoned as the 17th
century villager -- they finish up being imprisoned by their 'goods'.
The question then is, do we really enjoy the plenitude of goods at our disposal
or are they simply the clutter we need to deafen ourselves to the lack of
genuine goods, namely the goods of which Leibniz speaks?
Goods are not in themselves a barometer of the Good Life. Comforts, yes -- and
the 'rewards', if that's how we wish to see them, for hard work and the
unpleasantness of being vulnerable to bad health, accident, disappointment in
career, love, excitement and the trimmings of whatever we may be pleased to
regard as 'positive' aspects of life. Political freedom and, in recent ages,
religious freedom, play their role in this as well. But one may well wonder if
these freedoms are what they purport to be. Political and religious freedom
means, for many, simply the freedom of non-participation in social
responsibility. To be free in this way -- and I'm tempted to include freedom
from philosophy in this -- is mostly nothing more than a refusal to engage with
our conscience, which is another way of saying, a refusal to refer whatever we
are doing or not doing to something higher than mere subsistence as humans.
I'll be so brazen as to include Goods in this: for goods are to most of us just
another way of organising our subsistence. They are not referred to anything
higher, neither God nor conscience nor wisdom; and thus it is surely dubious
whether Goods and the Good Life have the direct connection we tend to associate
Leibniz would agree with this. In another of his German texts, dating from
close to 1700 and entitled, Gluckseligkeit, often rendered into English as
'Wisdom', he starts with a series of axioms, of which the first states,
Wisdom is nothing other than knowledge of Happiness,
inasmuch as it teaches us how to attain happiness.
A few lines further down, he tells us that pleasant and joyful thoughts are
conveyed to us by our perception of a gift for perfection or excellence. We
should note that for Leibniz (as indeed for all thinkers of that age),
'perfection' did not mean 'cannot be improved', but was a synonym for
completeness. A thing or act may be complete, and yet improvable: hence the
equivalence of perfection and excellence; and indeed Leibniz goes on to say
that 'excellence ... is that feature by which a matter acquires more
self-realisation... [i.e.] real being, strength, knowledge, rectitude,
advantage, depth of thought'. Today we look askance at the word 'wisdom' and
feel it embodies a somehow antiquated concept of knowledge. But this is not an
impression which easily persists when you teach, say, adult education, when you
are soon confronted with a genuine thirst for wisdom -- and then, because of our
helplessness vis-a-vis this strange, indefinable idea, we feed them more
knowledge in the forlorn hope that wisdom will somehow precipitate by itself!
Leibniz had no such scruples:
We do not notice at all times wherein the perfection of
pleasant things consists, or to what kind of perfection
they serve us; meanwhile however it is perceived by our
humour, if not by our comprehension. We say, in general:
'I know not what it is' that makes me like this thing; we call
it 'sympathy'; but those who seek the origin of things, may
find its source and understand that underneath the surface
of appearance there is something that though it escapes
notice, is truly the essence of the matter.
He is talking about harmony here: the order and perfection of things that is
hidden in the crinkled textures of phenomena. The insight applies unilaterally:
Perfection is what I call the elevation of any state of
being; for just as sickness is so to speak a degradation
and leave-taking from health, so perfection is an
augmentation beyond it, while health itself occupies the
middle ground and is the fulcrum and provides the platform
Accordingly Leibniz never entertains the least doubt that happiness, ergo the
Good Life, derive from a fuller understanding of the pleasures of the soul
(mind); but this in turn can be achieved in no other way than by improving our
understanding of nature, including human nature; for in the end 'a present joy
will not make us happy if it will not persist; for he will surely fall into
deprivation who seeks short-lived joy and suffers long-enduring grief in
consequence.' From which it follows that 'nothing serves as well for happiness
than the illumination of our reason and the training of the will to work
according to reason.'
For Leibniz all this boils down to enquiring after the respective quantities of
good and ill in life. What are the circumstances which we may associate with the
good life? If we are healthy, but poor; or if we are wealthy, but bored: is the
glass half full or half empty? Are we entitled to complain in either of these
respects? Leibniz was not the first, nor the last, to propose that we err in
looking on good health and middling comforts with a mind-set geared to deja-vu:
What we understand when we speak of physical ills is
nothing other than the displeasure of pain, grief and all
the other discomforts. But does this mean that a physical
good consists altogether of pleasure?... In my view, it
consists in a common condition, as for example good health.
We are in possession of all the good we need when we are not
in a bad way: just as it is one rung on the ladder to wisdom
to be free of foolishness: 'Sapienta prima est stultitia
carnisse.' And we earn praise if we have avoided blame:
'Si non culpabor, sat nihi laudis erit.' From this point of
view, all those of our feelings which do not directly
displease are physical goods, even if they are not
productive of pleasure; for it is deprivation, that
constitutes a physical ill.
In other words, there is a high preponderance of good in our lives, which we
despise when we take it for granted. Our greatest error is amour propre, which
makes us perceive distress as an insult and undeserved rebuke; and then,
involuntarily and as a psychological necessity, we expect and demand
overcompensation, instead of offering simple and sincere thanks for the return
of normalcy. As Leibniz wrote:
Our ills excite attention much more than our good; but it
stands to reason that therefore our ills must be but few in
comparison... For although many people profess to despise
human nature... yet by the same token self-love is highly
prevalent and most people are only too ready to be
satisfied with themselves.
There is also a quite unsavoury trait to be observed in this -- what Plato
refers to as pleonexia: wanting always more, especially Goods. Wanting, and the
lack of having, impinge on feelings and distort our perception of the genuine
Good, as Leibniz points out in his rebuke of Bayle:
Monsieur Bayle indicates that people who consider
themselves unhappy, undoubtedly are -- for in the end, our
feelings furnish the criteria for good and ill. But I reply
that a momentary feeling is the least reliable criterion for
any past or present good or evil. I admit that one may be in
pretty bad shape while such melancholy reflections endure;
but this cannot obliterate a previous sense of well-being,
nor that all in all the good we have exceeds by far all ills.
Passages like these remind us that, until quite recently, Leibniz was
considered a representative of the brand of rationalist humanism which brought
an immense optimism to bear on social and moral questions as well as a
seemingly inexhaustible confidence in the perfectibility of life. Today we gaze
on this optimism as a sphinx-like manifestation of innocent ebullience. We have
lost the last shred of it in the calamities of the 20th century; and we trust
reason no more than we trust trust (or faith) itself. That 'reason is the slave
of passion', as Hume opined, seems a much apter motto than the hope and belief
in the Good Life which Leibniz and his generation shared.
One might suspect that the diminishing affinity to the idea of benevolent
(transcendent) powers lies at the roots of our recent pessimism in even the
possibility of a Good Life, let alone that abstract notion of The Good.
Instead, Goods have become substitutes for it.
But if one seriously engages with Leibniz, and his historical station, one can
only wonder why the opinion holds that he and his generation should have had
more cause for optimism than we. Leibniz was an offspring of the 30-years war,
whose disastrous consequences matched the catastrophes of the Black Death and
the First World War. But his answer, in the Theodicy, to all those complainants
who whimpered, 'Why does God visit these calamities on us, on guilty and
innocent, on good and evil alike, and seemingly indiscriminately?', was that
God has laid the decisions affecting good and evil into our hands. If we want
the Good, it is there for us to achieve. And God did not create evil, as its
simple-minded personification seeks to persuade us: being a privation, it is up
to us not to deprive ourselves of The Good. And he had the confidence, even amid
the smoke of ruins and the still warm blood of the dead of the recent carnage,
to look forward to the rationality of man asserting itself. He would do his bit
to ensure that the world understood this message.
1. Quotations translated from Heer, F. (ed.): Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz:
Auswahl aus seinen Werken. Fischer, Frankfurt/M 1950.
2. pittance or sufferance.
(c) Jurgen Lawrence 2005
III. 'THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-ATTACHMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN MEANINGFULNESS'
BY RUEL F. PEPA
The principle of non-attachment in the context of human reality -- why, are
there other contexts in this case? -- is a principle of human freedom. It is a
potent acid test to prove in definite terms the reality of human will which is
inherently free -- for to talk of 'free will' is a redundancy. The will is
necessarily non-attached with anything. Hence, an 'attached will' is a
contradiction in terms. In that case, the will is the single vital component
that makes humanity human. On this basis, authentic humanity is established in
and by itself not in a context but as a context. The whole situation could
therefore be the 'presuppositionless presupposition' -- the bottom line -- of
being and meaningfulness whether in terms of the being of meaningfulness or the
meaningfulness of being.
Attachment is the situation where the human being's understanding of her/ his
humanity is generated by factors of power that emanate and flow from sources
that are not in -- hence outside of -- the human person's individuality.
Attachment, in this sense, occurs as the strong force that draws a human
individual to the fold of a system characterized by interconnected demands,
invented obligations and institutionalized mandates. Through these
considerations, the human being circumvents the meaning of freedom in
artificial and alienated -- even alienating -- terms for such terms are imposed
from the outside of the human individual and not something that is felt and
willed from within her/ himself. Very often, we sacrifice our own humanity by
capitulating to certain demands and expectations of legal, moral, social,
political and economic natures among others. These are situations when the will
is de-activated and in the process even our very humanity is held in abeyance.
We therefore temporarily lose our humanity.
Attachment is caused by a paradigm that has led us to accept without any
question an interpretation of being and life fully submitted to the dominance
of an all-encompassing system and the more specific subsystems within it. In
this connection, the meaningfulness -- as well as meaninglessness -- of a human
life is therefore entirely determined by that very system itself. Attachment is
attachment to the concrete constituents/ elements of a system both in general
and specific terms.
The system has conditioned humanity -- and has been reinforcing the
conditioning -- that the meaningfulness of the human being's humanity rests on
how s/he attaches her/ himself with the states of affairs that obtain in the
system. Such derivation of meaningfulness alienates the very unique individual
existence of the human being for in that sense human signification is precluded
unless reckoned as inherently a part or an aspect of a larger system, a network
of interconnected elements, events, factors and conditions. The basic question
at this point is: Is there no way to get to an understanding of human
meaningfulness isolated/ detached/ unattached/ non-attached from a systemic
locus? Or, on the contrary, one can only truly capture the meaningfulness of
humanity if and only if it is viewed in the 'purity' of human individuality
that has the inherently unique capability to exercise her/ his will in the act
of choosing, decision-making, creating, even destroying?
Human meaningfulness becomes real only by way of acts affirming one's
autonomous existence non-attached with the demands, mandates, obligations,
conditions set and put forth by a system that can never generate and claim an
iota of necessary connection between itself and the human individual. In other
words, even if human conventions have established and continued to sustain the
connection between the human individual and whatever systemic context s/he
finds her/ himself, that connection can never be rendered as necessary in
It is the non-attachment of the human being with a system that affirms her/ his
humanity for such humanity is not defined in social, political, economic or
whatever terms but only in terms of human freedom expressed in and through her/
his will. It is therefore the will that defines the meaningfulness of the human
being. The will is the substance of humanity and the only factor of humanity's
non-attachment with a system.
(c) Ruel F. Pepa 2005
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