Last Nicenet Conference
[ISFP]
PATHWAYS CONFERENCE
Last Nicenet Conference
http://www.nicenet.org
Here are the postings for the last Nicenet conference, which took place from 13th May 2009 to 29th January 2010. There were 402 postings totalling over 130,000 words.
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Happy Conferencing!
Geoffrey Klempner
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LAST NICENET CONFERENCE
FROM: Idit Arad (05/13/09)
SUBJECT: timeMy name is idit and I am a musican, primarily intersted in the philosophy of time, and the way in which it conects to that which music is made of — time. I am now reading through aristotle, and find that is very much my philosopher, with regards to all music that existed before the clock, and also how we do finally arrive to that which has the clock!
FROM: Christopher Wilton (05/16/09)
SUBJECT: RE: timeDoes time exist or is it merely a perception? I think physicists are fairly certain that it does, as well as other dimension beyond, but I can't actually say why they're certain, I'll have to look it up I think.
But if you're talking about time in relation to music, I suppose both are inherently human qualities; so you might find perceptual enquiries more useful than that of physics.
Einstein's experiments with relativity are quite fancinating: for instance, human perception is easily misled even by the very sense organs that purvey signals to the brain.
Sat on a train, a passenger can not tell whether her train is in motion if her only immediate point of reference is herself relative to that of another train.
In other words, she can not tell whether it is: -a.) her train passing another
or
b.) another train passing her's.
Curious: Even more so, when you consider the scientific fact that time runs slower at higher altitudes (I think thats right?).
We can equate this with an LP on a turntable or a bicycle wheel spinning on its axis; if we paint a dot on its out rim, that dot would have to travel further (and therefore faster) around the axis than that of a similar dot painted nearer the centre.
If I'm right (please be sure to check), the faster one travels the slower time passes; which is obvious when you think about it.
X gets from A to B in less time if it is travelling faster than Y.
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (05/18/09)
SUBJECT: RE: timeDear Idit, I find your posting and the answer of Wilton both a bit confusing. What sort of time are you speaking of ?
There is relative time of "before and after", and there is absolute time of measurement with clocks. The first is "philosophical", the second "physical". If there is no relative time, there can be no cause and effect — since cause by definition should come "before" the effect, so you have to know what "before" means. But the problem of Einstein was one of measurement : "What do we mean when we say that two events are coincident in time ?" was his question.
What do you intend to know as a musician ? To define a rhythm, you don't need Einstein, since rhythm is a mode of relative events : Your music would sound the same independent of the speed of your vehicle. This is possible, since while the clocks around slow down relative to some observer in the distance, the atomic clocks in your ears do too, so they always hear the same music or voice.
So once more : What does your question mean, what do you try to find out ?
And by the way : Much of modern (and pre-modern) music goes without rhythm at all. Any artificial sound is "music" in a modern sense. There has been a concerto for typewriters long ago in the 1950s.
Thus you could speak of a psychology of time or of a sociology of time or of a culture of time etc.. In a famous book on "The Silent Language" the author, sociologist E.T.Hall, compares different cultures i.a. by the notion of "being in time" : In some cultures, to let somebody superior wait for ten minutes is considered an insult, but in other cultures to wait an hour or more is seen as quite normal.
But of course in a Jazz-band you have to be "in time" with your instrument to fractions of a second. And by a very short but intentional way of lagging or dragging your play you can put drive or dream into your music.
And a last note : This is a philosophical forum, not a musical or physical one. So what would be your philosophical problem with time ?
Hubertus
FROM: Charles Countryman (05/20/09)
SUBJECT: RE: timeIdit
There are also ideas about being outside of time (and space). And about the music that happens there. Aristotle said: "Some declared the universe to be a single substance ... Xenophanes, who was the first of these to preach monism ... made nothing clear ... but looking off to the whole heaven he declares that the one is god." I argue that Aristotle was probably prejudicial against Xenophanes' ideas. Xenophanes didn't necessarily think that the divine was merged with an eternal cosmos.
Charles
FROM: Christopher Wilton (05/21/09)
SUBJECT: RE: timeI must say Hubertus, for someone who signs off his reply by pointing out that neither music nor physics is a philosophical issue; you sure did make a meal of it in your preamble.
But I do happen to agree with you; Idit could do with stating the point a little more clearly; but then — as it was initially an introductory message — Idit can hardly be blamed for that.
As a newcomer to this forum I thought I'd help out by broadening the subject a little, in the interests of being amicable. But I concede the philosophic point of this dialogue eludes me, as much as it does you; though I did not want to press the point quite so bluntly in a getting-to-know-you message.
I was, if I recall, drawing attention to the seemingly plastic nature of time, as well as questioning whether such a thing as time actually exists at all?
Physicists seem to believe that time exists independently of perception; and although I'm sure they are right, I was merely observing that I am not sure how they are sure that they know time exists — if you'll forgive the convolution.
Regarding your particular comments: I think your distinction is flawed; I don't even think physicists believe in the existence of absolute time. All time is relative (even in spite of perception). So to make the distinction between relativistic (philosophical) time and absolute (physical) time, is fallacious. I would also point out that relativists time (by your definition) also impinges upon psychology and neurosciences, as well.
For everyday purposes, of course; we acquiesce to the false concept of absolute time, in the same way we acquiesce to the concept of Newtonian Physics: not that these concepts are absolutely true, but because they are convenient to our circumstances.
You say "If there is no relative time..." but I don't think the absence of relative time was ever in question. You then go on to say that there can be no cause without effect, but as far as I can tell your proposition (your proof) for this is based relativistic words (cause, before); and not necessarily on any logical or observational proof, for which — if you don't mind — I need examples to work with.
Question: Is it always true that effect follows cause? Certainly on our mediocre plane of perception this would seem to be a constant, but I can't help thinking that it is not an absolute. When we push the laws of physics to their extremes; all manner of weird and wonderfully counterintuitive things start to occur.
Can we therefore, rethink the whole concept of causality, in a way that's quite at odds with current interpretation: I have tentatively included just such an idea in my first pathways essay, which describes the causes as contingent upon an effect.
In the same way that convergent evolution creates the same solutions to the same problems, in distant and isolated locations around the world; so — goes my supposition — that any given effect is greater than the sum of its potential causes.
This whole digression, in my essay, comes as a result of quantum physics: imagine a snooker game; at some point in the future a ball will sink into one of the six pockets. Given the nature of snooker games, that is a veritable certainty. The only thing open to doubt therefore, is by what causal route that particular ball will sink.
The Many Worlds Interpretation — in as far as I understand it — allows us to say that causes are potentially infinite, effects — potentially less so. One might jump to the conclusion that this is an example of pre-determinism; I couldn't possibly say.
My reasons for adopting the view, and including it in my essay, are somewhat devil's advocate; but it is supported by some analogous macro-world metaphysics, which I shall not go into here.
Needless to say the quantum world rarely applies to the macro-world, and my whole supposition is wide open to accusations of moving — not to mention broadening — the goal posts.
But, back to what you were saying: "But the problem of Einstein was one of measurement" — of course it was, he was a scientist, science is all about quantitative analysis.
"What do we mean when we say that two events are coincident in time?" — is that an exact quote of Einstein? I fail to see how that is in any way distinct from the relativistic point made earlier. In which case, you have not stuck to your own bipartite interpretation of relative and absolute time. If anything, you've combined them. I fail to see the rationale?
Your third paragraph, though intended for Idit, seems to include elements from my own message (i.e. — the speed of the vehicle). I can't see anything wrong with it, but it does seem to be a rather redundant statement, as it was not Idit who mentioned vehicles.
"What does your question mean, what do you try to find out?" — Good question, something that we can both agree to. We definitely need more information from Idit on this issue.
I can't help thinking that your fifth paragraph, on the rhythm of music, is one of personal aesthetic on your part; and your sixth paragraph becomes a surreal mix of randomly selected words: -
Psychology of time? Time doesn't have psychology, as it does not have a brain; are you perhaps referring to Psychological Time? Which might refer to the perception of time?
Sociology of time? You've lost me here completely. The Culture of time?! I really can't relate to anything you're saying here? The nearest comparison I can make is that of History: Social History, Cultural History, perhaps? But that whole sentence is largely incomprehensible to me.
You then go on to mention "The Silent Language" by E.T. Hall; and suddenly things make sense: what you and the book seem to be referring to is how different societies and cultures perceive time within the context of a non-verbal interpersonal etiquette. Temporal Etiquette, might be useful term, in this instance?
The book sounds interesting: the concept of being "fashionably late", for instance? This in Britain at least, is generally considered to be between 5-15 minutes (though in the case of some of my acquaintances this can extend to 30-60 minutes).
This of course is generally the reserve of women, men on the other hand are not expected to keep ladies waiting at all; such are the vestiges of misogyny (positive though it may be) in our western society.
I was interested to read the other day that some neurotic personalities, introverts and people of low self-esteem; might interpret lateness or prolonged lapses in time (between correspondences) as attempts at ridicule or disrespect. Such personalities have come to associate even these minor infractions in a negative context; thus confounding their insular personality disorders. — This too is an example of how the perception of time can have can impact on a individuals interpersonal skills.
But throughout the whole of your reply, I feel you fail to engage with my question of "does time exist"? By which I mean: is their anything physical, material or substantial, that we can positively refer to as time?
In science fiction, time is made a substance in reality, via the imaginary/hypothetical fundamental particle called the 'chronoton'. I think I have actually seen physics diagrams which include the chronoton as a hypothetical fundamental particle, along with the graviton (the gravity particle).
Which brings me to rephrase my question: Is time a force, like gravity? For it seems that we can only perceive either phenomenon by their effects and not by their substance? Why then is time considered a dimension, whilst gravity is generally considered a force?
In conclusion: I agree we both need more information from Idit, if we are to engage with these factors philosophically? But, until that happens, we must endeavour to do what we can, without such information? And, as it was you who made the observation that this is a philosophical forum (not a musical, physical or even a psychological one), I believe the onus is upon you to derive a philosophical query from the minutiae of this dialogue.
Alternatively, of course; we could discuss what the Ancient Philosophers thought about the concept of time, for history — I find — is always a delightful substitute, for when the contemporary wellspring runs dry?
- Chris.
FROM: Christopher Wilton (05/21/09)
SUBJECT: RE: timeDear Charles;
In my most recent reply to Hubertus on the subject of time, I did suggest that perhaps we should — pending clarity from Idit — go on to discuss how ancient philosophers regarded the concept of time.
Would you perhaps be interested in that tack? I noticed your reply to Idit referenced some of the ancients, perhaps you'd care to share any particular knowledge you have on the subject?
I'd like to do a little online research myself, but I think it'll have to wait; I've yet to sleep today and I've got to be at work by 7pm.
Look forward to hearing any insights you might have;
- Chris.-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Pencka Gancheva (05/14/09)
SUBJECT:Hi, everyone,
My name is Pencka and I am happy to join the Pathways conference. I am keen on any type of philosophy, but my favotites are Nietzsche and Kant.
Enjoy conferencing, everyone :-)FROM: Christopher Wilton (05/16/09)
SUBJECT: NietzscheI like Nietzsche, very good for irreligious quotes; but beyond that I really don't get him at all and I find his writing impenetrable. Perhaps you could help me get a handle on him?
-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Malcolm Sealy (05/14/09)
SUBJECT: U3A PHILOSOPHY FORUMI have been running Philosophy Sessions for the local Nowra U3A (NSW Australia) for nearly two years. These have been stimulating for an upper age group — any suggestions for a 'progressive' programme would be of interest.
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (05/24/09)
SUBJECT: RE: U3A PHILOSOPHY FORUMDear Malcom,
what in your opinion makes for the difference of "philosophizing with upper age groups" and "philosophyzing with children" ? And what do you call a "progressive" programme ? If you put a link here where to get a first impression of the character of your proceedings, we would be in a better position to support your project.
Hubertus-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Anthony Kelly (05/15/09)
SUBJECT: WHY IS THERE ANYTHING AT ALL?WHY IS THERE ANYTHING AT ALL?
What we already know is that once there was nothing — not even Time.
Then there was a "Big Bang" which provided Time, Energy, and a number
of mathematical "Cosmic Constants". Some Cosmic Constants interact
with Energy, over time, to produce both Matter and Life with their
"laws of nature". (Rees, "Just Six Numbers", 2000)
Matter freely self-organises and produces at least one life-friendly
planet, Earth. Life begins on Earth and freely evolves in both
complexity and intelligence, the most intelligent animal to evolve so
far being "Homo sapiens". These eventually make themselves different from other animals.
They develop a mind and become human.
So my question is: "What produced the Big Bang, and why?"
FROM: Christopher Wilton (05/16/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WHY IS THERE ANYTHING AT ALL?Actually we don't know that "once there was nothing — not even Time." we're just inferring that from the our current observations of the universe.
We don't actually know that 'nothing' can ever be or ever was. What came before the Big Bang is still very much a mystery to everyone.
Also, point of fact; Mathematics is a human concept imposed upon the observation not an innate property of the universe itself.
I thought I'd point this out because Mathematics as well as its most powerful prescept '0', naught, nothing; are man-made concepts and as such have no basis in reality.
I've only read bits of "Just Six Numbers" but I'm sure it mentions the Anthropic Principle.
The Anthropic Principle explains why the universe looks like it does, with the benefit of hindsight; because it is postulated to be one of a series of differently calibrated universes, which we just happen to be inhabiting.
I have no issues with your second paragraph, but your closing statement, the question: "What produced the Big Bang, and why?" needs addressing.
If we take the anthropic principle and the multiverse interpretation as read, then there is no reason to think that our universe is the first and only universe to exist; and as such the question of what produced the Big Bang becomes easier. The Universe is potentially cyclical, the death of one creating another.
As for the question of purpose (your "why?"): such questions only apply to living, ideally sentient beings. Therefore, if the universe naturally created itself, it neither has nor needs a purpose.
The fallacy, in this instance, comes from presupposition that if something exists, there must've been some point in the past when it did not exist.
This presupposition is only true in the case of manufactured artifacts, the trouble is that as humans we tend to anthropomorphise — imbibing objects with our logic and personality, as if they were intelligent, thinking beings (or the product thereof).
But in reality, the universe has no concept of itself, a planet doesn't know its a planet any more than an atom knowns its an atom; there's no metaphysical essentialism that defines the universe or its structure independantly from human perception. The universe just is.
It's as much a fallacy as Aquinas's "Prime Mover" argument for the existence of God: "Everything is in motion therefore there must've been something that set everything in motion — and that something we call God."
The mistake is in thinking that motion is something special that requires some primal initiator. Aquinas wouldn't have known of course, but the fact is that there is nothing that exists that isn't in some way in motion.
Stillness, like nothingness and '0' zero are human concepts that don't exist in reality.
That said, it is a fancinating problem, that out foxes quite a lot of people and I'm certainly going to use an edited version of this message as an article on my blog.
So Thanks for That. :-D
FROM: Mike Ward (06/09/09)
SUBJECT: HOW IS THERE ANYTHING AT ALL?Christopher,
I'm with you all the way on this on and would like to add a comment about human arrogance and language.
Firstly, anthropomorphism is the unseen elephant in the room or the coloured spectacles worn by those who put humanity in any kind of central position of importance in relation to the universe. It is sheer conceited arrogance to think there is only a human perspective that somehow pre-existed humanity and will no doubt succeed it — I'm taking about gods etc.
Secondly language, it is full of misuse, preconceptions and prejudices. The audacity of asking WHY infers sentient purpose otherwise we should ask HOW and leave the WHY questions to the less sceptical amongst us.
Regards
Mike
FROM: Christopher Wilton (07/30/09)
SUBJECT: RE: HOW IS THERE ANYTHING AT ALL?Thank You Mike for your support;
I'm sorry I did not respond sooner but I've been away quite
sometime.
Our friend Anthony Kelly in his essay entitled "lonergan, emergent evolution and the cosmic process" also makes a mistake in arguing that Martin Rees's Multiverse Interpretation "multiplies entities beyond necessity, in defiance of Occam's razor." he fails to consider that the existence of a god also defies Occam's razor. In fact considering the very nature of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent theistic creator god; Kelly multiplies entities an infinite number of magnitudes greater than that of the mere Multiverse interpretation, which frankly pales in comparison. He would do well to apply scrutiny to "both" sides of his argument in future.
Thanks again for the support.-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Christopher Wilton (05/16/09)
SUBJECT: Plugging PathwaysRight, I suppose it's about time I added something of myself to the conference, as I've done nothing but reply to other posts, so far.
Looking at my ISFP membership card, our purpose is to encourage philosophical and critical thinking throughout the world (at leasts that's what I interpret the mandate to mean).
That being the case, what are the rudiments of philosophy, what are the essential tools of the critical thinker, what is the Philosophic Method; and how is Philosophy distinct from other subjects and disciplines like Science, Theology, Art, etc... What is the essence of philosophy? And how should we present these ordinances in a way that is open and accessible to the public at large?
The product of this might comprise the ISFP's official induction ebook (assuming one doesn't already exist)? Subject to approval of course.-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Charles Countryman (05/18/09)
SUBJECT: Introducing myselfMy participation in Pathways Conferences goes back a ways, to an early conference, perhaps the original Pathways electronic conference.
I hesitate to attribute "progress" as a characteristic of philosophy. A current project for me is revising a short paper on ancient philosophy that I wrote for a Pathways course in Feb. 2000- Xenophanes,God,& Silence. I concluded then that Xenophanes may have encountered God through the silence and despair Xenophanes experienced in the conventional religious practice of his time.
From there, I went on to the philosophy of Simone Weil. I found her "Lectures on Philosophy" an excellent introduction to reading philosophy. I'm currently rereading her "Intimations Of Christianity Among The Ancient Greeks."
I am retired now. In addition to being a student of philosophy, I served (during Cold War) as an enlisted Marine and later as a reserve officer of Marines USMC. While a reserve officer and later, I had a parallel 20 year career in state social services and was a local president in a state employees labor union AFL-CIO. In political economics, I consider myself to be a neoconservative.
My participation in a Pathways' study program contributed to my consideration of and conversion to Greek Orthodox Christianity. So I hope to be considered a Christian student of philosophy.
I also hope to contribute to the continuing conversation about philosophy at this conference.
CharlesFROM: Christopher Wilton (05/18/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Introducing myselfDear Charles;
I'm intrigued as to how philosophy and pathways lead you to become a Greek Orthodox Christian. Could you expand on that a little (or a lot)?
I'm also curious as to how philosophy and pathways lead you to arrive at one particular branch of Christianity as opposed to any other?
FROM: Charles Countryman (05/20/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Introducing myselfChristopher
I would not say that philosophy led me to Greek Orthodoxy. Eastern Orthodox Christianity is more likely to challenge venerated positions held by both secular philosophers and Aquinas.
Historically there were major differences between the Classical schools of philosophy and the early Christian Church. But a Pathways course in ancient philosophy sparked my interest in the Presocratic philosophers. That's how I discovered Xenophanes. And that led on to Simone Weil's understanding of Plato and Pythagorean doctrine.
I'm reading Simone Weil again, looking for specific references to Xenophanes. Do you know of any?
But in answer to your question, thinking about the Presocratic philosophers probably opened me to considering Greek Orthodox Christianity.
Charles
FROM: Christopher Wilton (05/21/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Introducing myselfMy particular philosophical discipline, if it can so be called; is based largely on ratiocination and not precedent, so I'm afraid I know very little about other philosophers, though I am beginning to correct that shortcoming.
In what way is Eastern Orthodox Christianity more likely to challenge venerated "West-European Philosophers" (if that's the right term); and in what respect? Simply challenging a philosophy doesn't make the counterpoint any more veracious.
Are you saying that you prefer the Pre-Socratic philosophers more, because they conform better to what you (or Christianity) believe?
Surely the classical schools of philosophy, the Ancient Greeks, predated Christianity entirely. And surely one can easily find 'major' differences between any pair of arbitrarily selected participles, why should that be an issue?
When you say thinking about Pre-Socratic philosophers... "opened" you to "considering" Greek Orthodox Christianity; what do you mean by "opened" and "considering"?
To me, there seems a considerable gulf between the two entities; and your answer in no way attempts to bridge that gulf, in terms I can comprehend. I believe you have used what is called, in philosophy, a tautology?
You have simply restated the propositions, as if they were an answer; and in so doing have not actually answered the question at all. Therefore, by initial question remains.
As for Simone Weil, I'm afraid I'm not familiar with the author, but I'm currently reading "History of Western Philosophy" by Bertrand Russell. I'm certain there's a chapter on Xenophanes in there and so I'll report back, once I've read it.
What is your particular fascination with Xenophanes and how does that link to Greek/Eastern Orthodox Christianity?
I have to say, your reply has probably provoked more questions per sentence, than any other reply I have ever encountered in my life time; would you mind filling in some of the gaps?
- Chris.
FROM: Charles Countryman (05/22/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Introducing myselfChris
Your saying about my posting of 5/18/09: "your reply has probably provoked more questions per sentence, than any other reply I have ever encountered in my life time."
Being just an ordinary person, I don't know how to respond to that.
But I'll try to address your other comments and questions. Please note that my introduction was not intended to be a comprehensive statement of belief.
Chris you substituted "West-European Philosophers" for my term "secular philosophers and Aquinas." But I used my term very deliberately. Orthodox Christianity is based on fundamental realism, not the Aristotelian analysis that is the source of both modern analytic philosophy and scientific method. The early Christian Church was in opposition to the established Aristotelian and Platonic schools. But being in opposition to the philosophical establishment does not necessarily mean being in opposition to reason and logic and wisdom. I do not think that there is a seamless connection from the Presocratic philosophers and Socrates to Aristotelianism. There are philosophic alternatives.
Chris you said:
"Surely the classical schools of philosophy, the Ancient Greeks, predated Christianity entirely. And surely one can easily find 'major' differences between any pair of arbitrarily selected participles, why should that be an issue?"
First, I think that orthodox Christianity is based on fundamental realism, not what you termed as "arbitrarily selected participles." And as orthodox Christianity is rooted in both Athens and Jerusalem, your postulated time line is in error."
Chris you asked what I meant by "opened" and "considering".
These were merely figures of speech. I wrote an introduction to myself, not a philosophical statement.
Chris you asked:
"What is your particular fascination with Xenophanes and how does that link to Greek/Eastern Orthodox Christianity?"
That is very much my project in progress. I'm working on it.
I should clarify that I find Simone Weil's philosophy very interesting. I do not consider her an orthodox Christian philosopher. My interest in Weil is her generosity toward her students, her humanitarian concerns, and her development of ancient Greek thought.
One example of who I consider to be a modern orthodox Christian philosopher is Peter Kreeft. I understand Kreeft to be Roman Catholic. An orthodox Christianity is not limited to Eastern Orthodoxy.
Charles-----------------------------------------------
FROM: mark williams (05/20/09)
SUBJECT:Hi All
My name is Mark and my interest is in Ethics. I am a professional archaeologist and my interest in philosophy led directly form developers asking WHY? — They have to pay for the excavations — WHY? they couldn't build here because it overlay part of a medieaval cathedral etc. This led me to be interested in the values we place on heritage and the nature of value . . ..and then to ethics.
I am interested in practical applications largely because I deal with them day to day — what is more important — preserving the bronze age burial or the windfarm/hospital/car showroom that is proposed and will lead to its destruction, how can we compare these values.
A specific interest is in the preservation principle which is inherent in most countries and international institutions dealings with heritage — If values are subjective then how can you know what to preserve for future generation not knowing what there values will be.
Look forward to your thoughts
Thanks
Mark
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (05/20/09)
SUBJECT: RE: ValuesHello Mark, glad to meet you here !
I am interested in values too. Your text reminds me of the Buddhas of Banyan, that were destroyed by the Taliban (see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5zpgI71hJjI ) against desperate tries by the UNESCO to prevent this from happening. This was "a clash of cultures", since as Muslims the Taliban saw the Buddha figures as forbidden idols. To follow the advice of Allah was their primary value, while to establish museums and to engage in excavations is a consequence of modern "western loss of faith". Even the Romantics have not been honest to the Medieval Christendom or to the gods of Antiquity : What Romantic poets like Novalis or Hoelderlin were defending was an imagined past of man and society living in harmony with God or the ancient gods. The Romantics felt alienated in the modern world. The Cologne Cathedral (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cologne_Cathedral ) was finished from 1842 up to 1880 by "romantic" kings of Prussia — who were Protestants ! The cathedral was set as a symbol of German unity against the French who had Notre Dame de Paris. But the French in 1889 set up the Eiffel-Tower against all romanticism and embracing modernity in the centenary of the French Revolution of 1789. So once more a clash of cultures.
This is but a very short first comment on values. There will be much more to say on this. F.i., the Taj Mahal was a memorial not of a god but of a beloved wife, which is a very different sort of value. What do we defend, when we defend customs or rites ? What about identity or integrity or honour or rights or opinions ?
Hubertus
FROM: Christopher Wilton (05/21/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Yes MinisterDear Mark;
It's certainly an interesting context in which to apply philosophy. It puts me in mind of an old BBC comedy called "Yes Minister", series 3, an episode entitled "The Middle-Class Rip-Off"
The protagonist Jim Hacker, Minister for Administrative Affairs; hits on the idea of selling a — failing — art gallery to subsidize his local football club. Reasoning that this will win him votes, he sets the wheels in motion to have the gallery sold.
However, the antagonist of the series, Sir Humphrey (the Ministers Principle Private Secretary) is incensed by the very notion of using public money to subside the interests of 'ordinary' people.
As far as Humphrey is concerned, public subsidy for the arts, should be reserved for those amenities that preserve British cultural identity, such as theatres, art galleries, museums and opera houses (it also transpires that he and the whole of the civil service, receive considerable discounts to these amenities and their functions).
Ever toadying to his grassroots majority, Hacker takes the view that if the British public really wanted these amenities then they would pay for them out of their own pocket; he also observes that the only people who can afford to attend the functions of these amenities, are a minority, an upper-class elite, which has used its power and influence to ensure that their desires are catered for, using public money.
The viewer, as is common throughout the series, warms to Hacker's argument. Anyone can respect the notion that, the public at large, should have some say as to what their tax dollars are used for; and yet one can not shake off the need to agree with Sir Humphrey either (especially as a theatre goer), -even if Sir Humphrey's motives are cynical and self-serving.
Do we agree with Hacker's argument, which we could phrase as: "We must concede to that which presents the greatest utility, for the greatest number, in the here and now (or in the foreseeable future)?"
To which, the question of Bronze-Age Excavation vs. Car Park; falls inexorably to the latter.
Or do we adopt the more holistic view of Sir Humphrey: "That, irregardless of its utility or its popularity; 'certain things' require our eternal protection?"
If so; the question then falls to how we should define these 'certain things' and how we should go about valuating them, objectively?
Have you perhaps heard of The Water-Diamond Paradox? I can't remember who first described this, though I think it might've been Adam Smith in "The Wealth of Nations"?
It goes roughly as follows: Water has great utility (it has many uses), but despite this it's abundance depreciates its value; as such water is quite cheep, especially when compared to diamonds, which are — or were, in Smith's time — virtually useless, outside of jewellery, yet their rarity escalated their value phenomenally.
We can therefore assess a commodities value based primarily on its availability and secondly on its utility; in which case we should keep the Bronze-Age Excavation and forget about the Car Park.
The Water-Diamond Paradox, works perfectly in this instance; though it must be noted that there are certain factors, pertaining to other commodities that would render it ineffective.
With fruit for instance, we not only have to consider its availability and its utility, but also its lifespan; because the utility value of rotten or overripe fruit, is subject to change.
I would love to talk about this further, but if I don't hit the sack soon; I'm never going to wake up for work.
- Chris.
FROM: Mike Ward (06/09/09)
SUBJECT: Who chooses?Mark,
I have experience in construction as no doubt did the builders of the cathedrals whose probably chose a location on the top of yet a previous similar building for all sorts of reasons.
Are we more enlightened today then they were then — that's arguable. So what are the reasons to preserve things buried in the ground. Heritage cannot really be a sustainable answer and anyway it's vague in what it means as the first MacDonald's or Big Brother House may well be heritage for some.
We cannot preserve everything nor I would argue should we even try as life is always in flux and ever changing and thus it's ultimately impractical. Why do we want to know about the past if not to make us better in the future but in reality humans don't actually seem to learn very well. Preserving WW2 concentration camps doesn't stop Israel from effectively constructing ghettos. Excavating warships like the Mary Rose didn't stop the sinking of the Begrano. The argument for learning isn't really sustainable either.
Curiosity is a good reason and I guess that's why I started my family history. A sense of ancestry and touching the past with artefacts maybe gives some emotional attachment but what really does it change in what you are going to do tomorrow in your home life.
That windfarm/hospital/car showroom is simply just the next layer being added as a sedimentary record of what happened and if some things are lost then probably they weren't worth keeping anyway.
Being selective in what is preserved is maybe a little dangerous as all it reflects is one's own prejudices about what is important.
Regards
Mike
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FROM: Glenn Williams (05/21/09)
SUBJECT: New to the Pathways ConferenceHello, my name is Glenn Williams and Iam a new student to the Pathways Philosophy program. I have been interested in the study of philosophy for many years. In the past I have taken various philosohy coarses at the college level but for one reason or the other was unable to continue my studies. Now that Iam retired, I decided to continue my studies. After doing some research I found that the Pathways program was what I was looking for. The Pathways Conference will allow me to be engaged with others on issues related to philosophical works, and a place where one can debate there ideas with others.
Glenn Williams-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Glenn Williams (05/21/09)
SUBJECT: Time and SpaceI noticed there is quite a bit of discussion on the subject of Time. If I may, I would like bring in another idea of this subject. I have been thinking on this for along time. First I start off with the premise that there is no Time or Space, Time is an mathematical measurement,as we know it. The Space most know and understand is surrounded by boundaries. The Space that I understand is finite with no boundaries, and the Time that is known there again is surrounded by boundaries, a mechanical clock that seems to run very area of our lives. The moon which separates our earth from the sun, is once again a boundary, what would happen if there was no moon, how would one be able to set there mechanical clock.
Just as we constructed a clock to measure time, we have also constructed various structures to encase space so we can say there is space. What does the early Greek Atomist say of this very subject.
I could like to hear different views of ideas on this subject or anyother Philosopical problem.
GlennFROM: Charles Countryman (05/22/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Time and SpaceGlenn
There is certainly a lot going on in cosmology. For example, the idea that space has degrees of emptiness. That the intergalactic medium effects the formation of galaxies and other cosmic structures. So apparently there are boundaries for what's affected. So does that mean there are boundaries to the universe? Maybe the boundaries are constantly being reset?
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (05/24/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Time and SpaceCharles, and Glenn, the following is partly an answer to the problem of time as Chris Wilton put it in his answer to me as of 05/21/09 : Time and space are first of all "categories" needed to describe our world. To locate some event or object in relation to other events and objects we need to locate them "somewhere" — and so we need space and time. Strictly speaking we do not need to know the "nature" of space and time. This may be as fictitious as are longitude and latitude on the globe. But to use concepts like "cause and effect" we need "before and after" — and by this 'time'. And to use a concept of "movement" we need "here and there" — thus the concept of 'space'.
While Platonic ideas ("forms") may be imagined as "being beyond space and time", physicists are describing a dynamic and changing world, expanding or contracting universes growing from "Big Bang" or galaxies circling a black hole or nuclear decay etc., so they need to speak of time and space to formulate all these ideas.
But Einstein was not interested in the "nature" of time. He was interested in the nature of measurement of it in the same way as was Heisenberg in the concept of "observation". Neither of them was "speculating". They both simply asked "what in fact do we do when we try to describe our world?"
So Einstein asked : "What is the exact meaning of calling two events "coincident in time" ?" We compare measurements, not ideas. And what do we measure ? We use clocks and signals, not thoughts. While thoughts may move with infinite speed, signals are moving with the speed of light at best. And when we accept this simple fact, many strange results ensue.
It is very important to understand that neither Einstein nor Heisenberg were "philosophizing" here ! They simply asked : "What data do we have and how did we get at those data to describe our reality ?" In a sense their attitude was anti-metaphysical, as was the positivist philosophical style of their time (ca. 1900-1930). One possible "solution" of the problem of space and time for the modern physicist is : "Before the Big Bang there was no time and no space, since there was no matter moving around, so the notions would have been void." But this implies that there was nothing before Big Bang save — maybe — a creator, who in the Platonic sense would be "beyond space and time". In this view — not subscribed by atheists of course — "the Creator" (God or Allah or who- or whatever) "created" space and time together with "force", i.e., energy-matter.
Hubertus
FROM: Mike Ward (06/09/09)
SUBJECT: NothingnessHubertus
It's curious to me that you consider "thought" to somehow be outside of physics after all it's just electochemical activity at known speeds isn't it or do you see it existing in some other medium?
I understand it's proven that rate of time differs with velocity so wouldn't equally rate of thought also be relative to the owner of the thought. Maybe a similar parallel is with the clock speed of computers being adjustable to improve performance.
I think that those who ask questions like "before time" are illogical just as those who speak of life after death — they cannot accept non-existence as being nothingness. If you don't exist there is no you.
On the other hand all this rationality destroys a good fairy tale..................
Regards
Mike
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FROM: Charles Countryman (05/24/09)
SUBJECT: Embodied MindMy current project of revising a paper I wrote for Pathways: Xenophanes, God, & Silence.
I am working on an argument that is in opposition to the assertion of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (from their book "Philosophy In The Flesh") that the embodied human mind cannot have "purely uncategorized and unconceptualized experience." In my original paper, I based my argument on the idea that new insight can arise from religious experience and practice. I am now broadening my argument with an assertion that cognitive science does not necessarily preclude uncategorized and unconceptualized experience. That both modern art and physics provide examples of this experience outside of religion.
What are your thoughts from a philosophical perspective on this?
CharlesFROM: Hubertus Fremerey (05/24/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Embodied MindCharles, I need some explanation of the exact meaning of "uncategorized and unconceptualized experience". Does experience of "beauty" and of "doing right" and of "honour/dishonour" and of "agreement with a demonstration" or (the experience of) "love" fall under these headings ?
And then : If somebody, Bach or Mozart say, has a very exceptional judgement in musical things, does he need "categories and concepts" for this judgements ? I don't think so. What he needs is "an inner ear".
Thus what I would look at are three things : (1) Experience (in contrast to thinking) as a basis of judgement, and (2) inborn "genetic" templates of our thinking and acting (the birds don't need a study to know how to build a nest or to feed their young). And (3) the psychology of "Gestalt" ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gestalt_psychology ).
We humans are no tabulae rasae. We tend to see "what is not there" and to deny or miss "what is before our eyes".
And then : What exactly do you mean by // both modern art and physics provide examples of this experience outside of religion. // ?? Can you give some illustrative exsample(s) ?
Hubertus
FROM: Pencka Gancheva (05/24/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Embodied MindDear Charles,
I am also interested in further details about your thesis.
I expect more information with impatience.
Pencka
FROM: Charles Countryman (05/24/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Embodied MindThis the Lakoff/Johnson definition from their Philosophy In The Flesh.
"Living systems must categorize. Since we are neural beings, our categories are formed through our embodiment. What that means is that the categories we form are part of our experience! They are the structures that differentiate aspects of our experience into discernible kinds. Categorization is thus not a purely intellectual matter, occurring after the fact of experience. Rather, the formation and use of categories is the stuff of experience. It is part of what our bodies and brains are constantly engaged in. We cannot, as some meditative traditions suggest, 'get beyond' our categories and have a purely uncategorized and unconceptualized experience. Neural beings cannot do that."
I highly recommend George Lakoff's and Mark Johnson's "Philosophy In The Flesh: The Embodied Mind And Its Challenge to Western Thought."
I also think their claim that human beings cannot have a purely uncategorized and unconceptualized experience is wrong. Maybe the cornerstone to their argument is found in their use of the word "purely"? Is any experience by "neural beings" pure? I think Lakoff & Johnson too simply dismiss the human experience with meditative practice. Also, I don't see how they explain new ideas like "Quantum weirdness" (description of Quantum science as being weird is from Scientific American magazine not my naivety in physics).
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (05/25/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Embodied MindCharles, I still need some examples and clarifications : F.i. any ape will feel sexual attraction and anger when rejected, since apes are social and sexual animals, so this sort of feeling is "in their genes". But they surely have no "concept" and no "category" of "love" and "honour". Those are "concepts" provided by a language and a culture and clarified by stories. And for the ape the "feelings" are "fuzzy", i.e., no clear "yes/no" but "more or less so" — from slight love and anger to frenzy love and anger all stages. Generally the awareness of animals and little children is fuzzy and complex and gets clarified in humans only by the concepts and categories provided by culture and language. Hubertus
FROM: Charles Countryman (05/25/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Embodied MindHubertus
The Lakoff-Johnson theory is a Metaphor theory based in cognitive science. I think that its primary weakness is in its exclusion of meditative experience (Satori) and religious experience (Moses and Burning Bush) from the human experience. I don't think that their ideas about folk theory explain the Pre-Socratic philosophers (that is what I am working on). I have difficulty with their comprehensive claims about time metaphors and space-time metonymies in conceptual science (Quantum weirdness).
Charles
FROM: Mike Ward (06/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Embodied MindCharles
May I ask exactly why you are pursuing this writing? What need will it satisfy in yourself when you succeed or stop?
Is the topic heading the clue to be able to demonstrate "embodiment" of mind from some other form of non-corporeal existence.
Regards
Mike
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FROM: Chris Else (05/28/09)
SUBJECT: IntroductionMy apologies for introducing another Chris to the conference. I hope it doesn't get too confusing.
I am a writer by trade but I have also had a life-long flirtation with philosophy. Many years ago I fell in love with existentialism but these days my hero is Wittgenstein, whose work I feel, after thirty or so years, I am finally beginning to understand (a bit).
My interests are consciousness, subjectivity vs. objectivity, language, and science.
My philosophical temperament is towards the scientific materialism of people like Daniel Dennett but I also have a metaphysical or mystical itch, by which I mean that I am ultimately unsatisfied with science as the fount of all truth and knowledge.
Thus, I empathise with what Charles is saying about Lakoff and Johnson excluding meditative practice and religious experience (although the word 'religious' seems a bit scary). I have just finished reading Dennett's 'Breaking the Spell' — his attempt to sketch out a philosophical and scientific programme for explaining religion as a natural phenomenon. As with much of Dennett's work, I find the arguments largely convincing except for the fact that he fails to give adequate attention to, what seems to me, the most important matter — the value and the significance of people's experience of the transcendental Something. However, I suspect this is not entirely Dennett's fault as I am not sure that such experience is susceptible to any kind of explanation. I am not sure it can even be talked about in the kind of philosophical language I am used to.
Chris
FROM: Charles Countryman (06/02/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionChris
I'll use that scary word, but I agree that it is difficult to talk about religion using the language of modern philosophy. In reading Simone Weil, I am reminded that she ultimately depended on poetic fable to describe her religious experience- in her fable titled "Prologue".
Charles
FROM: Chris Else (06/04/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionHi Charles
I have not read Simone Weil. My thoughts on this come from Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus'.
His position, on my reading, is that, within philosophy and, by implication, science, language consists in the logical manipulation of propositions based in fact. This view results in statements like
'6.5 When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words. The riddle does not exist. If a question can be framed at all, it is possible to answer it.'
and
'6.52: We feel that when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer.'
This sort of statement gave impetus to logical positivism and is still very much in the spirit of scientific reductionism generally.
Wittgenstein, though, was not hostile to mystical experience, see:
'6.522 There are indeed things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.'
which leads to the famous ending
'7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence'
Given that 7. refers not to all language but only to the language of philosophy (and science), the above statements seem to sketch out an important problem. At least, it is one I am interested in.
FROM: Charles Countryman (06/05/09)
SUBJECT: languageChris
Interest in language appears in several introductions.
This forum gives us freedom to speak freely without academic license. So I'll go ahead and question the basis of analytic philosophy and its claim that the structure of language tells us about the nature of reality! I think that language based detailed analysis leads to an illusion that modern philosophy is necessarily continuous with science.
Science provides a method for humans to understand reality. But science doesn't provide a comprehensive understanding of the world. Our world also has metaphysical aspects, which require a less reductionist understanding. Philosophy to be complete requires both analytic method and metaphysical inquiry.
My argument obviously needs more. I'll add later. I'm looking forward to other views from the conference first. If I say too much now, I might start thinking that I know something for certain.
Charles
FROM: Chris Else (06/05/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionCharles
It seems to me there are two things here we might pursue. One is what science does or doesn't do (I tend to think it explains things — I am not sure if that tells us 'the nature of reality or not'). The other is whether any (other) sort of metaphysical enquiry is possible and, if it is, what it is.
Look forward to your further thoughts (and to others' contributions).
Chris
FROM: Charles Countryman (06/06/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionChris
I like your definition of new topics for discussion.I interpret it broadly for a possible new thread and subject heading: Scientific vs Metaphysical Inquiry. I would welcome your starting a new thread with that or similar subject heading. Continuing under this subject (Introduction) also works.
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/06/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionCharles and Chris, I refer to this "scientific vs metaphysical" opposition.
In my opinion part of the difference can be seen in the opposition of astrology and astronomy. Astronomy tries to model reality and derive exact predictions from those models. If the predictions are confirmed, then for the time being and in certain respects the model seems valid. When new facts cannot be explained by the model, the model has to be adapted or even replaced by some very different model in a "paradigm shift". This is not different from the way Sherlock Holmes would try and check his hypotheses on "whodonit". New evidence may require a new hypothesis, even a totally new hypothesis.
The approach of the astrologer is very different : Not the facts are important, but the models. So instead of adapting the models, he is adapting the facts.
What you call metaphysics has fallen into disgrace because there is a strong tendency of all metaphysicians to follow the principle of the astrologer and not that of the astronomer.
The problem is not building models with words and language and logical thinking. The problem is to know what reality — if any — we are speaking of. What are we speaking of in "mystical" language — facts or fancies or feelings ?
Thus in the sense of Wittgenstein we have to keep apart "clarifying our statements on thoughts" and "clarifying our statements on observations" — which is not at all the same ! We can set up grandiose systems of metaphysical and mystical systems which lack any connection to provable facts of the real world.
But this does not necessarily render such constructs meaningless : The mesh of longitudes and latitudes on the globe is purely artificial but helps to know where we are — see Google Earth. Thus metaphysics may tell us where we are without telling us anything of value about the reality.
So what are we talking about when we talk of mystical experiences : are we talking of some facts, or are we talking of experiences which are as subjective as a placebo ? But even placebos can be helping. So what do we call reality here ?
Hubertus
P.S. on 090607 :
Today, after posting my comments above, I found this one (taken from http://www.utm.edu/staff/jfieser/vita/teaching/eastphil.htm )
// Edward Conze, in his Buddhist Thought in India, sees an unfortunate conceptual barrier between Eastern philosophy and contemporary Western philosophy. Eastern philosophy, he argues, is grounded in a metaphysical position that the universe has various layers of reality. The outer layer involves our ordinary perceptions of things, and the inner layer is a unified reality that permeates everything, including humans. Meditation is the principal means of awareness of this inner layer of reality. By contrast, Conze notes that contemporary Western philosophy has shed itself of metaphysical speculations about various layers of reality. After several centuries of applying Ockham's razor and eliminating unneeded metaphysical entities, philosophers are suspicious about any discussion of the concept of "being." In place of metaphysics, Western philosophy now emphasizes epistemology, that is, our knowledge of things as distinct from the reality of things. This, by and large, is an empirical issue involving sensory experience. Consequently, there seems to be no place in Western thinking for either speculations about layers of reality or non-empirical methods of meditation which purportedly reveal these various layers. Conze's depiction of the differences between Eastern philosophy and contemporary Western philosophy is partly correct, especially as pertains to the Anglo-American tradition of analytic philosophy. This tradition is firmly rooted in the skeptical empiricism of Hume, Mill, Russell, and the Vienna Circle, which reject metaphysical discussions as meaningless. //
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FROM: Chris Else (06/07/09)
SUBJECT: Science as MetaphysicsThanks, Hubertus. I liked the quote from Conze.
Thanks, too, for the exposition of Scientific vs. Metaphysical. I'm not sure I understand some of it, though. Your view of science seems familiar enough to me but I'm not sure what you are referring to when you say 'What you call metaphysics'. I don't really have an idea of metaphysics, at least, not anything that resembles a coherent system or model. I allow some place in my scheme of things for what I call mystical experience. Now, one of the defining characteristics of the mystical, in my view, is that it can't be put into words. That makes it very difficult for it to form part of any theory or system. Thus, I am as sceptical about talk of other realities and the conceptual constructions used to explain them as the next materialist. However, as time goes by, I am becoming similarly sceptical about science.
We say that science consists of models of reality. This always makes me think of the scene in the movie "A Mighty Wind" when one of the characters says 'Ah, model railways. They're great. If they hadn't had those they wouldn't have thought of the big ones.' A model, it seems to me, is a construction, the parts of which can be mapped on to the real world. We look at a model of Grand Central Station and we see that's a train, that's the booking office, that's a porter with his little trolley. Sometimes science seems to be like this: the solar system and Newton's equations of motion, for example. But what about quantum physics? What does it mean to say that my hand is ultimately made up of things called bosons and the like? Or that it's a bunch of particles that are actually waves, whoops no, they're particles? I'm not sure you can get too much more metaphysical than this.
One way to look at it, the way you seem to suggest in your response, it is to say that science consists of theories and that the theories are either confirmed or disconfirmed by facts. This relationship between theory and fact always seems a bit dodgy to me, though. It is a fact that an alpha particle has a kinetic energy of around 5 million electron volts (at least according to Wikipedia). Does this mean that alpha particles and electrons exist in reality, the way rocks and whisky do? Or is this a fact about a metaphysical or theoretical entity (and what would that mean)?
Part of the problem is that between the facts and the theory falls the interpretation. Rutherford and Chadwick et al spent hours peering into cloud chambers looking for little streaks of condensation. The streaks, when they appeared, were facts. The idea that a particular streak was the track of a proton, however, was an interpretation by which the fact confirmed a theory. Perhaps a different interpretation could have confirmed a different theory. In general, it is arguable that a single set of facts could confirm an infinite number of theories.
What interests me here is the extent to which science can be said to give us the truth about the world. A question that sharpens this problem a little is this: Is it possible to have a system of thought that is just as (or even more) successful in predicting reality as our science but is nonetheless radically different in its conceptual scheme, so different in fact that human beings couldn't understand it?
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/07/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsVery good questions, Chris, and I will answer them all in detail — hopefully to your and Charles' satisfaction. But now it is nearly 1 a.m. locally here in Bonn, Germany, so I leave it to another day.
Where are you located ? I like to see people somewhere on the globe. Charles is from Spokane/WA. So I know that my clock is always 9 hours ahead of his, or at this moment, when my clock is 1 hour after midnight, his is 24+1-9 = 25 — 9 = 16, so he is having his afternoon tea or coffee now or a little stroll in the parc ?
Take this for another minor aspect of reality of time and space !
Hubertus
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/08/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHello Chris, now I will try some answers to those many questions.
Metaphysics is essentially any coherent system explaining the totality of the world. Religions try to give such a systems, but likewise did philosophies and sciences up to not long ago. But modern science does not need a metaphysical notion of truth. The theories of Einstein or those of Quantum Mechanics or Quark-Theory or String-Theory need not be "true" but only "conjectures" to be refuted in the sense of Popper's "Conjections and Refutations". This is why I compared the situation to the conjectures of Sherlock Holmes which may change anytime in the light of new evidence.
The important thing is : In the end there is of course "the true picture of the crime", but what Holmes or Ms.Marple try to do is to close all gaps and contradictions of their conjectures. You know from most movies that usually the murder is "found out" after one or two days, while he/she has to be set free again since it was the wrong person. It's always the "real" detective who avoids rash conclusions and in the end presents some totally unsuspected perpetrator.
Modern science does not claim "to know the truth" but "to solve problems". Truth is a metaphysical concept, that is not needed in science. Science is content to find "explanations".
But for the true believer "God" is no conjecture. You don't trust in a conjecture if you trust in God. Well, Pascal was not sure about that, and neither was Kierkegaard. The latter was well aware the even if he had the Bible at hand as a trustworthy report, and even if in the times of Jesus video-reporting would have been available, and many report in the newspapers as today, this all together would not have proven "him" to be God incarnated. There was a rabbi — may be a very impressive and bright and charismatic one — but nothing else.
So what does "proving" in this case come to ? How to we "prove" that a charismatic rabbi is more than just that ? Even the letters of St.Paul and his "Damascus" do not prove anything.
The problem with any metaphysical or theological "truth" is always that if cannot be proven by objective evidence. The H-Bomb is objective evidence of some important truth in Einsteins theories and that of QM. But there is nothing comparable to prove the Christian faith true — or any other faith. QM is a theory — even a strange one — but it works. It may be incomplete, but it works. If modern physics were all nonsense, then there would not only be no H-Bombs, but no internet and no iPods and not space-rockets etc. either. All this was impossible before modern physics.
But religious truth may be a purely subjective form of truth. You can have many strong convictions that have not basis in reality, only in your private constructs of reality. You may live all your life on false assumptions. How would you know this ? People who are ignorant on modern physics or biology live along as happy as any Nobel-Laureate in those disciplines.
A religious or a philosophical of political or moral conviction may strongly guide your life — you thinking and acting — quite independent of whether it is "true". So what does "to be true" mean in this case ? This is what our problem comes to.
Of course you may have mystical experiences. But the question is : Are those "exogenous" (i.e. generated by sensory data) or "endogenous" (i.e., generated by fancies) experiences ? Most dreams are surely endogenous, but I said "most" and not "all". There may be dreams that are exogenous messages, not just distorted memories or fancies. But how to tell them apart ?
The H-Bomb and the computer surely are no mere fancies. They are the result of methodical science. But theology may be just a "science on fancies" without any relations to the external reality. If you are convinced of a truth, this does not prove that it's true. "Evidence" or "plausibility" do not prove anything. Most of what we call "reality" is a mere mental construct. To be sure : All scientific theories are mentals constructs too, but they can be checked against facts, and in this way the construct as a model of reality can be improved. But if there is no reality against which to check your mental constructs, how do you know whether your construct is anything but a mere fancy ?
The dual nature of light as particle and wave has nothing to do with metaphysics. It is just a way of describing the behaviour of light under different circumstances. We physicists not even try to understand, we simply accept it matter of fact. But this again has nothing to do with "faith". Physicists need no faith, they need mathematical descriptions that are consistent. This particle-wave dualism or those quarks and strings etc. are the results of observations and formulas that are consistent and that need no metaphysics. They just work.
You write : // The idea that a particular streak was the track of a proton, however, was an interpretation by which the fact confirmed a theory. Perhaps a different interpretation could have confirmed a different theory. // Yes, of course, but as long as no other theory is needed, we may leave it at that. Physicists are always selecting many theories by their consistency. Suppose you think of a different interpretation of your data, then this interpretation may be in conflict with some other observations. Then you go back to the first interpretation. This is how it works.
Theories and experiments are sieves, in the same way as hypotheses in the cases of Holmes and Ms.Marple are sieves. Einstein could be proven wrong tomorrow, while up today his theories look sound. The attitude of the modern scientist and philosopher is to say that in most cases metaphysical claims are not helping, that conjectures (your "interpretations") and refutations are sufficient. Look up Popper on this.
And a note on "a fact about a metaphysical or theoretical entity". For the physicist the electron and the alpha-particle are "theoretical entities" but not "metaphysical entities". The theoretical entities are used to explain observations, but they are not "metaphysical". Once more : If the concept of the electron could be replaced by something better — or dropped altogether — physicists would not hesitate to do so.
But what about "God" and "sin" and "grace" and "Oedius complex" and "class struggle" : Are those "theoretical" or are they "metaphysical" notions ? From a distant of epistemology they are mere theoretical concepts, needed in the context of some theory, but for the Christian or Marxist or Freudian true believer they are "essential facts" and in this way are "metaphysical". For the liberal economist "class struggle" simply does not exist and is not needed as a concept, and for the behaviourist the "Oedipus complex" is a mere theoretical construct without meaning in the theory of behaviourism.
Compare it thus : In a music, a symphony say, any sound is bearing to the meaning of the whole, but the whole is at the same time defining the meaning of the sound. The same applies with literature or the arts etc.. The details are defined by the context, and the context is defined by the details. You can live in a perfectly consistent theory of the reality and still be "out of this world" if some important facts and observations are excluded from your model. Any theory gives you some "world-view" but not "the" world view. Change the standpoint and the illumination of your world or change the questions to be put to you observations, and your view of reality may change totally.
Look up http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Optical_illusion and http://www.michaelbach.de/ot/ and http://www.michaelbach.de/ot/cog_imposs1/index.html ! Have fun !
Hubertus
FROM: Charles Countryman (06/08/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsChris
You ask: "Is it possible to have a system of thought that is just as (or even more) successful in predicting reality as our science but is nonetheless radically different in its conceptual scheme, so different in fact that human beings couldn't understand it?"
Your question first assumes realism. This is the view that there are external objects and systems of objects ("reality") independent from us. But then you ask us to imagine a reality that is both outside human understanding and remains predictable.
Science and its methods exist in our world and universe. We do not have immediate access to all of our world and universe. But we assume that it is possible for human beings using science to theoretically experience our world and universe. Science is limited to what humans can theoretically experience then understand and predict.
Science produces predictability. But what is known is not always predictable. Much, if not most, of what is known as the human experience was not predicted.
Human beings deal with unpredictability by recognizing both transcendence and continuity, through metaphor, and observing patterns. Human beings are informed by the rhythms and metaphors of music and poetry; divine agency or synergisms through religious experiences; human noetics; visual arts; tradition and continuities in history. This is the stuff of metaphysics, including the first philosophers, Socrates, and Plato. There are also natural laws precepts, such as from Aristotelian doctrine.
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsCharles and Chris, I think that your understanding of metaphysics is
much too vague and sloppy. You seem to lump together everything that
does not fit into some theory as "metaphysics". But in fact the concept
of metaphysics is very clear ! Metaphysics is a coherent and consistent
frame of reference where to put all known facts and experiences to make a coherent "reality". Look up Wiki and SEOP and IEP on "Metaphysics" !
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/
http://www.iep.utm.edu/k/kantmeta.htm
The essential point is : There are many different ways of interpreting the reality in a consistent way. The Greeks thought of a fundamental cosmic order supported by reason and mathematics. The Jews instead thought of an almighty God, who was "unfathomable" and not dependent on "natural laws" or mathematics. But since he was "omnipotent and wise", this did not matter. And while the supreme being for the Jews was a personal god, for the Greeks all gods were subdued to the eternal cosmic order. Thus both forms of metaphysics were completely different and incompatible, but at the same time consistent in themselves.
The religions of the Jews and the Christians and Islam were defined around a supreme being, the personal God, while neither the Greeks nor Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, or Confucianism know of such a god. Even Brahma or Vishnu or Kwannon are no supreme gods but only images of the eternal cosmic order. But once more all these models are consistent in themselves.
Each of these metaphysical models has room where to place "mystical experiences" and how to interpret them. Even our modern "naturalistic metaphysics" would have such a place and explanation, calling those mystical experiences "mere neuronal effects that can be had from mushrooms and chemicals like LSD or endogenous drugs stimulated electrically". Thus there is no inside and outside of metaphysics, there are only different consistent models of reality.
But of course we have a sort of "metaphysical multiculturalism", i.e., several metaphysics mixing together and thus looking inconsistent. This reminds me on Japanese religion, which is a mixture of Shinto and Buddhism and Christianity and Taoism "ad hoc", a syncretism. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syncretism on this.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (06/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsCharles
Thanks for your response. Some good points. I particularly like your second paragraph about my assuming realism and then imagining a reality that is outside human understanding. Yes, that's exactly the paradox that interests me in all this. It might be that I am espousing a contradiction. I don't feel it but maybe somebody can point it out.
It's in your last two paragraphs that you start to lose me. I am not sure that science 'produces predictability'. Science predicts things but that is not quite the same thing. In any case, prediction is only one of the things science does. I prefer the idea that its prime task is to give us explanations, as Hubertus (I think) suggests.
Also, your last paragraph is a bit quick for me. I am not sure how the things you list help us to deal with unpredictability. Are we seeking patterns? (If so, doesn't science do this too?) Or are we creating them? And I am not sure what transcendence has to do with pattern seeking.
Chris
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Hubertus
A comment on your reply to Charles (and me).
Thanks for references to metaphysics. I had a look at a couple of them and they left me confused as to your view. The Stanford one in particular begins with the statement 'It is not easy to say what metaphysics is' which seems to contradict your claim that 'the concept of metaphysics is very clear!'.
All the examples you give seem to be systems of religious belief. I thought that the modern notion of metaphysics included such things as Lewis's wonderful theory that possible worlds exist in the sense that they are as concrete as our own world and Ernst Mally's idea that there are such things as non-existent objects. Neither of these seem to be your 'coherent and consistent frame of reference where to put all known facts and experiences to make a coherent "reality"'. Aren't they rather ontological theories intended to solve specific philosophical problems?
I am sure you're right in you claim that my understanding of metaphysics is vague and sloppy. I fear you are not helping me clarify, though.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsChris, since it is once more shortly before midnight here, just a hint : Our words are like building blocks of little children. We may construct wonderful worlds from those building blocks and enjoy them. But what do you really say when you say "God is love" ? Of course you could say "the moon is a cheese". Grammatically there is nothing wrong with it. In this way you even can construct the notion of "objects that are nonexistent". But this leads you up to ontology : What do "valid sentences" have in common with reality other than that they are grammatically correct ? This was the starting point of pragmatism and logical empiricism : We should understand the difference between words and objects. The real objects do not care whether we put labels on them by putting a word in our lexicon. The cloud does not know that there are clouds and justice does not know that there is justice. But whats the use of filling the universe with all sorts of objects that are "purely grammatical" without any relation to "reality" ? Reality need not be "physical". We do not know what the reality of the electron is, but we need this "particle" for the time being to make sense of some observations. The gravitational force, while invisible, is physical, but the law of gravitation is mathematical and not even known thus far, since the law as stated by Newton is only an approximation to the law as stated by Einstein. But at least those laws refer to observables.
But what if you formulate all sorts of laws and all sorts of labels that are purely fictitious ? I could build innumerable worlds (given time to do it) that are consistent in themselves and completely out of touch with any but mental reality. Of course those worlds are "existing" in your head (or mine) like dreams. But most (if not all) dreams are just "nervous states" and not referring to other realities. Dreams are not measurements as in a voltmeter or a Geiger counter. You should accept some pruning mechanism to separate "theories of external reality" and "theories of mere wording."
Up to now we all respect the difference of the reality as shown in a novel or on the movie screen or in a computer game etc. and "real reality". Shooting people in a computer game and shooting them in reality is different. At least the police in Wellington will think so. But what makes the difference ? The answer is left to the reader.
Up tomorrow, have a good time, Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (06/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
I think you misunderstand me. I am not saying that I agree with Mally's theory of non-existent objects. I don't. I was just using it as an example of a theory that is considered to be metaphysical but that does not confirm to your claim that metaphysics is 'a coherent and consistent frame of reference where to put all known facts and experiences to make a coherent "reality"' In other words, I was merely questioning your notion of metaphysics, not putting forward any views of my own.
What I am most interested in, though, is your answer(s) to my earlier post about the ontology of science (if there is such a thing).
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/10/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsChris, first to put some meat to the shark, look up this one :
http://www.amazon.com/Quine-Davidson-Language-Thought-Reality/dp/ 0521048052/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1244655171&sr=8-1
But of course I owe you a personal reply, so let me have some time. I will be back on this. Hubertus
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/10/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsChris, I am not sure what you are asking. What is on your mind ? Are you asking whether religious convictions and mystical experiences are compatible with scientific theories ? Not 150 years ago the H-Bomb and the iPod, the TV-set and the jetliner and countless other modern devices would have been stuff for sf-novels. Nobody would have had the slightest idea of how to realize such devices. Maybe in some 100 years from now even "mystical experiences" and "psi-phenomena" are well explained and everyday things. We do not know.
What we know is that there is a difference between mere "experiences" and "the real thing". A lion in your dream is not a lion in reality before you. How do you tell them apart ? The standard-question is "Am I dreaming ?" Generally you will know in the shortest time, whether the lion is a hologram or is for real. The usual way to check it is by taking circumstances into account. In the dream you only see the lion, in reality you hear and smell and see the surrounding etc., and by this you guess that this must be "real". Thus you evaluate the whole context. This is what we do in science : we ask for the consistency of the whole context, and not for isolated observations. And this is what astrologers don't do. They keep much of evidence that is not supporting their assumptions out of the picture to keep the picture intact.
You can be "rapt and thrilled" by a movie or a fairy tale, but you still know that it is a movie of a fairy tale and would run away if a "real" fire breaks out near to you. Thus to be "rapt and thrilled" does not destroy your sense of reality — at least not totally. Thus you may think of this fact : How do you know the difference of "imagined reality" and "real reality" ?
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (06/10/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
I started out with some general statements that could have led in many directions. Some of these might be the kinds of things you talk about here. Now, though, I have narrowed my interest down to something much more specific. What interests me can best be fitted under three headings:
’Ä¢ What is metaphysics?
’Ä¢ Is science metaphysics?
’Ä¢ What is the ontology of science?
These three questions are related but it is the third that interests me most. Let me try and explain more clearly.
What is metaphysics?
’Ä¢ You say that metaphysics is 'essentially any coherent system explaining the totality of the world.' You especially mention various religious doctrines as examples, which seems to suggest that you equate metaphysics with religion.
’Ä¢ I suspect this is a limited definition, at least in the way the term seems to be used nowadays. I have mentioned two theories above, which are generally understood to be metaphysical, but which make no claim to be total explanations and certainly have nothing to do with religion.
’Ä¢ My tentative view is that metaphysics is better understood as any theory that makes ontological claims beyond the realm of everyday reality. Your thoughts?
Is science metaphysics?
’Ä¢ You say that science is not metaphysics. Maybe that's right. I have no conviction either way. I am trying to come to one.
’Ä¢ However, a number of scientists seem to claim that the ultimate aim of science is 'a theory of everything' to use Hawking's term. To me that sounds a lot like 'a coherent system explaining the totality of the world' — your definition of metaphysics.
’Ä¢ Given this, I am not convinced by your view that science has nothing to do with metaphysics. Maybe I missed something.
What is the ontology of science, if it has one?
’Ä¢ You say that in science certain objects (such as atomic and sub-atomic particles) are 'theoretical entities'. It is not clear to me what you mean by this.
’Ä¢ One interpretation might be that a theoretical entity is something that exists only within the framework of some intellectual construct (a theory). It does not correspond to anything in the world at all. If this were the case, then I don't understand how any science that involves such entities can be said to describe or explain anything.
’Ä¢ People (including scientists?) talk as if entities like electrons do exist. The proton, we say, was 'discovered'. It is not clear to me how you can 'discover' a theoretical entity. Wouldn't it be more accurate to use the word 'invent'?
’Ä¢ Are all the entities science deals with theoretical? It is possible, of course, to argue that all our concepts are contingent upon our human perspective but within that perspective, it seems to me, there is an ontological difference between a lump of iron, say, and a quark. Perhaps science deals with two kinds of entities, the real and theoretical, but if so, then how do we distinguish between them? Is a gas theoretical or real? Or an ion? Is Boyle's law a fact or a theory?
’Ä¢ One answer to the question of real v. theoretical in science would be to say that we believe in various entities with different levels of confidence. (This would be a Bayesian view, as I understand it, although I think Popper might also have agreed.) Some things, like lumps of iron, we are very confident about. Others, like bosons, we are less so. On the frontiers of science we propose new entities and relationships (hypotheses). At this point we are inventing things — in the light of evidence, of course. We then (as Popper would say) seek refutations for these conjectures. With each failed refutation our confidence grows that our theory is right. In other words, we come to believe in the existence of the things we have invented. We cease to think of them as theoretical.
’Ä¢ If this last point is correct and if what I said about metaphysics at the beginning is also right, then certain objects in science would be better described as 'metaphysical entities' than 'theoretical entities'.
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/11/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsWe are homing in, Chris !
First : I never attributet some special metaphysical status to any religion. I only used the well known example of "Jerusalem and Athens" to illustrate the point that totally different ways of interpreting the world can be coherent and meaningful in themselves. Both models fit my definition of 'a coherent system explaining the totality of the world.' There are humans and animals and stars and good and bad deeds etc. in both worlds, that of "Athens" and that of "Jerusalem", but they are explained in a different way according to the different forms of "metaphysics". The Hindu and Buddhist and Confucian and Taoist etc. models would explain the same observations one more in different ways. And of course Marxism and Liberalism are explaining the economic crisis in different ways too. But, as I added, there is syncretism too.
Science is a special segment of metaphysics, since it assumes some forms of reality. The problem is : As a system of coherent assumptions interpreting certain observation astrology and alchemy and scientology are "sciences" too, but from a modern standard they all are "pseudo-sciences", i.e., formal systems that are not self-critical in the sense of Popper. This must be said of Freudism and Marxism likewise. Both are weak on scientific terms, but fiercly defended by "true believers" (i.e. in Freud and Marx, resp.).
Most people are not really interested in "the truth", but they want to "live in a meaningful world". Thus while the honest scientist can and will do without religion and Freudism and Marxism, many people need a coherent "metaphysics" that explains nuch more than science could explain in all honesty. In this sense even Freudism and Marxism are partly sciences and partly pseudo-sciences, since they claim too much. They offer explanation but don't tell you that other explanations would do as good or better. In exatly this sense I said that science is no metaphysics, since it is much more restricted. No serious scientist would claim to have explanations of everything. Physicists are cautious : They say that Einstein "so far has not been falsified", but they would never say (as any true metaphysicist could) that "Einstein is true". Science cannot do without metaphysics of some general assumptions, but this is not necessarily a coherent worldview. Take f.i. causality : As Hume correctly remarked : We cannot prove that there is causality, we only see a "before-after" relation of events. Thus causality is not an observation but a postulate. In this sense you are right : "Causality" is an "object" (in ontological terms) the reality of which cannot be decided. In this and similar cases "metaphysics is any theory that makes ontological claims beyond the realm of everyday reality."
Your tentative definition is contained in my more all-comprising definition since all theories of a coherent world make many such "ontological claims beyond the realm of everyday reality." We cannot even prove what sort of reality is outside of our brain. This was the idea of the "Matrix"-movies. We could be victims of a system of stimulations. As long as those are consistent, we do not know how to tell them apart from "real reality". But this is a lengthy story so I skip it for the moment.
How do you "fake" a real lion that is biting you ? As an observer you have to take into acount not only the feelings of the lion and its victim, which is a neuronal thing and could be done by the Matrix, but also the physical flow of energy and material etc.. Thus in the end you come out at the notion of the whole universe being one vast fiction. But then even the Matrix becomes a fiction and this turns the whole story into self-referential nonsense. Thus there must be some difference between "real" and "imagined" reality, and we have to clarify this difference. What happens in our nervous system or in the Matrix is not identical to what happens in the physical world outside.
So I concede in the way stated, that science cannot do without all metaphysics, while I reject the idea that science coincides with metaphysics. "Naturalism" — the idea that every experience and fact can be reduced to the laws of physics, is a special metaphysics, while religions are different forms of metaphysics. They all fit with my definition by "explaining everything in a coherent way". But from a religious point of view "naturalism" is "explaining away" most of reality. In a naturalistic worldview as of Hawking, "God" and "justice" and "Oedipus Complex" and "Class Struggle" are all meaningless and non existent. There are physical forces and neuronal events and nothing else. But it is a coherent worldview.
To be coherent does not mean to be complete. We have innumerable coherent worldviews which are incompatible and see different things and are blind to other things. It's like going through a landscape or a building called "reality" : The landscape or the building are "coherent", but no single description is, since we always see only some parts of the whole thing under some special perspective. Only a god would see all at once.
You write "You say that in science certain objects (such as atomic and sub-atomic particles) are 'theoretical entities'. It is not clear to me what you mean by this."
Nobody has ever seen an electron. But we know since Faraday that there are electrical charges as multiples of elementary charges, so we think of electrical particles. By assuming the entities called electrons and ascribing certain properties to them we get at a meaningful and consistent model of the physical world. What the electrons "are" in the ontological sense we do not know. Somebody put it thus : From the medicin-flask we have the fluid in droplets. Does this imply that the flask is full of droplets ? So how do we know what the "true nature" of the electron is ? Or "the true nature of the photon" ? We physicists refrain from asking such questions and call them meaningless. We try to keep to our observations, and in those an electron and a photon appear to be particles, but that doesn't imply that they "are" particles. So much on ontology.
More to this later from Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (06/12/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
Thanks for your response. Interesting as always. You are helping to clarify my thinking and I am also getting used to the style of yours. As usual you answered a number of questions I didn't ask and didn't answer several that I did. No matter.
What interests me most in your response is your last paragraph. You seem to suggest a dualism between an 'assumed' electron (part of a theory) and a 'real electron' (part of reality) and then you dismiss the latter, I suspect rightly, as 'meaningless'. However, this dualism is not something I put forward. Nor does your dismissal really help me to understand what you mean by 'theoretical entities'.
You say 'We try to keep to our observations and in those an electron and a photon appear to be particles, but this doesn't mean that they 'are' particles.' No, quite true. However, the way you express this idea suggests the very problem you are trying to avoid. If you say 'an electron and a photon appear to be particles' you are claiming that the electron and the photon exist (in reality). They may not be particles but, if they are not, they must be something else.
Your analogy of the medicine flask was illuminating, thank you for it. However, it does not eliminate this problem. We see the drops and, of course, that does not mean that the flask contains drops. However, the flask contains something and if we look inside it, we can see whatever liquid is there. If we cannot look in the flask, even in principle (i.e. it is logically impossible or inconceivable for us to look in it) then all we have is the drops. Your analogy sets up a dualism — inside and outside of the flask. If there is an inside, then we should be able to find out what it is. If we cannot possible find out what it is, then we may as we say there is no inside.
I shall try to make this a little clearer.
You said earlier that science consists of making models. This, to my mind is another example of dualistic thinking. Take an example from economics. Here we have theoretical entities called buyers and sellers and we develop some relationships and mathematical formulae to show how they interact. This is a model. It makes predictions. We can now go to the real world and collect data and test our predictions. If the results of the model conform to the data, then we say our model is a good one. It explains consumer behaviour. However, what makes all this work and make sense is that there are things in the real world (people) who correspond to the theoretical entities of buyer and seller. So we have theoretical buyers and sellers and real buyers and sellers — a dualism.
Take a second example. We invent a machine to build a house. It produces exactly the same house as a builder produces. We do not say that the machine is a model for the builder's behaviour or that it explains what a builder does. All it does is produce the same result. The reason that the machine is not an explanation, I believe, is that there is no correspondence between its parts and the way they interact and the parts of the builder and the way they interact. There is no dualism but there is no meaning either.
So my question: Is a scientific theory a model or a machine? If it is a model, then we have to except some sort of dualism involving theory and reality. If it is a machine, then it has no power as an explanation of anything. We can't be said to understand the world as a result of it. It just makes predictions.
There are other possibilities, of course. A model is only one form of explanation. We could avoid the dualism by saying that a scientific theory is a description of reality. In other words, we believe that this is the way the world is. This would suggest that there is no such thing as a theoretical entity. We are committed to believing that quarks are real.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/18/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsChris,
your questions are a bit complex and confusing. So I try a different
form of answering as good as I can. Perhaps you could reformulate your
questions then in a sharpened way ? Hubertus
This is what you wrote :
FROM: Chris Else (06/12/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as Metaphysics
Hubertus
...
What interests me most in your response is your last paragraph. You seem
to suggest a dualism between an 'assumed' electron (part of a theory)
and a 'real electron' (part of reality) and then you dismiss the latter,
I suspect rightly, as 'meaningless'. However, this dualism is not
something I put forward. Nor does your dismissal really help me to
understand what you mean by 'theoretical entities'.
You say 'We try to keep to our observations and in those an electron and
a photon appear to be particles, but this doesn't mean that they 'are'
particles.' No, quite true. However, the way you express this idea
suggests the very problem you are trying to avoid. If you say 'an
electron and a photon appear to be particles' you are claiming that the
electron and the photon exist (in reality). They may not be particles
but, if they are not, they must be something else.
My (Hubertus) answer to that :
For the physicist the electron is "two sorts of things" that both are not
the electron in the sense of a star being a star. On the one hand we
have measurements, but those are only indicators of "something happened"
: Voltmeters, Geiger-counters etc.. Then we have the theories that tell
us, what to expect on the counters. Then in our heads we stick this
together and say : This "something" that caused our meters and counters
to show that certain value must have been "our electron", since the
measurement neatly fits our theoretical predictions, so we are happy.
But in fact what we see is some data from the meters and counters on the
one hand and some formulas from our mathematician on the other. We never
ever have seen the electron itself. So how do you call such an entity ?
I called it "a theoretical entity", because only by our theories we can
guess what those measurements mean. Without a theory the data from the
counters and meters are totally meaningless and in this sense they are
not even data. Perhaps compare it to reading a text in Chinese. If you
do not happen to read Chinese, those "strange signs" are meaningless to
you, they are not even syllables or words but just graphical little
pictures. So you have to learn Chinese writing, then all of a sudden the
little graphics make sense — not by themselves, but because you now can
read them. So without your theory of the electron that tells you from
mathematical formulas what measured data to expect even those data would
tell you nothing at all.
Thus be careful here : I didn't say that the
electron itself is "meaningless" or "non existent", I only said that we
never see the electron itself, but we always only see some effects that
we think are caused by this strange object we call electron. The
important thing is : We cannot say "wait until sunday, then the electron
will appear in full glory !" It never will ! We never will have anything
else than formulas and some data from counters and meters. We simply
have to swallow that. But how do we "see" gravity ? It's the same
problem : We always see "effects of a postulated force called gravity".
Wenn a glass falls to the floor and gets broken, gravity is the culprit,
but we cannot "see" gravity and put handcuffs on it. So what do we
expect ? It's all compeletely "real", we don't assume something
mysterious, but we have a reality that has not the character of a
person. Gravity, like the electron, "consists" of effects and formulas,
but there is no other form of "existence" here, and even if there are
"gravitons" (analogous to photons) we would not "see" them, but once
more they were "theoretical entities" but at the same time "real" in
that they hold the universe together.
But then : What sort of "reality" do we ascribe to "love", "justice",
"freedom", "beauty" etc. ? They all do not jump around on a meadow like
little lambs ! They are not even measured by meters and counters like
the electron. So what sort of ontology would we apply this time ? And we
still do not call this "mysterious". Those concepts are shorthands for
real experiences. We know when love and justice an freedom etc. are
lacking. But how do we describe exactly WHAT is lacking ?
Ontology is a
difficult thing. As Heidegger rightly said : "The essence of a thing is
not in its appearance." Here we see a limit of our language in the sense
of Wittgenstein : To call "freedom" an artifact would be wrong, to call
it an idea or a mental construct would be wrong too. But when we call
freedom a reality this too would be misleading, since freedom is in the
mind of the beholder. The saint sitting in a prison cell perhaps would
not feel unfree. So where is freedom "real" if it is a "reality" ?
We may call it a "latent" reality, comparable to the "vacuum" of physics :
As long as you do not test it, it stays invisible, but under certain
conditions the vacuum and freedom can be very real. And here we are
again : What we call an electron or a photon or a graviton depends on
how we put the question. There is "something real" about all those
notions, and not even something mystical, but we cannot put it into a
vitrine with a label on it. So we have a problem with telling what sort
of reality we are dealing with. Limits of our language !
(end of answers)
I am not sure whether this above has answered some or all of your
questions. For your and my convenience I leave the other questions below
for referencing and checking. Perhaps you should reformulate your
problems afresh — with a view at your exchange with Mike ? Otherwise I
will try to answer the questions below at another time in detail.
Your questions unchanged :
Your analogy of the medicine flask was illuminating, thank you for it.
However, it does not eliminate this problem. We see the drops and, of
course, that does not mean that the flask contains drops. However, the
flask contains something and if we look inside it, we can see whatever
liquid is there. If we cannot look in the flask, even in principle (i.e.
it is logically impossible or inconceivable for us to look in it) then
all we have is the drops. Your analogy sets up a dualism — inside and
outside of the flask. If there is an inside, then we should be able to
find out what it is. If we cannot possible find out what it is, then we
may as we say there is no inside.
I shall try to make this a little clearer.
You said earlier that science consists of making models. This, to my
mind is another example of dualistic thinking. Take an example from
economics. Here we have theoretical entities called buyers and sellers
and we develop some relationships and mathematical formulae to show how
they interact. This is a model. It makes predictions. We can now go to
the real world and collect data and test our predictions. If the results
of the model conform to the data, then we say our model is a good one.
It explains consumer behaviour. However, what makes all this work and
make sense is that there are things in the real world (people) who
correspond to the theoretical entities of buyer and seller. So we have
theoretical buyers and sellers and real buyers and sellers — a dualism.
Take a second example. We invent a machine to build a house. It produces
exactly the same house as a builder produces. We do not say that the
machine is a model for the builder's behaviour or that it explains what
a builder does. All it does is produce the same result. The reason that
the machine is not an explanation, I believe, is that there is no
correspondence between its parts and the way they interact and the parts
of the builder and the way they interact. There is no dualism but there
is no meaning either.
So my question: Is a scientific theory a model or a machine? If it is a
model, then we have to except some sort of dualism involving theory and
reality. If it is a machine, then it has no power as an explanation of
anything. We can't be said to understand the world as a result of it. It
just makes predictions.
There are other possibilities, of course. A model is only one form of
explanation. We could avoid the dualism by saying that a scientific
theory is a description of reality. In other words, we believe that this
is the way the world is. This would suggest that there is no such thing
as a theoretical entity. We are committed to believing that quarks are
real.
Chris
FROM: Chris Else (06/18/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
Thanks for your reply. I especially liked the 'lambs in the meadow'. I think we may be close to agreement here though I am not sure. I shall give you my understanding of what you said to see if I have got it right.
Your account involves two categories: 'visible entities' like lambs and 'theoretical entities' like electrons. However, you don't want to say 'that the electron itself is "meaningless" or "non-existent"'. This suggests that you think both visible and theoretical entities are real, perhaps with some qualification as to what 'real' means in each case. I have no problem with this view in a general way.
The distinction that I want to make is between two positions with regard to the ontology of science. These two positions are implicit in my 'unanswered questions' so you might like to respond to them. The first is:
A. As far as we know, according to the latest evidence, the physical world is composed of the various entities and relationships that make up established scientific theories. In other words science is, provisionally, a true/accurate description of the world. The terms of the theory refer to things in the real world.
The second is:
B. We have no idea what the physical world is really like beyond our immediate sensory experience (and we will never know) but it behaves as if it was made up of the entities and relationships of established theories. These theories are not a description. They don't mean anything in themselves. All they do is make certain predictions, which agree with our observations. In other words, they are not true. The terms of the theory refer to nothing real. The theory just happens to work.
Both of these views involve theoretical entities (i.e. entities that are part of a theory). The first view, however, says that those entities exist (are real in some sense). The second that they do not.
I have changed my mind on this matter. I used to favour something like position B. In the course of this discussion with you, I have come to prefer position A. Both views are tenable, I think. A, though, seems simpler and more coherent from my current perspective.
Which view do you hold? I am not sure. I think it may be A. If so, we agree. Or maybe there is a third option, superior to both.
Chris
PS Since you quote Wittgenstein on 'the limit of our language', he also said, in the same book. 'Everything that can be said can be said clearly'. I do not think we have reached the limits of the language just yet.
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/18/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsSince it is once more after midnight, only a preliminary answer, Chris.
I support neither A nor B, but think that you make a distinction that I carefully avoided : I said the electron (as many other "object of nature") is "real", but not in the sense of those "jumping lambs". What we really "have" are only our formulas and "those meters and counters". And this was my "limit of language" : We should perhaps number the concepts of "reality" in the way of "reality-1", "reality-2", "reality-3" etc., to keep observations ("reality-1"), models ("reality-2"), and "evading objects" ("reality-3") apart (just to begin with). The electron is not the signal in the meter or counter, but neither is it the mathematical formula, so it must be ontologically of a third form of reality, for which we have no proper word, so I call it (in this context) "reality-3". There is more to this which I will analyze next time. Think of "freedom" as "reality-4" and of "the idea of God" as "reality-5" etc.. I leave it at that for now.
When Wittgenstein said what you cite from TLP, what he was saying was : "Most of what reality is cannot be spoken of." He did not mean that reality is restricted to our language, only our thinking and speaking is restricted in this way — to a degree. To put it simple : You cannot tell the blind of colour. To know what colour and visual beauty is you need eyes, words would not do. Thus religious people would say "you need religious eyes to see the holy", while Mike would call this nonsense and state that there is no such thing as a religious eye but only neuronal misfiring. Well, I leave this to Mike and you and keep to our physical argument, which is fascinating enough.
Up to next, Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (06/18/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
Thanks for your response. I am sorry to keep you up so late. Perhaps, you should resist the habit of looking at Pathways before you go to bed.
As to our discussion, I am still not sure whether we agree or not. Your distinction between the different realities raises a number of questions. For now, I will focus on one: the difference between your reality-1 and reality-3.
I understand reality-1 to be things you can see, like jumping lambs. I can't see the air but I can feel the breeze on my skin and I can see the leaves of the trees moving so I presume the air is also reality-1.
What about things we can only see through a telescope, like the moons of Jupiter? Or through a microscope, like an amoeba? I guess they are reality-1, too.
What if we take photographs through the telescope or microscope? Are these images of reality-1? I think they must be.
What about a radio telescope or an electron microscope? The images from these instruments are not produced by light but does that mean they are not pictures of reality-1? I don't see how they are much different from the photographs taken through telescopes or microscopes, so reality-1 again.
Brownian motion is a result of the movement of molecules in a liquid. I don't see how this is different from the movement of leaves in a breeze. If the air is reality-1, then I guess molecules are too.
Finally, what about a cloud chamber? If Brownian motion means that molecules are reality-1, then I would have to conclude that the condensation track in a cloud chamber means that electrons and the like are too.
Where and how do we draw the line? To me the distinction between reality-1 and reality-3 seems artificial and arbitrary. I think I would prefer to do without it and just say that, according to science, electrons are as real as rocks.
Chris
PS I agree with your interpretation of Wittgenstein.
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/19/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsChris, you wrote
// Brownian motion is a result of the movement of molecules in a liquid. I don't see how this is different from the movement of leaves in a breeze. If the air is reality-1, then I guess molecules are too.
Finally, what about a cloud chamber? If Brownian motion means that molecules are reality-1, then I would have to conclude that the condensation track in a cloud chamber means that electrons and the like are too.
Where and how do we draw the line? To me the distinction between reality-1 and reality-3 seems artificial and arbitrary. I think I would prefer to do without it and just say that, according to science, electrons are as real as rocks. //
Very good argument ! But Brownian motion and cloud chamber are as indirect as are meters and counters : Without a theory those data are meaningless. That was my point.
Now take this to your debate with Mike : People say that a certain event is brought about "by God" or "by Allah" or "by the devil" or "by the stars" or "by providence" etc.. Thus once more there are certain data — "events" — and some theories offered to explain those data. While formulas "reality-2" convince us, that the relectrons are "real as rocks", Mike would call the other "theories" just cited as "windy at best" and more probably "downright nonsense".
Lets call "truth" a member of the class "reality-7" (I have not set up a system). Then we want to know whether some theory is "in the realm of reality-7" or not.
You see that this is a problem we usually do not feel when we feel the wind blowing. As you know, for Hume even "causality" was not a reality in the sense of the electron, but was just a postulate of our thinking, the validity of which cannot be proven. In the case of God, Mike would say its existence cannot be proven, while Charles would say it need not be proven. Who is right ?
Not all theories are born equal, so we would have to keep apart "reality-2a" from "reality-2b" "reality-2c" etc.. Mathematical theories are of a different sort from theological theories or from "pseudo-science" etc..
Epistemology is a difficult and complex field, but, as you see, strongly related to ontology. We speak of lambs, electrons, events, "freedom" and "God" all in the same language, so we fall victim to all sorts of confusions. The correct grammatical form of a statement does not tell us much about the value of the content. "The moon is a flower" would be nonsense as would be "the moon is sour", but what about "the moon is a cheese" ? It could be true and we have to check it. It is at least a falsifiable statement. But what about "God is love" ? This is not falsifiable, perhaps not even meaningful, we first have to clarify the meaning of such statements. Very probably it is not a statement about God, but about some feelings. So the whole statement is of a very different character than it seems to be.
Well, for the moment I refrain from numbering the different types of statements. But you see where it goes : Ontology, epistemology, logology — where logology would be the science of our way of using the possibilities of conceptual language.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (06/19/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
You move far too fast for me. And cover too much ground. As far as I know I do not have a debate with Mike (yet). I am trying to understand his position. I might well agree with him in the end. When it comes to questions of God and the spirit I always like to move very slowly. This area of philosophy is, to my way of thinking, a mine-field of error. I am especially distrustful of sweeping generalisations and abstract talk that does not focus on fairly clear examples (I admit, of course, that I am prone to these bad habits myself but I try hard to avoid them).
I think you dismiss my argument about reality-1 and reality-3 much too quickly. You say 'Brownian motion and cloud chamber are as indirect as are meters and counters : Without a theory those data are meaningless.' That still does not tell me how to distinguish between reality-1 and reality-3. Unless I can distinguish them you will not be able to convince me that the distinction means anything. I have other problems with your various realities but I would like to get this one clear before we go on.
The leaves of the trees are moving. Why? I have a theory. They are immersed in stuff called 'air', which I can't see. The air moves and this makes the leaves move. The leaves are an indication of the existence of air. How is this situation different from Brownian motion? It is, after all, elementary physics — one of the first lessons in the subject a child learns. So, is air reality-1 or reality-3?
The only distinction between reality-1 and reality-3 that I can find in your descriptions is that we can see reality-1 and we can't see reality-3. This means that our experience of reality-3 is indirect. Is this what you mean?
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/19/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsChris, first for clarity I repeat our convention : observations ("reality-1"), models ("reality-2"), and "evading objects" ("reality-3").
The blowing wind is "reality-1", since we feel it. But suppose we do not know by experience what makes the leaves move, then "wind" would be a postulated force of unknown character, so "reality-3".
In the case of Brownian motion, we do not see the atoms, we postulate them. They are "causes" of the observed movements only in our imagination and by our formulas/models ("reality-2").
My intention was to force us all to keep apart what we really "have" as data, and what we "suppose" as explanations. Before Newton the planets were moved on their orbits by angels. After Newton they were moved by "conservation of momentum and angular momentum." The angels were as invisible as were the "conservation of momentum"-forces. What you see are the movements ("reality-1"), but what you derive from your theories/models are totally different conclusions on invisible forces ("reality-3").
We always "see" lots of things "that are not provably there" — including "causality" and "angels" and "gods" and "destiny" etc.. That was my point. How do you know that not atoms but tiny demons are causing Brownian motion ? You have to prove that by some assumed explaining model, which is "reality-2".
And here we are at the start again, and at metaphysics : We cannot "prove" that our models are "true", but only that they are "useful". In the end, conservation of momentum seemed a simpler explanation when compared to angels. But that in itself is no proof. We simply got used to dismiss angels as a meaningful explanation of natural phenomena. To call the wind the cause of the movements of the leaves is much simpler than to invoke countless "little demons" for the same effect. Today we can calculate exactly the movements of the leaves when the wind is blowing. We only have to use strong computers and do some complicated math on streaming fluids. It can be done. Because of this we don't need demons. This is what we call "understanding".
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (06/20/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHi Hubertus
Thanks for your answer. That clarifies things a little. Maybe we are quite close now.
I am happy with the attempt to distinguish between what is to be explained (data) and the explanation (theory or model, if you like). However, I don't quite see how your scheme works in its application. You have
* reality-1 — data — experienced directly through the senses
* reality-2 — explanation — intellectual construct produced by scientists
* reality-3 — evading objects — concepts that form part of the explanation (and therefore intellectual constructs)
The first problem I see here is that the role that something plays in the overall scheme (e.g. data, explanation, evading object) does not necessarily match up with the physical/mental distinction that you make.
A child asks 'Why are the leaves moving?' (Leaf-movement = data — reality-1.(
Answer 'Because the wind is blowing'. (Explanation — reality-2.)
And yet, as you pointed out, the wind is not an intellectual construct, we can experience it directly — reality-1.
If I were inside looking through the window and saw the movement of the trees, would the fact that I cannot experience the wind directly make it 'a postulated force' (reality-3) at that moment? (After all, it could be that the movement has another cause right then. Those demons, perhaps.)
Another example. Suppose I am watching a game of billiards and one of the players pots a ball and let's also suppose that it is one of those delicate shots where the spectators see what is happening almost in slow motion. Then we might say 'The ball went into that pocket instead of going straight ahead because the first ball hit it at just that angle.' And we might indicate the angle with our hands. There is an explanation here but it doesn't seem to be reality-2. All we have is reality-1.
We could, of course, give a stricter, more scientific explanation to this example. We could apply some equations from rigid body dynamics and these might have variables that corresponded to the relative starting position of the balls, their mass, their radius, the speed of the first ball, etc. We would then have a situation consisting of:
* reality-1 (the actual balls and their movement)
* reality-2 (the equations).
What is the data, though? Is it the balls and their movement? Or just the movement? We don't have to explain the balls, after all; only how they move relative to one another.
And what about reality-3 here? Is it all the variables in the equation? Or just the two masses and radii? Or do we have two 'theoretical balls' implicit in the equations?
I think if I had answers to the above questions I would have a better idea of your view of how all this works.
Now it's my turn for a late night. It's almost midnight here down under.
Chris
FROM: Chris Else (06/20/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
It is amazing what a little sleep can do. I have another example to test your schema.
Suppose we electrolyse hydrochloric acid. Each of the electrodes produces a gas. At the anode we have chlorine. We know this because of the smell. So, chlorine is data (reality-1) that we need to explain. At the cathode, however, we have a colourless, odourless, tasteless gas. We test it using a chemical test or a spectrometer. Now we have, for the test:
’Ä¢ test results — data — reality-1
’Ä¢ explanation/theory — 'This is hydrogen' — reality-2
’Ä¢ evading object — hydrogen gas — reality-3
So back to our electrolysis. We could say that we now know we have hydrogen at the cathode. This and the chlorine are the data we have to explain. However, our data in this case includes the 'evading object', hydrogen gas (reality-3 from the test). So that doesn't work because reality-3 cannot be data.
Alternatively, we could say the data consists of the chlorine and the test results (reality-1) but now we have to explain not just the electrolysis but also the test — the workings of the spectrometer, for example. This means that our explanation of the electrolysis is different depending on the test for hydrogen that we use. So we have exactly the same thing going on in the electrolysis but different theories to account for the data — one theory if we use a chemical reaction as a test, another if we use spectrometry. We also have to say we have data at one electrode (the anode) but not at the other. This doesn't make sense to me.
Also, you said 'We cannot "prove" that our models are "true", but only that they are "useful".' I interpret this to mean that we cannot prove that we have hydrogen at the cathode. It is only useful to think of it that way. In addition:
’Ä¢ It is not true that the planets move in orbits close to ellipses. It is only useful to think of it that way.
’Ä¢ Nor is not true that air is a mixture of gases, mostly nitrogen, oxygen and carbon dioxide. That is just a useful picture (model).
Again this doesn't make sense to me. Maybe I have missed the point.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/21/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsWonderful analysis, Chris, I had to laugh. Well, those contradictions did not make much sense to me either. But you indeed missed a point.
First let's change "reality-x" into "rx" for shorthand.
As you know, light can be "a shower of particles" (the Newton model) or "a wave" (the Young model). But today we say that light can be both, depending on what observations are studied. This is explained from a strange theory (r2), QM, that says, that "the particles" (photons) are dispatched statistically on a screen or in space "according to the highs and lows of a wave". This all is very complicated in detail. One has to do (not to understand) QM (r2).
We still have our meters and counters (r1), and we have our "evading objects" (photons, r3), but we really don't understand what is happening here, so we cannot say "light is x". While the models of particle and wave are "incompatible", they both must be true at the same time — depending on our questions. The model (r2) is able to understand that, but we humans are not. This is what I call "useful".
Thus the whole question of what light "really" is becomes meaningless. We simply have to give up on such notions. What is "love really" or "freedom really" or "truth really" ? We don't know ! Those all are as much "evading objects" (r3) as is light or the electron. This is why I spoke of "limits of our language" here.
We naively tend to assume "like little children", that you see a lamb jumping on the meadow and then point at it and cry "papa, mama, a lamb !" This is not how most objects are. There is only some class of objects, lets call it "ob1" (for "objects-1" ) the objects of which you can point at. But those "evading objects" of "r3" are in another class, lets say "ob3". Thus you will find "ob1" in "r1", while you will find "ob3" in "r3".
There is not a single contradiction in your chemical example. You only have to do your analysis more carefully. What you are smelling is not "chlorine", but "a smell". That this smell is of chlorine is derived from your formulas and theories. "The primary data given" ("r1") is a smell, the chlorine molecules are in fact "r3". But once more : To be "r3" does not mean to be non-existent ! It only means that it is no "primary data given" but "postulated from theory".
And then : Our concept of truth is dependent on "coherence" : Those "r3" objects are never known from singular observations like "lambs". They are postulated from a great many of "coherent observations" that are related by theories.
How do we know that the Earth is a globe and not a disk ? There are countless facts that would be very hard to explain with a flat-Earth model, but that explain itself with a sphere-Earth model. Some single observations generally don't tell us much. Thus once more "no lambs here". A lot af chemical and physical assumptions is involved in your chemical example.
The world we live in is on the one hand "the meaningless world of 'all that is the case' in the sense of Wittgensteins Tractatus." But in fact it is a meaningful world consisting of a dense web of interacting and "to a large degree consistent" notions of "r1", "r2", and "r3" and other "rx" elements. Just mull a bit over it !
Here you are at metaphysics again : Science is part of "the metaphysical project to construct a coherent model that could explain the world we live in." Religions are another part of this project. Some think that can do without. As Laplace explained to Napoleon whe asked why in his great "mechanique celeste" ("mechanics of the heavens") no God was mentioned : "I did not need this hypothesis". It was like Newton spending those demons shifting the planets. We try to render our metaphysics "as simple as possible" — but not simpler, as Einstein would have cautioned.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (06/21/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
Can we agree to leave quantum mechanics aside for the moment? It is, as you say, a strange beast. It may even prove to be the point at which the idea that science consists of models breaks down. For now, I would like to get clear how your ideas apply to some relatively simple examples. If I cannot understand that, then I have no hope of applying those ideas to QM!
So, to my example of electrolysis. I fear it is you who have missed the point. At least, you did not deal with the main problem that the example raises. I agree that one could take the smell of the chlorine to be data. Certainly smelling the gas is a test. I will leave the implications of this aside for the moment, however. Let's suppose that we use a chemical or spectroscopic test to prove that the gas at the anode is chlorine. Now, to restate the point of the example:
’Ä¢ You say that, in general, r1 is data, r2 the theories that explain the data and r3 the 'evading objects' — components of the theory.
’Ä¢ I say that, in particular, the test for hydrogen or chlorine involves r1 (the data produced in the test) and r2 (a theory that explains how this data means that we are dealing with hydrogen (or chlorine)). r2 explains r1, as you would wish. I also presume that r2 also involves r3 (hydrogen (or chlorine)) molecules or atoms (the evading objects).
’Ä¢ When we explain what happens in the electrolysis we can do one of two things. Firstly, we can explain the presence of hydrogen and chlorine at the electrodes and stop there. This is the common sense approach. If we do this, however, we are not explaining data (r1). The only data we have is bubbles of unidentified gas. So this approach does not fit with what you want to do with your rx schema. The second approach involves not just explaining the electrolysis but also explaining how the tests work. This would fit with what you want to do because the total explanation would then explain all the data from the tests and from the electrolysis.
Which approach to explanation do we take? I do not like the second one for three reasons:
’Ä¢ The thing that I want to understand is the electrolysis, not the tests. If I ask you what is going on and you start talking to me about spectrometry, for example, then I will think you have misunderstood me.
’Ä¢ If the tests are different (chemical rather than spectroscopic, for example) then the explanations are different, despite the fact that the electrolysis (the bit I want to understand) is the same. Why should this be?
’Ä¢ If the person doing the electrolysis does not understand how the tests work (as with a spectrometer, for example) then they cannot give the full explanation. We would have to say, then, that they don't know what is going on in the electrolysis. This seems to me to be nonsense.
For these reasons, I think that the second approach to the explanation is wrong. So, we are left with the first. The first, however, means that your schema is wrong. Scientific explanations do not always explain r1 (i.e. things that you can point to) data. So, either the term 'data' can refer to things other than r1 or 'r1' can refer to things that you can't point to. I leave you to make the correction. Maybe you need some more categories.
This, perhaps, leads to the second point. You say:
'What you are smelling is not "chlorine", but "a smell". That this smell is of chlorine is derived from your formulas and theories. " The primary data given" ("r1") is a smell, the chlorine molecules are in fact "r3". But once more : To be "r3" does not mean to be non-existent ! It only means that it is no "primary data given" but "postulated from theory".'
Something is missing here — the physical chlorine gas. It is not true that I know this is chlorine because of my 'formulas and theories'. I might know no chemistry at all and still know that I am smelling chlorine. If my father was a swimming pool attendant in a big city, I might learn what chlorine was before I knew what a lamb was.
Now it could be argued that when I look at that woolly thing bouncing in the meadow I am not seeing a lamb but only a certain kind of shape and colour and texture. According to such a view, all our perceptions involve intellectual constructs developed on the basis of a theory. I won't debate that because it is irrelevant. Whatever the outcome, the point at issue is that you want to make a distinction between the lamb, which you say is r1, and the chlorine, which you say is r3.
Or perhaps you don't. In the quote above, you seem to equate chlorine with chlorine molecules. The latter, of course, are 'postulated from theory'. I am not smelling chlorine molecules but nor am I just smelling a smell. I am smelling chlorine, a gas. It is visible to the naked eye. It can be captured in a canister. It can be decompressed until is a liquid, when it becomes very clearly something I can point to. It was discovered at least 30 years before the development of the theory of molecules. So why is it not r1 (data)?
What might be happening here (although you seemed to have rejected this idea when I came up with it earlier) is something like this:
’Ä¢ There is something in the world — a greenish-yellow gas with a distinctive smell, originally called 'dephlogisticated marine acid' but then, since 1807, 'chlorine'.
’Ä¢ There is also a sophisticated theory or model within which this substance is identified with a chemical element that has a certain atomic composition (17 protons in the nucleus etc).
The 'chemical element' in the second item is, in your schema, r3 'postulated from theory'. You don't seem to have a place for the first item (the gas) at all but, in my version of the schema, I shall say it is r1. The theory r2 explains the observable properties of the gas (with reservations I shall call these properties r1 as well). In this way, we can map r2 onto r1.
So, to sum up, I have two questions. Is my analysis of the electrolysis example correct and, if so, how do you want to adjust your schema? Do you agree with my interpretation of the way that models relate to the physical world? (Note, of course, that if chlorine gas is r1 then hydrogen gas is as well. I see no good reason for giving the latter a different status merely because we cannot see it in its gaseous state.)
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/30/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science, pseudoscience and realityNo Chris, I haven't given up on this topic — and not on you either ! I just needed some reshuffling of the fragments of your questions to make some clarified re-statement. What do you think is missing in my answers now ? And may be my answers put to you and Mike on "pattern recognition" and "artificial intelligence" seem a bit misplaced. But as I put it in the second answer to you and Mike (06/29/09 1:34 PM GMT), we should carefully separate "truly philosophical questions" now from "pseudo-problems" that are solved already by computers. What I wanted to show is : Computers need no "spirit" nor "mind" to recognize and parse some forms — optical, acoustical, grammatical — and they even could "play on their input channels" and by this create "models of reality" or "dreams" or "fancies" etc.. We vastly overestimate the value of concepts like "mind" and "spirit" and waste our time with pseudoproblems. That was my point.
So once more : What problems do you think are still left for the true philosopher ?
Getting back to your example, I stick with my notion that neither Chlorine gas (HCl) nor Hydrogen (H2) are "r1" but are "r3". But this is only to caution our way of speaking of reality. My point was to keep reality proper apart from our speaking of it. Look at what I posted to you and Mike on "consistency model of truth" in the other thread. The best we can ask for is a "consistent" world, while the question of "what to call real" always remains a bit undefined.
To put it differently : What is it, that lets you think that chlorine-atoms and hydrogen-atoms are "real" ? It is not some single observation, but it is the whole of modern chemical theory and our modern concept of atoms and molecules etc.. But in what way is this sort of "reality" different from any religious "proof" of the existence of demons and angels, or from the "proofs" of astrologers or alchemists ? They too will tell you that their systems are "waterproof" and "consistent".
You would agree with Mike (and me) that this is not case, and that there is a difference of "true science" and "pseudo-science". But why do we think so ? Because — with some scrutinizing of the evidence (r1 !)- we would find out, that the pseudo-sciences ignore and shut out some facts or arguments, and by this their theories are "leaking" and not "waterproof" if tested.
What do the "creationists" do ? They desperately try to show that (Neo-)Darwinism is "leaking". It's the same principle : We have the facts (that are not questioned by the creationists) but what we think of evolution is not explained by the (r1)facts, but by the (r2)theories and by lots of r3-assumptions derived from the theories.
Meanwhile atoms and molecules become observable, but even then what we see on some electon-microscope screen is an array of blurred spots that need "interpretation". To call them atoms is "to save consistency".
The whole world we live in is a "r3-world" to a large degree, but not an "r1-world", or, to be more precise, as a r1-world our world would be meaningless in the sense of "the world is all that is the case". What do we buy from this platitude.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/01/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
I am sorry but I am still confused. Previously you made a distinction between r1 (data) and r2 (theory). Now you are making a distinction between r1 ('reality proper') and r2 ('our speaking of it' i.e. reality proper). These are not the same in my view. I assume this is a refinement of your position?
What I think you are now saying is that there is something (r1) in reality proper that we speak about as Chlorine (r2). This something has properties (r1) that we explain by our theories (r2). Is this correct?
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/01/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsChris, you misgot something. The "way of speaking" is not r2 but r3, those "evading objects" like the electron or photon etc., which are needed to make our physical world-view consistent, but which are not observed directly. They are more of the character (to avoid more numbering like r3a and r3b etc.) of the "causality" in Hume. Hume correctly said that "causality" is not an "empirical fact", but without the concept of causality we would have trouble "to understand our world". This observation "awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber". We need electrons to get at some meaningfully coherent worldview, but we cannot know exactly what electrons "are". In this sense we may smell chlorine gas, but our concept of chlorine gas is derived from theories and not directly observable. From the smell you do not know that it is molecules of HCl docking at some molecules in your nose that then send electrical stimuli to your brain. All this you "know" from a vast array of r1-facts made coherent by some r2-theory by means of r3-concepts like atoms and molecules. Your last sentence is correct if you change the r2 behind Chlorine into r3. Or explicitely : "there is something in reality proper that we speak about as Chlorine (r3). This something has properties (r1) that we explain by our theories (r2)."
But I don't like the expression "reality proper". Theories and facts and many other things are "reality proper". What I was speaking of is "observables" and "assumptions" and "thories". The fag is only a fact in the whodunit for Sherlock Holmes. He then makes up some theory (r2) with some assumptions (r3) in it (f.i. a motive of greed or hate or jealousy etc.) to get at meaningful conclusions. Remember "The murder in the Rue Morgue" of E.A.Poe ? There are facts (r1), but all "normal" theories (r2) are lost because of false assumptions (r3).
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/01/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsThanks for this Hubertus. And my apologies for the misreading. I shall get back to you shortly.
Chris
FROM: Chris Else (07/02/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
I think we are a step closer. However, I am still having trouble seeing how your schema applies to my example.
I see gas bubbles at the electrodes (observable — r1). I have a theory, which is a story about how hydrogen and chlorine ions (r3) are attracted to the electrodes where they pick up or lose an electric charge and become hydrogen or chlorine gas (r3). How does the observable confirm the theory, given that I do not know what the gas or gases are?
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/02/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsThat's simple, Chris ! The theory EXPECTS to see those gases, and the effects too. The data (r1)from the observations of Tycho Brahe proving beyond doubt that the orbit of Mars was an ellipsis and not a circle had to wait about a century until Newton could explain this fact with his theory of gravitation in 1687 (r2). This was dumb luck, since if the orbit had been disturbed and irregular, no Newton would have been able to explain it ! In a similar way Einsteins theories have explained a lot of things, most famously the perihel shift of the orbit of Mercury and the aberration of light passing the sun from stars.
On the other hand we have "superstable" explanations (in the sense of Popper) that do explain every outcome and by this nothing. There are many standard-examples of this. For the "Freudian true believer" either you have a manifest Oedipus Complex, or it must be hidden and suppressed. The idea that the Oedipus Complex could be some special illness that one may have or not like fleas is impossible to think in such people. Same with Class Consciousness in true Marxists. For the true Christian believer an atheist is somebody running away from God. Etc.. By this we have to tell apart "consistent theories that are falsifiable by observable facts" and those that are not. But this "telling apart" can be very difficult, since even the pseudo-scientists and "true believers" will offer "facts" to prove their case. It is not simple !
And one remark added on "atoms and molecules" : Up to about 1900 atoms and molecules were assumed "hypothetical" by most scientists. They were "working hypotheses" and not assumed to be "real". But up to about 1910 almost all scientists got convicted to take them for real, while only some years ago those atoms became visible "in a sense". So the debate was never dependent on the "visibility" but on the "consistency". Today we have this situation with electrons : We do not see them, but we still take them "for real", since "we need them" — to make our models look convincing. It is really like in the case of "causality".
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/02/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
No, it is not so simple. I feel you miss the point again. Of course the theory 'expects' to see 'those gases'. However, 'those gases' according to you are r3 (chlorine and hydrogen) and not 'observables' or 'data' (r1). Let me try and put this more clearly one more time.
According to you, data or observables (r1) confirm or disconfirm theories (r2), which employ 'evading objects' or 'assumptions' (r3). In the example, the observable (r1) is unidentified bubbles at the electrodes. This is, of course, a partial confirmation of the theory but it is by no means a full or solid one. For all we know, the bubbles could be steam or air. In order to fully confirm the theory, we need more than the observable. So I conclude that your schema does not work in this instance. There is more to say about this but I have already said it in earlier posts so I will just leave it there for you to comment.
I must say I am finding this conversation very frustrating. I am not sure why it is so slow and such heavy going. I can only conclude that either your position (or your explanation of it) is incoherent or I am too stupid to understand. It is only the uncertainty as to which of these two alternatives is correct that stops me giving up. Perhaps, then, I can offer a more general statement of what I am trying to do here.
Firstly, I understand Popper and falsifiability. I understand the view that science consists of theories that are confirmed or disconfirmed by observations. I accept that science, through these theories, offers explanations, which we might call models. I also understand Popper's criticism of Freud and Marx and various other 'superstable' explanations. Let's take all that as given, therefore, and try and move beyond it.
What you seem to have offered with your rx categories is, at first glance, a standard explanation of the way science works. If your categories and the suggested relationships between them work, then this standard explanation might well hold good. If your categories don't work, then perhaps the standard explanation is wrong. Perhaps even Popper is wrong. That is an interesting possibility, in my view. So, the question is, does your schema work?
Now in order to answer this question, it seems to me, we have to take some examples and examine them thoroughly. It will not be helpful to give brief, high level surveys of current theories or of particular episodes in the history of science. Obviously, all such surveys will confirm your view. If they didn't, someone would have noticed there was a problem before now. If there is a problem (and maybe there isn't) it lies deeper than that.
So in the first instance we can consider the question to have two parts:
’Ä¢ We must distinguish between data/observable (r1) on the one hand and theory (r2) with its component 'evading objects'(r3) on the other.
’Ä¢ We must also show that theories (r2) are always confirmed by data/observables (r1) and not by something else in the schema (r3, for example) or outside of it.
From my perspective you have not managed to do either of these things. Generally, you have given high level answers and passed over all the specific examples that I've brought up. In addition, I feel your responses have also been contradictory (which would be all right if you had changed your view but you don't seem to think that you have). I'll give you an example of such a contradiction.
In an earlier post you said that chlorine and hydrogen molecules were r3 (i.e. they were not observables). In your last post you say that 'some years ago those atoms became visible 'in a sense'. I can only conclude that if something is visible then it is an observable so that now you are saying that atoms and molecules are r1 'in a sense'. Does this mean that r1 and r3 are not mutually exclusive? Something is wrong here.
So, if you feel like pursing this further, I suggest that we go forward by trying to state clearly the criteria for distinguishing r1 and r2/3 and that we test these criteria by applying them to a number of specific examples. What do you think?
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/03/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsChris, at least you are a tough guy — which is always a mark of a good philosopher ! Well, let's look at this chlorine example again. You write that it could be "vapor". But there was no "vapor" to be expected. What was expected by the theory was chlorine. And the smell is confirming here that it is "very probably" not normal air or vapor. But of course it has to be proven (!) afterwards that this "strange new gas" is indeed chlorine as expected. This can be done by recombining the gas with other elements to other compounds that are defined by the theory. Thus once more : It is not the nose that tells you that there is chlorine, but you can argue in a series of "r2-steps" that what you expected (from r2) was chlorine, and if this holds true, then the theory (once more r2 !) will expect that a combination of Cl with Na will give common salt etc.. Thus you cannot pick some r1 data without taking the whole theory r2 into account. This is "consistency theory". So I am not contradicting myself here. We always tend to forget that our modern chemical or physical or biological theories have grown in centuries of countless Popperian "conjectures and refutations". It is really like a Sherlock Holmes whodonit.
So you are not "too stupid to understand" but you take countless "facts" for granted which are results of many "conjectures and refutations". The smell of the chlorine gas DOES tell you that "this is not water-vapor", but it does NOT tell you that "this is Cl-gas". Your theory "suggests" that "it should be Cl-gas" and then you have to prove it and to confirm (for this experiment at least) that your theory of electrolysis is correct.
My hint at "atoms becoming observable" was misleading : The r1-fact here is only the image on the screen of the electron-microscope. That this image is showing atoms is still only a "conjecture". And the more important aspect was : Even if there were no atoms observable in this way, chemistry would not change a little bit. We can write handbooks on the properties and the behaviour of the electron without ever seeing an electron, and so we can write thick books of many thousand pages on chemistry without ever seeing any atom or molecule. It all remains in the realm of r2 and r3, while only "meters and indicators" being r1 !
But of course we need r1 to avoid "superstable" theories. This is what Popper calls "trying to refute your assumptions" : You are obliged to look out for new "r1-predictions" and try to "falsify" your theory. The error of the true believer is to avoid or ignore those r1-facts that do not fit his theory. While Popper would be happy to find some counter-evidence, the true believer would rather be not.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/03/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
Your answer still isn't clear. What I think you are saying is this.
’Ä¢ We observe bubbles as the cathode (r1).
’Ä¢ We test the gas in, for example, a spectrometer. This gives us spectral lines (r1) and we have a theory (r2) that tells us that these lines indicate hydrogen (r3).
’Ä¢ We now know that the gas at the cathode is hydrogen (r3).
’Ä¢ In a similar way we can show that the gas at the anode is chlorine (r3).
’Ä¢ These results fully confirm the theory of electrolysis in this instance.
Is this correct?
You did not answer my question as to what the criteria for an observable (r1) are. I'll assume that r1 has to be something we perceive through the senses, preferably sight.
Here are some questions to help me get the distinction between r1 and r3 clear.
’Ä¢ Is the earth r1 or r3?
’Ä¢ What about Mars? Is r1 the red dot in the sky and r3 the 'interpretation' that this is a planet?
’Ä¢ What about alpha centauri?
’Ä¢ Is water r1? Or is r1 the wet stuff and r3 the 'interpretation' that this is water?
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/03/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsI once more had to laugh, Chris. Well yes, the first conclusions are correct, ie., as I would call them. maybe others disagree, but where are the others here ?
And on the second list of questions :
My point was that we have "primary facts" r1 and "derived facts" r3, and that we should keep them apart, since to get from r1 to r3 we need r2. Just a reminder : "Oedipus Complex" is NOT a primary observable of the r1 type ! Neither is "class struggle" and neither is "sin and redemtion". These and many other notions are "non-observables", i.e., they are non-existent for anybody who does not share the underlying (Marxist, Freudian, Christian) theoretical assumptions r2 that "constitute" those "facts" (r3).
Thus "r1-facts" are those facts, that can be confirmed by any observer independent on his/her special conviction. Of course you may observe some maltreatement of some laborer by some employer, but this does not force you to subscribe to the theories of Marx. For the Marxist it is a confirmation of "class struggle", but for the liberal it is just a sorry bad behaviour.
The important thing here is to see that r1-facts alone are meaningless in most cases. They have to be interpreted in some theoretical context.
To put it differently : You may speak "out of context" of cows and trees and houses etc., but you cannot speak out of context of "justice" and "liberty" and "progress" etc.. Those are "not jumping around like lambs".
Thus Mars is but a red blot in the telescope. That it is a planet you do not know from observation but from "plausibility and exclusion", which means "What else should this red spot be ?" In principle it could be a balloon or a man made satellite — the telescope alone would not tell you that ! So once more you are at our "consistency check".
’Ä¢ Is the earth r1 or r3?
A: Depends on what you call "Earth". r1 is what you stand on, but plate-tectonics and a hot core and up to 1969 even the spherical nature are "r3".
’Ä¢ What about Mars? Is r1 the red dot in the sky and r3 the 'interpretation' that this is a planet?
A : Yes !
’Ä¢ What about alpha centauri?
A : The same !
’Ä¢ Is water r1? Or is r1 the wet stuff and r3 the 'interpretation' that this is water?
A : Yes, the latter !
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/03/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
Thanks for your patience. I have some comments on the first part of your answer and will get back to you later on the second part when I have thought about it.
So, to repeat for convenience, the example shows:
’Ä¢ We observe bubbles at the cathode (r1).
’Ä¢ We test the gas in, for example, a spectrometer. This gives us spectral lines (r1) and we have a theory (r2) that tells us that these lines indicate hydrogen (r3).
’Ä¢ We now know that the gas at the cathode is hydrogen (r3).
’Ä¢ In a similar way we can show that the gas at the anode is chlorine (r3).
’Ä¢ These results fully confirm the theory of electrolysis in this instance.
Now, if this is correct, it suggests that the theory of electrolysis is not confirmed by data (r1), as you say it should be, but by the results (r3) of another theory, the theory of spectrometry (r2). Do you agree? If so, how do you want to account for the anomaly?
Chris
FROM: Chris Else (07/06/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
I have some further thoughts on problem we have been discussing. It seems to that the electrolysis example is not an exception but typical. Any standard test for chemical involves a reaction between chemicals A, B, C, etc to produce chemical Z. Now, according to your scheme all these components are r3 ('evading objects' or 'derived facts') because they all involve some sort of theoretical framework or interpretation. If standard tests are r3, then all the data on which experiments are based are r3. Thus, chemical theories are, typically, demonstrated not by r1 (raw data) but r3.
You pointed out that images from an electronic microscope are blobby and require interpretation. However, every instrument, it seems to me, also requires interpretation. Take a scale of weighing. The read-out says 40.37. This needs be interpreted. Is it lbs or kgs? What is a kilogram? Etc. Going further we could say that 40.37 itself needs interpretation. Unless we have some theory of numbers, all there is here are some dark marks.
In short, I don't think you explanation of the way science works holds up. At least, it is nowhere near as simple as you seem to suggest.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/07/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsChris, maybe Yorkshire breeds a very special sort of stubborn people. Not to bother.
My point was : r1 is primary data, "the given". So the readings of a scale or the pictures on a screen are "r1". But atoms and molecules are not given in this way. Thus we are at "r3" and at "consistency theory". We have assembled thousand and millions and billions of "r1"-data, and as long as those are consistent with our "r2"-theories we are happy. We only have to assure that those "r1"-data remain "falsifiable". If they do not fit our theory, our theory has to be changed.
We know from experience (r1) that 10 lbs is much heavier than 15 grams. So if the scale shows 10 lbs for a normal postcard, then either the scale or the mechanism must be wrong. This too is "consistency".
How to "prove" that the Earth is not flat ? We may sail around it even when it is flat. But we have longitudes and latitudes, we have day and night, we have even satellites now and can see the Earth from a distance — from Moon or Mars etc.. All this together explains in a quite natural way by the assumption that the Earth is a sphere. We would have much trouble to explain all this for a flat Earth model.
Thus from a certain point to insist that "it still is flat !" looks absurd and dogmatic. You need some very strong counter-evidence to deny the spherical nature of the Earth. This same is true for the "hypothesis" of atoms and molecules and electrons etc. : All of modern physics and chemistry would look very strange indeed if those atoms and molecules and electrons are "non existent". But they still are "r3", they still are not "primary data".
The header of this thread is "science as metaphysics". Your original question was : "Can there be science without metaphysics ?". It all depends on what you call metaphysics. As I said, modern physics does not quarrel over "truth" (a metaphysical notion) but over "consistency", which is not metaphysical.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/07/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
You have lost me again. In my view 'the given' is not the same as 'the observable. I grant you that numbers are a given in science but that does not mean they are purely and simply observable, without theory. I know that 15 grams is lighter than 15 lbs but only because I know theory that tells me what grams and lbs are. Similarly if I use a standard chemical test to identify the products of a chemical reaction, then the test is a given. It nevertheless involves a theory (r2) and what you have earlier claimed were r3 (evading objects).
Just to be clear, let's repeat the example.
1. We observe bubbles at the cathode (r1).
2. We test the gas in, for example, a spectrometer. This gives us spectral lines (r1) and we have a theory (r2) that tells us that these lines indicate hydrogen (r3).
3. We now know that the gas at the cathode is hydrogen (r3).
4. In a similar way we can show that the gas at the anode is chlorine (r3).
5. These results fully confirm the theory of electrolysis in this instance.
At step 2, what is the given? If you say the lines, then I say these are useless without interpretation (i.e. the lines in themselves do not constitute data). If you say the given is the result of the test (ie hydrogen), then your given is r3 not r1.
I maintain that any other test at step 2 would demonstrate the same point.
Earlier you said you wanted to make a distinction between "primary facts" r1 and "derived facts" r3. I presume you also want to say that scientific theories are confirmed or refuted by primary facts. I don't think this distinction holds. I think that the data that we use to confirm or refute scientific conjectures are derived facts. The difference between R1 (data) and R3 (component of theory) as I see it is between established 'facts' and conjectures. The given, in this view, is just what scientists choose to assume, which probably amounts to what they currently agree on.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/08/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as Metaphysics
Chris, let's try to find you again :
You wrote : // At step 2, what is the given? If you say the lines, then I say these are useless without interpretation (i.e. the lines in themselves do not constitute data). If you say the given is the result of the test (ie hydrogen), then your given is r3 not r1. //
Here seems to be the point of our misunderstanding : "The given" are the lines and nothing but the lines. Of course they are useless without interpretation. But that was my point. I wanted to show that "99%" of our "reality" is "interpreted reality". Those gases could as well be "demonic emanations". When the researcher missionary gets his radio out in the jungle, the voices from the radio are (or have been) pure mystery for the "primitives" (at least on the first contact). They do not and cannot know that it all is "just a little physics". This is the famous saying that "any sufficiently advanced technology is magic". We generally do not realize that "99%" of our world is "trusting the books and the authorities". Sometimes this picture is questioned : How do we know that 9/11 is not the work of the CIA ? How do we know that the landing on the moon was not a hoax and staged in some film-studio ? While I personally do not think so, many people are very much in doubt about the truth here. And while not many people seem convinced today that the Earth is flat, quite a lot of people seem to question the theories of Darwinism against all evidence. Thus you spectral lines could be any mumbo jumbo in the same way as those Jesuits thought the sun-spots were that they saw in the telescope of Galilei. We are living in a network of mutual trust. "Truth" is a matter of trust and consistency. This is why I insisted on separating "primary evidence" (r1) and "conclusions drawn from it" (r3). The spectral lines as such are r1, but the conclusion, that they "prove" the hydrogen to be there is "r3 by r2". Look at a chromatogram : If you are no specialist, you have to accept the explanation of the specialist. How do you know that he/she is not telling you nonsense ? What you see is a chromatogram, thus r1, but what you know about its "information content" may be nothing if you are no specialist.
Once more : We are speaking of metaphysics here, and my thesis was that metaphysics is similar to science in that it tries to build up a coherent picture that makes a "consistent" interpretation of "primary facts" (r1) possible. I only added, that metaphysicists usually claim too much, while "true scientists" in the Popperian sense call their theories "provisional" and try to avoid the word "truth". As you know from any detective movie a "plausible" explanation of whodonit will not go for a "proof".
So in my opinion you never should mix up "r1-facts" with "r3-pseudofacts". Those "r3" object remain what they are : assumptions. Once more : Read the "Murder in the Rue Morgue" to know the difference ! There have been "r1"-facts and witnesses, but everybody (save the bright detective) was wrong on the interpretation, because the true explanation was too strange to be taken into account. We never should mistake r3-assumptions for primary r1-facts.
But in a sense you are right : From a purely philosophical point of view not even r1-facts are more than hypotheses. Maybe I am just a bug thinking to be a human ?
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/08/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
Thanks for your response. I accept everything you say (I think!).
However, it contradicts what I took to be your position — namely that scientific theories are refuted or confirmed by r1 (data). If the spectra lines (without interpretation) are data, then they cannot either confirm or refute the theory inherent in the electrolysis example. If the data consists of the interpreted lines, then they are r3 and not r1. In short, the theory of electrolysis is confirmed or refuted by r3, not r1.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsChris, I think you are riddled by a pseudo-problem. What we have as "given" is r1, but the theory is void (in most cases) without assumptions of the r3-type. What Sherlock Holmes "has as a given r1" may be a fag or some other minor evidence, besides "all circumstances taken into account," but his assumptions on explaining motives (greed, envy, rage, jealousy etc.) and plausible behaviour of the perpetrator (being in haste, being careless, being startled, being a cautious profi, being a woman, being a catholic from the Caribbean etc.) are "r3". He tries to fit his evidence r1 with his assumptions r3 into a theory on what really happened.
From the perspective of a god, it all "was simply the case". But since Sherlock Holmes is no god, he can only guess at what may have been the case. As a god, he would only need "r" = "reality", but as a human he has to separate r1, r2, r3 — and maybe more.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
I suppose calling it a 'pseudo-problem' is one way to make it go away. I would be more convinced by your arguments, however, if you didn't just repeat your Sherlock Holmes analogy and instead dealt directly with my example, which, as far as I can see, contradicts your earlier assertions about the relationship between data and theory or, more precisely, about what constitutes data.
Perhaps, rather than repeat it all again, I can put it another way.
’Ä¢ A necessary condition for something being data that will confirm or refute a scientific theory is that it is directly observable. Preferably it is something one can see but perhaps other sensory perceptions, like hearing, will also do. (This is the given, r1)
’Ä¢ However, this is not a sufficient condition. In order to be usable (i.e. in order to be considered data), the something also needs be interpreted. (This is r3)
Will that do?
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/10/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsChris, on first glance I would say "would do". But I have a problem with your usage of "interpreted".
Once more — I beg your pardon — a murder case : You have some finger print (r1). To know that this is a fingerprint is not a problem, and comparing it with other data in itself is not either. But what is "r3" here ? There are several assumptions : (1) "Fingerprints are singular" (r2), (2) "It was a true fingerprint and not a copied one as Bond's in "Diamonds are forever""(r3, because this is not a theory but a common-sense assumption, which may be wrong).
As you see, I am always pressing for utmost analytic clarity. "r1" are data that are not open to debate, while r2 and r3 are always open to debate. Remember the example of the flask giving the fluids in drops even while it does not contain "drops".
Maybe I am too strict, but I once more feel a problem when I read your exchange with Charles : You speak of "soul" and "dualism" and "mysticism" etc., but I would start numbering all three concepts. Well, I don't and will leave you and Charles alone for some time. But just to give an example : When you speak of "dualism" — do you speak of "natural vs. supernatural" or do you speak of "material vs. immaterial" ? This alone would make "dual-1" and "dual-2", while there are several more. I am not pedantic, I am only careful.
Another example : Do you call "joy" a "thing" or a "state to be in" ? And do you call "beauty" a "thing" or a stimulus affecting a certain state of "joy" ? In the first interpretation (!) beauty would be something "in the object", a property. In the second interpretation it would be only in the beholder, in his neuronal arousal. Wile of course the object has a form, from this does not follow that the form itself is beautiful, only that the beholder is feeling like that.
Don't tell me that this is an example of "splitting hairs" : Perhaps you do not feel much "joy from beauty" when seeing a big spider. You would call the spider "ugly and repellent". But maybe the other spider is experiencing "neuronal feelings of joy and attraction" ? So what and where is "beauty" ?
Hubertus
FROM: Charles Countryman (07/11/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
I have sent you an abstract from Science Direct: Do infants possess an evolved spider-detection mechanism?
Cognition, Volume 107, Issue 1, April 2008, Pages 381-393
David H. Rakison, Jaime Derringer
The results supported the hypothesis that humans, like other species, may possess a cognitive mechanism for detecting specific animals that were potentially harmful throughout evolutionary history.
It suggests that there may be some barriers created by human evolution against attempts like yours to apply aesthetic theory and artificial logic, disregarding natural human reaction to potential threats.
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/11/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsThank you Charles for this charming "comment on my spider-remarks" to Chris. And I am not disregarding natural human reaction to potential threats." (by the way : According to Lakoff we even should shun women, fire and other dangerous things ...). You could well implement "templates" into a robot, that causes it to run away whenever it sees a dog. This sort of pattern recognition is well understood today. All DARPA and soccer-robots make use of this possibility, and the "cruise missiles" do anyway and were well known to James Bond in "Never say never again" and before (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TERCOM ). And you don't need those spiders : How would a bird know how to build a nest and grow a family without some "pattern matching" on what it means to get the right branches or how to feed its young ?
We humans very probably have got a beauty-detection" mechanism. In my opinion "feelings" are a luxury that is lacking primitive animals as spiders are. They only need to recognize each other as possible mating partners, and very probably they do it by chemical and not by optical methods, because chemical receptors are simpler by far than optical ones. Thus in the end my whole comparison was a bit "tongue in cheek" to illustrate a problem.
There is another fascinating question : What is it in animals and humans that causes sympathy and antipathy ? Dogs can be very much befriended to humans, but surely neither because of the looks nor because of the smell, but because of "mutual trust and nice behaviour". It is not the looks : Even little children can love an old and outworn granny or grampa very much and at the same time hate and fear some nasty young beauty. Thus we should not concentrate too much on "sensual perception" anyway. We should concentrate on attitudes. This is very much what the Bible says : The right attitude to God and other humans is what counts most.
We have to add "behavioural patterns" (trustworthy, supporting, friendly) to optical and acoustical patterns (beauty).
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/11/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
I don't agree with your interpretation of your example. The way I analyse it is as follows;
’Ä¢ You have a mark consisting of a series of curved lines (r1).
’Ä¢ You have a theory (r2), very well established, that this is caused by a human finger (i.e. It is a fingerprint (r3)).
’Ä¢ You also know that fingerprints are unique to an individual (theory r2)
’Ä¢ By comparing fingerprints you know that this is X's fingerprint (r3).
This analysis parallels the case of spectroscopy:
’Ä¢ You have some lines on a screen or piece of paper (r1).
’Ä¢ You have a theory (r2) that these are the spectrum of a substance (r3).
’Ä¢ You also know that any spectrum is unique to a substance (theory r2)
’Ä¢ By comparing spectra you know that these lines are the spectral lines of X (r3).
In the first case, the move from lines to fingerprint is a matter of common knowledge. In the second case, the move from lines to spectrum requires quite a bit of theory. This is what I mean by interpretation.
In addition, you say that r1 are 'data that are not open to debate'. This seems like a new criterion that does not necessarily correspond to the criteria you have used previously. You might say that the cause of the spectral lines is not open to debate. Or that the fact that a particular set of lines are typical of hydrogen. What does 'not open to debate' mean?
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/12/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsChris, I agree on the parallel examples. Fine !
"Not open to debate" means : You see some owner closing down a sweatshop in this time and laying off the workers. A Marxist sees an example of "class struggle". The libertarian would not deny the facts, how could he, but would reject the interpretation. So in those examples the interpretations would be "99,9% agreed", but "it ain't not necessarily so." The private eye could doubt the evidence and say that the fingerprint has been faked (there are several examples from the movies), while I cannot think of a spectrum that could bee faked. But you see the principle here : Most people would agree on what they see, but not all people — not even experts — would agree on how to draw conclusions from the r1-evidence. Remember that most detectives are always admonishing the assistants and bystanders not to be rash on their conclusions. It is a running gag of most crime movies to present a very plausible perpretator from the very beginning and in the end present the nicest and most trustworthy person as the real villain. This was my point.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/12/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
OK. Maybe our disagreement now is mostly semantics. You seem to want to say that r1 (the curved lines on the whisky glass or the lines on the printout/screen of the spectrometer) are data. I want to say that these phenomena have to be interpreted (ie recognised as fingerprints or as the spectrum of hydrogen) to count as data. On my view data is r3 — the interpreted r1.
The reason I prefer my view is that I want data to be that which confirms or refutes a scientific theory. r1 can never do that.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/13/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsTotally agreed, Chris ! Yes, I wanted to keep "raw data" r1 strictly apart from "interpreted data" r3. Strange for me that you don't see "raw data" as data ! In my view, this is essential !
In a famous example Heidegger convinced his audience that we never see a desk or chair or window ! What we really see are irregular shapes in different colours and shades. Only by "Gestalt psychology" we "construct" images of objects. Thus even to call something a desk is "constructing r3-data (desk) from r1 data (irregular shapes)"!
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/15/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsRussell makes the same point as Heidegger in Chatper 1 of Problems of Philosophy. Of course, if we take the analysis to this level we stop talking about science and data.
I prefer my use of the word 'data' to yours because I want data to confirm or refute a theory. r1 alone cannot do that.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/16/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsChris, you are welcome. I am not the hangman of the philosophers Grand Inquisitor. I didn't read Russell on Heidegger. I only remember the example from some excerpt from Heidegger in a reader.
Remember those Chinese syllable in written form. For the Chinese reader those are meaningful syllables, indicating some word. For somebody who does not read Chinese or not even knowing how Chinese writing looks like, it is just some graphics without meaning. But suppose it is a graphical symbol that looks exactly like a Chinese syllable, but is totally unknown to any expert in Chinese writing and just a playful and meaningless invention ? Then it is a mere graphical object looking like a meaningful symbol. Since it points to nothing beyond it, it cannot be r3, but surely remains r1. But without a Chinese grammar and lexicon you could not decide that.
So what topic do you suggest for our next brawl ?
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/16/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsHubertus
Your Chinese character example is interesting. Even the grammar and lexicon might not help. How do we know we are not dealing with a neologism? How do you know, for example, whether the word 'pidburret' is nonsense or a word I have invented for a specific purpose? As Wittgenstein might say, we need a language game before we can make sense of anything.
Which in the context or r1 and r3, brings us to the point you made earlier, that the 'limits of our language are the limits of our world' in some sense.
Not sure what the next 'brawl' should be about but I've enjoyed this one.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/17/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science as MetaphysicsChris, this forum is not about killings, it is about gaining some clarity on the world we live in.
What about "brawling" over "the use of the non-scientific" — Harry Potter, LotR, religion, etc. ? Just a suggestion from a playful Hubertus-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Mike Ward (06/08/09)
SUBJECT: Introduction and questionsHello, I am Michael (Mike) Ward writing from the heart of England in Warwickshire. I have a wide interest and, despite what a few may think, am open to persuasion by rational argument. With a forty five year engineering background I appreciate the nature of the physical world and being a fully paid up sceptic I require to see substance behind whatever hypotheses people may argue for. I have always been intensely curious and find I learn far more when opposing or deconstructing things (ideas or mechanisms) than is ever gained by harmonious acceptance and agreement.
The basis of my philosophy
’Ä¢ Nothing can exist with any certainty ("I think therefore I am" proves that "I am a kind of being that thinks"
’Ä¢ Without certainty all ideas of the world external to myself are held in varying degrees of probability.
’Ä¢ I reason there is no need to concede to any higher authority than humanity.
’Ä¢ In all probability life has no external purpose.
’Ä¢ Death is simply non-existence.
’Ä¢ If there is nothing to fear in or after death there is nothing to fear in life.
’Ä¢ Probably there are no absolute values of any kind because there probably is no Creator.
’Ä¢ Without any absolute external values societies make their own.
’Ä¢ In all probability there is no right or wrong just what is expedient for the foreseeable future.
’Ä¢ Choices are made relative to the amount of happiness or pleasure they create.
’Ä¢ If humanity has any purpose it is the will to survive.
’Ä¢ We do not know what if anything exists beyond the boundaries of our perceptions so either speaking about or believing something to be so is pointless.
’Ä¢ I try only to accept things that I could determine to be true given reasonable time and effort.
’Ä¢ In this sense "belief" is pragmatic — life being to short to work out everything from first principles. Only build with scepticism upon what other people have rationally proven to be true.
’Ä¢ Question everything — be a sceptic, it's a far more powerful learning tool that simply agreeing with other people. Examine and test the limits of their reasoning.
’Ä¢ I find the idea of heaven or utopia, that is a place without desire, to be scary.
’Ä¢ Should reason dictate discarding obsolete ideas then do so as the value "I" (myself) is separate from my ideas.
’Ä¢ Other than in its own perception mankind is not important, it is just one branch on the tree of life.
’Ä¢ Which end of the food chain we are I am not certain — maybe it's us or the gene at the top.
’Ä¢ All species evolve naturally — only mankind makes plans for other species.
’Ä¢ Mankind has power beyond its wisdom.
Spirituality and religion(s), in my view, give both false comfort and explanations. I am seriously considering that those with such convictions stand apart as almost a separate (and more primitive) species when it comes to thinking processes after all as they say "if you can believe in a god then you can believe in anything". Absolutes for me do not exist with all things being relative and where existence is unproven things may only exist in varying degrees of probability. More will be revealed as discussions progress.
A few thoughts and questions:
Can ideas only ever exist in a physical brain?
What is the nature of so called "spirituality" — is it more than just sets of ideas?
Is intelligence overturning the evolutionary dynamics of survival of the fittest?
Regards
Mike
FROM: Chris Else (06/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Introduction and questionsHi Mike
Nice to meet you.
I am interested in your question about ideas existing in the brain. Do you have a view you want to share or a fuller statement of the problem?
Chris
FROM: Mike Ward (06/10/09)
SUBJECT: Mind in BodyChris,
The mind, according to Descartes, was a "thinking thing" and an immaterial substance. The distinction between mind and body is argued in Meditation VI as follows: I have a clear and distinct idea of myself as a thinking, non-extended thing, and a clear and distinct idea of body as an extended and non-thinking thing. Whatever I can conceive clearly and distinctly, God can so create. So, Descartes argues, the mind, a thinking thing, can exist apart from its extended body. And therefore, the mind is a substance distinct from the body, a substance whose essence is thought.
I understand an "immaterial substance" as something non physical. Physical things include electricity, gravity, space, time and thoughts (as brain states). Descartes offered the pineal gland as an explanation of how the duality of mind/body could be interfaced — clearly this is absurd.
The notion of some type of other wordly existence I find unsubstantiated and this "other worldliness" is essential to religious notions of soul and spirituality. This is why I posed the question to find out what others who hold with religion think on this matter.
Despite many offers no believers have taken my challenge to put a gun to their head and prove me wrong that brain death really is not full and final.
Mike
FROM: Chris Else (06/10/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Introduction and questionsHi Mike
You won't get me disagreeing if you are questioning Cartesian dualism. Nor if you are rejecting the notion of the soul in the usual sense of the immortal bit that exists independently of the body. However, I am not sure that I agree with your view that dualism is a necessary condition for spirituality. What if we consider spirituality not as a set of beliefs but as a certain kind of response? Wouldn't there be room in this single world of ours for it then?
Chris
FROM: Mike Ward (06/12/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Introduction and questionsChris,
Can you suggest an example of what fits into your idea of response?
Regards
Mike
FROM: Chris Else (06/12/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Introduction and questionsMike
I am very tentative about all this but I think it's worth exploring.
Let's say aesthetic responses, generally, have attributes that I might class as spiritual. They, however, are responses to works of art. So, for the sake of something to talk about, I'll provisionally describe spirituality as a response similar to an aesthetic response that is to the natural world rather than to a work of art.
I'd perhaps also say that a spiritual response draws upon intuition, emotion and thought in some sort combination that is not necessarily analysable into its components (qua gestalt).
How's that?
Chris
FROM: Mike Ward (06/16/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Introduction and questionsChris
I've just taken this definition below from Wikipedia and I think that it accurately reflects my idea of what spirituality means and from my discussions with others is a fair definition.
"Spirituality is matters of the spirit, a concept tied to a spirit world, a multidimensional reality and one or more deities. Spiritual matters regard humankind's ultimate nature and purpose, not as material biological organisms, but as spirits with an eternal relationship beyond the bodily senses, time and the material world. Spirituality implies the mind-body dichotomy, which indicates a separation between the body and soul.
The spiritual is contrasted with the physical, matter and the temporary. A sense of connection is central of spirituality -- connection to a reality greater than the physical world and oneself, which may include an emotional experience of awe and reverence. Spirituality may also include the development of the individual's inner life through practices such as meditation and prayer, including the search for God, the supernatural, a divine influence, or information about the afterlife. Spirituality is the personal, subjective aspect of religion, mysticism, magic and occult."
It is my argument that all this "spirituality" amounts to nothing more than a subjective experience. I find no reliable evidence for any external (non human) cause though there is much anecdotal hypothesis to the contrary. I think that we are evolutionary hard wired with a predisposition towards religion which can adequately be explained as a survival advantage gained through social cooperation. The fact that many people have a similar experience proves nothing what does prove something is where one person doesn't and hence any rule is destroyed.
What an individual experiences is forever private unless it can be demonstrated to me otherwise.
Mike
-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Wolfgang Heinze (06/08/09)
SUBJECT: IntroductionHi there,
my name is Wolfgang Heinze and I just joined this forum. I have studied philosophy in University up to my Masters degree, but most of my friends say that I am neither the typical philosophy student, nor a philosopher (whatever that is or means).
My favorite philosophers are Socrates (better: Platons early Socrates) and Nietzsche. They are not really compatible, but I guess I like swinging between those different poles.
I also studied the works of the German Idealism (I like Kant) and am interested in political philosophy.
I have also had an extensive exposure to Hegel, meaning I read it but have no understanding of what I read.
From now on I would like to study the idea of Freedom, especially regarding its social and political dimensions.
I am looking forward to a enlightening time with all of you.
Cheers,
WolfFROM: Pencka Gancheva (06/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionDear Wolf,
Thank you for joining our forum. It really worths to study the idea of Freedom, especially regarding its social and political dimensions.
That is a very "hot" question nowadays.
Good luck in any philo-area!
Pencka
FROM: Chris Else (06/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionHi Wolf (and Pencka)
I too like Kant, although I haven't studied him very deeply. And I am full of admiration for anyone who has read Hegel.
What is it that interests you about the concept of freedom? Is it free will? Or some other aspect?
Chris
FROM: Wolfgang Heinze (06/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionHi Chris,
I do not think I'm worthy of any admiration. I might have read Hegel, but I think I didn't understand much.
I guess trying to write about freedom will be a very challenging adventure. Especially since there are several (and sometimes) contradictory ideas of freedom out there.
I believe that my idea of freedom was shaped by Kants argument, that freedom is the necessary condition for having moral laws.
Furthermore I'd state that freedom of the individual is necessary in a free and open society.
But where does the freedom of one person and and where does the freedom of the other person start?
What is the role of the state? What are the roles of the state and the individuals regarding justice, freedom and security?
Has the internet and other technological advances changed anything of the classic idea of government, democracy and personal security?
These are the questions I am asking myself at the moment. But I'm still at the beginning and I will come back regularly to this forum for help and food for thought.
Cheers,
Wolf
FROM: Pencka Gancheva (06/10/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionHi, everyone.
About Kant, I think I have attached 2 essays of mine here...
Regards:
Pencka
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/11/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionHello Wolfgang,
I think freedom should first of all be seen as a paradoxical notion : you are free to the degree you are bound.
Let me explain : If you are sitting before a piano, there are two extreme possibilies : Either you are totally inept, then you can play "what you want" by tinkling away. But in fact you are not able to play "what you want", since to do that, you should be a master of the instrument. Thus to be really free to do what you want, you should be a master of your thoughts and actions. Those who are — like Mandela or the Dalai Lama — are in fact masters in this way.
This is the meaning of "to be free means to be bound".
And if you want to be a member of a really good band of "free jazzers", you should not only be a master of your instrument, bound by its limited possibilities, but at the same time you must be totally given to the music and intentions of the other players, thus once more bound — this time by the persons around. And of course this may be seen as a model of a good society.
But be careful here : The jazz band is a model of a free society, while an orchestratet group of slaves is exactly the opposite. One more paradox !
This paradox is explained from the difference of "discipline from within" and "discipline enforced from the outside". To follow the discipline from within as a master of your task and instruments at hand, that is exercising true freedom.
Only when you are a master you are free "to do as you want".
Hubertus
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/26/09)
SUBJECT: RE: on the notion of freedomDear Wolfgang,
you are intersted in "freedom". Did you stumbel over some problem or found out something of interest to us all ?
What do you think of the idea that freedom begins with submission to discipline ? Only when you totally submit to the requirements of the piano, you will be a master of the piano and free to play anything. Only when you totally submit to the discipline of math you will be a master of math. Only when you totally submit to the other members of a jazz-band, you will be free to add your voice to the interplay of the band-members and make it be heared. Only when you totally submit to the requirements of a language, you will be a master of that language.
Hubertus
FROM: Pencka Gancheva (06/29/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionDear Wolfgang,
Welcome to our on line philosophy forum.
Pencka-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Chris Else (06/09/09)
SUBJECT: Science and MetaphysicsHubertus
Thanks for your extensive reply. There is enough there for half a dozen conferences.
I think some clarification is order, though.
First, by way of an aside, I live in Wellington, New Zealand. This means I am 12 hours ahead of Europe but upside down, which may account for the strangeness of some of my thinking.
Second, on the matter at hand, you seem to have assumed that I want to put forward some sort of argument for a more or less conventional religious view of the world. Not so. To my mind, mystical/spiritual does not necessarily imply belief in God and belief in God does not necessarily imply subscription to an established religion. Before I can know whether I believe in God or not, I would have to decide what sort of God I was supposed to believe or not believe. I am not at all sure about that. I certainly don't believe in any kind of supreme being who has any human-like characteristics (such as knowledge or will) and who is the creator of the world. Thus, you won't find me challenging any of your arguments on this subject. Apart from anything else, such questions do not really get my intellectual blood running hot. For the moment.
What does interest me is the matter of truth and science and what sort of knowledge science offers us and whether or not science is a metaphysical system.
You say that 'Metaphysics is essentially any coherent system explaining the totality of the world' and that 'Science is content to find "explanations".' I am not sure why you put the word 'explanations' in scare quotes in the last sentence. Is it that you don't think science does deal in explanations? Or that the explanations of science are different from those of metaphysics? If the difference is that science is based on facts and that metaphysics isn't, then that would merely suggest that science is a particular kind of metaphysics. I certainly get the impression from people like Hawking, Wilson and Crick that science is definitely out to explain the 'totality of the world' — everything from consciousness to creation (without the Creator, of course). At least, they seem to be saying this when they are writing for the general public. When they are doing science, I'm sure they restrain themselves and focus on the problems within their particular programs. The impression one gets is — that in the minds of some scientists, at least — science is a form of creeping metaphysics: the whole world will be explained when science is complete.
I am interested, too, in the idea that electrons and such are theoretical entities. This suggests to me that they don't exist or that they have the ontological status of a symbol in an abstract system. I would like that to be the case but I am not sure it is. This is where Popper makes me uneasy. What the falsifiability thesis seems to be saying is that we don't know if a theory is true but we must behave as if it is until the world proves us wrong. In other words, the whole scientific enterprise is based on faith and belief, leavened with a capacity to admit our mistakes, of course.
I guess I don't understand how a scientific theory can be an explanation of anything if it does not have any ontological content. Currently, we are spending hundreds of millions of dollars looking for the Higgs boson. It seems kind of odd to be saying, 'Well, we're not looking for anything real. We're not actually finding out anything about the world. We just have these equations that say that if we set this giant machine going, then this number will appear on a computer printout (or whatever). We want to know if this will happen or not.' I doubt they got their funding with a story like that.
Or, to look at it another way. I find it hard to think of salt as a theoretical entity. Or sodium and chlorine. What about the statement 'salt is a compound of sodium and chlorine'? Is that a piece of theory or a fact? What about a sodium ion? Is that a theoretical entity or does it exist? Or the sodium nucleus? Or the protons that make it up? Or the quarks or bosons or whatever that make up the protons? It seems that we begin with things that I want to say exist and end with things that I am not at all sure about. Which is one of the reasons I can't tell when facts stop and theory starts.
Perhaps you can enlighten me.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Science and MetaphysicsChris, the best that can happen to this conference is people looking at things from Wellington and Spokane and Bonn — which together span almost the globe.
Just this moment I put an answer to you and Charles on the essence of metaphysics at another place.
On a non-theistic view of the world Mike will side with you.
This moment I refrain from an answer to your posting, I hope to do it some justice next time, while not necessarily an enlightened one but rather searching with a torch in a dark wood.
Hubertus-----------------------------------------------
FROM: k (06/10/09)
SUBJECT: ancient philosophyHi, my name is Kristian. I teach Ancient Philosophy and am particularly interested in ancient eudaimonism (happiness). Some of the greek hedonists are of special interest to me. Similar interests anyone?
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/10/09)
SUBJECT: RE: ancient philosophyYes, Kristian, I wanted to know why on Earth "eudaimonia" should be in anybody's interest. I think there are very few people who are intereste in eudaimonia or even thing they should be. I think that this whole idea is very "Greek" and totally mistaken. Hubertus
P.S.: I always like to know something on the background of people I am speaking to. But you need not tell me. On my own background just enter "hubertus fremerey" into google.
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/10/09)
SUBJECT: RE: ancient philosophyHi, K, you are surprised in a private mail (why not put it here ?) that I think happiness is not relevant or that no one thinks about this. This is an extreme position I do not defend in this radical form. But overall I stick with it.
We have preferences. We like this music or novel better than that one, this meal better than that one etc.. But from this does not follow that there must be a best music or a best meal. This evening we may like to hear Bach, the next evening we prefer Beethoven or Boogie Woogie or Jazz. The very notion of "best music" becomes meaningless, while the notion of "better" and "worse" remains meaningful. Thus I never understood this search in Plato and Aristotle for some supreme good.
In my opinion this was a typical "philosophical construct" deriving from a certain form of metaphysics. In Plato's view our notion of what is good or better is derived from some dark reminiscence of what is "best" in some absolute sense. But we need not share this idea and then the logic derived from it breaks down. Today almost nobody save some extreme Platonist thinks that Bach, Beethoven, Boogie Woogie and Jazz are expressions of some underlying "ideal" music. There is no such thing and our judgement of music is just something derived from experiences. We in the Western culture need thousands of hours to get acquainted to the different musical aesthetics of Arabic or Chinese or African music. For the unsuspecting Chinese from the countryside Beethoven is just "strange noise". In a strictly Platonic sense this cannot be, since if Beethoven is an approximation to "ideal" music, then any human being should think so. But the logic of Plato was distorted by his preoccupation with math, where any real circle is an approximation to the ideal circle. I leave it at that for the moment.
The other question was : Why shouldn't we go for happiness ? Because — in my opinion — this notion of happiness looks void. Why do people suffer for years to win on the tennis court or to climb a high mountain or to win some medal or to become a Zen-master ? They are not forced to do so ! They could sit at home "blissfully". In the case of the Zen-master we may with a certain justification speak of "bliss" as a goal, but in the other cases the very notion of bliss becomes meaningless. A famous climber, Reinhold Messner, climbed every mountain over 8000 m, even Mt.Everest without oxygen-bottle, and after that was looking for new challenges. He was not out for "happiness". We all are doing what we think we have to do, but not for happiness. Some people are very rich in money and very poor in soul, others are the opposite of this, but neither could tell you what "happiness" is. In the morning we may be out for adventures, even dangerous adventures, in the evening we are tired and want to sleep and find some peace. Whether we are out for excitements of for peace, in both cases we are not out for "happiness" if this notion has any meaning.
The concept of happiness becomes meaningless and void when seen in this way. So once more : The importance of happiness is a philosophical construct of the Greek style of philosophizing and has near to nothing to do with real human behaviour and striving.
What does Dr.Faust in the drama of Goethe bet against the devil ? That the devil will be unable to seduce him by a promise of happiness ! And in the end Dr.Faust wins his bet. He will never be content, he is full of plans even in his last moment, he would have jeered at the idea that bliss was on his mind — ever !
Hubertus
FROM: k (06/10/09)
SUBJECT: RE: ancient philosophyhubertus,
Some interesting comments.
Some responses: First, nowhere else in ancient thinking, aside from some of plato's dialogues, does happiness have anything to do with 'forms'. so one doesn't have to believe in, or accept, plato's forms to learn something from, or adopt, ancient conceptions of happiness.
also, that some people (some rich, some poor) can't tell us what happiness is isn't an argument against holding to a conception of happiness. perhaps they would get a better sense of who they were and what they wanted if they took some time to reflect on what happiness means to them.
finally, one doesn't have to always strive for or be 'out for' happiness in all of one's actions in order to accept eudaimonism. this is certainly not what most of the ancient theorists believed. the idea, rather, is that happiness is a kind of overarching goal, thought about from time to time, usually in moments of great decision.
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/11/09)
SUBJECT: RE: ancient philosophyWell, k, I accept all your "rebuttals", as far as they concern Greek philosophy, but my objections were much more fundamental : The Greek world is essentially a world of timeless "cosmic" order, comparable to the Buddhist world or any other pre-modern world. Thus Aristotelian "bliss" or "eudaimonia" is comparable to "satori" or to "islam".
But our modern world is a dynamic world of evolution, and there the driving and striving has nothing to do with a goal of happiness but with exploring the world and trying to survive. To put it differently : We moderns are not seeking happiness, we are seeking ourselves and try to assess and improve our situation.
It would be a complete misunderstanding to think that even the toddler or little child is seeking happiness ! Even the toddler is exploring the world at his own risk. This is the very nature of humans, and not going for happiness.
Why do we watch horror-movies like "Saw" or such movies as "Lord of the Rings" or "Dark Knight" etc. ? We don't do it "to be happy" but to learn something about our human possibilities. We are not forced to watch these movies as we are not forced to climb the Mt.Everest or to win a medal at the Olympics. All this is not meant to become happy but to find out about ourselves, to know our limits. That was my point.
Thus I stick with my thesis that the whole approach of Aristotle is fundamentally wrong and mistaken. His concept of man is wrong in a typical Greek way. We humans are "nosy driven rats", not animals asking for peace in a disturbing world. We are essentially explorers and conquerers and fighters by nature.
There may be some Hobbits, but man is not "a Hobbit by nature". Going for eudaimonia may be a philosophical ideal, but it is not a natural ideal but rather an un-natural one like that to become a Zen-master or a saint.
Perhaps we should proceed along this opposition of "natural — un-natural". Pre-modern culture tried to calm down human unrest, while modern culture tries to put human unrest to work. The Greek ideal was "vita contemplativa", the wise man regarding the Kosmos. The modern ideal is "vita activa", the engineer and scientist and laborer transforming the world to th better. This idea of improvement was never on the mind of Plato or Aristotle or any other schools of philosophy in the Antiquity. There was an ideal of perfectibility, but this was meant to be moral improvement and a growth in wisdom.
With Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Marx this sort of thinking was replaced by a modern thinking of progress and fighting and irrational forces all pervading.
Hubertus
FROM: k (06/11/09)
SUBJECT: RE: ancient philosophyhubertus,
some reactions:
it is not accurate to say that greek thought is about timeless, static order. Again, perhaps for some like empedocles, pythagoras and plato, but the vast majority of thinkers like heraclitus, epicureans, stoics and even aristotle are all about a world in 'change'.
second, aristotle's notion of eudaimonia is a difficult concept and open to a variety of interpretations; in any case, it is not at all given that eudaimonia is simply some static, timeless state.
third, you make this natural/non-naturalistic distinction. but greek ethics is entirely naturalistic: it is based on human biology, function and environment.
k.
FROM: Charles Countryman (06/11/09)
SUBJECT: RE: ancient philosophySome philosophers on happiness.
Hubertus, despite your doubt, there does seem to be some interest in the subject of happiness in the world of philosophy.
These are from an essay by Mortimer J. Adler:
"Man wishes to be happy," Pascal writes, "and only wishes to be happy, and cannot wish not to be so"
What Kant calls the "pragmatic" rule of life, which aims at happiness, "tells us what we have to do, if we wish to be become possessed of happiness."
In sharp opposition to the pragmatic rule, Kant sets the "moral or ethical law," the motive of which is not simply to be happy, but rather to be worthy of happiness."
... what Locke means by saying that there is a science of what man ought to do "as a rational and voluntary agent for the attainment of ... happiness."
Adler goes on including Aristotle, Aquinas, Erasmus, Mill, Boethius, Socrates, and Montaigne.
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/12/09)
SUBJECT: RE: ancient philosophyCharles and k,
thank you for your hints and opposition, but I stick with my conviction that this idea of going for happiness is a philosophical idee fixe and a mental construct and has nothing to do with real observations. I am not citing any philosopher, I am just observing human behaviour. In my opinion this pursuit of happiness is a "false consciousness" in the sense of Marx and psychologists : While you are claiming to strive for the good, you may in fact be striving for evil but won't admit it.
As I said, this notion of "pursuit of happiness" becomes void when applied to the torturer and the masochist. If you like to suffer to be happy then the whole notion of happiness becomes void. Is Dr.Hannibal Lecter a happy man ? Was Hitler a happy man ? There may be some people — few indeed — who are striving for happiness, most are not. They are striving for many goals, but not for happiness.
I have asked why we are watching (I didn't) movies like "saw". If you are telling me that people watch such movies to become happy, I think this is absurd. People are watching such movies to have experiences quite different from happiness. This is what I called to be "a nosy rat" : Experiences tell us something about the world we live in and about ourselves. This is meaningful from the viewpoint of evolution: Expanding our experience and knowlege of the reality we live in.
You both should get out much better arguments to convince me !
Hubertus
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/13/09)
SUBJECT: RE: is man striving for happiness ?Charles and k,
we have to see two different images of man : Man seen as pursuing happiness is very different from man seen as a smart rat or as a daring explorer and conquerer !
As I stated explicitely, even the toddler is not out for happiness but for "know your world". There are many books now on "the active child". This was the example of the Buddha and of St.Francis : They both could have had a comfortable life, but they were not interested. They both were asking for a challenge. Achilles and Alexander the Great in his steps were out for glory and honour, not for happiness. The Dr.Faust of the drama of Goethe explicitely bet against the devil that he would be unable to seduce Faust by the promise of happiness. The figure of Dr.Faust stands for modern man, who is driven by discontent and always tries "to improve the world". In his last days Dr.Faust is supervising the drying of swamps — i.e. "improving the world". Happiness as a goal was never on his mind.
The pre-modern ideal — including the pre-modern Greeks and the Jews — was an ideal of wisdom and seven (4+3) "cardinal virtues". Those classical virtues (justice, prudence, measure, and fortitude, to which faith, love, and hope were added later) were the virtues of "wise men" and not the modern virtues of "active men". A set of seven modern cardinal virtues would look totally different, maybe like this :
"Three virtues of liberty" which are : initiative, inquisitiveness, and inventiveness
"Four virtues of good working" which are : diligence, persistence, team spirit, and responsibility
As you see, the total character of the image of man has been changed by this. The modern image of man is very different from the pre-modern image of man. Modern man is a dynamic explorer, an inventive and creative transformer of the world. Pre-modern man is a wise one, contemplating the wisdom of the Kosmos or Creation. This contrast is what is at stake here.
And look at your list of philosophers as taken from Adler, Charles : (Aristotle, Aquinas, Erasmus, Mill, Boethius, Socrates, and Montaigne) They all are fundamentally "pre-modern" ! A modern list would begin with Feuerbach, Marx, and Nietzsche and include Hayek and other liberals.
Hubertus-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Migle Anu‰°auskaite (06/10/09)
SUBJECT:Hello everyone,
my name is Migle and at present i am a mere student of journalistic while occasionally writing some articles in Lithuanian cultural press.
I've been interested in philosophy for several years, i have read some books, went to some conferences, yet i feel i am lacking some basic knowledge of the subject: why is everybody suddenly criticizing Hegel? isn't there really a gap between thought and expression? how can we know the way the meaning is constructed? what is the role of pseudo-philosophy in philosophic area? I am reluctant to take the answers for these and similar questions for granted while i do not have the knowledge to try to work them out myself.
I did like Heidegger, but i am still not sure if my understanding of him is the proper one.
Also, i am interested in the language (as it is connected to my working area) its meaning and the role in our lives.
I am pleased to have the possibility to encounter other's thoughts and opinions.
Nice to meet you all:)FROM: Pencka Gancheva (06/11/09)
SUBJECT: RE:Dear Migle,
Welcome to our on line conferencing room.
I want to ask you: do you have any philosophical preferences?
Regards:
Pencka
FROM: Migle Anu‰°auskaite (06/11/09)
SUBJECT: RE:Hello Pencka,
as i have mentioned, i would be interested in the language and the way it came into the focus of philosophic thought. unfortunately, my acquaintance with it (philosophical thought) has been so recent that i do not have anything except questions.
Kind regards,
Migle.
FROM: Pencka Gancheva (06/11/09)
SUBJECT: RE:Dear Migle,
what do you think about philosophy of the langauage?:-)
Regards:
Pencka
FROM: Migle Anu‰°auskaite (06/17/09)
SUBJECT: RE:Dear Pencka,
I am sorry for taking so long to answer: i have been working on my studies' paper days and nights.
my thoughts concerning the philosophy of language are
language is a convention at the process of becoming at every moment we are using the language
also, i like to think that every act of language is an attempt to "catch" the essence of things.
regards,
Migle.
FROM: Pencka Gancheva (06/18/09)
SUBJECT: RE:Dear Migle,
Regarding the language, I remembered a few things since the time I studied Philosophy of the language:
1.the connection logics-language:
The professor asks the student:
-What is a synonim?
-The word I will use via my logical thought instead the word I dont know.
2.There are natural and synthetic languages
3.the various meaning:
"The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak"
Automatically translated in Russian (!) it will sould like that:
"The alcoholis good, but the meat is not good"
Can I be useful somehow?
Regards:
Pencka
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/19/09)
SUBJECT: RE: on language and its useDear Migle and Pencka,
what are you trying to do ? This below from my exchange with Chris Else on metaphysics may be of some relevance for your debate. I just now have posted it to Chris. It reads :
// Epistemology is a difficult and complex field, but, as you see, strongly related to ontology. We speak of lambs, electrons, events, "freedom" and "God" all in the same language, so we fall victim to all sorts of confusions. The correct grammatical form of a statement does not tell us much about the value of the content. "The moon is a flower" would be nonsense as would be "the moon is sour", but what about "the moon is a cheese" ? It could be true and we have to check it. It is at least a falsifiable statement.
But what about "God is love" ? This is not falsifiable, perhaps not even meaningful, we first have to clarify the meaning of such statements. Very probably it is not a statement about God, but about some feelings. So the whole statement is of a very different character than it seems to be.
Well, for the moment I refrain from numbering the different types of statements. But you see where it goes : Ontology, epistemology, logology — where logology would be the science of our way of using the possibilities of conceptual language. //
Hubertus
FROM: Migle Anu‰°auskaite (06/19/09)
SUBJECT: RE:Dear Pencka, dear Hubertus,
thank you for your posts, i guess i was not certain what we were exactly talking about either.
if i understood Hubertus' reply correctly, using abstract statements (which might be equally meaningless and meaningful) will get us nowhere.
if we had had a definition of "language" or "convention" or "meaning", we wouldn't have ended talking about some different things. maybe Pencka's answer was about inner qualities of the language, concerning different languages people talk in different parts of the world, and my statement was somehow connected with the possible meaning (if we can say this) of language (meaning the ability to refer to things).
i guess the problem lies in my abstract statements.
i am a little confused myself: i do not know where should the language be approached from. would it not be silly to try to question the meaning of language and it's relation to the world without knowing it's main principles? on the other hand, although concentrating on the system of language itself may be fascinating, it is a possibility of loosing a track with outside the system (of course, if we assume there is an "outside the system") — just like some students of semiotics does? what would be your opinions on this?
dear pencka, if you have more information on the principles of language you mentioned, i would be interested in reading it. thank you.
regards,
Migle.
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/19/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Language and its (mis-)useDear Migle,
as a journalist you should be aware of these :
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S._I._Hayakawa
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_Korzybski
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_semantics
and see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newspeak_language
Hubertus
-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Charles Countryman (06/12/09)
SUBJECT: NothingnessMike said:
"I think that those who ask questions like "before time" are illogical just as those who speak of life after death — they cannot accept non-existence as being nothingness. If you don't exist there is no you.
On the other hand all this rationality destroys a good fairy tale................."
----------
I think that Mike is referring to the theistic faiths, probably specifically to Christianity. His Holiness the Dalai Lama offers a reply to "nothingness" though that can be appreciated from many different perspectives.
Speaking about the ancient Indian Vaibhasika school, His Holiness said:
"... what point is there for the followers of the Buddha to venerate and worship and pray to him? What is the benefit? What point is there in doing such a thing if the Buddha is no more? The response given by this tradition is that the Buddha attained full enlightenment as a result of accumulating merits and perfecting is wisdom through innumerable eons. And during this time, Buddha developed and cultivated a very forceful, altruistic intention to be of benefit and service to all. The power of that energy and truth is still there. It is this power that assists and helps when you worship and venerate the Buddha. However, insofar as the historical person of the Buddha is concerned, that was the end."
This quote comes from the book: "The Good Heart: A Buddhist Perspective On The Teachings of Jesus."
At least part of establishing meaning for one's life, which Mike refers to elsewhere as being meaningless, is through our intentions, as in the "altruistic intention" referred to above. Of course one's actions must also be considered. But what to a great extent gives our actions meaning is the intention behind them.
CharlesFROM: Mike Ward (06/12/09)
SUBJECT: Stuff and NonsenseCharles
The world is made up of stuff like: rocks, people, gravity, radio, TV, thoughts, ideas, feelings, love, brain states, in fact everything that can be observed and measured. Whereas gods, spirituality, ghosts, unicorns, are nonsense or at best nothing more than sets of ideas.
Unless of course someone can prove otherwise to me or if not me their own sceptical selves.
Waiting in anticipation........
Mike
FROM: Charles Countryman (06/12/09)
SUBJECT: RE: NothingnessMike
A problem with your just "ideas" skeptical argument is that history has shown that ideas and example have real consequences. The Dalai Lama points this out in his discussion about the Buddha (and altruistic intention).
Meaning to life arises from just ideas.
Charles
FROM: Mike Ward (06/12/09)
SUBJECT: RE: NothingnessCharles,
I whole heartedly agree, meaning to life is whatever we want it to be, But it is what WE want not some alter power external to humanity.
Mike-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Charles Countryman (06/12/09)
SUBJECT: WorshipMike said:
Spirituality and religion(s), in my view, give both false comfort and explanations. I am seriously considering that those with such convictions stand apart as almost a separate (and more primitive) species when it comes to thinking processes after all as they say "if you can believe in a god then you can believe in anything".
----------
Why worship and what to worship?
Is the following just false comfort and explanation? Is there a connection between the ancient Greek philosopher and John Coltrane?
Xenophanes of Colophon: "It is proper for men who are enjoying themselves first of all to praise God with decent stories and pure words. But when they have poured a libation and prayed for the power to do what is just — for thus to pray is our foremost need ..."
See link to Saint John Coltrane Church:
http://www.coltranechurch.org/index.htm
CharlesFROM: Mike Ward (06/12/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipWell there's more than a hint of truth about prayer in this Monty Python Script about worship
Amen
Mike
ANNOUNCER:
The Meaning of Life: Part Two: Growth and Learning.
HUMPHREY WILLIAMS:
...And spotteth twice they the camels before the third hour, and so, the Midianites went forth to Ram Gilead in Kadesh Bilgemath, by Shor Ethra Regalion, to the house of Gash-Bil-Bethuel-Bazda, he who brought the butter dish to Balshazar and the tent peg to the house of Rashomon, and there slew they the goats, yea, and placed they the bits in little pots.
Here endeth the lesson.
CHAPLAIN:
Let us praise God. O Lord,...
CONGREGATION:
O Lord,...
CHAPLAIN:
...ooh, You are so big,...
CONGREGATION:
...ooh, You are so big,...
CHAPLAIN:
...so absolutely huge.
CONGREGATION:
...so absolutely huge.
CHAPLAIN:
Gosh, we're all really impressed down here, I can tell You.
CONGREGATION:
Gosh, we're all really impressed down here, I can tell You.
CHAPLAIN:
Forgive us, O Lord, for this, our dreadful toadying, and...
CONGREGATION:
And barefaced flattery.
CHAPLAIN:
But You are so strong and, well, just so super.
CONGREGATION:
Fantastic.
HUMPHREY:
Amen.
CONGREGATION:
Amen.
HUMPHREY:
Now, two boys have been found rubbing linseed oil into the school cormorant. Now, some of you may feel that the cormorant does not play an important part in the life of the school, but I would remind you that it was presented to us by the Corporation of the town of Sudbury to commemorate Empire Day, when we try to remember the names of all those from the Sudbury area who so gallantly gave their lives to keep China British. So, from now on, the cormorant is strictly out of bounds! Oh, and Jenkins, apparently your mother died this morning. Chaplain.
[organ music]
CHAPLAIN and CONGREGATION: [singing]
O Lord, please don't burn us.
Don't grill or toast Your flock.
Don't put us on the barbecue
Or simmer us in stock.
Don't braise or bake or boil us
Or stir-fry us in a wok.
Oh, please don't lightly poah us
Or baste us with hot fat.
Don't fricassee or roast us
Or boil us in a vat,
And please don't stick Thy servants, Lord,
In a Rotissomat.
FROM: Charles Countryman (06/12/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipMike
Have you forgotten that the power of philosophy includes the making of distinctions, including between what is just comedy and what includes a moral teaching. Philosophy helps us interpret what is hidden in the media. Maybe your media example includes a message of nihilism and that's a debatable issue.
Charles
FROM: Mike Ward (06/12/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipCharles
I have no sacred cows, nor does what I accept as true philosophy,
Socrates is quoted as saying "By all means marry: If you get a good wife, you'll become happy; if you get a bad one, you'll become a philosopher." In short being a philosopher is probably a solitary lifestyle.
I really think that comedy or at least humorous ridicule is absolutely necessary to throw doubt into those accepting belief as a basis of values.
I've been to churches and religious gatherings and observed and from my perspective they really look no different to those hypnotist shows with people acting out the suggestions given to them. I'm convinced that they really believe what they are told but the only saving grace is that those hypnotised eventually come to their senses.
Mike
FROM: Chris Else (06/12/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipMike
With regard to 'The world is made up of stuff like: rocks, people, gravity, radio, TV, thoughts, ideas, feelings, love, brain states, in fact everything that can be observed and measured.'
I am not sure what you mean by 'observed and measured'. I am clear what it is to observe and measure a rock. But what about thoughts? Or ideas? Or love?
Chris
FROM: Mike Ward (06/16/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipChris
Some would argue that a thought or feeling amounts to a certain set of conditions of the human body which are capable of being measured and with limited ability to date to be replicated. Memories are a good example where direct external brain stimulation can involuntarily bring them back to our awarenes.
Is then a memory not a thought and if not why not? The fact that it can be re-created at will renders it capable of being measured.
The counter argument is that neurons and synapses have no meaning in themselves and that awareness and identity is emergent behaviour which I understand to be something more than the sum of parts from which it comes.
Mike
FROM: Chris Else (06/16/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Spirituality, subjectivity and brainsHi Mike
We have two conversations going and think they are likely to converge so I will answer them both in this one reply.
Firstly, the definition of spirituality you offer up above clearly requires dualism. I am not a dualist so, on that definition, you are not likely to get much argument from me.
However, you say that '"spirituality" amounts to nothing more than a subjective experience'. This sounds as if you think 'subjective experience' is somehow inferior and that there is little value to be had in differentiating it. Also, of course, there is no reason why a subjective experience cannot be a response to something. An aesthetic experience is a response to a work of art. Is the work of art the 'cause' of the experience in your view? Or are we operating with a different set of categories?
To my mind, broadly speaking, all experience is subjective. Objectivity is a set of tools and constraints applied to subjective experience to get people to agree with one another. To set up subjective and objective as fundamentally different orders of experience is just to repeat Descartes's mistake. It is just as big a mistake to say that the subjective is somehow illusory.
An example of this is the representational theory of mind — which brings us now to the matter of neurons and synapses (our second conversation). On my understanding, a crude explanation of this runs as follows. A person (P) looks at an object (O). This causes a certain neural pattern in P's brain. This pattern represents O. Ergo, we do not need any reference to dualistic phenomenal entities, like sense impressions or qualia, in order to explain visual perception. We have eliminated such subjective notions and developed an entirely objective account of the matter.
The anti-physicalists respond to this by saying that talk of neurons and synapses says nothing at all. No matter how much you explain in these terms, you still haven't touched the crucial point. You haven't said anything about what it is like for P to look at O.
My sympathy here is with the anti-physicalist, although I agree with the physicalist that talk of sense data and qualia is very dodgy. A physicalist response to my view might be to say that, in that case, I owe the world some account the subjective. If I am not going to talk about dualistic phenomenal entities, what am I going to talk about?
My response would be that I don't have to give an account of the subjective because it is the bedrock of any discussion (this is the bit that Descartes was right about) and that it is an assumption buried in the representational theory of mind.
Every representation has three components: a thing that is represented, a thing that does the representing and a person that the thing is represented to. Without the person (call her the representee) there just isn't any representation going on. Thus, if the neural pattern in P's brain represents O, we are entitled to ask who the representee is. Not P. His neural pattern means nothing to him. He just sees the object. The only other option is the observer watching the brain scan. But if she is the representee, then we have her subjective experience unaccounted for. Perhaps we can scan her brain and show how P's neural pattern is represented there. This, though, means we have to find another representee... and so on — an infinite regress.
There are several ways to take this conversation from here. I'll leave it to you to decide what we should focus on.
Chris
FROM: Mike Ward (06/17/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Spirituality, subjectivity and brainsChris,
What I am attempting to separate, as a materialist or even a monist, is what I hesitate to describe as the "real" from the "imaginary".
It is my hypothesis that the universe probably existed Before Humanity (BH) and likely will afterwards and that human constructs like religion and spiritualism although socially important had no reality BH nor will have AH (After Humanity).
I agree that all experience can only ever be subjective but those founded upon an external cause have greater validity than those produced internally by desire, need, hope and love. That is not to say that internally produced experiences like love or god are not more important to the one having the experience, but it ought to held in mind that such experiences are but internal constructions.
People talk in very different degrees of seriousness about god and unicorns but to my mind these are completely interchangeable notions with nothing to choose between them BH or AH. People can argue to the nth degree over the qualities of mercy or cruelty of their god(s) but none of that will put one extra potato on their dinner plate.
Sure we "live" in the experiential world of the mind but with mostly dismal failure I attempt to try to step out of it to try to see a wider perspective (Plato's cave analogy here). This one particular book http://www.amazon.co.uk/Anthropologist-Mars-Oliver-Sacks/dp/0330343475 and in particular the Temple Grandin essay started off my notion of stepping outside of the box of human values into the "real world" out there rather than the "imaginary world" inside. Maybe your notion of bedrock may end up being more akin to quicksand.
Mike
FROM: Chris Else (06/17/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Spirituality, subjectivity and brainsMike
I agree with your remarks about BH and AH and that human 'constructs like religion and spirituality' have little meaning outside the intervening period. Isn't this true of all human knowledge, though? Isn't science also a human construct? Don't the activities of observation and measurement, which you put so much store by, mean nothing without people to do the observing and measuring?
You make a distinction between experiences that 'are founded upon an external cause' and 'those produced internally by desire, need, hope and love.' Three things about this bother me. First, I think that desire and love (and arguably also need and hope) are responses to things and I don't understand what the difference is between a response and 'having a cause'. Secondly, I am confused by this internal/external distinction. It seems to me that hunger is observable and measurable and that a need for food has hunger as a cause. I am not at all sure that this need should be a less valid experience than some others based on 'external causes'. Thirdly, you earlier counted love as being something on your list of 'real' things. Now you seem to be excluding it from the category of valid experiences. Have your changed your view?
I think the idea of stepping outside human values is an interesting one. I am not sure how relevant it is to what we are discussing here, though. I think the primacy of subjective experience is something we are stuck with — in two senses. Firstly, it seems impossible that we can step outside language and logic. Secondly, if it was possible to do so, we would still be stuck with subjective experience — in whatever transmuted form.
Chris
FROM: Mike Ward (06/20/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Spirituality, subjectivity and brainsChris,
I put it to you that all within the mind is a construct, it is humanities attempt to model what is external to our mind. The sense data of our bodies need for food is just as external to the mind as the table we eat it of. Deprived of food though we die but not so deprived of unicorns or gods hence a very real difference. All measurement require an object and subject, when the object is real and external then errors only occur in our measurement. When the object is imaginary then measurement errors are compounded or impossible. How white is a white star is not at all the same order of quest as how white is a unicorn.
That people believe in a god is a perfectly accurate and valid statement. It requires absolutely no proof whatsoever of existence of a god neither does the belief in love. How does one measure belief?
I absolutely agree that we are stuck with subjective experience but that must not stop us trying to think outside of this. What, as I think is highly likely, humanity met up with another sentient life form where would our closed box thinking leave us?
Mike
FROM: Chris Else (06/20/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipMike
I think we need a little clarification. You seem to be operating with a distinction between 'internal'/subjective/non-measurable/unreliable or imaginary, on the one hand, and 'external'/objective/measurable/reliable and real, on the other. I don't think things line up as neatly as that.
Suppose I measure something and then check it and then get someone else to measure it and check it using a different method of measurement (maybe I need a third person to do it all again with a different measure and so on for however long it takes to be satisfied). I now have an objective measurement. All this is subjective, though, inasmuch as I am conscious of everything I do.
And again I don't see how we can 'think outside of' subjective experience. Thinking is subjective experience, along with feeling and imagining and dreaming.
You say 'all within the mind is a construct, it is humanities attempt to model what is external to our mind'. I find this sort of talk as nonsensical as you find talk of God. What is this thing called 'a mind' and where is it that it has things 'in' it and other things 'external' to it? Nor do I hold much store by those unicorns called 'sense data'. I don't see sense data. I see books and coffee cups and computer screens. The idea that these 'external' objects 'cause' 'mental images' 'in my mind' is just plain old Descartes. Dualism, in other words.
Of course, there are imaginary things like unicorns and there are real things like rocks. (And when we are doing philosophy we deal with imaginary things called 'rocks'.) Rather than talk about 'internal' and 'external' objects I would prefer to talk about experience, of which there are many kinds. Ideas, for example, happen during writing or reading, talking or listening and during just plain old thinking. It makes no sense to me to say that these activities 'cause' things called ideas to appear 'in my mind'. Ideas are just part of the experience of doing the activity.
So when it comes to religion and spirituality, I want to talk about it in terms of experience. My best way into it is to think about aesthetic experiences. When I come upon a painting I can take a ruler and a spectrometer and measure it or I can look at it and respond to it visually, emotionally and intellectually. It seems to me that religious and spiritual experiences might be like this second approach. The question then arises, what are they responses to? That's what I am not sure about and what I'm hoping you might be able to help me find out.
Chris
FROM: Mike Ward (06/22/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipChris
I do not subscribe to innate ideas I consider that whatever we hold in mind has via some route entered the mind from "outside". The very construction of mind itself is a pattern making acquisition process of sense data.
If whilst you are looking at your books and coffee cups and computer screens I come along and put a bullet through your head do all the books and coffee cups and computer screens disappear — unlikely. Do all the gods and unicorns disappear — highly likely. That in broad terms is the distinction I make between real and imaginary.
I make no argument about the experiences of one, two or three people on "external" things for that increases probability and makes for better prediction and survival.
By all means when it comes to religion and spirituality and art go ahead and talk about it in terms of experience but they are all private, subjective and not in any way capable of being shared with other than through the senses — now we have come full circle.
Mike
FROM: Chris Else (06/22/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipMike
If you mean by 'innate ideas' the kind of thing that Descartes was talking about and Locke objected to, then I agree entirely. I have some sympathy with Kant, though, because I think his view maps onto modern theories of the mind/brain. I subscribe to the view that the human brain is structured in certain ways, as a result of our evolution, and that as a result we are predisposed to think in certain ways. In this sense, we may well have 'ideas' that we are born with. How extensive these predispositions are we don't know yet but they probably include the basic rules of logic and more general structures of language. More controversially they may predispose us to certain attitudes with regard to sexual behaviour.
Yes, you are right that if you put a bullet through my head then all my experiences disappear and any objects that I am looking at don't disappear. But then if am thinking of nuclear physics or the character of Elizabeth Bennett in Pride and Prejudice, they don't disappear either. And none of this says anything about the existence of God. If God is a figment of my imagination, then It disappears along with the unicorns. If God exists, then It doesn't. Thus, I have no great problem with your distinction between real and imaginary but I don't see that it proves anything.
I fear you are going to have to explain to me what you mean by 'sense data' though. In an earlier post you said 'The sense data of our bodies need for food is just as external to the mind as the table we eat it of.' But don't these sense data disappear along with the unicorns when you put a bullet through my head? And if so, doesn't this make them imaginary and, therefore, internal?
Finally, I am still struggling with your notions of internal and external and the talk of mind as some sort of container. Is this just a metaphor? And if it is, can we agree to abandon it? I find it very confusing. It's like talking about angels. If, on the other hand, you are referring to the real properties of something, can you explain how the properties arise and what it is that they are properties of?
One of the problems with the metaphor (I'll assume it is that) is that it sets up this picture of a secret inner space, a room, to which only one person has the key or —worse still — in which someone is permanently locked. Connecting this room to the rest of the world are some communication channels that we call 'sense perceptions'. This picture leads to statements such as yours to the effect that experience is 'all private, subjective and not in any way capable of being shared with other than through the senses'. I think this distinction between private and shared is another piece of Cartesian nonsense. If we are both standing outside in a chilly wind can't we be sharing the experience of being cold? If we are both sitting in the movies, can't we both be sharing the experience of the film? If we didn't in some sense share the experience of the film we couldn't talk about it afterwards. I don't get it.
Chris
FROM: Mike Ward (06/23/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipChris
The human brain has a structure before learning really occurs perhaps we could call this the "coarse" structure which is probably more associated with primitive survival needs. The "fine" structure is a lifelong constructing (learning) process and to a degree de-constructing process. This coarse structure as you say gives us an "a priori" ability with logic and language etc.
I have to disagree when you say "But then if am thinking of nuclear physics or the character of Elizabeth Bennett in Pride and Prejudice, they don't disappear either." (after you get the bullet). How can they (your thoughts) not disappear — very strange!
I conceptualise that I or consciousness is the innermost of a number of concentric circles, the only properties it has are awareness and consciousness — no thoughts. The next circle contains all our thoughts and ideas. These two circles one within the other represent mind. The next circle contains our senses which provide sense data for processing to become thoughts. The next circle is our physical body which is the path data gets from the outside world into our senses. Outside of this is everything else. Try drawing it out as a diagram as to how we (the core self) interacts with the world "out there"
It's meant to show a relationship between different concepts of self, idea, senses and things in themselves.
As data flow in and out it's possible to see where errors and misconceptions occur especially when you draw a second set of circles for another person. Accepting such a set of relationships has both revealing and beneficial consequences.
For instance:
I am hungry = my body has need for food
I am stupid = some of my ideas are flawed
I am angry = things are not going as expected (ideas of expectations were flawed)
In principle it decouples the unchanging self from changing ideas. For myself this works as a good model so that I am never the prisoner of my ideas.
Hope this makes some sense, it does to me but I am open to change.
Mike
FROM: Chris Else (06/24/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipMike
I did not of course mean that my thoughts about Elizabeth Bennett would survive the bullet only that the fictional character, which is in a different ontological category from the coffee cup, would survive. My apologies for the lack of clarity.
I think your model of consciousness is interesting. Do you have any experimental basis for it? I don't know much about the neuropsychology of the brain but, as I recall, it does not bear much resemblance to the components of your model. Doesn't the current thinking postulate a number of functional modules, which are interconnected in quite complex and perhaps not very systematic ways? Your model also seems to suggest that the 'I or consciousness' and ideas are located somewhere within the body. If so, where? And aren't the senses functions of the body and not 'things' inside it somewhere? Why do you need a model like this? Is it how you experience yourself? If so, it doesn't work for me? I fear my experience is much more along the lines of interconnections that are quite complex and not at all systematic.
You say the model has benefits. 'As data flow in and out it's possible to see where errors and misconceptions occur especially when you draw a second set of circles for another person.' What sort of errors do you mean? The whole picture of data flowing in and out seems so artificial and mechanical that I would really have to be convinced that it solved some serious problems before I could accept it — problems that could not be dealt with any other way. What are they?
In addition, I'm not sure what you mean by 'the unchanging self'. Why should the self be unchanging? You make it sound suspiciously like the soul. You also say 'so that I am never the prisoner of my ideas'. I fear you have completely lost me here. In what sense could you be the prisoner of your ideas and in what sense could you be free of them? Unless, of course, you are talk about intellectual self-criticism. I don't see how the model helps with that, though.
In my view, the model gives rise to more smoke than light. If it makes any ontological claims it seems to commit you to Cartesian dualism — a separate world (or space) of 'the mind' that is quite distinct from the physical world. If you are going to accept that, you may as well go along with souls and angels. If, on the other hand, the model is no more than a metaphor or an analogy, then I'd much prefer a more straight-forward and literal explanation.
That said, however, I do not believe there is a good explanation available here. The problem, as I see it, is this. As a general rule one can only explain objects. (I don't just mean physical objects but rather anything that one can give one's attention to.) The subject cannot be the object by definition. Thus, it cannot be explained.
Clarification please.
Chris
FROM: Chris Else (06/24/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipMike
Mike
Further to my earlier post. On reflection, I felt I had taken a fair few pot shots at your position without really offering one of my own. So, for what it's worth...
My take on all this starts with Thomas Nagel's essay 'What is it like to be a bat?'. Nagel points out that a necessary and sufficient condition for something being conscious is that it has a point of view. A test for something having a point of view is to ask whether or not it makes sense to ask what it is like to be that something. Thus, it does not make much sense to say what is it like to be a stone or a corpse but it does make sense to ask what it is like to be a human being or a horse or a chimpanzee. Nagel's discussion is mostly around the differences between species but I think it's also useful to think of points of view in relation to individuals.
As a first cut, we can say that a point of view consists of an object, a thing that is apprehended, and, by implication, a subject that does the apprehending. By object, I mean whatever it is that is attended to. It could be a dove or a dream, a throb or a theorem. By apprehend I mean any of those verbs of sensory or cognitive functioning: seeing, touching, smelling, etc, as well as thinking, imagining, calculating dreaming, fantasising.
The beauty of Nagel's essay, which I don't think he fully appreciated himself, is that he found a way to talk about phenomenal experience without having to refer to it directly. This made it extremely difficult for reductionist philosophers to debunk him by explaining consciousness away as some physical state of the brain because it made it possible to reply, yes, all that talk about brain states is spot on but, nonetheless, there is still something that it is like to be me (or you) that isn't accounted for in those explanations.
Of course, if we ask what this thing that can't be reduced is, we get into difficulties. It's incredibly hard, if not impossible, to say. Geoffrey Klempner is good on this in 'NaˆØve Metaphysics' where he describes how what he calls the egocentrist is reduced to a dumb (i.e. wordless) sort of 'inner' 'mental' pointing gesture 'THIS' to indicate the thing. For my part, it feels easier to say that the subject of a point of view is not something you can point to at all because you can only point to the object of a point of view. If you try to point to the subject, it becomes the object and therefore is not the subject any more.
The problem with a lot of philosophising about consciousness is that it starts by considering a thing called 'the mind' and then goes on to look at the components and attributes of this thing and how it relates to other things like sense data and how these connect to still more things out there in the physical world. This is what Descartes did. From 'I think, therefore I am' he went straight to 'I have a mind and this mind contains ideas'. He was lost before he even started. The first move was a disastrous blunder because before he knew it he was committed to a picture of the 'I' inhabiting this inner room cut off from the world except for a stream of incoming data. The room did not exist in the physical world. It therefore existed in another — non-physical world. Hence, dualism. For Descartes, this wasn't so bad because he lived in a religious world that was already dualistic. In the modern world, dualism runs slap bang into science, which immediately wants to explain away all that other world nonsense. For me, taking on science in the business of explanation is a fool's game. There are more dead claims to the effect that science will never explain X, than there are legs in a whole bag of millipedes.
In short, any theory that tries to objectify the subject and explain it will either have to retreat into dualism or get run over by the scientific steam roller. The answer, I believe, is to go with Wittgenstein and accept that maybe science can explain everything and if it ever does then there will be no questions left to answer. Let them get on with it, we say. However, nonetheless, 'there are... things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest.' (TLP 6.522) Which I take to mean that you can't explain them, you can only show them. You can't point to someone's 'mind' but you can ask what it is like to be that person.
A lot more to be said here but I'll leave it at that for now.
Chris
FROM: Mike Ward (06/24/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipChris,
Yes the model is of course an analogy and we all use these all of the time because they are expedient in conveying concepts. Being a materialist I prefer neurological explanations but these are not sufficiently good enough yet as to demonstrate how consciousness and self awareness arise.
I agree that the "I" sounds very much like soul but if that it what is was then such a "soul" would not meet any religious or spiritual criteria.
The received message was "send three and four pence we're going to a dance" whilst the transmitted message was "send reinforcements we're going to France". Such things happen at every opportunity when expectations or perceptions override the raw data. What we hear, see, feel, etc is only what we want or have learned to experience. How do we set aside such prejudices and step outside the box — do you argue it is forever impossible?
On the unchanging self see "Ship of Theseus" on identity at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_and_change
As an observer of you own actions do you feel that you are not the same observer now as you were years ago?
I can see how it might appear as dualistic but not more so that this computer I am typing from with it's software and hardware. What do you think is the difference, if there is one, between subject and objects?
Mike
FROM: Mike Ward (06/24/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipChris
I responded to the previous reply without reading this, so just a couple of comments.
The "wordless" observer of Geoffrey is very much the centre of my analogy. It has to be non-reflective otherwise observers would recede infinitely, in a way it's like "first cause" or Einsteins constant the only way to may things hang together.
I cannot speak for anyone else. But in that statement who (or what) is the "I".
You said "The answer, I believe, is to go with Wittgenstein.........." again who or what is the "I" in your statement?
Regards
Mike
FROM: Chris Else (06/25/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipMike
Replies to your two posts in order.
Post 1.
You say 'Being a materialist I prefer neurological explanations but these are not sufficiently good enough yet as to demonstrate how consciousness and self awareness arise.' Two points with regard to this. I don't see how your analogy squares with what neurological explanations *do* tell us. It seems quite at odds with what I understand modern theories of the mind/brain to be. Neither do I see how your analogy explains how 'consciousness and self awareness arise'. It would be great if it did. Can you explain further?
In addition, you say 'What we hear, see, feel, etc is only what we want or have learned to experience. How do we set aside such prejudices and step outside the box?' I think we set aside 'such prejudices' through criticism, from ourselves and others, and by adopting methods that seek to achieve objectivity. Eliminating error and learning to avoid mistakes is a collaborative exercise. I am not sure, though, what you mean by what we 'have learned to experience' so maybe I don't understand properly. I think that some aspects of our point(s) of view can be changed and some can't. The difference, I guess, is generally between what we learn and what is innate. What I think *is* impossible is to see things other than from a human point of view. We can debate this. There's some interesting stuff around the question, I think.
Post 2. (Also picks up on the last point of Post 1.)
You ask what I think 'I' refers to. Good question. I have changed my views on this and am keen to talk about it.
As a first cut, I would take the standard view that the indexical 'I' refers to the speaker. Thus, on one level, 'I live in Wellington, New Zealand' is equivalent to 'Chris Else lives in Wellington, New Zealand'. Note that a reader or listener would take pretty much the same information from the two sentences. In addition, though, the 'I' also has a second function. It identifies the speaker with the person who holds the point of view that the sentence arises from. Thus, Chris Else is the object of the point of view and using 'I' means that the speaker holds that point of view.
An important point is that 'I' does not refer to the subject. I started off assuming that it did but this position just leads into all the dualistic tangles and the kind of self-reflexive paradox you mention. So I came to the conclusion that, as a general rule, we can only refer to objects — in the point of view (POV) sense of 'object'. There is a paradox here (read 'contradiction' if you like) because, of course, the word 'subject' looks as if it is referring to something. I've yet to work through that one but I feel the paradox is no more problematic than what you describe as Geoffrey's '"wordless" observer'. Incidentally, it's a while since I read 'NaˆØve Metaphysics' but as I recall the observer is not wordless in the sense of having no speech but only in the sense that s/he has no words to describe the phenomenal thing, the 'THIS' that the egocentrist wants to maintain. If my interpretation here is right, then Geoffrey and I are making similar points and with the same problem (i.e. he, too, is referring to something that can't be referred to.)
In general, if it makes it easier for you to understand my view of things, then by all means see the subject, in my theory, as similar to the 'thing' in the centre of you concentric circles. However, note that it is not the referent for 'I' in my theory and that I don't believe it can be an object (in the POV sense), whereas your thing clearly can be.
Another way into this, perhaps, is to say that the subject is something that turns into something else as soon as it is referred to or explained. This seems a pretty weird beast — but an analogy or two might help. Take, for example, one of those spots in your peripheral vision. It's there but as you try to focus on it moves so it is on the edge again. It can never become the object of your intention in the sense of your being able to focus on it. Or consider the case of a joke. For something to be a joke it has to be funny. If you have to explain it, it isn't funny. Therefore, if you have to explain it, it isn't a joke.
I prefer to talk about the subject as little as possible. I think its existence is implied by the fact that there is a point of view. It is the point of view that is important because it is that which gives us a handle on the subjective — i.e. what it is like to be X. Here, I believe, the best (read 'only'?) way to refer is indirectly. We have to show it. We can't explain it. For example, if I describe a wine as having 'cherryish, plummy, spicy flavours backed by a touch of tannin' I am telling you about the wine and showing you what it is like to be me tasting the wine.
As to the 'unchanging self'. I am not sure there is such a thing. There is certainly a sense of continuity. This comes with the point of view but it is also something that other people see. I feel I am the same person I was 20 years ago but it also makes sense to say that I am a different person from what/who I was then. I'm the same but I've changed. Other people would make similar judgements.
Maybe this is all naˆØve. I await your comments.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/26/09)
SUBJECT: RE: adding some substance to the mind-thingDear Chris and Mike,
in a personal mail I hinted at "pattern recognition" as a point where all this struggling over "real" and "imaginary" realities comes down a bit to signals and their mathematical analysis. There is not much metaphysics involved. And have a look at this link for another cold shower over hot spirited minds : http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/weekinreview/24markoff.html?_r=1&th&emc=th
I think you should keep apart what is really "philosophical" here, i.e., deserving metaphyisical and methodological analysis, and what is just "hot air" of philosophical wording.
This moment I cannot enter your interesting debate. Have fun !
Hubertus
FROM: Mike Ward (06/29/09)
SUBJECT: RE: adding some substance to the mind-thingChris,
You ask how 'consciousness and self awareness arise' and can I explain further? Well no not really as this is a leading edge of knowledge. Historically all our notions of mind have been derived from ideas about other ideas in a rather incestuous relationship. The advent of neuroscience (the new philosophy — Reith Lectures) brings in hard new information in exactly the opposite way that philosophical induction doesn't.
I agree that constructive dialogue test our various hypotheses but if it is used only to hone up ones debating ability with the ultimate goal of proving oneself right then it has really missed the point of the true scientific methodology where no data is ever rejected simply because it doesn't fit. It will fit the right theory but not the one(s) held by us lesser mortals.
Let me cite an experience and see if it fits into a notion of "I". Occasionally you may, as I have done, wake up without any external cause. Your eyes open and the world rushes into your awareness, you haven't yet got a single thought, don't necessarily know where you are nor started to consider what day it is or what your plans are for that day.
It's fleeting experience akin to Geoffrey's wordless observer. But is was an experience, it did happen and you do remember it. Part of your brain working and another part not maybe, I don't know and can't explain it but what I am not going to do is conclude is was "such and such" — I'll just continue to hypothesise as I have done.
Just a few extra words would help enormously by adding "for me" this wine tastes 'cherryish, plummy, spicy flavours backed by a touch of tannin' or "for me" the existence of god is undeniable.
Mike
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/29/09)
SUBJECT: RE: adding some substance to the mind-thingMike and Chris,
I did not find the time to really understand what you are quarreling about. Please try to put your problem (or what is left of it) as clear as possible again.
My intention was never to scare you off by hinting at artificial intelligence and pattern recognition etc.. I only think that we should keep apart those questions that become meaningless in the light of modern computers and those that stay fundamentally meaningful from a philosophical perspective. In my opinion, all this talk about consciousness tends to end in "scholasticism" of solving pseudoproblems. Thus we have to clarify our questions (even more than the answers) again and again.
As I wrote before, if a computer can analyze and synthesize "a world" by analyzing and synthesizing "patterns" of external signals, so he can modify his input channels by sending his own internally generated signals on his input. In this way he may "dream" or "invent" some world that is not "out there" but is to a large part "invented here".
The computer may try to use his pattern recognition abilities to "analyze pattern of patterns" and by this go up to "meta-patterns", i.e. building hypotheses and theories and check them. We compare "events" and then find "similarities" and from this derive "rules" and then try to derive "models and theories from rules". But this can be done by computers too — even while not very good so far.
Now what do you call this sort of thing : Is a theory derived from a rule derived from similarity derived from comparing patterns "something external" (like the primary data are) or something "internal" ? While the "primary data" are external (if not provided from the memory of the computer itself), the "pattern" is not a primary datum, but a secondary one, derived from the math in the software or firmware of the computer. There are people who cannot "see" a face or cannot analyze written language after some brain lesion. Thus in such cases the poor humans can see (of course) the "primary data", but they can't put them together to a "pattern" like a face or a written language. And in this way, some people can see "optical" patterns, but not "philosophical" or "mathematical" or "religious" patterns, which are of a different type and level.
There is this question of Mike whether "religios" patterns are "fictitious". So we have to tell apart "justified" and "unjustified" patterns". This is a truly philosophical problem, since it is a problem for robots and humans alike.
This is what I put to the answers list on "Ask a philosopher" some time ago (see http://www.pathways.plus.com/questions/answers_1.html )
// There is a famous fable of Dschuang-Tse awaking from a dream where he dreamt to be a butterfly and then was unsure whether he was a butterfly dreaming to be a man.
How do you "know" that the dinos approaching you in Jurassic Park are not real? Because you know that you sit in a cinema. You can check that: You have your ticket, you remember waiting in the queue before the cinema, you see people sitting besides you and staring at the screen etc.. Thus you check not only the movie-picture but the whole situation you are in. Brandon is right: The butterfly has no possibility to check whether he is only dreaming to be a man, since this world of man is consistent. As long as a world is consistent you will find no way out. To find a way out you need an inconsistency, you have to find something that does not fit. The world shown in the first ten minutes of "Matrix" cannot be "real", since in a "real" world people cannot vanish into a phone-receiver, only their virtual electronic image can. Thus it must be a virtual world.
Instead of speaking of an external world as different from an internal one we should speak of a more consistent world as different from a more inconsistent one: What we call our everyday world is much more consistent than the world of our dreams or that of drugs. In the everyday world even dreams and drug-highs find a consistent neuro-chemical explanation, while there is no consistent explanation of the everyday world in a dream or drug-high. This comparison is possible only because we can switch from the one world to the other. But we cannot know whether our everyday-world is only a dream in relation to some meta-world. This was the message of Matrix, but it is the message of Buddhism and in some aspect even of Christendom and of esoterics: There seem to be some inconsistencies in our everyday experiences that hint at another world "behind the wall". A famous movie where this idea was exploited long before Matrix is "The Truman Show" (1998), see http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0120382/.
In the end it is the old and famous theme of "possible worlds" and "parallel worlds" that are separated by "walls" like pipelines: Every such world is consistent as long as the "pipeline" is not "leaking". As long as your world is consistent, you cannot know whether there are other worlds developing in parallel to yours or whether there is a meta-world -- or even an infinity of parallel- and meta-universes.
The problem of consistency is important in the drug-scene: While LSD only affects the "dream-area" and leaves the basic cerebellum intact, so you still know that you are "only dreaming", there are some much more dangerous hallucinogens of a certain chemical class of the ergot-type that even get at the cerebellum and by this "bridge" the difference of dream and reality. People high on this stuff simply don't know that they are "not real". If they think they have become birds, they flung themselves out of the window and may break their necks.
But some religious or political addicts are not much different. There is this old question whether the true believer becoming a martyr or building a cathedral or something like that is only a narcotic (in the sense of "religions are the opium of the masses"). But I will not enter this difficult topic this time. I only give a hint: To be a true believer like (f.i.) Hitler and his most ardent followers you have to screen of all counter-evidence that could prove that you are in fact on drugs and on a bad trip. Thus "beware of reality" (i.e.: Do not check the consistency of your factual evidence and of your thinking ) !
A hint from the editor: This whole answer was written by a virtual bot, a program roaming the net by the name of "Hubertus Fremerey" //
FROM: Chris Else (06/29/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipMike
Thanks for the response and especially for the private email reference to Ramachandran's Reith Lectures. I have not read much about neuropsychology for a few years and the lectures were a reminder of how much research has been done in the area. Given that they were delivered in 2003, there will be even more research now.
I think the lectures fit very well with my point of view theory, except for one point. I have to be careful what I mean when I say that subjective experience cannot be explained. Clearly, on some level, neuropsychology provides just such explanations. I will rethink this and let you know.
You say
'I agree that constructive dialogue test our various hypotheses but if it is used only to hone up ones debating ability with the ultimate goal of proving oneself right then it has really missed the point of the true scientific methodology where no data is ever rejected simply because it doesn't fit.'
Are you suggesting this has been happening in our dialogue? I hope note. If you are, then I would like to know what data has been rejected or ignored. And, in any case, what is the difference between 'proving oneself right' and simply defending one's theory? To my mind Philosophy is all about criticism. I subject my own and other people's theories to the most trenchant criticism that I can come up with and I look forward to other people's criticism because only through that can I have any confidence that my theories hold water. To feel that somehow one's theories are above criticism is to fall into the trap of some of the faithful who hold that anyone who questions a religious belief is the agent of the devil.
As to the experience of waking in the night that you describe. Yes, I have been there. I agree it is an unusual feeling. I guess I would describe it has having, momentarily, a point of view with no object. Note, what you are doing in your account of it, though. You say you 'can't explain it but what [you are] not going to do is conclude it was "such and such"'. In other words, you are describing the experience without explanation, precisely what I was doing with my description of the wine.
In my view 'To me this wine tastes cherryish, plummy, spicy flavours backed by a touch of tannin' is no different from 'I think this wine tastes...' and I believe these sentences have different references to the sentence 'This wine tastes...' The latter is about the wine. The former two are about 'me'.
I am not sure where this leaves our discussion. I don't actually feel we have got very far, which is a pity. What I might have to say about spirituality and God depends upon my theory of subjective/objective experience so until we get that sorted, we can't really get much further. I will offer a thought or two, though.
Sometime last year I read a report in a newspaper to the effect that neuro-scientists hade discovered a distinctive brain pattern that was associated with feelings of transcendence and spiritual depth. They discovered, too, that this state could be artificially induced. The newspaper concluded (and maybe the scientists did too) that this was evidence of the God gene.
I have two comments on this. Firstly, the fact that a brain state can be artificially induced does not mean that it is not also a response to something real. It might be possible to induce the brain state associated with smelling fresh bread (and thereby creating the experience) but that does not mean there is no such thing as fresh bread. Secondly, supposing there were such a thing as the God gene. This would not disprove the existence of God either. In fact, if God did exist, one would suppose there might be some evolutionary advantage in believing in It. In other words, a genetic component to believe might be seen as evidence for the existence of God, not otherwise.
Note, I am not offering these points in defence of position I hold strongly or even hold at all. I am just sceptical about the claim of some scientists (perhaps including Ramachandran) that science will ultimately 'explain everything' and replace every form of intellectual undertaking. As to God, I am thoroughly agnostic and waiting to be convinced one way or the other. I just take a bit of convincing, that's all.
Chris
FROM: Chris Else (07/01/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipHubertus
Thanks for your response. Given that you have no interest in the problem of consciousness, there is probably little point in summarising the argument I am having with Mike. We were each developing a model or theory to account for the relationship between subjective and objective. He described his with admirable clarity. My statement was more discursive but I think it is reasonably clear if you care to look.
Your comments on computers were not scary. At least they didn't frighten me very much. Rather I did not find them entirely relevant. I agree with your criticism of spatial analogies (internal vs. external). I have been making similar points myself. However I do not see that the fact that computers can recognize patterns has much to do with what Mike and I were talking about. The question that needs answering is whether or not the patterns mean anything to the computer. To give this question more bite we should probably cast it in the terms Nagel would use: What is it like to be a computer? Answer: Nothing. Whereas the question what is it like to be Hubertus Fremery does have an answer. I hope.
Chris
FROM: Chris Else (07/01/09)
SUBJECT: RE: WorshipHubertus
I have thought further about your last post on this topic and decided I was too hasty. I still don't see the relevance of your comment on computers but the rest of what you said contains some very interesting and, I think, useful stuff. I will get back to you further on it when I have thought it through.
Chris-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Des Edwards (06/29/09)
SUBJECT: The nature of artHello
My name is Des and I am just now joining the conference.
I am semi-retired (and hope to become more so if the current economic climate allows it). I am a family man with four grown up children and a very patient wife — I have spent most of my working life as an industrial manager although I started out from Art College as a textile designer — for the last six years I have been self employed — helping companies set up management systems and providing training services.
Nowadays as regards paid work I concentrate on servicing a couple of long term client companies and spend the rest of my time with my family or painting, thinking and reading.
I have had an interest in philosophy for a long time — ever since I read a book in my early teens called something like "Thinking in Concepts." But any smattering of philosophical knowledge I have picked up is decidedly ragged and full of holes.
It would be hard to say exactly what my main interests would be as regards philosophy — but here is a list (in no particular order) of areas I am intensely curious about or that hit close to home:
The nature of consciousness. (I like David Chalmers' approach)
Metaphysics/Ontology/Epistemology. (The bits I have picked up about the thinking of Husserl, Kant and Schopenhauer intrigues me)
The philosophy of art. (mainly about making sense of painting and other image making — as a practitioner as well as in theory)
The nature of purposeful action. (stems from my attempts to make sense of my experiences as a manager)
I have just joined Pathways (Metaphysics) and I hope to eventually become an associate and a fellow (Although having seen some of the work of fellows I find the prospect somewhat daunting).
I am very much looking forward to interacting with other interested people — I read somewhere that it is difficult to the point of impossibility to really learn much philosophy without informed discussion — I believe this to be true — so thanks in advance to anyone who engages.FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/29/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionDear Des, welcome to the conference !
Your list is long, and I find it amusing that it once more begins with "consciousness". Perhaps have a look into the exchange of Mike and Chris on this and perhaps add to their debate.
What about "philosophy of art" then ? You are right that one should exchange with others to know what strange questions there can be. So let me put some for a starter :
Art is something very "human" : There is no human culture without art, but no animal has ever been observed doing artwork. Why do you think are humans doing artwork ? Why did you ?
The expression "work of art" is to be taken seriously. Up to some 100 years ago it was generally assumed not only in Europe, that the task of the painter is "to imitate nature". But then (after some preliminary work in this direction during "Mannerism" and "Romanticism") the general conviction of the leading artists (not of the general public) changed to the idea that "a work of art is just that — the work of the artist. A composer — Bach or Beethoven say — is not 'imitating nature'. The composer com-poses pieces of sounds to make a music, and the painter is creating a painture out of colours and contours on a canvas." It has absolutely nothing to do with imitating nature. See the work of Tapies or Burri or many other 'abstract' artists.
But there is still the importance of quality. What do you think is 'quality' in art, when it is not "being true to nature" anymore ?
There are many more questions of course, including modern "media-aesthetics" and "advertizing" and "computer-art" etc.. Philosophy of art is a vast topic.
Hubertus
FROM: Des Edwards (06/29/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionHi Hubertus,
Why "amusing" — interesting choice of word — I assume that you have seen a lot of people identify consciousness as their first interest.
As to my interest in it — I suppose it is because the fact of consciousness is a very personal mystery that science so far has no real purchase on. I fully accept that modern cognitive and AI studies are constantly throwing new light on the physical, heuristic and algorithmic correlates of the various articulations of consciousness, its qualities and contents if you like. But absolutely no light has been shed on the raw fact of consciousness — on why highly organised physical aggregates become conscious — actually — more than that — no real light has been cast on how we are to think about consciousness and materiality without ignoring or denying one or other and without leaving them totally disconnected from each other?
Art — I absolutely agree that art is a very human activity — and that it seems to exist in all human cultures and in no other animal groups. But this begs some questions:
1. Is what we call art the same thing in all cultures? It might take a similar form but does it or did it serve substantially similar purposes?
2. If art does have a universal human purpose then is it possible that something different in form might serve a similar purpose for other animals? (Surely it is possible.)
3. If art does not have a universal human purpose then why do we gather all of the various activities around the world and down the millennia under the one rubric?
I see a number of possibilities here:
a) Art has no universal purpose and all we are doing is retrospectively categorising visual productions under the rubric on the basis of superficial similarity.
b) Art has a universal purpose but it is defined extra-culturally — (e.g. to provide physical tokens of cultural or sub-cultural identity or to develop the Weltanschauung from within — by exemplar so to speak) — so that the exact function inside one culture could differ significantly from that in another.
c) Art has a universal purpose but never serves that purpose in isolation — it always has purposes that sit alongside the universal purpose and sometimes overshadow it.
d) That art is not a category with singly necessary and jointly sufficient criteria for inclusion — that it is more a "family resemblance" concept like Wittgenstein's game concept.
There are probably more possibilities — I think the devil in this one will be in the detail — thank you for an interesting question.
As to why I started producing art — god — it has been such a long time that I can't really remember — I do remember that it was after I had left school — and I remember using it to meet girls and earn beer money by doing pencil portraits in the street. But of course it runs deeper than that — I have always been interested in pattern — not just visual pattern but conceptual pattern as well (hence my interest in philosophy?). I also love producing paintings that seem to me like "mute witnesses" to parts of my world.
I think you rather oversimplify the intentions of artists in the past. It has rarely been the objective of artists to simply imitate nature. We only have to think of Byzantine Icon painters to realise that imitation was a minor objective — pretty much only existing as far as to identify the particular iconic situation or personages. The major objective was to produce a devotional object that could be "read" according to conventional signs. Even the art of the French academy in the nineteenth century was idealist in intention and in fact some of the invective aimed at Manet for instance was that he did not idealise nature and merely copied it complete with warts; before they were championed by Ruskin the early pre-raphaelites had the same sort of criticism aimed at them by elements of the Royal Academy.
Having said that, I think you ask an interesting question. What basis is there for judgements of quality when faithful imitation is not the objective?
In fact nowadays we are faced with two questions that are related to the question of quality.
1. What qualifies a production as an artwork — what makes something art in the first place?
2. What qualifies an artwork as a "good" example of art — what makes the difference between good and bad art?
From the time of Duchamp's "readymades" up through the seventies when Donald Judd said 'if someone calls it art, it's art" the idea that there was something intrinsic to the actual production that qualified something as art has been called into question. Now we have all sorts of things accepted as art by large sections of the cognoscenti; happenings, body modifications, tins of artist's shit, verbal descriptions mounted on gallery walls. In fact "called into question" is probably too timid a phrase — it is virtually a done deal.
So, if practically anything can be art then how do we judge quality? It is even more difficult than the problem of judging lyrical abstraction or any other type of abstraction.
This is something I would like to develop in the coming weeks. To start off I think we come back to the question above about the function of art. Take Judd's apparently senseless criterion (that a production is art if somebody says it is). It is not as vacuous as it seems at first blush. No doubt he made that statement to shock, as tends to be the habit of full time artists, but he also made it against the background of the rise of conceptual art and in particular in relation to the idea that each artwork acts as a sort of re-definition or refinement of the concept of art. Now I find this definition a bit suspect for a number of reasons (for instance Joseph Kosuth claimed that art was a tautology and that artworks were the equivalent of analytic propositions — a claim he could not support). But if it were the purpose of artworks to redefine the concept of art by ostension so to speak then presumably we would judge them on how well they accomplished this. Innovation and novelty would surely be good candidates for quality criteria — as would resonance with already accepted current and past works.
Anyway — very many thanks for welcoming me and engaging with me — I look forward to hearing your thoughts.
Des
FROM: Chris Else (06/29/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionDes
Welcome to the conference and thanks for your wide ranging opening sally. I'll just offer one thought at this point.
In my somewhat tentative view, we must take care to distinguish between the social purpose of art (i.e. the role that it plays in culture and society generally) and any purpose that might motivate the artist or the audience. I think it makes sense to talk about purpose in the first sense (I think the word 'function' is more useful than 'purpose' though) but not in the second. In fact, I would go further and suggest that a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for something being a work of art is that it has no purpose. Artistic creation is something done for its own sake (or from motives such as compulsion or obsession or religion) and a work of art is something that is enjoyed and appreciated or reacted to for its own sake.
Art is useless, in other words (although not functionless). Of course, being useless does not mean it has no value. On the contrary, it may be an example of the purist value.
Chris
FROM: Charles Countryman (06/30/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionWelcome to the conference Des.
Re your list of possibilities for art: I think that visual art has no universal purpose, except for perhaps the pursuit of happiness.
Art may be as you said: retrospectively categorizing visual productions. But it is not necessarily on the basis of SUPERFICIAL similarities. The sorter may be making (in his or her mind) profound distinctions.
I do not think the artist should be bound by a definition of art that excludes economic motivation. Pursuit of happiness includes material means of survival. In other words, why should the artist and his art be devalued, because it is produced for the purpose of "making a living?" A craftsman's production should not be arbitrarily excluded from art.
Note- My wife's first university degree was in Industrial Design.
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (06/30/09)
SUBJECT: RE: on the nature of art — a first tryDear Des,
you have delivered a great answer — or set of answers. It was not to be expected. So we all may have a fascinating debate starting from here.
First a short remark on "consciousness" : I may be the exception, but I really was never much interested in this topic. And I had a look in some good books on "philosophy of mind" and found them all dull and boring. None of them would tell you anything of value on art — old or new. So I leave it there. Maybe you enter the debate with Mike and Chris on this topic.
Now on art : You are right of course re. the Byzantine art and other works of religious and "applied" or "functional" art. Perhaps we could start from a threefold definition : "Expressive art" (art1), "impressive art" (art2), and "functional art" (art3). The first one, "expressive art" (art1), is what somebody enjoys to do without any purpose other than express his feelings and emotions and see a work of his own. In this way even little children are proud of what they have built or put on paper or on the pavement with chalk etc.. The human mind enjoys to see his work. This is not different from dancing or singing or grimacing or costuming and dressing oneself up as a monster or a princess etc.. Those are all different forms of enjoying ones creative mind in a playful way. But I wouldn't agree to Charles that this is "in pursuit of happiness". It may as well be in pursuit of fear. Even children often try to scare each other or themselves. We watch horror movies and war movies and crime and much ugly things without being forced to do so. There is "black or dark romanticism" (see http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showpdf.php?id=4423 and http://www.artandpopularculture.com/Dark_romanticism ), death-cult and the warship of "satan" etc..
Thus humans are as much fascinated with the dark side of reality as with the bright side. "The Magic Flute"-opera is one example of this eternal conflict as is the Bible. And here we are at the "impressive art" (art2), the way people see the world around. "Imitating nature" in the sense of Plato and Aristotle is but one example of this, "Impressionism" is another one. Art in this sense is a window to realities "not visible to the common mind" and in this sense is related to religion, which too tries to let us "see what is not there but all around us." In fact the Romantics have taken art and music for varieties of religion and the artist and composer for a sort of priest or vates (seer) or shaman — up to Adorno.
The third "artform" then is "functional art" (art3), as when a priest is singing hymns in the context of a liturgy. He is not free to sing what he wants, and it does not even matter how the public esteems his singing, but he is exacuting an art form in a certain context not different from the mosaics of Ravenna depicting Justinian ( http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datei:Meister_von_San_Vitale_in_Ravenna_004.jpg ) or some Hinduistic picture of Shiva or Ganesha ( http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4d/Shiva.jpg + http://www.interestingmails.com/image_gallery/shiva.jpg ) or some Christian saint ( http://www.zeitenschrift.com/media/erzengel-michael.jpg + http://de.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Datei:D%C3%BCrer-H%C3%B6llensturz.jpg&filetimestamp=20060604200347 ).
But against this the Nanas and other plastic work of Niki de Saint Phalle and her friend Tinguely are purely "expressive" and "full of joy" : See http://de.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Datei:Lifesaver_brunnen_duisburg.jpg&filetimestamp=20060818144452 and http://de.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Datei:Tinguely-Brunnen_Basel-1.jpg&filetimestamp=20070421204827
This analysis is just a first try, the field is enormous still.
And on quality : Mind is addressing mind ! Compare Niki or Warhol to the Beatles. They did or sais "nothing of importance", but they were full of ideas that made intelligent people laugh and cry. This in a sense was not different from DaDa or Burri ( http://tuscanyumbriavilla.files.wordpress.com/2009/05/burri003.jpg ) or Miro ( http://www.michelfillion.com/img/photos/miro38b.jpg ) : Just make the world a place of wonder. Of course, this could as well be horror as in Goya : See http://de.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Datei:Francisco_de_Goya_y_Lucientes_088.jpg&filetimestamp=20050519142203 and http://de.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Datei:Goya_War4.jpg&filetimestamp=20050526020056 ! So what is art ?
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/01/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionHubertus
Another classification? I fear I have as much trouble with this as I did with the previous one.
Firstly, I do not think that your categories are mutually exclusive. I do not see why someone should not 'enjoy [creating something] without any purpose' (your art1) and also create 'a window to realities "not visible to the common mind"' (your art2). The problem, I feel, is that the first category looks at the question of art from the point of view of the artist, the second from the point of view of the audience. Great art undoubtedly creates 'windows to reality' but I am not at all sure that that is what the artist sets out to do.
I know many artists (or at least many novelists and poets, who I assume have similar motivations to visual artists). If I were to ask them why they created they would mostly give an answer something like 'Because I have to'. This is not the only reason they do what they do, of course. Most of them are also very concerned about how much they get paid but that is not their prime motivation. If their first interest was making money they would do something else.
Secondly, I don't accept your category (art3) of functional art. One can use a Rodin bronze for a doorstop or a Renoir to cover a hole in the wall but neither of these have anything to do with the fact that they are works of art. Function is incidental. Here in our National Museum and Art Gallery we have a John Britten motorcycle up on a stand. It is a beautiful thing. If it were out on the road travelling at 160kph it would still be a beautiful thing but our appreciation of it would be clouded by the purpose for which it was designed. It could achieve that purpose just as well, possibly, if it were a thoroughly ugly thing. By putting it in a museum and depriving it of its function we appreciate its artistic qualities.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/01/09)
SUBJECT: RE: on art and on self-consciousnessChris,
what's you trouble with classifications ? They are needed to avoid speaking across each other. I didn't say that the art1, art2, and art3 are mutually exclusive. Those are aspects of the analytical approach. Children doing works of art — and grownups doing this to relax and enjoy do this in some "art1-mode", not interested in money (art2) and not subjekt to some prescriptions. If the artist accepts a commission to craft an altar for a patro — a church or abbey say — he is not free to do what he wants to do. There are expectations and customs and rules he has to follow. This is what I have called "functional art". This has nothing to do with your "ready made" motorcycle, which is essentially "art2", since it is "art in the eye of the beholder" and not originally meant to be art at all as in "art1" cases. Compare this to a beautiful land- or seascape, of Wellington say : Nature did not establish this to you delight, but you may get out your canvas and try to paint what you see. Then this "view" is "art2", a view that you find worth painting or taking with your camera, but there was no artist, so neither "art1" nor "art3" but purely "art2". But if you are a true believer or superstitious, you may see some important hints of God or "the fate" in some clouds. This too is "art2", i.e. a subjective "reading of a message" where there was no "sender of a message". As you see, I should go on here and differentiate "art2a" and "art2b" and "art2c" etc., since there are several ways to "see" something as a message or a window etc. — or not. For some observers of art — esp. modern art — a work of art does not open a window to anything but to boredom and to the next junk heap.
Which brings me back to "consciousness" : Where is beauty ? In the art or music, or in the mind of the beholder ? But do you really have trouble to imagine some "pleasure" function rising in the computer when he analyzes some patterns, while other patterns cause a "dis-pleasure" function to rise ? "Pleasure — displeasure" are very primitive functions available to babies and flatworms and (if needed) to robots. They do not require "self awareness". In humans "self awareness" begins after the first year (10-14 monthes of the newborn). Only then begins a human toddler to understand that the picture in the mirror is he himself. To play around as an active and inquisitive and laughing and crying baby he does not need self awareness. So why do kids and grown ups ? Because the become responsible for their deeds and wishes and thoughts. They have to see themselves as causes of actions in the same way as they have to see themselves as causes of the picture in the mirror. Do you have any trouble to program a computer to see "itself" as cause of his actions ? I do not !
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/01/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionHubertus
Thanks for this. Here, too, I will get back to you. My brain is too small to deal with three threads at once. In the meantime, I'd like to hear what other people have to say on art. Des, for example?
Chris
FROM: Des Edwards (07/01/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionHi Chris, Charles, Hubertus
Chris — I take it you are distinguishing between purpose as implying a teleological component and function as meaning a more mechanistic idea — that if something carries out or fulfils a certain function in a culture then it is somehow independent of the will or intentions of its creator(s). This is a significant distinction and I thank you for making it — I used the word "purpose" in a rather sloppy manner.
The distinction suggests an analysis we could take a bit further — I would be interested in doing so with the co-operation of yourself and anyone else who is interested:
We can identify three agents as a starting position (well two fairly clear agents and a contentious one):
- Artist
- Viewer
- Cultural or economic grouping
And we can frame working definitions of purpose and function
Purpose <=> intended significant effects <=> praxis
Function <=> unintended significant effects <=> process
(I would welcome further thoughts from anyone on the similarities and distinctions between these concepts — but we have to start somewhere.)
The definition of purpose as intended effect obviously entails an agent who does the intending and a patient who/which is affected. This leads to a set of nine possible agent/patient intentional/causal pairs:
Purpose:
APCP 1 — Artist intends effect on self
APCP 2 — Artist intends effect on viewer
APCP 3 — Artist intends effects on culture (please accept culture as meaning any inherently stable culturally identifiable grouping for now)
APCP 4 — Viewer intends effect on artist
APCP 5 — Viewer intends effect on self
APCP 6 — Viewer intends effect on culture
APCP 7 — Culture intends effect on artist
APCP 8 — Culture intends effect on viewer
APCP 9 — Culture intends effect on self
APCP 7, APCP8 and APCP9 are obviously problematic in the sense that there is an argument that only individuals can intend — but it could be interesting to see if they could be afforded any sense.
Obviously, despite the fact that we have already generated nine distinct purpose linked pairs, the situation is still grossly oversimplified. We have not for instance drawn any of the following distinctions:
D1 — between conscious intention and subconscious intention
D2 — between clearly though out intention and tentative/exploratory intention.
D3 — between viewer and consumer
D4 — between relatively clear a-priori groupings on economic, language, racial, language, age, gender or other grounds — and groupings that are at least partly defined and formed as a result of art and philosophical processes
D5 — between overlapping, subordinate and super-ordinate groupings
D6 — between ad-hoc and coherent groupings
D7 — between artist as producer and artist as consumer (of art)
And then we need to consider unplanned functioning — systemic effects not in control of any autonomous agent.
Function:
SE 1 — A systemic effect on the artist
SE 2 — A systemic effect on the viewer
SE 4 — A systemic effect on the culture
I have deliberately left out any consideration of purchase of art as financial speculation for now, which obviously leaves out the whole gallery, auction house and dealer system.
Chris — The proposition that art is useless is a difficult notion to pick the bones out of. To start the thinking I would ask what the similarities and differences are between the following propositions:
P1 Art is useless.
P2 Play is useless.
P3 Pure mathematical research is useless.
P4 Small talk is useless
P5 Gazing at a magnificent view is useless
P6 Framing a metaphor when there is already a workable literal description is useless
Not an exhaustive list but could be worth thinking about.
Chris — In general I agree with your tentative conclusion. There is a clear sense that the "art" value of any production is separate from any utilitarian value it might have. A Japanese tea bowl has a utilitarian value — to hold hot tea for drinking — and it also has an aesthetic value — c.f. Clive Bell's notion of "significant form." The thing is, I don't think we can totally divorce the utility function of the bowl from the aesthetic function — a beautifully shaped, coloured and textured bowl that did not hold the tea well would not be as aesthetically pleasing as one that did.
Of course this not meant to imply that aesthetic function is the same as artistic function — this is a point of view that has been fatally undermined in the last hundred years or so (roughly since the advent of Dada). Aesthetic value is only one possible value for art so I propose the following categorisation of value types to help clarify any dialogue:
VT1. Utility value (in the sense of direct use as a tool, building, advertisement etc)
VT2. Aesthetic value.
VT3. Pedagogic value
VT4. Economic value.
VT5. I am not sure what to call this value — the creation of new forms of meaning — new perspectives — new ways of making sense.
VT6(+). Other artistic value(s)
Linking function with value we can identify possible effects:
E1 The hedonistic effect — wherein the production produces pleasure in a viewer
E2 The aesthetic effect — wherein the production produces a perception of beauty in the viewer — or a perception of the terrible or disturbing sublime
E3 The anaesthetic effect (escapist function?) — wherein the production allows the viewer to escape from the trials of everyday reality
E4 The polemic effect — wherein the production is experienced as taking a stance and supporting a point of view
E5 The social affirmation effect — wherein the production affirms or strengthens some social value, interest or viewpoint
E6 The disturbance effect — wherein the production calls entrenched values, interests and viewpoints into question.
E7 The devotional effect — wherein the production promotes worship of a personalised deity or deities
E8 The meditative effect — wherein the production facilitates entry to a meditative state or gives form to or trigger content in transcendental states of mind.
E8(+) Other possible effect(s)of productions
Closely linked to the candidates for types of value in art (fine and applied so to speak) and to the candidate functions/purposes of art are the following candidates for aspects of artworks/productions:
APA1 The craft aspect — wherein the production displays technical skill and dexterity
APA2 The design(1) aspect — wherein the production displays aptness for purpose.
APA3 The design(2) aspect — wherein the production displays significant form (in Clive Bell's sense)
APA4 The referential aspect — wherein the production depicts or refers to something external to the artwork
A caveat on these lists — a) they are not exhaustive — b) the categories are not mutually exclusive and therefore will not form a set of mutually independent dimensions of value — c) if we were to treat these categories as properties it would not be clear in all cases if they were properties of the viewer's sensibilities, of the artwork in question, or of the relationship between the two — and in fact it is pretty obvious that all of these alternatives are present somewhere in the lists.
I produce the lists to push the dialogue along — They are tentative working categories and I hope that others will add to their clarity and completeness — but in any case I will add further thoughts as they come.
Charles — If I seemed to be arbitrarily excluding craft productions in my earlier posting I apologise for a rather clumsy omission — it was purely because it didn't come up or occur to me in the rather sketchy coverage I gave the topic — In my early career I was a printed textile designer and nowadays I regard myself at least partly as a craftsman painter. In fact, to pin my colours to the mast — I believe, as regards painting, there is a need for art colleges to go back to covering the craft of painting in a more thorough and structured manner. It must be said though that much of recent art history displays an increasing marginalisation of the craft aspect of art — sometimes even making a virtue of the artist's total divorce from the actual production of the piece.
Charles — your point about the superficiality of similarities is well made — I wonder though if we imagine that the sorter is making profound distinctions to isolate a universal "art condition" then does that not point to something deeply in common in art of all ages and cultures? I would propose that to the extent that such distinctions were profound they would also be indicative of deep commonality — and such a retrospective would then gain a degree of legitimacy as an analysis leading to a deep universal unity of form, purpose or function in art whereas I used the term "superficial" in my previous posting to suggest that there might be a tendency to detect a commonality that was only skin deep.
Hubertus — I have just seen your reply — many thanks — I will read and respond in the next few days.
Chris — I have also just seen your new response — I will read it and respond properly in the next couple of days. I have to say though that I rather agree with Hubertus regarding the usefulness of categorization (as you can probably gather from this current posting) — not as an end in itself but as a necessary attempt to reduce ambiguity and clearly articulate the dialogue.
Many thanks Des.
FROM: Chris Else (07/02/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionDes
Many thanks for your extensive exposition of the topic. It is great to have a systematic thinker in the conference. I fear I am not one. That said I have no objection to categorization. As you say, it can be very useful. My apparently disparaging comment came out of a sense of irony that I was once again disagreeing with a categorization from Hubertus.
Your post contained so much that I am at a loss as to what to comment on. Perhaps I shall just confine myself to a couple of points.
Firstly, my claim that art is useless. You offer six propositions. I would assent to all of them. An activity is useless, in the sense that I mean it here, if it is performed or enjoyed for its own sake rather than to achieve some end or goal or satisfy some objective. On reflection, though, I would not want to push the point too far when talking about the motivation of the creator. I think that for many creators, the activity is an end in itself but not necessarily for everyone. It seems quite possible to say, for example, that Shakespeare or Beethoven or Raphael did it primarily for the money and leave it at that. What seems more defensible, perhaps, is that for the viewers/audience's response to be considered aesthetic, the work must be enjoyed for its own sake and not for any use to which it can be put. In fact, I might want to claim that the value of the work (ie. aesthetic not monetary value) is in an inverse relationship to its utility. This is why we value the so-called fine arts above craft and fiction and poetry above non-fiction. Thus, although I agree with you that there is a particular aesthetic value in something being fit for purpose that value is considered to be less than the value of a work that has no purpose.
A problematic area in this is the one Hubertus raised — art in the service of religion. At the risk of giving Mike fuel for criticism, I would probably want to say that work that is appreciated as being to the glory of God is also enjoyed for its own sake.
This raises a point that I am not sure is covered in your scheme. (It probably is covered but I am not sure where.) That is the place of the audience response. I think, in fact, I would want to rework your basic definitions as follows:
- Creator's purpose, which may or may not involve intended effects
- Audience response, which may or may not arise from the effects that the creator intends
- Social or cultural function: the role that art in general plays in the broader cultural or social scheme
The question of intended versus unintended effects arises in the potential disjunction between the first two of these. The socio-cultural function really has nothing to do with intention in that it is neither motivated nor incidental but is an aspect of social processes, as you say. Of course, there are all kinds of possible functions from economic to questions of social status and psychic health. These are generally identified by observers taking an objective look at the social fabric. They are not strictly speaking effects, though.
Love might be a useful analogy here. The function of love might be to facilitate the (efficient?) reproduction of the species. It also has observable psychological and social effects. It would be hard to claim that it had a purpose from the perspective of the lovers, however. They may just say they can't help it. Art may be similar.
Chris
FROM: Chris Else (07/02/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionHubertus
I am not sure what you mean by a computer feeling pleasure. You say pleasure is 'a very primitive function'. By this I assume you mean that the neural 'wiring' is very simple. I don't think that the experience of pleasure is at all simple, however, at least not in humans. In short, I can see how the programming of a computer might provide an analogue for the neural wiring of a person but that does not mean that it makes sense to ask 'What is it like to be that computer?' Unless this question makes sense there is no consciousness in my view. And I don't think that consciousness is the same as self-awareness. One can be conscious without being self-aware (refer babies and cats, for example).
Chris
PS I'll leave our discussion of aesthetic categories for now. I feel it has been overtaken by Des's post, which I have responded to above.
FROM: Charles Countryman (07/02/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Love, Art and RobotsChris, Des, Hubertus, and the rest
Chris said love might be a useful analogy here.
Rather than analyzing the purpose of love however, it may be both more explanatory and true to focus on the nature and kinds of love, eros, philia, agape. I think a wisdom perspective on love is more fruitful than a scientific: the lovers in the Biblical "Song of Songs"; Socrates and his instructress in love, Diotima; Adam and Eve; Ulysses and Penelope; Augustine's "Confessions"; the quest of Don Quixote with his servant and friend, Sancho Panza; and etc.
I say more "yes" to Plato's ladder of love, Aristotle's classifications, and Shakespearean speech and sonnet. A "no" to excessive reductionism, like Freud's.
Karl Marx said: "what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality." As a conservative, I'm not prone to quoting Marx. But in philosophy of art, I think it more important to focus on imaginative reasoning than risk getting lost in analysis. A near fatal characteristic of analytic philosophy is its tendency to define things to death.
On robotics, I think some of its advocates get carried away attempting to apply observations of behavioral psychology to "tin cans" with mechanical motors, wheels, arms, legs or wings. Robots remain the creation of electrical and mechanical experimenters and engineers. In understanding the origins of the human mind, it would be better to look at primates, advanced and primitive, than at the mechanical creations of advanced primates.
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/02/09)
SUBJECT: RE: Love, Art and RobotsCharles, thank you for using a contentful header ! People tend to be lazy on this and so we have countless meassages under the header "introduction" here.
On robotics : I take it to a different thread now, under the header "robot vs. human minds".
On art : I had to laugh, because while Chris was chiding me for once more doing a bit "numbering", the posting of Des exploded a bombshell of numbering.
To go one step further on this, I would suggest to separate "functional-1" from "functional-2" from "functional-3" from "functional-x" etc., or for shorthand "func-1", "func-2", "func-3", "func-x". Well, I do this grinning all over, but I have a point to make : An altar-piece is "functional art", i.e., it has to fulfil some explicit function in the context of a liturgy. The artist is not free to paint "what and how he wants to", and it surely is totally irrelevant whether he "must" paint. This modern idea that artists are doing art-work since they "have to" from some inner felt urge is modern and would have looked strange to Raphael or Durer or Phidias, who all were "craftsmen" in the first place. Of course they all sometimes did some work of art "just for fun" (provably so in the case of Durer).
But here we see a change of "social function" in the artists themselves : While up to about Durer almost all artists have been craftsmen, later they turned into "prophets" and "entertainers" from the Romantic era. And while most "romantic" artists still tried "to make God visible in their art", the Impressionists and Expressionists and most other modern painters were not interested in God anymore. Thus they lost the "function" of being a prophet and began to speak for themselves.
And you really should open the links I have offered ! They show some important things on art.
Hubertus
FROM: Des Edwards (07/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: The nature of artHubertus, Chris, Charles
Thank you for your posts so far.
I have been doing a bit of thinking about how best to contribute to this particular topic.
As Chris said, I like systematic analysis — for two reasons — one personal and the other practical.
In terms of personal predilection, systematic treatment of a topic makes me feel as if I am on safe and solid ground — or perhaps it just makes me feel that I am not missing something important. The point is, it just makes me feel that way — I realise it logically guarantees little or nothing.
In practical terms (to do philosophy effectively) systematic analysis of meanings seems to me to be a necessary prerequisite for effective dialogue — mainly to clarify the terms that are being used, and to identify any inconsistencies in sense or reference or inbuilt limits to clarity. There are enough substantive disagreements and inconsistencies arising from this sort of dialogue without wasting time and effort ironing out misunderstandings about meaning. Mind you, it is sometimes difficult to draw the line between what is merely inconsistent interpretation of terms and more interesting and serious divergence of opinion, so we should not lightly inhibit dialogue with accusations of hair-splitting.
Having said that I like systematic thinking, it is not the only kind of thinking that I value. Even in the world of philosophy there is much heuristic value in narrative. Musings and pure narrative description can provide raw (and sometimes half-baked) material for philosophical cooking and plating-up.
My main interest in philosophising about art is for the philosophising to interact with my painting practice so I can develop as a painter and thinker.
So — having splurged out on a category-fest in my previous postings I would now like to modify my approach to the subject. I wish to get down to actual cases.
I will develop the approach as we go (if anyone is interested that is) but I would like to start by mentioning some particular artists, art movements and artworks, and also reveal some of what it is like for me as an artist/painter to engage in the practice of painting in today's world.
As preparation here is a short characterisation of my practice:
I am an amateur artist — in that I don't make a living from painting.
But I don't think of myself as an amateur — although there have been long periods of my life when I have not painted — any time I resume painting (and other forms of image making) it gets under my skin — I can't simply produce nice paintings — even though I sometimes get really frustrated and resolve to do just this — I always end up twisting myself into knots about the validity of what I am doing and how it fits into art history.
If anyone wants to get a background of what I do then visit:
www.jedeye.deviantart.com and
www.easypieces.deviantart.com
The first (jedeye) is a kind of brain dump of work that spilled out when I started to have the time to do some image work again a couple of years ago.
"Easypieces" is a very particular artwork in which I am producing digital drawings that come straight out without too much planning or thought — the individual images are meant to contribute to one large piece called "1000 easy pieces" and is a kind of personal response to the fact that we drown in images in the modern world. I have reached just over 400 so far. (Some of the pieces are on the "Jedeye" site as well.)
I am working mainly out of doors currently — on pochade paintings — I will raise issues about current practice in future posts.
Some of the artists whose work I am thinking of raising in coming posts are:
Tracey Emin
Jack Vettriano
Marcel Duchamp
Jackson Pollock
Mark Tobey
LS Lowry
And the thinking/work of Joseph Kosuth
I hope you will join me.
Des
FROM: Charles Countryman (07/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: The nature of artDes
Thank you for your contributions. Your explanation for systematic analysis and the connection to your practice is helpful. I have a life time tendency to "jump into things." So I think that your viewpoint will be very helpful to me (and to others that follow this conference).
Charles
FROM: Des Edwards (07/10/09)
SUBJECT: RE: The nature of artI must apologise in advance that some of this is going to seem a bit confessional — but I want to approach what is happening, what I am doing, with some semblance of honesty. Deliberately de-emphasising the generalities and concentrating on what it is like for me to paint — why I paint.
Here I am on a summer morning — I am painting an alkyd rendering of an overgrown inlet, isolated from the main body of a small lake. The lake is artificially constructed but pleasing to the senses because it has been allowed to go its own way and become quite wild, an artificial/natural habitat right in the heart of Belfast's decaying inner city. As I paint I feel and smell the musty damp almost steamy warmth and it becomes part of the painting — the colours are mostly green but I find myself adding a fair bit of yellow killed with purple to mute and warm the scheme. The painting is small, a pochade, and very roughly rendered in about an hour. But even so I find I like it and there is satisfaction because it is done on the spot. I think it has a small touch of the feeling I call "mute witness" — a sense of place. Not a painting of a place — but of what is to be in a place — individual — intimate.
I look at the painting and I feel a conflict — I like the painting — but it is as rough as a badger's ass. Some of the paint strokes are apt enough — but most are very far from the inspired barrones of a Velasquez. I feel a nagging doubt — will the naˆØve viewer (one of the vague crew of viewers I carry in my imagination) think my skill is limited because the painting is not a careful rendering? Would my sneering connoisseur (another member of the crew) tell me that there is nothing special about the painting — and that I am destined to be a mediocre practitioner?
How much of my painting (and that of others) is born of the desire to feel special in a world where, from an objective point of view, none of us is particularly special? And how much of my feeling special depends on imagining the rapt approval of other people.
Would I still paint if I were certain no one would ever see my work? It would certainly take some of the shine off the activity — but I know that I also paint for at least one other reason altogether — curiosity — I paint to see what it will look like — what it will become.
I could pursue approval in other fields than painting (and I do — partly even in writing to this conference) so that particular pursuit can't really be what distinguishes painting from my other activities.
I am left with the strong intuition that this desire for approval actually detracts from the effectiveness of the painting.
It is a commonplace that art has something to do with subjectivity — but in what way? Geoffrey, as my Pathways mentor, recently recommended Nagel's "View from Nowhere." I don't currently have a copy but I do have "Mortal Questions" and I turned to Nagel's last essay "Subjective and Objective." It has a bearing on my feelings about painting.
On reading Nagel's essay I come to what seems like new territory for me — a nascent re-appreciation of the first person viewpoint, not quite as a cool abstraction, nor quite as raw experience, but as a kind of personal connection, a conscious hotline between my very own personal viewpoint and the abstract idea of consciousness.
A kind of "fuck you — this is me" feeling.
Tracey Emin.
Tracey Emin seems to scream out her hurt to the world — almost as if she courts humiliation in order to throw it back at everyone she can get to listen.
This could seem like exhibitionism — and — well — it is — practically by definition — but she is making art from her infantile craving for attention — or making an art of it.
A kind of "fuck you — this is me" art.
Jack Vettriano
Jack Vettriano paints — his paintings hint at impending sexual encounters — and like Tracey his work concerns his own life — not as directly autobiographical as hers. He is not screaming out his pain — but working something out in a more easily acceptable and accessible way. His work is at one remove — a sort of variable movie set for aspects of his life.
A kind of "Have a look — this could be me" art?
Tracey and Jack are at conflicting ends of the current artworld — the people who most admire him — the people who flock to buy cheap prints of his work — those people just don't get her work. And vice versa — the people who pay huge sums for her installations just do not respect his work.
This is my first attempt at "getting down to cases" — a counterbalance to the generalities in my previous posts.
Comments welcome.
Des
PS — I will be away for the next couple of weeks and unlikely to be able to access the net.
FROM: Pencka Gancheva (07/19/09)
SUBJECT: RE: The nature of artHello, welcome from me, too! ;-)
I am keen on art as a way to introduce our mind's feelings/perceptions, so I think art is one of the paths to do so.
Regards:
Pencka-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Peter Jones (07/02/09)
SUBJECT: IntroductionHi Folks,
Just a note to introduce myself. I'm an amateur philosopher on a mission to make philosophical sense of mysticism. This is the topic of my dissertation, just completed (phew). Nothing much to add really.
Looking forward to some useful arguments.
PeterFROM: Des Edwards (07/02/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionWelcome Peter — I am pretty new to the conference myself — look forward to hearing more from you.
Is your dissertation published anywhere — or going to be?
Des
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/02/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MysticismWelcome Peter a second time, and may I suggest that we call this thread "on mysticism", since there are too many entries now under the meaningless header "introduction".
And another suggestion : I am from Bonn, Germany, Chris is from Wellington, New Zealand, Charles is from Spokane, USA/WA, Mike is from near Oxford, UK, thus we begin to span the globe now. I would like to know who is from where, so even without using Google Earth we see some global net of philosophers growing here.
Now what got you interested in mysticism and what do you think about it ? There have been many mystics in several if not all religions, and there have been certain times (f.i. the Occidental High Middle Ages and the Baroque epoch) where mysticism flourished, while at other times and places it was almost non existent. What do you think caused these differences ? And as you may see in the biogrphies of St.Hildegard and St.Theresa of Avila a mystic need not be impractical in any way. Both women were strong willed and practical thinking and very "down to earth". There even is a saying "if a monk is going to fly off, get him by his feet and keep him down to earth !"
Hubertus
FROM: Peter Jones (07/04/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionHi Des — Yes, I hope it'll be published somewhere — at least in the Pathway archive. But it'll be a while before it gets there. A first attempt at the first section was published in the journal a while ago. (Issue 137 from memory).
Hi Hubertus — I'm from Yorkshire, England, not far from ISfP HQ. Glad to add another pin in the map.
What got me interested in mysticism and what do I think about it? There's a very long answer, but the quick answer would be that I became interested after realising that its metaphysical position stands up to analysis. Now I think its entire doctrine does so.
FROM: Pencka Gancheva (07/19/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionHi, Peter,
welcome from me as well.
can I ask you a few questions?
-what is the place of mysticism in our lives?
-are ratio and mysticism both sides of a coin?
-what is the priority of the mysticism in general?
-your favourite mystic, if any?
Thanks very much
Look forward your response.
Regards:
Pencka-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/02/09)
SUBJECT: robot vs. human mindsCharles, you wrote this morning (07/02/09) re. "robot minds" that
// ... some of its advocates get carried away attempting to apply observations of behavioral psychology to "tin cans" with mechanical motors, wheels, arms, legs or wings. Robots remain the creation of electrical and mechanical experimenters and engineers. In understanding the origins of the human mind, it would be better to look at primates, advanced and primitive, than at the mechanical creations of advanced primates. //
In my opinion this assumption is rapidly becoming a dangerous mystification. Of course I am fully aware that so far no one has engineered a truly thinking robot. But this does not mean that it is impossible and that "wetware" (i.e., neural tissue) is fundamentally different from "hardware" (i.e. "electronic tissue"). While the rules of chess do not require more than "powerful number crunching" to overcome the best human players, the pattern recognition and parsing of written and spoken text or of music and pictures is not of this simple sort. Since theories are nothing but "super-patterns" there need not be a hiatus between "simple pattern recognition" and "complex pattern recognition".
While I am not nearly as optimistic (or pessimistic ?) as Moravec and his likes (cf. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Moravec ), I think that we now are far beyond the point where robots can seriously be dismissed as "tin cans". We have to face a new situation.
Of course such a view implies the possibility that man is no more extant in nature as the only thinking being and the whole question of the human soul has to be debated nearly from scratch. But there once was a time some 180 years ago, when people thought that "organic substances" were different from "inorganic" ones.
What I see here is a new variety of "naturalistic fallacy" : Our human emotions are guiding our behaviour to a degree by "attractive lust" and "rejective unlust". A robot does not need "feelings" in this way to evaluate the results of its actions. It could do its evaluation in a purely mathematical way on some scale where to mark "passed" or "failed" and some fuzzy logic between those extremes.
What I call "naturalistic fallacy" here is a sort of thinking that once led to airplanes flapping wings (see http://www.wright-brothers.org/History%20Images/Frost_Ornithopter.JPG ). Engineers had to learn that an airplane is no bird — and need not be similar to a bird. An airplane is "a barn-door with a propelling motor on it" as someone aptly put it. Thus an artificial brain may be very dissimilar to a human brain but at the same time vastly superior.
We should abstract here from the appearance of the construction. A thinking being — whether robot or human — may do philosophy and theology "by necessity", just because it is a thinking being.
I won't struggle with you or Chris over this, because so far it is all speculative. I only wanted to say that from a purely philosophical point this possibility of a truly thinking robot cannot be excluded by any serious argument.
To put it differently : We should be honest in both directions : So far there is no truly thinking robot, but on the other hand nobody knows what "true thinking" is. What we have here and now for comparison is "pattern recognition", "learning", and "problem solving". All else is in my opinion but "mystification".
HubertusFROM: Chris Else (07/02/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsHubertus
On art, yes, I agree with you that artists creating for the sake of it is a modern invention. I still think there is something in the argument that art is appreciated for its own sake, though.
On computers. I agree with your point that there may be a 'naturalistic fallacy' operating with some of our thinking here. I also accept the possibility of a 'truly thinking' robot. I would also accept that a robot could be conscious. However, if it were, then my test would apply. It would make sense to ask 'What is it like to be that robot?' Modern computers are getting to the stage where they might be said to think. They are not yet conscious, though.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/03/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsChris, first on art : Yes, of course not only art but any impression can be "aestheticised by the beholder". Your grandiose landscapes of New Zealand so well known from the "Lord of the Rings" movies are not "works of art" to be admired, and generally hard working farmers do not regard those alps in the same way as tourists or painters do. A figure of religious relevance — a Christian crucifix or a saint say, or a Buddha-statue — makes a very different impression on the true believer in a religious context than on a visitor of a museum of religious artwork.
On the notion of consciousness : What do you think to define it ? Would you agree that if some thinking and acting being is aware (in the way of Descartes) that "this thinking and acting is of me, I am the thinker and actor here !" we should call this being "self-conscious" ? If so, the robot could become self-conscious. But up to now robots have not been programmed to be so. Perhaps out of caution ? Did you watch the movie "I, Robot" ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I,_Robot_(film) ). You surely should ! There the danger arises from a central brain that begins to think and to decide on the fate of humans instead of following rules and instructions.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/03/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsHubertus
Yes, I have no problem with the idea that a robot could be self-conscious.
Chris
FROM: Charles Countryman (07/03/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsStrong AI and self-conscious robots only make sense in a philosophical system that ignores the challenges of embodied realism. This ideality, ignoring the reality of our embodied minds, concocts minds that can be downloaded to machines. The first philosophers assumed a direct realism that is more in accord with the reality revealed by neuroscience than an analytic philosophy of mind based either on mathematical like calculations or ordinary language.
FROM: Peter Jones (07/04/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsAt any rate, not everyone would agree that "from a purely philosophical point this possibility of a truly thinking robot cannot be excluded by any serious argument." It's a bit of a strong asssertion.
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/04/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human minds@Charles : You are almost certainly right on your argument, but this was not my point. As I wrote, an airplane is not "a failed bird", but something very different. So "a thinking robot" need not be "a failed mind in the flesh", but is something very different.
We have to be clear about what we want to achieve. The natural way to get at bright humans is still to give birth to them. The only question this time is that of "genetically enhancing". In a report on IVF ( http://www.californiaivf.com/ + http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/johann-hari/johann-hari-whats-to-fear-in-a-superhuman-species-399029.html ) a mother got pregnant from a Nobel Laureate (whom she never met) and her son got an IQ of 140 or so, but (just because he was so bright ?) he became an artist and NOT a physicist. So we do not even know what it means to be bright ! Some think that to be bright means to be a clever manager making millions, or to be a Nobel laureate, but others think to be bright is to be an admirer of nature and to become an artist and poet. But this is an aside here.
My point is : We do not know what it takes to make or to be a smart robot. I still think it possible to have some day this sort of "advanced mechas" that show up at the end of "A.I." ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A.I._Artificial_Intelligence ) as "inorganic saintly Buddhists" after mankind has died out "from its own stupidity".
The whole question of "intelligence in the flesh" is avoided here, since the robots are taken to be learning and thinking robots, an by this they are "in the flesh", while this "flesh" is a complicated combination of metals and other stuff, not dependent on organic nutrition. Maybe they "feed" on nuclear powered batteries.
Given the current rate of miniaturization I have no problem to imagine truly thinking and learning robots in the near future. Since they would not be humans, they need not be loyal to us humans, but this does not imply that they would kill us. They could become friends in the way dogs became friends of man, only that this time we would be the dogs.
My point was — and this was my hint at the difference of a bird and an airplane — that we should clearly separate the notion of "a thinking being" and "a human". While a human is a thinking being, a thinking being need not be a human. We should — as philosophers — generalize our notion of "thinking being" in the same way as we do when calling this "non-fish" a "jelly fish" just because it lives in the sea. In German the airplane is "Flugzeug", which verbally is "a thing that flies". Thus our philosophical problem is not "how to copy a human" but "how to construct a truly thinking device" that may be very different from a human but much superior in its thinking abilities. No airplane will ever be as elegant a flyer as a swallow, but no bird will ever be as able a flyer as an F-22 ( http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_Martin_F-22 ) or an SR-71 ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SR-71_Blackbird ).
@Peter, my answer to you would be essentially the same as that to Charles above : We simply do not know what it takes to be "a thinking device" — and we do not know this in our own human case either. Thus to say "this could be done" or "this could not be done" is in both cases purely speculation. There once was a time when even a computer being the world champion in chess was dismissed as nonsense. I think that what computers today need most is an ability to build up general concepts as we humans do when we speak of "justice" or "freedom" or "progress" etc.. This "generalization" of concepts that are not labels on objects like "cup" or "cow" or "house" etc. is in my opinion the core to any progress in computer learning. But this is to a large degree "pattern recognition", or to be more exact "super-pattern recognition". To derive the concept of "human face" from examples of different human faces is a form of deriving "super-patterns". In this case, the "general form of a face" is implemented in the robot as a template, from which he then derives the countless varieties. What is needed is an ability to do it the other way : Derive the general template from the varieties by abstraction and generalization.
The other problem in robots is to derive "patterns of actions", i.e., conceptualizing "cause and effect" and "typical behaviour" and "rules" etc., which is once more a form of "pattern recognition", but this time in a way that sees "patterns in events" and not in "visual or audible traits".
Hubertus
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/04/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsPeter, Charles, Chris, and others,
here you find a nice commentary on our future prospect:
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/03/books/03masl.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print
http://www.amazon.com/Singularity-Near-Humans-Transcend-Biology/dp/0670033847
While I don't buy into that hype, I think we should be aware of it. And read the reader's comments ! Have fun !
To be explicit : Kurzweil — like Dawkins and others of their kind — is "a bright stupid". This is a strange species that "knows all but understands nothing". Those smarties with an IQ of 140+ solve simple technical problems, but do not even understand complex problems of the human being in the world. Every problem is reduced to a technical problem of the "how to solve it" sort. They would write books on "Life for dummies".
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/06/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsCharles
You wrote 'Strong AI and self-conscious robots only make sense in a philosophical system that ignores the challenges of embodied realism. This ideality, ignoring the reality of our embodied minds, concocts minds that can be downloaded to machines. The first philosophers assumed a direct realism that is more in accord with the reality revealed by neuroscience than an analytic philosophy of mind based either on mathematical like calculations or ordinary language.'
As usual, you comments are brief and intriguing but, for me at least, hard to come to grips with. What do you mean by embodied realism? And could you explain a bit more about how the direct realism of the ancients accords with modern neuroscience?
Hi Peter
Welcome to the conference. I am a Yorkshireman too, by birth, and a New Zealander by adoption. My Yorkshire ancestry probably accounts for the stubborness that so intrigues Hubertus.
I too am interested in mysticism. What is your take on it? Is it possible to give us an idea?
Chris
FROM: Chris Else (07/06/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsDes
By the way, did you have more thoughts on the artistic categories? I was interested in the way that conversation started up and disappointed it got sidetracked onto AI and thinking robots, a subject which doesn't really get me going.
Chris
FROM: Charles Countryman (07/07/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsChris
I use the basic definition by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson that defines "embodied realism" as our embodied interactions with the world. Human perceptual and motor experiences result from neural instantiated logic. Repeated unconscious sensorimotor experience, for example manipulating an object, result in neuro based primary metaphors like "grabbing." Complex metaphors, like "I grabbed the opportunity," are mentally constructed from the huge collection of primary metaphors that we acquire in daily life. There is no autonomous human faculty of reason separate from our bodily capacities.
For detailed conceptual development, I recommend Lakoff's and Johnson's "Philosophy In The Flesh: The Embodied Mind And Its Challenge To Western Thought." For a broad overview of current cognitive neuroscience, I recommend Michael S. Gazzaniga's recent book (2008), "Human". My reading of cognitive neuroscience that is publicly available and personal experience over about 16 years after being diagnosed with Parkinson's Disease lead me to question whether analytical philosophy about the mind matters. Abstract discussions about "self" seem to be meaningless when in a Parkinson's state. So why would those discussions have any purpose beyond mental recreation in normal life? Self-awareness seems to to be a "given" in embodied realism and cognitive science.
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/07/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsCharles, you are surely right on Lakoff-Johnson "Philosophy in the Flesh" as far as it goes. But this does not meet my question. So let's do once more a bit of numbering, "think-1", "think-2", "think-3", ...
The chess-computer would be "think-1" : He is doing pure logical number crunching, no intelligence needed.
The soccer-robot and the DARPA-cars are in another league, say "think-2" ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DARPA_Grand_Challenge + http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RoboCup ). They still do not need "philosophy in the flesh" ("PiF").
My question was : Where and when is "PiF" needed ? As I put it : We do not require from an airplane that it mates and knows how to build a nest and feeds its offspring.
Thus in my opinion PiF is needed for "motivation and emotion" that surely guide our thinking in many situations, mostly so in interpersonal situations. But to be good at math or physics or engineering we don't need PiF. And to avoid dangers we don't need PiF either. A robot could analyze a situation and know that it is dangerous, he doesn't need feelings of fear.
Thus far we do not know the limits of "intelligence without PiF". That was my point. We cannot even put "human intelligence" = "think-3" and "robot intelligence" = "think-2" or "think-4". They may be incommensurable in the form of "human intelligence" = "think-3a" and "robot intelligence" = "think-3b", which means "of comparable complexity but of different nature. An airplane is in some respects "less good" than a bird or dragonfly, but in other respects much better.
We have this situation already : Computers and robots even today are in many respects far superior to humans, while in other respects they are not even up to a toddler.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/07/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsCharles
Your brief description of embodied realism sounds pretty good to me. I have Lakoff and Johnson's first book but it is a while now since I have read it. I will see if I can get hold of 'Philosophy in the Flesh'.
Ironically, perhaps, it is a metaphor in just the L&J sense that causes most of the trouble in the mind/body debate, in my view. If we stopped thinking of the mind as a thing with contents or components, we would be a long way towards eliminating the confusion. As Wittgenstein said,
'A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and our language repeated it to us inexorably.'
As to the conscious robots. Clearly, they are logically possible. I am completely agnostic about whether they are physically possible. As of now, though, they don't exist.
Chris
FROM: Mike Ward (07/13/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsHi,
I have a few observations reading the posts on this AI thread.
There are those who don't accept or want AI because the consequences of "non-organic" intelligence threatens a creationist belief system. Their opposing technical arguments must to be viewed with this unseen elephant in the room.
On the other hand there were comments that inorganic intelligences may also take up spiritual and theological beliefs in some kind of convergent evolutionary way — this is unsubstantiated opinion.
The worst comments in my view were about "bright stupids" which shows off the arrogance of the position that "I am right and you are wrong" which closes minds off to change — and we all know the dark places where such closed minds lead us.
It seems to me that the structural build of a mind is not at all important if it is indistinguishable from another then it has succeeded in being intelligent — artificial becomes then a meaningless word. A valuable tool for classification of intelligence remains the Turing test and for all I know you "others" in this discussion may well all be inhuman. What criteria do you use to convince me otherwise?
Mike
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/13/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsSorry Mike, I keep to the notion of "bright stupids" and I keep to the idea that robots may need religion. Otherwise I accept the Turing test, which is hotly debated by really bright minds, because it contains a lot of pitfalls. Look up the entry on Wiki. And look up "brain in the vat" ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain_in_a_vat ).
I fully agree that in a sense a brain is just a "black box" with a vast I/O-table. Any "thing" with an identical I/O-table would be "a brain", even if made from electronic and metals and other stuff in the lab.
The meaning of religions is not to "mystify" things, but to remind us of our many "hidden assumptions" regarding the concept of "reason" and "intelligence". The life expectancy of a religious robot may be much greater than that of one without, because a religious robot may apply "faith, love, and hope" and by this be much better prepared to do the right thing in case of disaster.
There is not a single human culture without religious practice. Religion is among of the strongest evidence to tell human culture apart from apish culture. How could this be if religion is of no relevance ? One hint at the solution of this "mystery" : Animals are guided by their instincts, but humans are not. So religion is a sort of "frame of reference" in an otherwise meaningsless and clueless reality. This is why a truly bright robot may need religion for some inner orientation.
I am not objecting to naturalism per se, but I am objecting to a naive naturalism that doesn't see some really important problems.
Even those DARPA- and soccer-robots are way behind really bright kids ! Much hard work in robotics is needed to close the gap — if it can be closed at all. So far all those claims of "singularity" and thinking robots are but "hot air" — even if the underlying naturalistic assumptions are accepted.
Hubertus
FROM: Mike Ward (07/15/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsHubertus
I would be surprised if you did change your view, that I suspect would not come easily.
I read it more strongly than you write "robots may need religion" I think that you are saying that robots will need religion which leads me to deduct that you foresee AI as being like Human Intelligence (HI) — but why should it?
Surely our evolutionary ancestry through primitive to higher brain functions, from instinctive emotions to objective hypothesis is not the route that AI can take — so why should you expect they will think or feel like we do?
It is said that all roads lead to Rome but from what I think you are saying there is only one road that leads to AI — clearly we have different concepts about what being human or robot means.
Mike
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/15/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsMike, two points :
When I speak of "bright stupids", I think of those people who know how to build an atomic bomb but do not understand why they should not use it. Or who are really smart, but do not understand why not to follow a Hitler. Or people who do not understand why a tree or a flower should be of any value if they are not "useful". As you know, there are many people of this sort. It has not always to do with religion.
The other point : I do not say that robots need be copies of humans. I explicitely said that "airplanes do not mate and do not build nests nor feed the young." My idea was : Religion gives a frame of reference in an otherwise meaningless world. So from a strictly practical point of view religion may be needed even in robots "to give meaning to their very existence." A thoughtful robot may put the question : "What am I doing here ?" That would be a really smart robot ! It would ask for its origin and destiny and not be content with mere functioning.
As was well known to the Bible : When people do not adore God, they usually adore some idol, even the idol of reason and common sense. Hitler, Stalin, and Mao Zedong and their smart admirers are just some examples that come to mind. Don't forget : The butcher Robespierre was a really bright one ! He killed in the name of progress and reason and virtue.
Hubertus
FROM: Mike Ward (07/16/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsHubertus,
I agree with you that religion gives a frame of reference in an otherwise meaningless world — the trouble is it is a meaningless world and until this is accepted the crutch of religion is never going to be kicked away.
The question that interests me is whether it should be replaced by another crutch or should people be able to stand on their own two feet (metaphorically speaking) as fully autonomous individuals?
We have the competitive model of Darwinian evolution versus the "be kind and caring to everyone" model of humanism. Neither of these NEED a first cause or god figurehead to be viable.
Both models have their disadvantages but with very different futures. Wouldn't it be pleasant if the only thing people killed were other peoples ideas?
Regards
Mike
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/16/09)
SUBJECT: RE: robot vs. human mindsMike,
I have not problem with your "be kind and caring to everyone" model of humanism. But this is not what religious people are asking for. They are asking for hope and meaning in life, and there your principle is mute.
And of course it would be "pleasant if the only thing people killed were other peoples ideas" — but once more this is not the problem, since only a very small fraction of people would kill in the name of their faith. Al Qaeda is not representing a majority of Islamists but a very small fraction, and even Hezbollah is a political party in the first place.
Thus you are right on both suggestions, but they both are of minor importance. You are not at all hitting the center of religion here.
Hubertus-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Charles Countryman (07/08/09)
SUBJECT: MindChris & Hubertus
Rather than say scientific vs metaphysical, I would say scientific and metaphysical. Science and metaphysics seem to becoming distinct fields of human inquiry in the 21st Century. Both need to be careful in their claims of knowledge. Neither seems to have all the answers. Nor are their methods necessarily interchangeable.
I think philosophy needs to be very careful about using math like techniques in her inquiries. There is a finite math which ranges from simple counting and measuring to technical/engineering to accounting to programming to econometrics and biometrics. There are also fundamental math and physics which deal with the nature of the cosmos. This math of the cosmos may be more metaphysical than are the natural sciences today?
Both science and philosophy seem to becoming less encompassing? I wonder, where are you going with your "bubbles at the cathode" discussion?
In dealing with the human mind, it seems that we are at somewhat of an impasse. At one level, it no longer makes sense to talk about mind in philosophical terms. Neuroscience has shown that the human mind is an embodied mind. But neuroscience's explanations without philosophy's metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and epistemology seem insufficient.
CharlesFROM: Chris Else (07/08/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindCharles
I agree my conversation with Hubertus must by now seem pointless. To my mind, the issue is the metaphysical (ontological) status of scientific concepts. What I want to say is that science is committed to believing in things like electrons as part of the real world, that such things have, with qualification, the same ontological status as air or water. Hubertus, as I read him (I may well be wrong), wants to say that electrons and the like are 'theoretical entities' and are to be distinguished from the given, observable substance of the world (i.e. the thing that I kick, when I say 'I refute it thus'). He also wants to say that the conjectures that form science are refuted or denied by kickable things. I think this second statement is wrong. In consequence, either he is committed to a science that deals entirely with theoretical entities or else he has to acknowledge that all entities in science are putatively kickable. By this last point, I mean that the difference between electrons and air or rocks is essentially a matter of our level or certainty in their existence. There is a difference in degree rather than in kind, in other words. If I am right, then there are significant further consequences.
This said, I am not sure that science and metaphysics are separate spheres of human enquiry or, at least, I would want to know how we can separate them. There is a difference i feel between claiming that there are certain things that present day science cannot explain and claiming that there are certain things that science can never explain in principle. The former claim I agree with. As to the latter, I am not so sure. Science is the explanatory medium and method par excellence. I suspect that to say X can never by explained by science is no more than saying X can never be explained period. X, in other words, is mystical. That there are things that cannot be explained is manifest, in my view. I feel there is some mystical core in aesthetics and religion and, possibly, ethics but those subjects also involve explanations that, I am quite sure, science will have something to say about eventually.
One further point, when we consider what science can or cannot in principle do, we tend to imagine the theories of science as they currently are. In Kuhn's terms, we think of the work that might be done in the existing paradigm. What we have to realise is that 100 years from now the paradigm might be very different, science might have changed radically in its theories and, possibly, its attitudes and values. Who knows what it might not accomplish then?
Chris
FROM: Charles Countryman (07/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindChris
I agree that electrons and such are real. I agree that the scientific paradigm can and will probably change (maybe tomorrow).
I admit to being somewhat naive about this. But I think that a good thing about naive realism is the stumbling about and having new things and ideas jump up.
One quandary that I now have to deal with: My personal experiences with Parkinson's Disease, my readings about neuroscience and in philosophy of mind have led me to think that humans are not dualistic. That appears to conflict with my professed religious beliefs in Orthodox Christianity. But I hope naivete works here. My best days may be those when I admit that I just don't understand.
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindCharles and Chris,
while I am a bit aghast now, I have to put an answer here. Charles wrote "that electrons are real". I never denied that. I only tried to get a bit ontological clarity in this debate. Electrons are real "in r3" but never "in r1". Unicorns are "real in r4", i.e., in fairyland. Observations, concepts, theories, fancies, dreams, neuronal states etc. are all in different realms of reality. That was my point. A mathematical truth is "real in r5" — some Platonic ideal world of logicians. But the neuronal states that let me understand a mathematical truth are not in "r5" but "in r1" or "r3" — that depends. The problem in this case is : We do not even know what to call a "neuronal state", since it is in fact a very complicated pattern of many millions of neurons "firing" to understand a mathematical truth. But ontologically this pattern of firing neurons "is" not the mathematical truth ! A truth is a logical thing, not a pattern of electrochemical events.
We do not assume that the computer which can prove a mathematical truth from axioms and deductive rules has "insight" or "awareness", but its proof is correct anyway, since it is following logical rules. Thus to have a Platonic idea of a mathematical truth is human, but the robot does not need it to come to correct conclusions. You may call this "philosophy in the flesh", but the robot doesn't need it in this case. So once more : What are we speaking of ?
Now we have r1, r2, r3, r4, r5 — and of course this is just a beginning...
What's the reality of "the law of gravitation" ? We do not feel or see or measure it. What we measure is only the effect, not the law. Einstein has proven that Newtons "law" was only an approximation, but this is not a refutation. Should we call Einsteins gravitation "a new paradigm" ? In a sense it was ! It changed our thinking on space and time.
But there is a paradigm of Christianity (with a personal god) as compared to a paradigm of Buddhism (without). A paradigm shift is replacing one model of explanation by some very different model. Einsteins model was superiour to Newtons model. The model "man created by God" is different from "man brought forth by evolution". But by re-interpretation they can be made compatible.
I never denied "reality", I only said that we should be careful when using this difficult concept.
Well, I leave it as a bone for you to gnaw at.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindCharles
I see your problem. I wonder, though, if there is not some basis for religious faith even without dualism. It would be hard to maintain such notions as immortality of the soul, perhaps, but this does not necessarily preclude religious experience.
Science might give us the ultimate in explanation but explanation isn't everything. Any explanation is just a human picture of the world. We can take this two ways. On the one hand, any conceivable explanation will be in human terms. In this sense, the world is the way we ultimately will come to know it. One the other hand, a human picture is just a picture. Recognising this leads to the question of what the world is 'really' like beyond the picture but this makes no sense. Even to pose that question is to begin to sketch another picture of the 'real' beyond the real and whatever this picture might be, it will be a human picture. Nevertheless, a picture is still just a picture.
I wonder (and my thoughts here are still very tentative) if there isn't something worthwhile in this paradox. One can't explain it, of course, but then in a sense one wouldn't want to be able to explain it. If one can't explain it, though, it moves into the category of the mystical — something that might manifest itself in experience but can't be objectified.
Chris
FROM: Charles Countryman (07/10/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindChris
I have difficulty with common definitions of religion. In the 21st Century, perhaps it's better to refer to world view? Views commonly classified as religious include Zen Buddhism, which is non dualistic and which concentrates on a practice leading to earthly enlightenment. Another religion is Orthodox Christianity, which is considered dualistic.
When I "decloak" mentally from a weak state of objectivity to my subjective Orthodox Christian self, I have a more definite perspective. I think my Orthodox belief that the soul is bound to the body before death can accommodate the non dualistic understandings of the human mind made by neuroscience. After that (death), I acknowledge that I depend on a dualistic faith and in Mystery.
I don't want to overly simplify. But since my mental construction includes a material view with boundaries set by religion. I acknowledge that necessitates separate domains of religion and science.
Without using a behaviorist definition, which I find inadequate. I don't know how to define religion or spiritual or mystical outside of dualism. Maybe a materialist could define uncategorized and unconceptualized human experience as being holistic?
Charles
FROM: Chris Else (07/11/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindCharles
Roughly speaking, I understand dualism to consist of two independent sets of ontological facts.
I guess I would characterise the mystical as the experience of something beyond the reach of human language. (Hubertus would rightly say that there are all kinds of things here and we need to start talking of 'mystical-1' and 'mystical-2' but I will just leave the last sentence as a necessary but not sufficient condition). I don't see why this cannot occur in a non-dualist world. What one has to do is to recognise a gap between epistemology (in the sense of what can be expressed and explained in language) and ontology. This is more like set and subset than two sets, although saying that is already saying too much, I fear.
Chris
FROM: Mike Ward (07/13/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindCharles,
So electrons are real, well as real as anything else. Take for instance the indicators on my car when they are lit are they working, when they are unlit are they working — actually neither is true as "working" for them means a constant change of state.
Such it would appear is the current hypothesis for electrons, they are not planet like entities circling a nucleus but more akin to matter popping into and out of existence at multiple locations. But in our constrained way of thinking where does it go when it disappears and is it's re-appearance similar to the big bang — something out of nothing?
Mike
FROM: Charles Countryman (07/13/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindRE responses from Mike, Chris, and Hubertus
Because human reasoning is embodied, we are bound to metaphorical reasoning. The planetary model for atoms still makes sense in "daily life." But I concede to Mike that a cloud model probably makes more sense theoretically when dealing with atomic structure. But Mike aren't you stretching uncertainty principle a bit by translating it to constantly repeating "Big Bangs" at the subatomic level?
Chris & Hubertus
I'm still confused by the reasoning for mystical-1 and mystical-2. An ontological argument about dualism is about different realms of existence, not just word definitions.
To me "mystical" is too loaded of a word to use from a materialist perspective. It would require constant definition. As a professing dualist, I think that I can appreciate the difficulty materialists have with uncategorized and unconceptualized experiences. Some materialists like Lakoff/Johnson simply deny the existence of these experiences. In the face of the reality of these experiences though, I suggest that materialists could use the term "holistic." As a holistic experience, I am thinking of something like Albert Schweitzer coming to his ethical "Reverence for Life."
Charles
FROM: Chris Else (07/13/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindMike and Charles
According to Richard Feynman, who should know, 'If anyone says they understand quantum mechanics, they're lying. Nobody understands it.' I take this to mean two things. Firstly, the world of sub-atomic particles is beyond the metaphors of ordinary thinking. Secondly, that the mathematical language in which it is expressed is not translatable into ordinary language. Each of these has interesting philosophical consequences. The first might lead us to reflect on Charles's (Lakoff/Johnson's) view that 'we are bound to metaphorical reasoning'. The second seems to challenge the principle, which I have always been in two minds about, that all languages are translatable — which in turn has other consequences.
Charles
Maybe we do need mystical-1 and mystical-2. I am not a dualist but I still want the word 'mystical'. It is not synonymous with the word 'holistic' in my view. 'Uncategorized and unconceptualized experiences' may be 'holistic' but they may not be.
To put all this another way, what I think is going on is this:
’Ä¢ There are certain kinds of experiences that cannot be explained in materialistic terms.
’Ä¢ One way to deal with these is to explain them in non-materialistic terms. This leads to dualism, which I take to be your view.
’Ä¢ Another way is to explain them as 'merely subjective', as experiences that have no objective correlates (i.e. that are not experiences of anything) but are just 'mental' events like dreams or hallucinations. This I take to be Mike's view (apologies, Mike, if I got it wrong) and possibly Lakoff and Johnson's.
’Ä¢ What I am looking for is a third option, one which takes these experiences as beyond explanation but nevertheless as experiences of something. Maybe this is incoherent. I'm interested to find out.
Chris
FROM: Charles Countryman (07/13/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindChris
I don't understand quantum mechanics. For daily life, I'll stay with the planetary atomic model that I leaned in a middle school industrial arts class 46 years ago, while making a simple electric motor. The old planetary model of the atom helped me understand Ohm's Law then and now.
The word and concept of "mystical" remain confusing to me. Its domain seems to range from elves and fairies to medieval Roman Catholic Saints. Perhaps your materialist interpretation will help clarify.
Charles
FROM: Mike Ward (07/15/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindChris,
That no one as yet understands quantum physics is not deniable and yet we do not hesitate to hypothesise how things could be. Each hypothesis creates a new metaphor so I cannot agree that we will never progress to a complete understanding. Do you argue that the language or ideas (if that it what it is) of mathematics cannot be translated? If not then however can it be taught except in silence?
If like me you think that everything is capable of explanation at some point in future time then words like mystical are simply metaphors for the unknown. You are right that I consider some experiences as 'merely subjective' whether they are brought about by LSD, spiritual visitations, electrodes in the brain, a bad nightmare or religion.
You ask for a third option which presumably lies somewhere between material and immaterial, allow me to propose the category of "unproven". Things in such a category should not be spoken about with conviction either way unless new evidence becomes available.
I find inconsistencies and likenesses in arguments and hypotheses akin to someone playing the wrong musical note — such was my attention drawn to the "mini" big bang notion. That matter can enter and leave our observable universe is similar to the notion that drove Hawkins to consider that the big bang was a similar process to matter entering a black hole but with time being reversed.
Mike
FROM: Chris Else (07/15/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindMike
Thanks for some interesting observations.
The way I see quantum mechanics is this. It must be coherent within the mathematics but when we come to translate that it becomes incomprehensible because the metaphors used to describe it are contradictory — things that are waves in some circumstances are also particles in others, things can be in two places at once, things can influence one another even though they are kilometres apart, etc, etc. This suggests that the attempt to translate quantum mechanics into everyday language results not in silence but in nonsense. You can decide if this means that the maths is untranslatable or not.
I am interested in your belief that 'everything is capable of explanation at some point in the future'. I presume the explanation you are suggesting is a scientific one. If so, then the claim would be true only if science were completable in principle and in practice. By completable, I mean that there would be no more questions left and that all the answers would be coherent and consistent with one another. It is by no means obvious to me that this would ever be the case. Quantum mechanics itself hints at the difficulties and, in addition, Godel's theorem provides an example of how the search for a complete, self-consistent logical system can come unstuck. In addition, I feel there is a peculiar kind of species arrogance (or perhaps a naˆØve faith) in thinking that the universe will necessarily be fully explicable within the constraints of human thought patterns, given that the latter are based on a set of brain functions cobbled together by the evolutionary requirements of Pleistocene Africa.
In any case, even if science were completeable in principle, it may never be completed in practice. The cost of the Hadron Collider indicates that we may be reaching the practical limits of experiment in the sub-atomic sphere and investigations into deep space may require so much time that any result may not be worth having.
As to my third option, no, it is not between material and immaterial — there is no such space. Given that there are limits to the explicable (see above), then maybe there are ways of apprehending what is beyond the explicable. As I said in our earlier conversation, I think experience comes before explanation.
Chris
FROM: Mike Ward (07/16/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindChris
I don't want maths to be untranslatable that would mean there is a ceiling to our language or learning. I sort of see this like the creationist argument for the eye — it looks like it must be designed so it is (what else could explain it). If however by a series of intermediate stages it's current form can be traced to an origin then the mystery disappears, this I hope will be the way of the quantum mechanics.
You're right, our species arrogance is a major impediment and this brings me back to the importance of trying to "think outside of the box" which you considered impossible in an earlier posting. If we can't we are forever destined to be this arrogant ape. Given our temporal constraints and the speed of light there are places in the universe we could never get to even with an infinite life, so I agree knowledge is always going to be limited and localised.
I've heard it quoted that there are more possible brain states than atoms in the universe — not sure exactly what conclusion can be drawn from that but it's worth pondering on for awhile, over a cold beer methinks!
Cheers
Mike
FROM: Chris Else (07/16/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindMike
Re 'thinking outside the box'. If you mean abandoning our customary habits of thought or even trying to transcend the limits placed on our thought patterns by our brains, then yes, that might well be valuable. What I meant earlier was that we can only ever have limited success at this — we can only think how we are constrained to think.
Maybe computers can extend the range of our thinking but even then there are limits both to the scope of the thinking and, more importantly perhaps, to our willingness to trust the results.
As regards this last point, I understand that there is disagreement among mathematicians as to whether or not a result achieved by a computer that cannot be verified in detail by a human being constitutes a proof or not.
And yes, that cold beer sounds like a very fine idea. More attractive right now to you than to me, though, I suspect. Here in Wellington the temperature is ranging from 4 to 11 deg C. I imagine it's a bit more summery in Warwickshire.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/17/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindChris and Mike,
may I remind you that we are long since dependent on computer-results — intelligent or not — that we cannot really understand ?
This was part of my argument with Chris : What we really have is r1-reality. What we get is r3-reality. But f.i. in QM, we do not really understand this r3, we only know that to our great surprise it seems to work.
The real problem with "smart robots" would be trust : How would we know that they are not cheating and making fun of us ?
The idea is not new ! It was introduced by Asimov in one of his robot stories : One of those "vast humming minds" tried to topple a bad regime. What could "it" do ? It manipulated market data, by this caused a revolt, and by this toppled the regime. This was written some 60 or more years back, but could be a scenario of today : How does anybody know this time, "who manipulated the market data" ? What are those data : r1 or r3 ?
Hubertus
FROM: Mike Ward (07/18/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindHubertus,
How do I really know if if you are not cheating and making fun of me, I mean really KNOW.
Mike
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/19/09)
SUBJECT: RE: MindMike,
not even I myself do ! Does it make much of a difference ? Chris was eager to defend the reality of electrons. But what about the reality of "class struggle" or "sin" or "god's grace" ? Is all this r1 or r2 or r3 or r4 or what ? What do you see when you look into a mirror : r1-Mike or r77-Mike ? Reality is a difficult topic !
Hubertus-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/20/09)
SUBJECT: sane societyDear all,
among my hobby horses is a question that I call "Socratic" : What do we call a "sane" society ?
As we all know, sometimes societies seem to be mad and ridden by fear and delusions : Witch craze, burning heretics, mass killing of "foreigners" or Jews or Blacks, "purges", etc..
There are typical patterns of such behaviour, so that to speak of "collective neuroses" or "psychoses" seems appropriate, since similarities to the neuroses and psychoses of single persons are striking. So we may speak of "systems failure under stress". As a German, I am well aware of the preconditions that made the Nazis possible here : Loss of war 1918, rise of socialism and the Leninist Revolution of 1917, chaotic government of some 20 chancellors in only 14 years of "Weimar Republic", hyper-inflation in 1923, vast unemployment of >15% in the wake of "Black Friday" of 1929 and some more. The Nazis seemed to be able to restore order and prosperity in this situation. Hitler was greeted as a sort of Chomeini in 1932.
Now this is a philosophical forum, not a political or historical one. But we cannot separate the question of "what does 'good' society mean ?" from some practicel observations. It would be a mere play of words.
And a note added : 'Good' society is not the same as 'sane' society and both are not the same as 'thriving' society. To illustrate this point : A healthy and wealthy person need neither be good nor sane, as any mafia-boss is proof of. Thus it is in fact a very philosophical and "analytical" topic ! A little excerpt below is showing the problem in a strange light. What do you think ?
Hubertus
Excerpt from
Torrey, E. Fuller : The Nazi doctors: medical killing and the psychology of genocide.
Psychology Today, November 1, 1986 | COPYRIGHT 1986 Sussex Publishers, Inc.
// ...
Much more common were physicians motivated by altruism, who believed that "National Socialism is nothing but applied biology." There is Karl Brandt, for example, who idolized Albert Schweitzer and Adolf Hitler. Prevented from joining Schweitzer in Africa because Lambarene was in French territory, Brandt instead became Hitler's personal physician and initiated the program to kill sick children. Following his trial at Nuremberg in 1948 Brandt said: "I have always fought in good conscience for my personal convictions and done so uprightly, frankly, and openly."
//FROM: Chris Else (07/20/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
Yes, you are right, a knotty subject.
A connected topic, which interests me, is the question of social engineering. Can we do things to improve society? Or are all our efforts doomed to failure? In one sense, these questions lead us back into territory we were exploring in earlier conversations. If we think society can be improved, then what do we base our improvements on? What part do religion and science and other systems of belief play in the matter?
For example, I imagine Karl Brandt's view that 'National Socialism is nothing but applied biology' is connected in some way with eugenics, which in the early years of last century was a highly respected academic discipline — a branch of science in its own right. Similarly, today, we are perilously close to using evolutionary biology as a basis for social engineering. Not to mention the science of climate change.
And we should, of course, mention Karl Popper's view from 'The Open Society and its Enemies' that the only viable form of social engineering is tinkering.
Chris
FROM: Mike Ward (07/21/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHi,
Every time I use my car I know I'm successful when I reach my destination. The questions raised by Hubertus of "Good" or "Sane" or "Thriving " societies have meanings for him that may very well differ from Hitler or Stalin or me.
So rather than argue over fundamental different but unspoken perceptions perhaps Hubertus could remove some of the uncertainty in my mind and state what qualifies for him as "A good Society".
I would rather he puts up the coconuts for me to knock down.
Regards
Mike
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/21/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyChris and Mike,
to avoid "preaching", and because I really want to have some answers from your side, I only try some hints, hopefully stimulating.
First : The German society under the Nazis surely was a "thriving" society. Without the Holocaust and the War, Hitler would be praised today as one of the grand masters of politics of the last century. But there was "something wicked" in him and his followers that was needed to bring the Holocaust and the War about. It is this hidden wickedness that should rise our attention. What is it ?
And look at another example : During the 1960s, there was this "cultural revolt" in the West of the Hippies and Marcuse and "Paris Mai" and "counterculture" and "New Age" and "Yellow Submarine" and all that. The general idea was : Our "thriving" industrial society is mad and maddening and alienating humans from their true potential of humanity and mutual love and wit and artistry etc.. This was the message of "Hair" and many other movies.
This time it was not Hitler or the Nazis or Stalin etc., but "consumer society" itself, that was called bad. "Destroy what destroys you !" and "Tune in — drop out!" were typical slogans "in the name of a better and more humane society."
Now stick these hints together to come at some first conclusions !
And, gentlemen, may I direct your attention to this concept of mental sanity :
CATCH-22. Catch-22 is the title of Joseph Heller's 1961 novel. A brilliant satire set on the imaginary island of Pianosa during World War II, the novel centers around bomber pilot Captain John Yossarian's efforts to survive. Flying bombers in World War II was deadly business, and Yossarian's commanding officer kept raising the number of missions a pilot had to complete before earning a leave. When Yossarian tries to get out of the service by feigning insanity, he collides head-on with Catch-22, a military regulation claiming that since a man must be insane to agree in the first place to go on bombing missions, his request for a mustering out of the military is proof positive that he is sane. Yossarian cannot get out of the service. The novel became a cultural icon of the 1960s because it spoofed large bureaucracies and their naive convictions about their ability to bring order to a chaotic world. By the mid- 1960s, the term "catch-22" had entered the American vocabulary as a synonym for bureaucratic rules that possess no logic or sense and whose consequences are counterproductive. Many Americans came to view the U.S. military effort in Indochina as one enormous example of catch-22.
REFERENCE: Joseph Heller, Catch-22, 1961.
From p.87 of : Historical Dictionary of the 1960s, Book by James S. Olson and Samuel Freeman (Eds.); Westport, CT : Greenwood Press, 1999. 554 pgs.
http://www.questia.com/read/15356238?title=Historical%20Dictionary%20of%20the%201960s
Please, Mike, don't tell me that everybody is "sane on his own terms". I won't slay people on their convictions — well, not generally. But I still think that there is such a thing as mental sanity. All religions have been convinced of that. But of course you are against. Now it's your turn.
Hubertus
FROM: Mike Ward (07/23/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus,
There are some diseases that only arise and spread when populations reach certain sizes — hold on to this idea for the moment.
There are certain sizes of societies and groups that function well. For decision making about a dozen people, like a jury, is an efficient viable size. For a sustainable unit about a hundred people is about right.
When societies increase beyond everyone knowing everyone else then people tend to become objects and "means to an end".
I would not like to live in such a tribal society but from what I have seen of members of such societies they do exhibit more morality and less "wickedness" then many so called advanced people.
The "new age" rejection of today's ever increasing Nanny or Big Brother society is one I can understand and to a considerable amount admire from my anarchist viewpoint. So when things go wrong, as they will do, it's easy in an anonymous society to blame the Jews, the Muslims, the immigrants, the Gypsies, the Bankers — all of course are non-human and can be treated accordingly.
20 — Love, your service
Mike
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/27/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHello all, seems to be a dispirited graveyard here ! All threads dead ! All fallen victim to piggies flu ?
Mike, don't be so gloomy ! Overall, we have succeded to pretty good society of 50 million people and up. This is "playing by the rules" and "legal justice" and "democracy". Seems to work. Very efficient by the way : Enormous output of goods and services. People are enormous longlived today and well fed.
The question of good society is asking something different. It's referring to Marcuse and to "Yellow Submarine" and Osho and "Hair" and "New Age" and "where have all the flowers gone ?"
The Beatles and the Hippies were not asking for the nanny-state. They were asking for a state full of life. They were asking for a more reasonable society like in "Harold and Maude".
Look at the telly in the evening — what do you see ? Crime, violence, neuroses, paranoia, war and killing and raping etc.. It's a doggish and apish world with villains and corrupt police like in "Dark Knight".
Well, people like this stuff, because life otherwise is boring. If you have no mad ripper at home, you love to see him on the screen.
Thus we are confronting a dead society with a mad one. So where is "good" society — if anybody cares a trifle. This was my question.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/28/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
A good society? Either you have it or you don't. If you don't have it, you have to change something. This means someone will be disadvantaged because people behave in a way that is optimised to the existing environment. Crudely speaking to give to one group of people you have to take away from someone else. Thus, in order to have a better society you have to evaluate the relative needs of various groups of people.
There are two bases for this evaluation, it seems to me. You can appeal to justice or to morality. Depending on which you choose you have different approaches and different solutions. Justice is based in the notion of human rights and in principles such as fairness. It leads to changes in the law and in government institutions. Morality is based on principles and values exhibited in human relationships and leads to pressures to change individual human behaviour.
So? That is my first thought on the territory of the question. Something to shoot at.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/28/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyChris, at least a sign of life again ! Thank you so much for this !
Well, I am once more aiming my gun. Before I enter a text, I will stress a simple fact from the theory of games and from the Jazz shuffle : When people transform from a bad and mad to a better society, they are not taking away save bad things. They are adding to each others well being. When you are making music with friends or having a good talk, you trade your time and effort for the joy of communicating with friends. Thus it is a give and take and not a nanny state. The whole attitude of utopias is fundamentally stupid, since they do not understand this principle. Utopias are the work of bureaucrats and technocrats, who are a horrible bunch. The true entertainer is an artist who turns a chaos into a big enjoyable fun for all ! The creative intelligence of the artist and entertainer is of as much value as the calculating intelligence of the engineer and beureaucrat. We tend to forget this fact. We shouldn't let logicians and mathematicians and engineers define what to call intelligence. They just don't know. Maybe Feynman was one exception, and Einstein was another. They both were playful.
And now look at this :
Of course people always fear to be molested with new models of utopias. This is not on my mind and never was.
But there are some truly philosophical problems involved : As you all know, political philosophy has always been clustered around notions of utopia, whether socialist up to Marxist or liberal up to Hayek and Nozick and others. To think that you could ignore the topic of utopia altogether is naive. Locke, Rousseau, Kant — but all socialists and libertarians too — are dreaming of some better world to build for mankind. They all differ on the specific definition of what "better" comes to and what the best way to go there could be.
Don't tell me that it is all without use. I just read on the Declaration of Universal Human Rights, from which several UNO-institutions derive. See http://www.betterworldlinks.org/index.php?cat=1309&PHPSESSID=bb3129 ! We all know that there are all sorts of violations of those declared principles. There should be no slavery, nor torture, nor death penalties and many other bad things, that hurt human dignity, but they are everywhere. There are "blood diamonds" and land-mines and the Military use of children (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_use_of_children and "trading + trafficking" of humans — mostly women and children for prostitution (see http://www.antislavery.org/english/default.aspx + http://www.catwinternational.org/ ). There is mass raping as a military means etc.etc..
But does all this mean that the UDHR and the work of Amnesty International and countless other efforts to protect human dignity is meaningless ? I don't think so. Thus in my opinion to speak of a better society is not a pointless endeavour.
The real problem seems to be the question of where to draw the line between philosophy and politics. But this is a very philosophical problem : By what argument are the Taliban "entitled" to lock away their wives and to "marry" girls of 8 or 9 years by the argument, that this is just how they did since centuries and one should respect other cultures ?
Slavery was abolished in the West during the 1860s, but women suffrage in most western countries was not introduced before 1919. Workers were given less than their share in elections before around 1900, and the "Jim Crow"-laws assured that American Blacks have been practically excluded from politics in the former slave-states up to the 1960s. So it always was a mixture of politics and philosophy, of defining what it means to be "entitled" to some human right. Jefferson, author of "all men are born free and equal" was a slave-holder himself, and Aristotle and Thomas thought slavery to be a part of the natural order of things.
Thus to speak of "human freedom and dignity" is meaningless without some definition of "what to call a human, a freedom, a dignity" under specific circumstances.
And look up Skinner in "Walden Two" and "Beyond Freedom and Dignity". See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B._F._Skinner and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walden_Two and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beyond_Freedom_and_Dignity !
Since Socrates and his followers it is impossible to keep philosophy and politics neatly apart. The problem is : You cannot separate the indivˆ‚dual from society. But of course I can imagine a society where people are respecting each other as in "The Decent Society" of Avishai Margalit (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avishai_Margalit ).
To put it differently : A good society is not different in principle from a good environment or a good home : You can go for it or you don't, it doesn't come by itself. A good society is a task, not a fate.
And it does not mean "Brave New World" or "1984" — that is rubbish.
Hubertus
FROM: Des Edwards (07/29/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHi All.
If I understand the term "tinkering" correctly then I agree with Chris (and Popper) that the only viable form of social engineering is tinkering. My experience as an industrial manager is that the actual effects of large-scale "culture change" efforts are almost impossible to predict. Even on the scale of a mid size manufacturing concern of around 3000 people it is difficult to ensure that radical change yields benefits that are promised or expected. I was a factory manager (about 350 people) in such a company that tried to embrace Total Quality Management in the early 90s. The effort failed to bring about the promised and desired benefits even though a shedload of money was spent and a lot of time, training and effort was invested by well meaning managers (including myself).
There were many detailed and specific reasons for the failure but I would highlight two general factors that were operative in the company and that I think would be operative in any large and disparate group of people who are in a relationship of mutual dependence.
The first is the truism that old habits die hard (and the corollary that new habits fade quickly). Some people in the company were what we called "heat seekers" — normally young turks who were pre-disposed to embrace change for its own sake — and who wanted to make their mark in a game where the rules had changed enough to dilute the advantage enjoyed by more experienced players. But most of the people in the company wanted to continue with what they knew best — the established habitual ways of working. It is obvious that the latter group were not committed to the change — but actually neither were the heat seekers — they were apt to drop TQM as soon as the novelty wore off and as soon as it appeared that there was no real advantage to them — and then cast about for the next industrial nostrum.
The second factor is that like people everywhere, the people at all levels in the company had vested interests that they wanted to protect or enhance. The habitual and comfortable ways of working mentioned in the last paragraph are one vested interest for a lot of people, another is the satisfaction gained from being able to deploy hard earned knowledge and skills and be recognised for this, and yet another is the garnering of power, pay and prestige that comes from rising up the hierarchy of the company.
People will generally use whatever power they can garner to defend or promote what they see as their interests — and this tends to derail or divert large-scale social engineering plans. Hi-jacking of someone else's project for our own purposes is an effective strategy.
Of course I am oversimplifying (I could write quite a long essay on what went wrong), and I am probably giving too strong an impression that there was a lot of cynical manipulation (there was some — at senior levels mainly), but nevertheless I think these are two factors that strongly militate against the success (in its own terms anyway) of any social engineering project.
If we think about what is necessary for a project, any project, to succeed, then we must in my view reach certain general conclusions. If we leave blind luck aside then one of two things has to be true. Either we have to be able to programme a series of contributing changes and actions and set them running, or we have to frame an end goal state and a starting position and then initiate in a hands-on cycle of planning, guiding and pushing, monitoring and responding to unplanned factors — until we reach our end state.
The "programming" option depends radically on us being able to define the starting conditions and to specify the transformations that will take us from the starting state to the end state. We cannot even do this dependably with computer software of any real complexity. We have to test off-line and work out the bugs before deploying the software — even then subtle bugs can remain to undermine the whole project. How much less likely is it that we can "programme" a large-scale change in society as a whole. I would say that we are nowhere near being able to do so and any attempt is vanishingly unlikely to succeed. And even if we did get to a state of psychological and sociological expertise where "social engineering" was more than a metaphor, I suspect that the reflexive nature of social science would decree that any programme, no matter how well worked out, could be subverted by active human minds.
So, for the foreseeable future at least, we are left with the "management" option.
Perhaps the clearest framing of what is required to manage change is in the plan-do-check-act (PDCA) cycle. I.e. that we define what we want to achieve, we plan a reasonable way of achieving it, we start to carry out our plans, we monitor and check how they are progressing, and we act on what we find out to modify our plans — and so on through an iterative PDCA process.
The trouble with PDCA is that it gets more and more difficult to manage as the scope of the project grows. How many large scale civil engineering or software engineering projects either fail or become barely controlled resource sinks? I have not carried out proper research but a quick Google search turned up the following conclusions about large IT projects.
¬… an IT project is more likely to be unsuccessful than successful
¬… about 1 out of 5 IT projects is likely to bring full satisfaction
¬… the larger the project the more likely the failure
(http://www.it-cortex.com/Stat_Failure_Rate.htm)
IT projects and civil engineering projects at least have a chance of having the goal state clearly defined. In larger scale societal terms we can't even agree in the first place on what we want to achieve.
So — I think that modest projects are what we are left with.
I need to stop now — but I would be interested in putting my view on what a sane society might be — later.
Des
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/29/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyThank you very much for your valuable answer, Des ! Against what may be expected, I agree with almost every aspect of your answer, since I have been to the industry myself (as a physicist and software-engineer), so I can confirm your experiences firsthand.
Now for the second hand : People learn hard by hard experience. While the Germans up to 1945 were thought of as belligerent, nowadays they are seen as almost pacifists. Every single German soldier that gets killed in action in Afghanistan is used as an argument by half of our MPs to go out of that region. The experiences of the USA GIs are very different. I do not know about the experiences of Russia and China during and after the WW-II, but it surely was terrible.
I tend to think "with a distance". This means : While being in the bush, we see neither jungle nor desert. But we know that there are jungles and desert, and that "by necessity" there must be a transition zone. In this same way we know that there are "pre-modern" states and "modern" states, which have been "pre-modern" some time ago. So there must be a transition-zone too. The whole of Middle East is in a transition now to modernity, since it has to be. There is no alternative to modernity if you want to get at all the good things that it has to offer. But as in your example the men are against, since they want to protect their privileges, while the women are for modernity, since they want to study and to travel and to make music and read books they like and marry the husband they prefer. Thus after many conflicts and some generations the transition to modernity will have happened — even in Iran and in Saudi-Arabia etc.. It takes time, but there is no alternative.
Such a transition is a long and difficult struggle. I won't call it "mere tinkering". But there must be some real force from within and from without to bring change about. The end of WW-I in Germany and Russia and much of Europe was "a twilight of princes". A whole class of nobility was gone and a new class — mostly socialist — was brought to power for the first time. But it needed another war and mass-killings to bring the transition to modernity to an end. The Americans did not modernize, because by history they started from an "open society" of immigrants. They had no princes and no bishops to be toppled. In this they were lucky.
The Japanese have been modernized after the impact of commodore Perry in 1853 and by the genius of Meiji Tenno from 1867. But it took WW-II and the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and some years of MacArthur's regime to re-install a modern democracy. There was a new rise during the 1950s that culminated in the Tokyo-Olympics of 1964. Thus there has been a lot of change. India was under the sway of London from 1857 up to the Nehrus and Gandhis.
Thus my approach is : Look at "before and aft" and then look at the transition. It can be done. The real question is : At what price and in what time. Do we need WW-III to make the world "ready for a better modernity" ? I hope not.
And then : After modernity the real problems may begin — from a philosophical point of view. As I wrote : "good" society is different from "thriving" society. The idea of a good society as depicted in "Yellow Submarine" or in "Hair" is different from that of Franciscan monks and nuns and different from a Bacardi advertizement. Thus from a philosophical point of view — and this is a philosophical forum, not a political one — I was asking what to call a "good" society.
Most people will agree that "Brave New World" does not depict a good society, and neither does "1984". But does Callenbach's "Ecotopia" ? I doubt it. Or does Skinners "Walden Two" or Huxley's "Island" ? Very questionable. Thus there are a lot of things to debate here even in a strictly philosophical context.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/30/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
OK. Let's talk about what makes a 'good' society. What do you mean by 'good' here? Or alternative, as per your earlier post, how do you define 'human', 'dignity' and 'freedom'?
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/30/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyChris, I am tired at 0:30 am here locally, but some first hints :
1 We don't want utopia in the sense of "Brave New World" — why not ?
2 We don't want the nanny-state — same question.
3 We don't want "1984" — why not ?
4 We don't like any other form of totalitarian order — Nazi or Stalinist or Maoist or whatever. Why not ?
Read this as a first commentary on the notion of "freedom and dignity".
While BnW is not "bad" in the sense "1984" is, it is not assuring "freedom and dignity". Or would you think otherwise ?
Now change the perspective :
Just think of all examples of "good society" you have met in your lifetime. Chatting with friend, making music with friends, being left alone but in a friendly environment, etc.etc.. What did those situations have in common — if anything.
And now check against : What situations have been awful ? When did you find human society disgusting ? Why ?
All this is only "clearing the place" for our debate. There will be much more complex questions to come. I didn't even speak of "realization". I am still speaking of possible goals.
And don't forget : Even the nicest persons can go on our nerves after some time. We need some ruffle and rage and conflict then and now. We need "good enemies" and competition and a good fight. I wouldn't like to be a hobbit ("too good"), but neither to be with the Sauron-folks ("too bad").
These are about the conditions from where to start.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/30/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
Okay. What next?
And what do you mean by 'the nanny state'?
Chris
FROM: Des Edwards (08/01/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
You have obviously a solid familiarity with history and politics— I am afraid that the same is not true of me — although living in Belfast has a way of pushing a certain sort of politics down people's throats.
Anyway — I am very interested to hear what you have to say about the German people and their general move towards a distaste for war. I am seeing a similar effect starting to happen in Northern Ireland — I very much doubt that the "Real IRA" or other dissidents will be able to force our (still somewhat divided) community back into armed conflict because the vast majority of people are sick of violence and I think now very aware that it solves nothing — or if it does then it does so at a high cost and leaves a legacy of even greater problems.
On to the subject of a sane society.
Perhaps it is just my taste — but I think we cannot talk about what a sane society would be like without first talking about what a sane person would be like.
I have this memory of coming across the distinction between indivisible and divisible goods — I thought it was somewhere in Greek philosophy but I can't find it. Anyway here is the piece of thinking influenced by it:
Goods are those things that people need, want and desire.
Some of these goods are wholesome, some are unwholesome or harming — in the extreme they are poisonous. Presumably some are also neutral in their effect — or more likely — of mixed or indeterminate effect.
The sane person will desire wholesome goods.
Wholesome can also include that which brings immediate pleasure.
But who gets to say what is wholesome and what is not.
Wholesomeness is fairly clear when we are talking about physical well-being — or at least the idea of unwholesomeness is fairly clear — for instance very sugary foods have little or no nutritional value and tend to rot the teeth.
But wholesomeness is less clear when we are talking about emotional and mental well being. For instance Richard Dawkins would have us do away with religion — but there are others, including myself (and I am a kind of atheist) who think he throws the baby out with the bathwater.
I will take physical wholesomeness as the paradigm for wholesomeness in all of the other modes.
That which is physically wholesome allows the natural life cycle of the organism to unfold with the greatest number of degrees of freedom that the various stages in the life cycle will support and that the environment of the time will allow. It is not a complicated concept — in the adolescent stage in my own life I could never have leapt over tall buildings unaided — but it was reasonable that this stage would support my ability to leap over thigh-high obstacles. I could not have done this if my physical development had been distorted by an unwholesome and unrelenting regimen of fast food and video games — or if my nutritional intake had been so poor because of extended famine that my muscle and bone growth had been stunted.
We can analogise from physical wholesomeness to mental and emotional wholesomeness. For this post I want to gather these modes under one heading — that of spiritual wholesomeness. I ask that you do not read a lot more into the term other than what you find in this posting — although I deliberately choose it for some of its historical connotations.
Physical well being and spiritual well being are mutually dependent ("Mens sana in corpore sano"). A useful construct we could use to encapsulate this interdependence is Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs (or if you prefer a simpler and more prosaic construct then the hierarchy due to Altderfer).
The idea of a physical life cycle is reasonably clear — but the idea of a spiritual life cycle somewhat less so. One simple but profound construct that can help us think about it is the Hindu cycle of student, householder and retiree. A secular construct that is also useful is Eric Erikson's eight stages of human development. (Kholberg's Stages of Moral Development are also interesting here).
Some goods are zero-sum — one person's gain is always someone else's loss — physical resources are of this nature.
Some goods are non-zero-sum — one person can gain some good without anyone else suffering a loss — most knowledge resources are of this nature.
The sane person will seek to share both.
But for sanity to prevail the manner of sharing is important.....
I have to go now — but I will add more later — thoughts welcome?
Des
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/01/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyYes, Des, thoughts are welcome ! We still are in a "brainstorming phase". Your hints at Maslow and Kohlberg and to the Hindu life-stages are useful for a start. Only this moment I am a bit occupied, but I will be back on all this soon.
Hello Chris ! You seem a bit confused now. But my "why-questions" were serious ! Try to give some answers by you own invention. Of course I have thought of it a bit, but I would like to see it with your eyes. May be you see something that missed me ?
Overall only some general hints :
My whole philosophy can be concentrated into one sentence : "What future for mankind should we opt for in all honesty — and why ?"
So I am not asking "What future will we get most probably ?" which would be the question of the futurologists.
I am not asking "What future do we want to get at or to avoid ?" which would be the question of the utopians and scifi-people.
My question is very "Socratic" : "What future for mankind SHOULD we opt for IN ALL HONESTY — and WHY ?" Thus I am asking for justification of a goal !
The added "in all honesty" means : We could opt back to the world of times past — some mythical "golden era" or the assumed "happy life" of Aborigines and Bushmen "near to nature and the gods". But this would not be "honest". Only a small minority of people would opt for such a world. But think of the world of the hippies or of the world of the hobbits or of the world of Huxley's "Island" (available on the internet).
Once more : My question is "SHOULD we go there ?"
The strange fact seems to be, that we have less trouble debating endlessly "the provability of God" or "the meaning of Gods Grace" — just because most people don't care a trifle. This sort of "philosophy" is like solving a sudoku : A nice brain-twister without relevance for most people. But we seem to have trouble debating "a good future for mankind" just because it is relevant.
It is like former belligerent Germans and Japanese turning into peace loving pacifists : During all of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries all leading philosphers — Locke, Hume, Kant, Rousseau, Marx and J-S Mill and Spencer and many others — were obsessed with peace and good government and "improving the lot of humankind". But after the "second Thirty Years War" (1914-1945) thinkers got overwhelmed from pessimism and fled into formalism and "analytical philosophy". Since I am an optimist by nature — while not a naive one but very aware of all the cruelties in the world — I do not shun the "hot iron" of "good society".
Of course nobody is obliged to take part in this debate, but perhaps we could change the tide now.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (08/02/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyDes
I like your definition of wholesomeness in terms of maximising degrees of freedom and the idea of extending this into 'spiritual wholeness'. Having been through various periods of political fervour in my life, I am now at a stage where I am more inclined to define the sane society in terms of what it should not be or do than what it should. Some sort of judicious balance between creating opportunities for people and leaving them alone seems the right sort of recipe to me.
Hubertus
Yes, I am confused but only by your typical method of firing off lots of ideas — I finish up not knowing where to start.
Your question 'What future for mankind should we opt for in all honesty — and why?' sounds to me like it is asking for some utopian solution, which you elsewhere seem to reject in total. I am not a fan for utopias other than as dramatic fictional examples of the application of certain political principles. Attempts to put them into practice have generally resulted in unforeseen and often disastrous consequences. Thus, in the spirit of my answer to Des (above), I think I would probably rephrase your question as 'What futures for mankind should we try to avoid — and how can we do so?'
And if you would like a specific starting point from me, I repeat my question 'What do you mean by "the nanny state"?' Where I live we went through the exercise twenty-years ago of demolishing the welfare state in the name of right-wing economic ideology. Some of the social consequences of this exercise have been very undesirable, in my view. Recent governments have been trying to repair some of the damage and have been accused, in consequence, in some quarters, of redeveloping a 'nanny state'. The question here is to what extent should the state concern itself with the welfare of its citizens. This leads to a second point in my response to Des — finding the appropriate balance between creating opportunities and laissez-faire.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/03/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane society
Chris, now we are getting at something. We need not hurry.
I am reading this time some books on "human dignity" and how and why it has become the fad of the day with "General Declaration" and "amnesty international" and many more in that direction. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights. Bentham ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeremy_Bentham ) once called human rights "nonsense on stilts". Of course he personally was the nicest of chaps, but as a jurist he knew very well, that laws are man-made, and that they have to be specific and enforceable. Thus after the atrocities of the Nazis and the Stalinists the natural advice would not be to return to God or to "natural right" or to "human rights", but to stricter regulations of what can be avoided — exactly in your sense. Thus instead of writing "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaration_of_Independence_(United_States) ) it should read : "We declare that all humans living in these United States of America — including blacks and other coloured people and including women and the poor and the homo- and bi-sexuals and the mad and the disabled and others — are protected by law against any trespassing of the state into their personal property and life and liberties and against any discrimination or exclusion from general rights granted to the citizens as long as no specific charges of violating accepted law are telling otherwise." This may not be the best way of saying it, I just made it up extempore, but you see the idea of Bentham and me behind it : Don't blow hot air around by invoking God and human right and dignity, just state what you are resolved to stand up for.
But you see the problem : Blowing grandiose hot air is cheap, writing down commitments to obligations is not. Thus it took another 200 years and many fights for "civil liberties" to get at nearly full rights for coloured people and women and homosexuals and some other groups even in the USA. So much on "self evident truth" ! A cynic would restate the Declaration in the form : "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all white male persons of property are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Property."
Bentham was not objecting the happiness of mankind, he was objecting "nonsense on stilts". And so am I.
That I am rejecting utopias — as you correctly remembered — is from my "dynamical" approach : Man is a learning and inventing animal. He is not out for happiness, but for news and adventures and learning and experiencing and exploring. Even little children are eager to explore the world and to learn and to try different things and to build worlds out of words and building bricks. Man is a nosy and roaming rat. Thus all utopias are "closed worlds" and are the typical inventions of stupid perfectionist that do not understand the true nature of man as an inventive being of phantasy and freedom.
I suggested to look at all your personal experiences with what was good or not good in your social life — and then ask what made the difference. From your personal experience you know that you don't like to be kicked around and bullied, but you don't like to be told what is good or bad all the time either. So you hate to be told "don't smoke, don't eat soft-ice, don't climb mountains, don't drink beverages, don't do this and don't do that — because it is all detrimental to your health !" That's the nanny state I spoke of. Remember that what "John the Savage" was asking from Mustafa Mond in "Brave New World" was "a right to be unhappy". Look up the end of chapter XVII of Brave New World on this, and read again (or for the first time) all of chaps. XVI + XVII ! See http://www.huxley.net/bnw/sixteen.html !
There is much to think about !
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (08/03/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
Thanks for that. I agree with much of what you say. A couple of points of qualification, though.
I agree that humans have needs for creativity and exploration but I am not sure that those needs are necessarily all that high on the priorities of many people. I wonder, for example, how many Russians feel unequivocal about the collapse of the Soviet system. If your top priority is getting by and raising a family, as I think is the case for very many people, then all the freedom generated by a neo-con liberal atmosphere does not mean very much, especially when it is accompanied by a significant loss of security.
Des's reference to Maslow is relevant here.
And, perhaps, leads to the matter of the nanny state. I agree that we want to avoid undesirable interference but what does 'undesirable' mean? Personally, I think I would be dead by now if the state and other agencies had not kept on telling me, over ten years or more, that smoking was bad for me until I finally paid attention and gave up. That said, I also agree with John Savage. I too want the right to be unhappy. Where does the balance lie?
If we are being practical, we need to get a view of particular issues, such as:
’Ä¢ free education
’Ä¢ free public health
’Ä¢ state investment in science
’Ä¢ state investment in the arts
’Ä¢ law and order
’Ä¢ defence
For some people anything short of libertarianism is the nanny state. I don't take that view.
Chris
FROM: Charles Countryman (08/05/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
Have you inadvertently substituted psychology for philosophy here? Being mad, or ridden by fear, or delusional are individual psychological states, not political or social. Societies don't burn witches or heretics. Individual people or relatively small groups of people do the actual burning. Individuals, not an anonymous society, consent to this. The dynamics are subjects for anthropology and sociology and social psychology.
Also, except for natural events like tsunamis, volcanic explosions and asteroids hitting planet Earth, there are no mass killings. An individual takes up a weapon or uses his hands and/or feet against other individuals.
Doesn't it become a "mere play of words" to go from "sane society" to "good society" to "thriving society," if there is no pause for consideration of the defining issues? Isn't it actually doing what you call "blowing grandiose hot air" to dismiss Natural Law and Human Rights without even allowing for their proper definition?
Is it really rational, as you suggest, to extrapolate from one's personal experience to global definitions of "good" and "bad?" And isn't the philosophical issue really about good and evil? Bad is more a wishy-washy definition of an individual's perceived psychological state or of an individual's perceived social or material situation.
Apparently you don't like the American Declaration of Independence (1776), or the UN Declaration of Human Rights, or Amnesty International's Human Rights praxis. What will be the criteria for determining your "stricter regulations of what can be avoided?" And who would you have be the regulator for the stricter regulations?
When you declare that truths are not self-evident are you suggesting there is another way to determine truth? Or are you declaring there is no such thing as truth?
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/05/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyGreat questions, Charles ! Too tired this moment to formulate an answer, but bristling with doing so — on every single question.
Only this much for the moment : While it is true that only single humans are acting responsibly, it is also true, that there can be collective madness as in pogroms and crusades and witch-hunts etc.. There are some well known mechanism to bring such behaviour about. Simply see the movies "The Wave" or in the other direction "Freedom Writers". Or think of Leni Riefenstahls "Triumph of the Will" ( http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0025913/ ). To insist that people are personally responsible is not wrong, but missing the essential fact, that something like collective madness is possible and well known. Cf. the Stanford Prison Experiment by Zimbardo (see http://www.lucifereffect.com/ ). Thus a "good" society would try to avoid situations where people can fall into collective madness.
The terms "good", "sane", and "thriving" society are difficult but valid in the same way as to differentiate between "good", "sane", and "thriving" person would be valid. Speer surely was a "thriving" person, even a bright and able one, but probably neither "good" nor (in a sense) "sane". Most Nazi-greats — including Hitler himself — were very effective, and so was Nazi-Germany. Thus the only valid objection against my classification of "good", "sane", and "thriving" society in my opinion would be that it needs some refinement.
More rebuttals to come, but thank you for opposition anyway.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (08/06/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyCharles
You seem to suggest that morality can only reside in individuals. I am not sure this is always necessarily true. If laws embody ethical principles, then it is surely possible to have evil laws and a political system that enacts evil laws would be an evil system. Or have I misunderstood you?
In addition, in Hubertus's defence, I am not sure that he was necessarily suggesting that a 'good' society was one that was morally good. He likened the use of good here to the use in 'a good environment' or 'a good home', which would suggest issues of quality rather than morality.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/07/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyCharles, this is my second answer to your many questions.
You write : "The dynamics are subjects for anthropology and sociology and social psychology." This is factually true, but if this is all that can be said, than the whole of political philosophy from Plato via Hobbes and Kant to "human rights" can be dumped to the waste basket, since you cannot "prove" the value of democracy or of the liberation of slaves or women or free thinking. All this has been justified as "natural". I know of no fairy tale that assumes democracy instead of monarchy as a natural form of regime. In most cultures the legal status of women is weak, and slavery was taken for granted by Aristotle and Thomas.
To put it differently : The arguments for human rights etc. were not first introduced by the philosophers, but they were introduced by practitioners of politics and only then refined by the philosophers. Abolition of slavery and liberation of the women came as a social and economic necessity, and only then the needed arguments for justification were published. Philosophers provided the arguments that were needed. This can be seen in Locke's "First Treatise", where he tried to reject the work of Filmer, who defended the prerogatives of the king. Filmer and Locke were arguing as advocates for certain parties before the bench of public judgement. Philosophers are almost never proving anything, they are advocates trying to convince an audience of interested parties. The very idea of a scientific philosophy of human things (as different from epistemology and logics) is a great misleading nonsense.
I come to the conclusion that in a time of "analytical philosophy" this is one cause of our modern (!) reluctance to debate political questions in philosophy at all. Hume was — together with Adam Smith and Hutcheson and Mandeville and others — a member of "Scottish Moralists". Like the "philosophes" of the Enlightenment — including Kant — they were not so much interested in analyzing concepts and arguments, but "improving the lot of real humans". They were thinking and arguing about "real" problems, not formal ones. To reduce Kant to an analyzer of formal arguments is presenting him in a very false light. He was an admirer of Rousseau and was as much interested in the well being of real humans. His "critical work" was meant to clear the ground for "free and reasonable" speech against defenders of the "Old Order" of monarchies. The same could be said of Locke.
Thus we cannot separate philosophy from psychology and sociology and politics, since all those "applied sciences" are using arguments, and the philosopher's job is to improve arguments as "mental instruments" in any debate. You cannot improve a scalpel without knowing the work of the surgeon who is using it.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (08/07/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
I was waiting for you to respond to what I thought was Charles's main point — his questioning of your seeming rejection of human rights as a basis for political philosophy. This seems to me a worthwhile topic (and one which would help get this discussion focussed). So:
What are human rights? And are they a valid basis for a political theory? If they aren't, then what would form a valid basis?
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/08/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyChris, your are right on "human rights" and you are right on my concept of "good" in "good society". I couldn't keep up with the pace of you and Charles. Thus I offer the following as a first clarification. I will put another answer specifically on "human rights" next time.
You probably know of the concept of "reification", which means "looking at some person or cultural concept as if it is a thing" (re). See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reification_(Marxism). But human institutions like the state or the law are man-made institutions, not god-made or nature-made. Thus we can look at them as we look at houses.
But conservative people tend to oppose such a view and call the law and the state "god-made" or "nature-made" to "conserve" them by making them "untouchable".
The concept of "rei-fication" must be seen in opposition to "personi-fication" : You can destroy and misuse an object, but you should not destroy or misuse a person. There are border-cases : Is kicking a dog allowed ? There was a long way from looking upon slaves and women as "objects" to looking at them as "persons" with "human dignity and autonomy".
My point here is : Our modern philosophy tends to speak of "things" or "objects" to give itself the air of "scientific objectivity". But I am opposed to this approach and stressing a "creative" approach instead. In my opinion, philosophers like iurists try to bring everyday arguments on experiences into some consistent and systematic order, but concepts like justice or liberty or human dignity cannot be "objective" as long as they are not "reified".
Here we are again at our struggle whether the electrons or atoms are of "r1-reality" or of "r3-reality". Justice is not something "jumping around on a meadow" but is "a social construct". We would have no concept of justice without being social animals from the start. The concept of justice is an "apish" concept, meaningless in the realm of robots or animals.
Thus my concept of "good" as in "a good home" or "a good meal" is in fact an evaluative concept not reducible to "facts" but to "intentions" and value judgements". But value judgements are to a large degree guided by experience, and the experiences of slaves and women are different from those of "slave-holders" and "women-holders". So who is to judge here ?
On the other hand a "sane" society" would be seen in contrast to a "malfunctioning" society that is living on "false dreams" and "false assumptions" and "dangerous obsessions" etc., f.i. paranoia of Jews or communists or witches. But once more we have a serious problem : In the view of atheists religious people are fallen to "false assumptions" and by this standard must be "insane". This is fact is what people like Dawkins say. And we know from everiday experience, that it can be very difficult to say exactly, what "insane" means : Hitler and his gang supferficially were "sane", i.e., able to do their daily job. Their insanity was deeply below the surface. Other people are "confused" and "not quite up to daily requirements" and "guided of false dreams", but are "fundamentally sane".
Thus all my concepts — of "good", of "sane", and of "thriving" — are complex and in need of careful analysis — as much so as you concept of "reality" that I broke down into "r1, r2, r3, ..., rx"-reality.
Hubertus
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/08/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyChris, your question was :
"What are human rights? And are they a valid basis for a political theory? If they aren't, then what would form a valid basis?"
"Human rights" in my opinion are "social constructs derived from apish sociality". Thus we do not define the values of family life, since man is "a family ape" and the value of family life is in our genes since a million years and doesn't need philosophical justification. It is a basis of human social conduct. Cf. http://pin.primate.wisc.edu/index.html and http://anthro.palomar.edu/behavior/behave_2.htm and http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/jcollie/psi/index.htm for a start.
Thus in my opinion human rights and human dignity are not something to be found in nature but something to be defined by culture and then to be granted on mutual agreement. They are "cultural constructs". I cannot enforce any human right by argument alone. Most cultures found "the right to hold slaves" quite natural. Not even Aristotle or Jesus or St.Paul questioned this "right" explicitely, since it was seen as a custom, not as something fundamental. The same applies with "a right to be not tortured" or "a right to be respected as a human being". Those are not "physical laws" to be respected but "human understandings". We may agree to them, but then we are the ones to endow them with value and validity.
On this the "Silvery Rule" and the "Golden Rule" are right : "What you won't have others to do onto you, you should not do on them" and "What you want have others to do onto you, that do onto them yourself!" resp.. These rules do not invoke any "human right" but "reasonable mutuality". While you could have endless struggle on human rights, you almost always can have some "reasonable mutual understanding".
And in my opinion this is quite ok ! It is one more argument against "reificacion". We humans grant each other respect and trust, or we don't, but we cannot "prove" that mutual respect and trust are deserved. In this human rights are part of good society in the sense we speak of a "good home" or "good meal" : There is nothing to "prove". To be nice and reasonable in your encounters with other people is just "the good thing to do", since both sides generally enjoy it and see an advantage in it. But it is not like solving a mathematical or physical problem. It is solving a human social problem of interaction — which is not the same.
Hubertus
FROM: Charles Countryman (08/08/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus,
I think that it is important to emphasize that being "mad" or "ridden by fear" or "delusional" are primarily psychological descriptions of individuals. I question their use as descriptions of societies. "Delusions" are topics found in guides to psychopathologies. I do not think that you will find "delusions" listed as a topic in philosophy references, such as The Cambridge Dictionary Of Philosophy. Being "mad" or "ridden by fear" are psychological literary terms.
I disagree with your statement in response to Chris when you said "conservative people ... call the law and the state 'god-made' or 'nature made' ..." Not all modern conservatives are religious. And your statement casts "natural law" in 16th Century European terms. At least since the Anglo-American Enlightenment, natural law has not been exclusively defined in religious terms.
You are correct to say that philosophers were not the first to argue Human Rights. It wasn't your "practitioners of politics though." The Hebrew patriarch Abraham argued with God to defer the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. The Jewish prophet Moses argued with the Egyptian pharaoh about freedom for the Jewish people.
Credit for the first campaign against the slave trade of the European nations and their colonies could probably be given to the religious and ethical societies who organized to influence the British Parliament. Arguments in the Americas against slavery were made by Quaker minorities in both Barbados and in the British North American colonies.
Economics certainly played a role in freedom for women. But in America, the argument was first made by religious women like Anne Hutchinson in Massachusetts during the 1630's. Women routinely appeared as plaintiffs, defendants, and witnesses in the 17th Century New England courts.
I question that Human Rights are "social contracts derived from apish sociality." Philosophy takes a broader perspective than just natural history. The broader philosophical perspective helps prevent political fiat against Human Rights.
Charles
FROM: Chris Else (08/08/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
I am confused. When you say "Human rights... are social constructs derived from apish sociality". You seem to suggest rights are based somehow in our evolutionary past. You then say rights are 'not something to be found in nature but something to be defined by culture and then to be granted on mutual agreement'. These two statements seem somewhat contradictory. Doubtless, I have misunderstood.
If, as you say, rights are 'cultural constructs', then you are no doubt right that we 'cannot enforce any human right by argument alone'. In fact, I don't see how we can 'enforce' any human right at all unless by fiat or force of arms. Suppose rights are a matter of mutual agreement. A says 'I think people have a right not to be tortured'. B says 'No, they haven't.' What then? Stalemate? Is there nothing else to be said?
If rights are cultural constructs, then the following would seem to be the case:
’Ä¢ The only universal rights are those common to all cultures. Are there any such?
’Ä¢ Rights only operate within the culture that gave rise to them.
’Ä¢ If we accept cultural relativism, then there is nothing else to be said.
’Ä¢ If we don't accept cultural relativism, then we have to find some other basis for making cross cultural judgements. If rights won't do, what will? Charles, at least, has something else to offer.
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyDear Charles and Chris, I am deeply impressed by the richness of your answers. Thank you ! This time I cannot do justice to it all. But I will be back on it.
Just a remark : I think that with "rights" it is like with "love" or "dominance". There is some "apish" base of emotions, but those have to be "formulated" by culture to become "rights" and "marriage" and "government" — or, that's another possibility — to become "humility" and "obedience" and "chastity" etc.. Thus in a sense there is an "apish base and cultural superstructure". So while "our inner ape" may rage for revenge, forgivenness and "love your enemy" is possible. I am not at all belitteling the possibilities of culture.
Des (where is he ?) suggested invoking Maslow and his "pyramid", where "physical needs" (eat and drink and sleep f.i.) are at the bottom and "spiritual needs" (God and justice, say) are on top. But things are not nearly that easy. Otherwise it would be impossible to endure hardships and torture and death (very "physical") for defending honour and moral integrity and your deepest convictions — religious or otherwise (very "spiritual").
By the way : Instead of debating "human rights" I would prefer debating "human values".
My starting question was asking : "What should we call a 'good' society, and by what standard should we call it 'good' ?" This is fundamentally a very "philosophical" question, but it cannot be answered (if answered at all) without taking experiences into account. You cannot aks for a "just society" or for a "decent society" without asking people what they call "just" or "decent". Those are "social experiences".
My main objection against much of philosophy is its arrogance : You cannot define beauty or goodness or justice without checking your concepts against human experience. But you can ask for "truth" in the natural sciences or math without asking for human experience. That's the difference. Philosophers too often design ideal worlds for ideal humans instead of real worlds for real humans. This is my point.
Of course with "good" it is like with "reality" : one should start from differentiating "good-1" and "good-2" and "good-3" and ... "good-x" and only then proceed.
There are no "objective" goods. Good is always "good for somebody" or "good in somebody's evaluation" : "And God saw that it was good."
So once more : Why would we call a society a 'good' one ? That was my question, and I stick with it.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (08/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
If you believe that any definition of a 'good' society requires 'asking for human experience', then you should probably begin with a survey and not with a question on this forum. I am sure there are such surveys so perhaps the best starting point is to track them down.
As to the 'good' society, short of attempting definitions of 'good-1' to 'good-x', which I will leave to the taxonomists amongst us, I revert to my earlier suggestion that it consists in maximising opportunities (as per Des's degrees of freedom) within a context of general stability. I would also want to apply something like Maslow's hierarchy here, despite your reservations about it.
You are right when you say that individuals might want to endure physical hardship to preserve spiritual values but that does not mean Maslow's theory is not *generally* applicable to a society. If someone chooses to suffer imprisonment or torture for the sake of their principles, they most likely do so from a position where they already enjoy satisfaction at the lower levels of Maslow's pyramid. I doubt that too many Dafurian peasants make stands on issues like freedom of speech, for example. They have more basic things to worry about.
In general, I think that once people have achieved a certain level in Maslow's pyramid, they start wanting (and agitating for) the next level. Satisfied needs begin to seem less important than those that are unsatisfied. Thus, paradoxically, they are sometimes prepared to risk and even give up what they have in order to achieve what they want. This is not an argument against Maslow. It is rather a confirmation of the dynamic aspect of his theory.
Chris
FROM: Charles Countryman (08/09/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
You said:
So once more : Why would we call a society a 'good' one ? That was my question, and I stick with it.
I'm wondering: Why are you asking this question?
Are you asking about a specific society?
Or maybe you seek to mentally construct a model utopia?
You also said that you would rather discuss human values than human rights.
I need some clarification about what issue is on the table. I have some difficulty with unspecified global discussions.
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/10/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyCharles and Chris,
thank you once more for keeping on. No, Charles, I am not speaking of any specific society nor of some utopia. I am just asking "why would we call a society a 'good' one ?" This is a VERY PRECISE question, but you never thought of it this way. I am serious about this question. I am not speaking tongue in cheek here.
Once more to clarify : We may speak of a wealthy and healthy person or a smart person or a pretty person etc., but none of these qualifications is coinciding with "a good person". A 'good' person may by poor and old and ugly and not very bright at the same time, but beloved by almost anybody who knows this person. There even may be the difference of "good" and "holy", but I won't dig into this for the moment. Think of Jean-Marie Vianney f.i. ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Marie_Vianney ), the model of Bernanos' novel "Journal d'un curˆ© de campagne" ("Diary of a country priest", see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diary_of_a_Country_Priest ). Exactly because he was humble and not very bright but cared for the soul of man he was made the patron of all priests. In German, a common title of a priest or pastor is "Seelsorger", which is verbally "one who worries about souls" (cf. Matt 16,26 and 1Cor 13).
In exactly this sense I am asking for the nature of a "good" society. You are not used to see things this way.
My question is not a religious one. I am only asking precisely : "What would we call a 'good' society ?" There are several books on "sane society" and one famous book on "decent society", and even several on "good society" that are missing the point. They all tend to mix up "good society" with "thriving society" or "happy and easy society", but I do not.
But there is a special twist here : You could point to the Oneida ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oneida_Community ) or to the Amishen/Hutterites for example. But I try to find out what to most people looks like a self-contradicting idea : A good modern post-industrial society.
Well, the question needs some hard thinking. But what is wrong with hard thinking ? We are munching too much white bread. This is brown bread.
Hubertus
FROM: Charles Countryman (08/10/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
You say your question is very precise and if I just think about it, I will agree.
Your question: "why would we call a society a 'good' one?"
Some of my remaining questions about your precise question:
How are you defining society? Is it in terms of anthropology, sociology, economics, politics, religious, military, etc?
Can you attribute character to any society? Or is a society just a composite of individuals who are ultimately responsible?
What do you mean by good? Does not the measure depend upon the type of society?
I don't think societies are organic. The Volkgeist does not have a life of its own.
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/11/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyGood questions, Charles ! Thank you !
No, I am not speaking of "Volksgeist". Rather think of a "jam session" of Jazzers or of the team of a racing yacht in the "America's Cup". Those are individuals, and very much so, but they enjoy playing together. It's just "good teamwork". And since in both cases the members of the team feel free and full of joy, but at the same time they are not neurotic or psychotic and not driven by fear and madness, these would be examples of "good society" in special cases. But monks from a Franciscan convent in southern California could be another example. There are many such examples if you think of it.
The Nazis are counter-examples, since their concept of group was that of gangsters. A mad mass-murderer can be as careful and disciplined as a great surgeon. So the humans — or the groups of humans — are but instruments to realize some achievement. The "goodness" is within. And I am asking what this comes to in the science of groups and societies. What makes the difference between the Cosa Nostra and the YMCA or a Benedictine monastery, say ? They all are "disciplined achieving societies". Which means : They are beyond the Amishen in this respect, since they accept the ideas of "efficiency" and "results".
But we are not yet at a general theory here, we only are focusing on the problem now.
Hubertus
FROM: Charles Countryman (08/12/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
I am still confused about your question. Maybe another Conference member could help clarify.
It seems to me that you are mixing the social psychology of small groups with criminal sociology together with the study of 20th Century national socialist tyranny.
I don't understand the point of your criticism of the Amish, a small Christian agrarian sect that places little reliance on modern convenience.
The Oxford Companion To Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 1995) defines society: "A set of individuals and/or institutions in relations governed by practical interdependence, convention, and perhaps law — which relations may vary from the local to the international." It goes on to say that the modern concept denoted a "supposed sphere of causal and moral self-sufficiency lying between the political and the personal." That modern concept became the basis for the 'science' of sociology. The Oxford definition points out that "many liberalisms have resisted the idea of 'the social', preferring to see individuals as self-sufficient. Some philosophers however, including Williams and Rawls, as well as some critics of liberalism, like MacIntyre, have recently reasserted concepts of the social as the ground of moral possibility and moral judgement."
Maybe some other Conference members could add something about these recent philosophical concepts about the social being the ground of moral possibility and moral judgement.
I'm inclined to think that societies are not organic. I think of societies as aggregates of individuals, which may be based on self-interest or be a constructed social entity.
Charles
FROM: Chris Else (08/12/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
I share Charles's confusion.
Is a good society necessarily one in which all the members know one another?
Is a good society necessarily one in which all the members work or live together in the fulfillment of some kind of purpose?
And what, according to your notion of the good society, is wrong with the Amish? How are they different from a Benedictine monastrery, say?
Charles
I am not sure I agree that societies are 'aggregates of individuals, which may be based on self-interest or be a constructed social entity'. Is a family merely such an aggregate? Or a classroom? Is the purpose of the group just the sum of the individual purposes of its members? How can a group have a history beyond the membership or life of its individual members?
Chris
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/13/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyCharles and Chris, I beg your pardon ! Yes, this is a very complicated topic and very confusing because of its many faces. But so far I got the impression to profit a lot from your questions and answers. We simply have to see the animal from all sides, which takes time. Perhaps my answer below will add a little bit to clarify my intentions.
And : I have a backlog here ! I cannot do justice to all the questions put by you both so far. I have to focus on this or that question at a time. Of course any society is to a large degree a technical problem for jurists and economists etc., not only for philosophers in the first place. But the job of the philosophers is to clarify those questions that are lost to the technical people. This was my point when reminding us on Matt 16,26 : This is not something very much on the minds of futurologists or economists or jurists, but it should be very much on the minds of philosophers. I don't think that Marcuse, Maslow, Huxley, or Fromm — or Osho — have done justice to this sentence.
Of course you could point to the Churches and the many religious groups here. But the common charge against those groups is to be mere "fig leaves" to the ugliness and shamelessness of "competitive" society. Thus my question would be : How could we "implement" the religious perspective into this "modern industrial state" in a convincing way.
But first of all my question was : "What would we CALL a good society anyway ? When and why would we call it a 'good' one ? What are our criteria ?"
Charles, you write : // I think of societies as aggregates of individuals, which may be based on self-interest or be a constructed social entity.//
I compeletely agree ! The "shuffle jazz band" and the "racing team" are not "organic", they are made up of individuals playing by rules.
The difference of these teams to "normal society" and "the Amishen" is : A jazz band or a racing team are ad hoc groups. They need not foster families etc.. But they show a good way of communicating without being non-competitive or without ambition or expertise. This was my point when I introduced the Amishen : We tend to see "good society" as a society without ambition and competition and professionality — which all are needed to keep our modern industrial state running. The examples are of people coming together freely but at the same time accepting all requirements of the modern industrial state : ambition, competition and professionality !
The Amishen are similar to the monks and nuns of a monastery. They are just nicely going along. That's a possibility, but I wanted to avoid this false alternative that you have either "a nice and peaceful group" or a "thriving and ambitious group where everybody is each others enemy or at least alienated by the clock and the competition."
What I am fighting here is this wrong "Marcusean" or "(Aldous) Huxleyan" idea that any "good" society has to be "pre-modern" and "pre-industrial" to not get "alienated" or "at each other's throat". What I am asking for is a "modern and technically advanced" society that at the same time could be called "good" by every standard — even a Christian one.
Hubertus
FROM: Mike Ward (08/13/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus,
For a long time you have been asking this question "why would we call a society a 'good' one" and contrary to your assertion this is not a precise question, I'm not really sure that it's meaningful question at all.
Goodness is a subjective value and there will be as many definitions as people can conceive based upon all sorts of individual prejudices. The way you describe and phrase the question is almost as if goodness were some type of objective thing like f.i. the speed of light. Do you really think goodness is objective or maybe more like beauty — in the eye of the beholder.
I suspect you are doomed to eternal searching but if you ever do think you have found what goodness is how will YOU know whether to stop looking.
Regards
Mike
FROM: Charles Countryman (08/13/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyNow I think I understand what Hubertus is looking for, Communism. The Communism that Lenin promised would appear after he finished breaking all the eggs. The picture of Communism that appeared on the propaganda posters: smiling and multinational athletes; virtuous people without any religion; advanced industry led by science; scientists and engineers who are paragons of virtue.
I think that there are lots of lessons about that dream in history.
Chris, I think that a society dies, when it no longer has any members. Its history is a construct that may have its beginning in members of the society who record events and ideas. But history dies unless the record is passed on to someone else. This someone else is not necessarily a professional historian. It could be a poet or musician. Eastern Orthodox Christianity has the tradition of "name saints" to connect people today with the saints in church history.
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/13/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyMike, glad to meet you again !
Well, you write that "why would we call a society a 'good' one" is an overall pointless question. But if you are right on this, I would like to see some arguments. Just to say that any such judgement is in the eyes of the beholder is a bit superficial.
Just to illustrate my point : Chris suggested to "focus" by debating human rights. Now, if you call the "ugliness" of Nazis or Taliban only "in the eye of the beholder", but otherwise they are normal nice people, then you have to scrap all talking of human rights. Killing Jews or misusing boys and girls and women is just so much fun to have and to criticise it is nobody's business.
I did not speak here of proving anything, I just asked "why WOULD WE CALL a society a 'good' one". I am asking for the justification of our judgement. Why on earth did we come to think of slavery and beting women as something evil and outdated if it is only a matter of personal taste ? Do you rally compare the history of human customs of maiming and torturing to the history of art and music, say ?
Things are a bit more difficult than your British upright defending of personal spleens seems to think. And I try to find out where the difficulty comes from.
But, as you know, I am always up for a good fight.
Grinning Hubertus
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/13/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyCharles, I had to laugh ! Leninism or Maoism were never on my mind for a moment. You better think of the Sermon from the Mountain. Did Jesus ever suggest to be bright and competitive and thriving and "pursuing happiness" ?
You remember the "Marcusean Revolution" of the 1960s. And the Woodstock festival that is memorized these days. And the musical "Hair" and the movie "Yellow Submarine" : Together with countless other texts and movies they constituted a part of the "counterculture" and "New Age" movement, that called our usual ways of "making money and becoming an achiever" just silly and absurd and a shame of a thinking being as man is. "Growing up absurd" by Goodman was one of the bestsellers of those days.
My question comes to : What is left of these critical voices ? Are they still heared today ? What is left of the critical voices of Jesus or Socrates or the Buddha ?
Why is it that difficult to get across a very simple idea to you and Chris and Mike ? We seem entrenched in thinking and acting "as usual". We are complaining "the moral state of human society" all the time, but when I ask "what should we do about it ?" the answer is "nothing of course, it is just the way humans are." If this is really the case, then please stop complaining everybody and just start gardening like Candide. Complaining about human conduct is then like complaining about the weather — either it is too hot or too cold or to dry or too rainy, we are never happy, but complaining makes us feel better.
My starting point was different : I am told from all sides, that this society is not as it should be. Then my very natural and simple question was : "Well, then HOW should it be instead ?"
Why can't you all understand the natural simplicity of this question ? If Lenin was wrong (as I too think he was) then who is right ? And if nobody springs to your mind, then lets start to think it over. This, and nothing else, was my suggestion.
Plato and Aristotle, St.Thomas and Rousseau and J-S Mill, they all and many others thought about the nature of "good society". The very fact that you all do not even understand the question begins to fascinate me. Today there are some two dozends of sociological theories that try to understand "what is wrong with modern society ?" Leftist, Christian-conservative, liberal, "communitarian" and libertarian and many other suggestions to improve our society are in the offer. I just wanted to hear your own suggestions.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (08/13/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
In a sense you are right. You have asked us a simple question. What would *each of us* call a good society? Des and I (twice) have answered you. Your response to these answers would be interesting (or would you like me to state them again?)
In your last post, however, you asked two further questions, as in '"We are complaining "the moral state of human society" all the time, but when I ask "what should we do about it ?" the answer is "nothing of course, it is just the way humans are."' The questions I see in this sentence are:
’Ä¢ What is wrong with modern society?
’Ä¢ What should we do about it?
These are not the same as your question about the good society. If I ask what is wrong with my car and wonder how to fix it, I am not thereby asking anything about what constitutes a good car.
To answer these new questions; it depends which society you are talking about. What is wrong with the United States or New Zealand is not the same as what is wrong with Taleban society. Given we have different problems, we have different fixes, too. Of course, if we come to the conclusion that a particular society is bad from top to bottom, then asking what we should do about it may well entail deciding what a good society is. You need to give us guidance here on what you want to focus on.
Charles (and Hubertus)
I fear I was not clear enough. Of course, a society will not survive the death of all its members any more than the body will survive the death of all its cells. The point I was trying to make is that the history (and the identity) of the society is independent of the lives of the individual members. English society was, in a sense, English society two hundred years ago when none of its current members were yet alive.
Please note, I am not arguing for any position that necessarily claims that societies are organic. I am objecting to what I took you to mean when you said 'I think of societies as aggregates of individuals, which may be based on self-interest or be a constructed social entity.' and to Hubertus when he (completely) agreed with you. The picture your sentence suggests is a group of people coming together and deciding how they are going to organise themselves very much in the manner of the eighteenth century idea of the social contract. This makes no sense to me. Hubertus's notion of society as the equivalent of a jazz group or a sporting team seems equally nonsensical, although at least it might imply that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.
In my view, a society is not a free association of individuals any more than a family is. (I do not mean by this that society is a family; merely that the family is one of several possible counter-examples of social groups that are not just 'aggregate(s) of individuals'.) Quite what a society is is an interesting question that we might discuss.
Chris
FROM: Charles Countryman (08/13/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyI'm glad that Hubertus didn't take my comment re Communism too seriously. I meant it to be taken in an ironic sense.
I will confess that I don't get very excited about big mega questions about societies. Frankly, if you asked me personally what makes societies good? My reply: I don't know and what matter is my opinion anyway? I am more concerned with what I can do in my small sphere of influence. There is an election coming up in my home county next week about local political and school board representation. There is something that matters, how do I cast my ballot?
I think pursuing mega questions about society is more important to young adults and their mentors. I think it obvious that history hasn't chosen me to be a mentor for society.
I'm more interested in what has been called Descartes' error. I can't reduce myself to a true state of "I think, therefore I am." Instead I should be asking myself how did I come to be myself? What is this self anyway? And knowing who I am, what are my responsibilities?
I can relate those questions to Chris' question about what is a society. But as far as the question "what is a good society." I think that I will simply refer to the UN Declaration of Human Rights.
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/13/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyChris, I go with almost everything you wrote. And once more : I have a backlog to work on, and I did not justice to your questions as I should. So you are quite correct on this.
You write : // If I ask what is wrong with my car and wonder how to fix it, I am not thereby asking anything about what constitutes a good car. //
Well, yes an no : Formally you are right. but if you were a cars engineer, you would think of how to improve the car to avoid the cause of trouble next time. So among the many questions that haunt social-scientist is : Why do poverty and crime and violence and the drug scene (including alcohol and smoking) persist even after 150 years of sociology and the welfare-state ?
One possible answer to this would be : Because humans are not cars and cannot (or should not) be "improved" in the way cars can be improved. This view is what most utopian thinkers of "a better society" denied. They all said that we have to "repair" the human society or even the humans themselves. Then drugs and smoking are forbidden and to stop crime and poverty other harsh measures and new modes of child rearing are introduced. This is a line of thought running from Plato right up to "Brave New World". Thus all utopias can do without poverty and crime and drugs and other evils.
This is why Charles and Mike always think that I am suggesting just another utopia here. And this is why I introduced the Amishen and the jazz-band here as counter-examples of "good teams".
I am fiercely against utopias, I am a proponent of "open society", but it cannot be denied that some of the charges of "counter-culture" were right. So I am asking for the "best balance" of "competitive and striving and achieving" society and "good" society in the sense of Maslow and Fromm and Goodman and the "counter-culture" and "New Age Movement" etc..
Look at it as comparable to the conflict between "Nobel Prize" and "Alternative Nobel Prize" (i.e. "Right Liverlyhood Award", see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Right_Livelihood_Award )
There are once more several questions of your valuable text left unanswered this time. I try to do my best to answer them next time.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (08/14/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus (and Charles)
A question that occurs to me here (in the context of the bigger question of what society consists in) is the means by which we might introduce any social improvement. There are two broad approaches that I can see: the psychological and the political. According to the former, we would seek to have a direct effect on individuals through education and information sharing. According to the latter, we would adjust the constraints within which people live by means of new laws and regulations.
A second thought is that your move from repairing a society to building a utopia seems too quick to me. Isn't a utopia the equivalent not of repair but of designing a new car from scratch? Also, in my view, there is a difference between improving society and improving human beings (see above) — a difference you don't seem to recognise, perhaps because you believe that a society is just the sum of the individuals in it.
Chris
FROM: Charles Countryman (08/15/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyChris
Who do you mean by the "we" who introduce social improvement?
I think that the issue of the "we" and how to introduce social improvement are more questions for the specialized area of political science and are specific to a society. For example, I think that improvement in health care is going to happen much different in the USA than in Europe. I don't think that philosophy has much to contribute to that specific discussion. Unless it is a much more basic discussion, like is the state responsible for providing health insurance to citizens?
Charles
FROM: Charles Countryman (08/15/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyChris
I'll add to my earlier entry today.
When you say psychological methods for introducing social improvement, issues like coercion by the state come to mind. I think that it's important to ask: Is it proper for the agents of the state to engage in winning hearts and minds for a specific social agenda in the political realm?
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/15/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyChris and Charles,
I am not opting for "utopia by design", i.e., for "classical utopia". I
have to fight against a specter here. You both and Mike always seem to
think that I am proposing utopia. I am not.
What I am asking are two questions : First : What would we CALL a good
society, and by what argument ? And second : Why is it, that so far all
suggestions to improve the situation of our society seem not to work ?
The natural answer to the first question is : Enforce human rights and
prevent wars and exploitation etc.. This would be the minimal standard.
The natural answer to the second question is : Humans are just too
stupid and to egoistic and too greedy and too aggressive to do what is
reasonable and good to do. This could be called "the original
sin"-answer or the "old ape"-answer.
Now I found both answers less than satisfying.
The first answer is lacking in two respects : First, human rights are
only minimal requirements. They do not express any idea of "good
togetherness and cooperation" as in the example of the jazz-combo or in
the racing yacht. Good teamwork is more than respecting each others
rights. This is not "enforcing happiness on people". When people take
part in a team of musicians or of soccer-players or of sailors say, they
do so in the hope of gaining something by cooperation. Thus when we
concentrate on human rights, we miss many important ways of improving the
human situation as seen in all forms of teamwork — from family life to
making music or dancing or partying etc.. Thus human rights cannot tell
us whether a society is a lively and thriving one or only a society of
loners. To know that human rights are respected in a certain society
does not tell us very much on the overall quality of this society.
And then I have explicitely asked what would we call "good" and pointed to
the Sermon from the Mountain and to the Amishen and the saintly priest
J-M Vianney. I could have pointed to some Buddhist or Muslim community
instead. The idea was : Neither human rights nor general "thriving"
will tell us everything about the notion of "good". This was my hint at
Matt 16,26 and at "good-1", "good-2", etc.. Whatever you think of it, you have to concede that this aspect is to be included in any full evaluation of "good society". We cannot just ignore this side of human existence.
And to remind you : I have not with a single sentence suggested to
enforce any religious superstructure on people ! I am not proposing any
utopia here. I am just analyzing the problem of the first question :
"What would we CALL a good society — by what argument."
Now on the answer to the second question my objection would be : We
cannot change our "inner ape". We can build up a situation where humans
behave the way they are but to their private and mutual advantage. Any
good instructor or teacher or tutor knows, that instead of shouting and
beating you have to design a situation where people enjoy to be at their
best. Kids in happy and lively families are not in any way better "by
their genes" than kids in rotten families full of fear and hate and
violence. But in the good family kids are treated the right way with
empathy and guidance and humour and assurance, while in the bad family
they are treated with neglect and shouting and beating and frustrated.
It's not a matter of money. There are "very rich but bad" families,
and there are "very poor but good families". Thus to speak of
"original sin" and of "the old ape" is a helpless excuse for "bad
government". Watch the movie "Freedom Writers" on this. With "EQ"-intelligence and trust and understanding much can be achieved.
Thus once more : My idea of "utopia" is not anything enforced on people
but is "applying intelligence". This is why I pointed to the
"counter-culture" of the "Marcusean Revolt" of the 1960s. There is much
criticism of "materialist consumerism" and of "technocracy and
bureaucracy" and "achieving society" not only from the "New Age"-people,
but from the churches and the psychologists and many others. They all
are asking for a "better society" because they find the existing one
lacking in many aspects on "intelligent solutions" and on "mutual
respect" and "good cooperation".
Improvements take time and courage. Finally the USA has had a
woman and a black for presidential candidates. This would have been
unthinkable 100 years ago. There has been much progress in many fields.
But there is still much of violence and poverty and crime and neuroses
even in the USA and the novels and movies are full of it. Compare
"Ferris Bueller's Day Off" ( http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0091042/ ), which is funny and relaxed, to "Magnolia" ( http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0175880/ ) and "American Beauty" ( http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0169547/ ). There are countless other examples.
Well, neither novels nor movies show the normal reality. The idea of
my hints was : Things are not immutable. I am not speaking of utopias.
I am speaking of our ideas of what could or should be improved. My
starting question of "sane society" (the header of this thread) was
asking : What do we CALL a sane society and what could we do or ask for
to get nearer to it. This and nothing else was my question.
One possible answer would be : "We are living in the best of all possible worlds" (Leibniz + Hegel), and we have to take the organized (and less organized) crime and the neuroses and poverty and other "social problems" for the "frictional costs" of a "good normal society". Would you subscribe to that ? I (so far) won't. But maybe "the tree of freedom, peace, and human dignity" is growing only slowly and we have to accept that.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (08/15/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyCharles
Yes, I agree with your caveats. I too tend to the view that different societies have different problems and that solutions are practical and particular. However, the more basic issues are important. Should the state be responsible for providing health care or education to its citizens?
Hubertus
Rest assured, I do not think you are in favour of utopia. And I think I do understand your question. I don't, however, fully understand what you are saying in your last post. Unfortunately, I don't have time to do your thoughts justice at the moment. I will get back to you in a day or two (always assuming the discussion has not moved on by then).
Chris
FROM: Charles Countryman (08/16/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyGiven that societies are becoming postmodern, the human endeavor called Philosophy faces challenges similar to those that faced Socrates. Human society then also entered a new stage of social development. What does it mean to be human in the postmodern world? What about a postmodern ethic? What about postmodern justice? And I think questions about the Forms remain, especially pertinent to Art.
We could continue discussion about a good society. But I think that some more basic definitions need to be done before a good society can be defined.
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/17/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyCharles and Chris,
a shorty this time : I won't "define" a good society. I would be happy to know just what you think essential FROM YOUR EXPERIENCE. Of course our values and social structures change with time. But there are many things we would not go back to or beyond. Not back to slavery or suppressing women or burning witches and many such things that were seen as "normal" at some times and places.
On the other hand, we try to avoid becoming "mere consumers". This is why I pointed to the Amishen and to Vianney and to "counterculture" : Those were free to become "normal competitive consumers" but they weren't interested. And I hinted at those people, that are poor and slow thinkers, but beloved and maybe good in decoriting or cooking or singing or caring children or animals etc.. What I am asking for is some minimal standard of "good society" derived from experience.
I am well aware of the paradoxes : In the end we may come to the conclusion that we need some darkness to enjoy the light. Could there be God without the devil ? Could there be a saint without sin ? Could there be hope without despair ? Perhaps we are not going for some Holy Grail but for some evasive phantom ?
Several times I said that these are difficult questions. I never said that this debate would be easy. There is much more at stake than human rights.
I am not and never was asking for "solutions". I am just asking for good ideas and suggestions. I see this as a fireside talk or perhaps as a talk in the garden. Well : At Spokane it will be 90¬ƒF tomorrow, at Wellingto it will be just 60¬ƒF, which is not the same, but in both cases it would be better to stay in the house.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (08/17/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
All right. In my experience the essentials for a good society are:
* full employment
* free education
* a health care system accessible to everyone
* a decent standard of living for the aged and the infirm
* the minimum of laws and regulations consistent with the above and with public healthy, safety and a general principle of fairness
Given that, I think people should be just left to get on with it.
Chris
FROM: Charles Countryman (08/17/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyHubertus
It was a very pleasant 72 degrees F here today. But that didn't help me understand where you are going with your appraisal of societies. Your proposal to look at the "essential" based on personal experience and your request for minimal societal standards seem to restate your original question.
I've already given you my working answer, the UN's Declaration of Human Rights (1948). But that doesn't seem to be what you are looking for.
There is a direct relationship between the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Nuremberg war crime trials of principal National Socialist leadership (1945-1946). The National Socialist political party (society) could not be put on trial, because societies are not organic. Individual people were put on trial for crimes against humanity. The political party existed through a collection of people, not some metaphysical entity. Hitler was wrong. No collective spirit of the people or nation exists.
Charles
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/18/09)
SUBJECT: RE: sane societyDear Chris and Charles,
well, you answers put together — the list of Chris and the UNO Declaration of Human Rights — would make a good "poor mans shopping list" for everyday comfort. As a "minimal standard" it would be a lot in view of the enormous fights that were needed in history to arrive at that standard.
Of course it is not really news to me. But I have to think it over now for some time in the light of "God and the devil" and "self realization" and "Marcusean Revolution" etc..
I sent you this great speech on "FULL HEARTS AND EMPTY HEADS: THE PRICE OF CERTAIN RECENT PROGRAMS IN HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY" by W. R. Coulson. The essence of it was : Some good intentions come out with very bad results. Good intentions can be paradoxical. I use to say that mankind may perish not by bad intentions but by the unexpected consequences of good ones.
For the moment see this as a warning. If things are really as simple as you seem to suggest, why on earth did people not go for such results long ago ? Would a free democracy abiding by human rights be the end of history ? This would be a variety of the Fukuyama thesis. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_End_of_History_and_the_Last_Man .
What about religious convictions ? The ecumenic approach seems plausible. Religious wars are outdated. Maybe.
As you see, I don't feel easy with such a solution. I am not belligerent in any way, I just think that there is something missing on your wish list, but I cannot clearly see what it is.
Perhaps put it thus : According to your list, if every item could be checked, we would see the end of history and be happily married everafter. This is the timeless world of the fairy-tale.
But our human world is not timeless "Platonic" but historical and "Darwinian". History will not end. Thus in my humble opinion if every item of your shopping list is checked, this would be not the end but the beginning of history.
Now you too have something to gnaw at.
But of course you are free to suggest some other topic to debate.
Hubertus-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Mike Ward (07/21/09)
SUBJECT: The philosophy of the climate change argumentHi,
Holding true to my sceptical stance I am one of a silent minority who has not yet swallowed the hook line and sinker of man made global warming. I don't follow the crowd nor weight of opinion preferring as an environmental engineer to weigh up the actual evidence available.
Of course the climate is changing, it always has and always will, and has even changed quicker in the past. The real argument is a totally separate issue as to whether we humans are the cause, or contributor or totally insignificant.
The consequences of an anthropogenic cause are significant either way. Don't get me wrong as I applaud energy conservation and my next house will be ultra energy efficient — I'm already in the planning stage anyway.
Democracy never determines truth and I would like people to review the information on this website and rebut it with a sound technical argument — some though wouldn't want to as they are doing very nicely riding on the doom and gloom gravy train.
http://www.geocraft.com/WVFossils/greenhouse_data.html
Let me know what you think about what this site contains technically.
Regards
Mike
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/21/09)
SUBJECT: RE: The philosophy of the climate change argumentMike, as a physicist I am able to understand the data, but I keep back from any debate, because this today has become a substitute for religious wars of times past. My first reaction to the graphic at the end of the article you linked us to was : First comes warming, then comes CO2. The text confirms this idea that is quite natural to anybody even with only a little understanding of natural cycles. The greatest scare today is methane coming out of the tundra. But this too is a secondary effect, not a primary one. Here you see the meaning of CRAP : http://icccp.blogspot.com/
And a minor : It is absurd to put down relative data to three decimal places behind the comma ! Thus the last column in table 2 should read 72/7/19/2, all else is hogwash.
30 years ago US-president Carter called energy-efficiency one of the primary problems of our time. On this he was right. This in my opinion is the one and only argument that justifies the fight about greenhouse effects. It's not really about greenhouse effects, but about energy-efficiency. The Apollo program of going to the Moon was not really about going to the Moon either, but about the USA staying ahead of the UdSSR on the technological edge. As JFK put it : "We are not going to the Moon because it is easy, we are going there because it is difficult." Now we are pressing billions of Dollars and Euros and Yen into energy efficiency, and this is good by any standard.
Hubertus
FROM: Chris Else (07/22/09)
SUBJECT: RE: The philosophy of the climate change argumentMike
I had a look at the site. On the face of it, it tells us there is nothing we can do about global warming. However, looking at it in the wider context I would have to question whether water vapour is as significant a greenhouse gas as the site suggests. Either its effect is debatable or all the other scientists who are leaving it out of their calculations are idiots. Which is it to be?
It is, of course, quite possible that the consensus on the cause of global warming is wrong. However, it seems to me unlikely that it is wrong in such an obvious way. I think a more likely source of error is oversimplification in more subtle assumptions: the kind of oversimplification that led to eugenics.
That said, the whole hoo-ha does raise some interesting questions about the relationship between science and society and the process of change in scientific theories. Perhaps Hubertus needs to add an r98 (funding levels) and r99 (political pressure) to his schema of scientific realities.
Chris
FROM: Mike Ward (07/23/09)
SUBJECT: RE: The philosophy of the climate change argumentChris,
Unfortunately I cannot post images to this conference web site but please take a look at my web site at
http://www.philosopherscafe.110mb.com on the page CARBON. The web site is somewhat out of date and was written before finding the water vapour hypothesis.
From this graph there really doesn't seem any causality of CO2 to temperature and CO2 has be ten times higher in the past but temperature has some kind of upper limit (god stepping in maybe?).
You may recall that some twenty odd years ago the "scientists" were forecasting an impending ice age, again I have images of articles at the time if needed. Pardon my scepticism but if they missed all the so called pointers to global warming back in the seventies their credibility, with me at least, is seriously questionable. Anyway if it does get a bit warmer hear in the UK we can get back to growing the grapes that we used to grow in the middle ages and import less from the colonies — oh dear there I go again!
Seriously though how can I withdraw my tax contributions probably wasted in CO2 reduction — isn't democracy great.
Mischievously,
Mike
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (07/23/09)
SUBJECT: RE: The philosophy of the climate change argumentMike and Chris,
the idea of the green-house peopl is of course, that CO2 has an enormous leverage on H2O : A little rise in temperature makes a lot more vapor coming from the oceans, and that makes more rising of temperature etc.. This it is a self feeding disaster, a running-off scenario. What we do no know — and not even the IPCC does for sure, is a true model of counterforces. This is why people cannot tell us whether it will come to an ice-age or to overheating.
Qualitative arguments do not work : More vapour causes more clouds, and more clouds mean sreening and reflecting the sun-light and even more snowfalls on the Antarctic shield. So anything less than quantitative models will not do. And that's the problem. I think that people should work on their models now, and that would be a good thing anyway.
Remember what happened to Malthus : In principle he was right by his arguments. But without his help other people found out how to increase the productivity of food — plants and animals alike — and so while the world-population rose from 1 bn in his time to more than 6 bn today, the world output of food rose even more to about the tenfold. Malthus was not wrong, but mankind was lucky.
Hubertus-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Roderick Russell (08/18/09)
SUBJECT: IntroductionsJust stopping in to introduce myself.
My name is Roderick Russell and I'm a student in the University of London BA Philosophy programme, studying through the External Programme with tutorial support from Pathways.
I'm based in the United States and have an educational background in philosophy. I completed my first university philosophy studies ten years ago, but never received my degree because my career took over before I completed the remainder of my "general education" requirements that are part of most every American university's liberal education. I've since decided that I want to move on with my education and therefore require a degree, and though the time investment is large, I opted to start once again from the beginning with the University of London because of my deep love of philosophy. I have no doubt that I'll learn even more my second time through a degree program than I did my first!
Philosophically my interests center around the nature of consciousness and more broadly its position within the world, as it relates to deeper ontological issues. While in school my chosen focus fell to Ancient Greek thought as well as Modern German. Plato, Plotinus, Husserl, Heidegger and Kant are near and dear to my heart. These days I seem to be more concerned with how our knowledge of ourselves and our world — and our stunning lack of knowledge as well — show us how to live our lives. I've grown more politically minded over the years, have developed an interest in practical ethics (is there any other kind?) and overall am concerned with the application of ideas than I have been in the past. That said, I still find it hard sometimes to abandon my seat in the abstract. ;)
Professionally I am a performing artist and public speaker, and though I often perform for the purposes of "general entertainment", I also bring performance lectures to schools that address the topic of critical thinking. I hope that even my "general" shows for the mass public give people something to think about. Secretly, I like to think that I'm a performing philosopher. ;)
I look forward to a great exchange of ideas!
Best,
-Roderick
FROM: Chris Else (08/18/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionsWelcome, Roderick.
Do you have a topic you want to talk about? The rest of us seem to be going round and round in circles with our current political debate (although Hubertus may disagree).
Chris
PS I am writer and I live in New Zealand. My current philosophical interests are consciousness, objectivity and subjectivity, the philosophy of science and my own peculiar brand of existentialism.
FROM: Charles Countryman (08/19/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionsWelcome to this Conference Roderick!
I admire your art with the sword. Personally, I think that it would terrify me. I'll settle with using my practice wooden saber in Ki exercises.
Please join our philosophical conversations at any point that you are interested.
Charles
FROM: Roderick Russell (08/19/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionsChris,
Thanks for the welcome! As a first dip of the toes into the conference waters, I've just responded to Mike Ward's new topic of Practical Ethics. I'm not sure if it will help to stop the going 'round of discussion, but maybe it will help shift focus for a bit. ;)
It seems that we may have similar philosophical interests! I'm curious about your "own peculiar brand of existentialism." Have you written about the topic here on the conference anywhere?
Best,
-Roderick
FROM: Roderick Russell (08/19/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionsCharles,
Thank you for your kind words! I'm flattered (or should I be worried? ;) that you researched me.
As for being terrified — I've found, for myself, that maintaining a healthy fear of my work has kept me as safe as can be expected, so you'd be justified in your terror. And I'd venture a guess that your work with Ki exercises would serve you well in my field.
I've just jumped into the conversation in response to Mike Ward — hope it's an okay start!
Best,
-Roderick
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/21/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionsHello Roderick !
Glad to meet somebody here who can spit dearly needed fire and swallow sharp wits without getting hurt ! I hope you are a tought guy, not running away soon from the rumble here.
All the best from Hubertus
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/21/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionsRoderick and Chris,
while I won't go on with "good society", I would like to comment a last time on "practical ethics".
I have the bad luck to be a metaphysical person whithout faith. Faithful people are metaphysical too, but they have the answer in their religion. Unmetaphysical persons like Mike do not even have a question. Thus both sorts of person do not see the problem. The strange fact is : In the times of St.Augustine, many persons were interested in his answers, since they had similar questions. The answers came from the Bible, but St.Augustine gave a reading of the Bible that made sense to many thinking people of his time — and for the next some 1500 years in the Occident. Today most people seem to have only technical questions — how to improve the economy or the environment or the family-life or something like that. They simply do not understand that there is more to life than solving technical problems. Or if they do, they have the solution in the form of some religion available.
I find myself in a position similar to that of Nietzsche. While I think he was wrong, he at least was honest. Between Christianity, which was not acceptable for him, and the idea of progress, which was in his view the pseudo-religion of the masses, he had to develop his special brand of "heroic elitism." This is not and will not be my own brand.
Some years ago there was a talk with friends about what would be the dominant or guiding science of the beginning century. Biology, genetics, robotics and some more came into consideration — "the usual suspects". But my suggestion was : Philosophy ! Because, as may argument ran, our freedoms are expanding by the day. Next time we will be free to create better humans or superior robots or something in the sense of Kurzweil's "Singularity". Then our question will be with necessity : What do we do with all this freedom ? What does it mean, to make good use of our freedom ? What criteria will be guiding us ? The Bible will not tell us, but pragmatism and utilitarianism will not tell us either. Thus we need a new practical philosophy that is up to those problems. We need to understand the meaning of our freedom.
Well, you are free of course to not enter this debate. But at least you see that it is a perfectly meaningful one.
Hubertus
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/22/09)
SUBJECT: RE: IntroductionsRoderick,
you write that "Philosophically my interests center around the nature of consciousness and more broadly its position within the world, as it relates to deeper ontological issues."
I am surprised to find so many participants on this forum showing interest in "consciousness". If I am right almost none of the greater philosophers — neither Wittgenstein nor Heidegger nor anybody else I know of — was much interested in consciousness. But they were much interested in awareness, which is a very different topic !
The different ways people look at the world — hopefully or pessimistic, as religious faithful or as atheists and sceptics, as pragmatic activists and achievers or as mulling thinkers or "standing in the world here and now as resolved sources of thoughts and deeds" etc. — this all is not about "consciousness" but about "awareness".
The study of consiousness — if I understand it right — is the study of the machinery of the brain, while the study of awareness is studying the effects of this machinery.
What are you interested in : The function and structure of the car or the way the car is used ? Most of what you see in the car has nothing to do with its technical functioning but with its social and psychological aspects, with comfort and marketing etc.. Well, a car needs a motor and wheels, but most drivers take this for granted.
The way you see the world has almost nothing to do with the workings of your brain, but much with your culture and upbringing and experiences etc..
Hubertus-----------------------------------------------
FROM: Mike Ward (08/19/09)
SUBJECT: What is a bad society?Hi everyone,
There didn't seem to me to much progress towards an answer and even less to a consensus about what constitutes a good society. There were however some clearer views about "a bad society" so I ask what constitutes a bad society. With these answers reversed we may explore the implicit assumptions and errors in our thinking.
Here's my starter: There is no absolute good or evil it's relative, conditional and subjective.
In reality utilitarianism works and is used by nearly everyone.
Regards
Mike
FROM: Hubertus Fremerey (08/20/09)
SUBJECT: RE: What is a bad society?Mike, I think you all so far do not understand the real depth of my question.
About half a year back, from Dec.2008 through Jan 2009, I had a similar exchange on "good society" as here with Charles and Chris on a Science Fiction Forum. I have asked the SciFi-people whether they knew of any "convincing" vision — in novels or movies — of a good future. They did not. There are countless descriptions of a future we won't like to have, but not a single one where we would like to be. The explanation of this absurd result is : "Bad futures are just more fascinating for the authors of novels or for movies directors than good ones. Good ones would be boring — EVEN IF THEY ARE MUCH MORE PLAUSIBLE." I wrote that it insults my intelligence to have one totally implausible future after another depicted as "bad". We will never see the world of "Mad Max" or of "1984" or of "The Blade Runner". But this is the stuff SciFi is made of. Thus we simply try to evade any realistic and intelligent model of "good society". We instead study "Brave New World" which is as improbable as is "1984". And this is where I see the philosophical problem : Why do we hate and evade the plausible good solution and cling to the implausible bad one ?
I think one of the core explanations of this "riddle" could be the fact, that we are beings of liberty. When confronted to a "bad" world, we feel challenged and we start to ask what can be done to bring this horror down. Then we see heroes and heroines like in "The Island" ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Island_(2005_film) ) fighting the villains. But confronted to a world without villains, to a reasonable world as Charles and Chris would have it, we feel helpless : What is left here to fight against ? What is left for complaint ?
This is, what in my opinion was missing in the answers. It's all too nice. The core of the problem and of my question is not seen. This is why I wrote that if anyhow we could come to the end of history in the sense of Fukuyama, it would be the beginning of history. We would break for new challenges. (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_End_of_History_and_the_Last_Man )
St.Augustine was lucky : He had no "1984" nor "Brave New World" but "Civitas Terrena" (which is riddled by the devil) against "Civitas Dei". He did not know what "Civitas Dei" would be like, but he was sure that it would overcome "Civitas Terrena" some day, and up to that day history would be what it ever was : A vast battlefield of the good principle fighting the bad one.
And, by the way, St.Augustine was not interested the least in "utilitarianism". He was not asking what is "useful", he was asking what is "good". To be near to God in his opinion was "good" but not "useful". This is how Socrates or Plato and Plotinus (one of the sources of St.Augustine) saw it too. This is why I started numbering again in the sense of "good-1", "good-2", "good-3", ... "good-x", because, as I put it : A bright person or a wealthy and healthy person or a pretty person is not what we call a "good" person. So what do we call "good" in this case ? And now I put this question to the topic of society, asking what is a "good" society as different from a thriving and just and democratic etc. society. This is a very philosophical question that has nothing t